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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
CRITICAL MOMENTS OF SOCIAL SPATIALIZATION IN THE 
NEIGHBORHOOD: AN ALTERNATIVE READING OF THE MAINSTREAM 
GECEKONDU HISTORY 
 
Demirtaş, Neslihan  
 
P.D., Department of Political Science  
 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Banu Helvacıoğlu 
 
 
June 2007 
 
 
This thesis aims to expose an alternative local historical reading of the formation of 
a gecekondu space as a response to modernist consideration of gecekondu 
development in Turkey. The social construction of neighborhood space, which 
occurs at the level of social imaginary and representations as well as at the level of 
real interventions in the form of social practices producing a built environment, is 
narrated by means of insider perspectives and using qualitative techniques. In this 
reading, it will be made explicit that the dynamics and patterns by which the 
modernist, strategic interventions in local space and tactical acts of the migrants in 
producing their locality are closely interconnected. This interconnectedness not 
only sheds light to the weaknesses of the strategical practice of imposing a 
modernist space but also the tactical acts of migrants utilizing the loopholes in the 
strategical realm. Spontaneity as the defining and intrinsic quality of gecekondu 
settlements is mainly embedded in the diverse local agencies that lead to spatial 
contingencies. The ethnic identities constitute the main means by which the 
migrants employ certain tactics with regard to strategical policy acts and to other 
groups in the neighborhood. Within the context of the intertwined nature of tactic 
 iv
and strategy, gecekondu settlements will be discussed as a by-product of the sum of 
modernist strategical acts more than as unintended consequences of urban 
development.  
 
Keywords: Gecekondu, Social Spatialization, Tactic-Strategy, Ethnic Identities, 
Spontaneity, Spatial Contingency.   
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
MAHALLEDE TOPLUMSAL MEKANSALLAŞMANIN KRİTİK ANLARI: 
GELENEKSEL GECEKONDU TARİHİNİN ALTERNATİF OKUMASI  
 
Demirtaş, Neslihan 
 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Banu Helvacıoğlu 
 
 
Haziran 2007 
 
 
Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de gecekondu oluşumunun modernist ve seçkinci bir bakış 
açısı ile değerlendirilmesine karşı alternatif bir yerel tarih okuması yapmaktadır. 
Söz konusu alternatif okuma, Mamak’a bağlı Boğaziçi mahallesindeki toplumsal 
mekansallaşmanın anlatımını temel almaktadır. Mahalle mekanının hem toplumsal 
düşün ve temsil hem de fiziksel mekana müdahaleler düzeyinde oluşumu, 
niteliksel yöntemlerle ve içeriden bakış açısı ile anlatılacaktır. Bu anlatım içinde, 
yerel mekanın modernist stratejik müdahalelerle dönüştürülmesi ve göçmenlerin 
kendi mekanlarını oluşturmak için ortaya koyduğu taktik eylemler arasındaki iç içe 
geçmiş ilişkinin dinamikleri ve örnekleri gösterilecektir. Bu ilişkinin doğası, hem 
stratejik alanın modernist mekan dayatma eylemlerinin zayıf yönlerine hem de 
gecekonduluların stratejik alanın açıklarından faydalanan taktiksel eylemlerine ışık 
tutmaktadır. Etnik kimlikler, göçmenin stratejik alanın politik eylemleri ile başa 
çıkmasında ve yerel düzlemde diğer gruplarla ilişkisinde en önemli araçlardan ve 
 vi
belirleyicilerdendir. Araştırma alanındaki güç ilişkileri, değişik sosyal grupların 
stratejik alanın ajanları ile toplumsal mekansallaşmanın değişik anlarında 
kurdukları farklı ilişkiler ile belirlenmektedir. Gecekonduda geçirilen süreç içinde 
göçmenlerin taktik eylemleri direnme ve hatta yerel mekanı ciddi bir şekilde 
belirleme kapasitesi kazanır. Gecekondu mahallelerini betimleyen ve onlara içkin 
kendiliğindenlik özelliği, büyük ölçüde yerel eylemlerin bu kapasitesine dayanır. 
Aynı kapasite, stratejik alanın yukarıdan aşağı dayattığı modern mekan 
uygulamalarının, mekansal olumsallıklar eşliğinde sapmasını getirir. Strateji ve 
taktik bağımlı ilişkisi içinde gecekondu mekanı, modernist planlamanın 
beklenmedik sonuçları olmaktan daha çok stratejik politikaların ürünü olarak 
değerlendirilecektir.   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Gecekondu, Toplumsal Mekansallaşma, Taktik-Strateji, Etnik 
Kimlikler, Kendiliğindenlik, Mekansal Olumsallık.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Conceptual Framework of the Thesis  
 
Gecekondu is one of enduring problems in Turkey having political, societal and 
economic repercussions. This chapter starts with a brief analysis of various 
representations of gecekondu settlements in public debate. In order to have a better 
understanding of these various representations the chapter provides a brief 
explanation of socio-spatial transformations in gecekondu settlements over time.  
Overall purpose of this chapter is to introduce conceptual tools in accordance with 
the research objectives of the thesis. The spatial conceptual and methodological 
framework that will be employed through the thesis will also be made explicit 
within the context of this chapter. 
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 1.1.1 Introduction  
 
Since the 1940s, with the initial emergence of gecekondu (squatter) settlements in 
the largest cities of Turkey, namely Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir, there has been an 
extended public debate. Gecekondu literary means “built-overnight” and 
gecekondulu refers to people living in gecekondu settlements. Initially, the concept 
of gecekondu referred to houses or settlements constructed on state or privately 
owned land without planning and/or construction permission through the efforts of 
migrants from the rural to urban areas and their fellow countrymen.  
 
In time, the meaning, attributes and status of gecekondu have changed. The 
early “gecekondu” neighborhoods had been legalized over time. Therefore, 
classical definition of gecekondu does not apply to these settlements anymore. 
Especially since the early 1990s, gecekondu is no longer a concept signifying all 
the settlements of low-income people in the periphery of the cities. Besides, the 
newly emerging unlawful settlements in the 1990s, which occurred mostly as a 
consequence of forced migration1, hardly reflect the socio-spatial qualities of 
classical “gecekondu” settlements.  
 
Parallel to the socio-spatial transformations in low-income settlements, the 
general public approach that have been defined by social actors having different 
                                                 
1 Forced migration is either the forced deportation of the villagers, being Kurd in ethnic origin by 
state security forces or their unprepared sudden decision of rural-to-urban migration as a consequence 
of the fights between state security forces and PKK, a separatist group seeking to establish an 
independent Kurdish State in the southeastern part of Turkey. Forced migration had dominated rural-
to-urban migration starting from the early 1990s 
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agendas with regard to representation and definition of these low-income 
settlements have also been transformed over time. Representation of these 
settlements in public perception by diverse actors differently depending on the 
context constitutes an important part of gecekondu policy where the general 
strategical parameters of dealing with gecekondu issue have been defined. Diverse 
legal means to deal with the unlawful aspect of gecekondu settlements, the problem 
definitions in relation to gecekondu growth in political, academic and journalistic 
circles, planning policy orientations and all the attempts to represent gecekondu 
space and population are considered within the context of the strategical acts in 
dealing with gecekondu space in this thesis. As will be mentioned in the following 
pages, the main objective of the thesis is to exemplify the tactical acts of the 
migrants in dealing with these strategical acts and to show the intertwined nature of 
the tactical and strategical realms. Tactical acts of the migrants include all the 
critical decisions, acts and forms of resistance in order to survive both in relation to 
the hardships of the local context and to the strategical acts and interventions in 
gecekondu space. Consequently, the thesis will be an endeavor to come up with a 
local history of a gecekondu neighborhood by considering the intertwined nature of 
the strategical and tactical realms with an insider perspective. Before making the 
research questions explict, though, it will be helpful to define the problematic 
nature of strategical realm in dealing with gecekondu spaces over time. So, the 
following operational questions will help to define the context of the strategical 
realm, which are:    
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- What kind of a public discourse2 about low-income settlements has been 
constructed over time?  
- Who have dominated the definition of public discourse in relation to these 
settlements?  
- What kind of changes and continuities can be identified over time with 
regard to this public discourse?  
 
Although these questions will be discussed at length in the following chapter, 
it is necessary to briefly address these questions in order to highlight the relevancy 
of the research objectives of this work. At the outset it is also important to note 
that, gecekondu and gecekondulu becomes an object in the eyes of various societal 
actors, who internalize different subject positions defining the role and status of 
gecekondu. The subjective concerns related to gecekondu settlements show 
variations for different actors who define the public agenda.  
 
The interest of politicians in the gecekondu development is twofold. First, 
they perceive gecekondus as a potential source of votes. Second, politicians have a 
responsibility to solve the problems in these settlements as part of urban problems. 
There have also been numerous academic works on gecekondu settlements in 
different fields. Sociological studies dominate these academic works but 
gecekondu has become a topic of political science, economy, and urban planning 
as well. The journalists have often carried the problems related to gecekondu 
settlements into public attention by using all means of mass media.  
 
                                                 
2 Public discourse here does not only refer to the representations and narratives on gecekondu issue in 
public debate but also to the legal or political practices in dealing with and defining gecekondu space.   
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Although there are variations in these different actors’ reason of dealing with 
gecekondu settlements, a modernist-elitist perception has dominated their 
approaches to gecekondu settlements and gecekondulu to a large extent. In other 
words, modernist-elitist perspective defines public perception that refers mostly to 
the credents of urban middle classes about gecekondu settlements. The groups that 
have constructed public discourse about gecekondu settlements and gecekondulu 
are sometimes referred to as “urbanites” throughout the thesis in order to reflect the 
common position these groups have internalized vis-à-vis gecekondulus. The term, 
urbanite, is borrowed from Özbek (1997: 228), to signify a loose group consisting 
of bourgeoisie, state bureaucrats, the urban middle classes, Kemalist intellectuals, 
and some radical intellectuals who define the parameters of the urbanity mainly 
with reference to gecekondulu.  
 
Public discourse to a large extent has been defined by the impositions of 
“urbanites” and thus has been shaped by a strong elitist perspective. Therefore 
gecekondu neighborhoods and their “way of life” have been conventionally 
portrayed in Turkish public understanding as the main problem and an impediment 
against modernization. The public discourse has taken different forms and been 
acknowledged by different urban groups over time depending on the macro 
political, social and economic context of the country and the socio-spatial 
transformations of gecekondu space(s) in this context.   
 
In this study, the course of gecekondu settlements is divided into three main 
periods in accordance with their changing socio-spatial context.  The first period in 
gecekondu history overlaps with the years of transition to multiparty politics in 
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Turkey. The initial encounters with gecekondu settlements in the periphery of cities 
and their spread in number occur as a result of the initial populist of experiences of 
multi-party politics. In the 1940s gecekondu settlements had first entered the public 
agenda with the initiation of migration from rural to urban areas, most of all to 
Ankara and İstanbul. During those years, the public agenda about these settlements 
had also started to take form. Republican Regime’s strategy of creating a modernist 
urban space that took Western cities and lifestyle there as its main reference point 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s had determined the content of elitist perception. 
This elitist understanding had in turn defined public discourse with regard to 
gecekondu settlements in this period of early encounters with gecekondu 
settlements.  
 
The act of imposing a Western way of life and existence on society supposes 
ideal templates of “urbanity”. The main act of the Republican Regime in the 
service of this ideal was to reconstruct Ankara, capital city of Turkey as a planned 
and modernist city. The city was planned and constructed in a twofold fashion as 
the socio-spatial representation of that ideal. First of all, the physical space of the 
city was constructed and planned with a strong reference to Western European 
cities. Secondly, in congruence with this physical planning, the social space of the 
city was constructed and implemented by taking the “urban way of life” in Western 
European cities as its main model. The construction of modernist social space had 
been realized by making “urban lifestyle” visible to public. The modern lifestyle 
was modeled and acted out by the newly arrived elites of the city, namely the 
families of state bureaucrats, intellectuals and representatives of Western countries. 
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This process had defined the parameters to be an “urbanite” in the early years of 
the reconstruction of the city of Ankara.  
 
In spite of all planning attempts under the rule of Single Party regime, namely 
the Republican People’s Party, gecekondu settlements in the periphery and slum-
like residential areas inhabiting seasonal workers at the traditional centers of 
Ankara and İstanbul had initially become visible in the early 1940s. Yet, these 
settlements were few in number and constructed primarily for the purpose of 
sheltering. The intellectuals, journalists, bureaucrats, and academics of the early 
Republican Regime who had been socialized via the Republican ideals have shaped 
public discourse in those years and delineated the terms of “urbanity” by mainly 
pointing out its “other”, namely gecekondu spaces. Furthermore, the ideal 
templates of urbanity and urban space have been continuously defined by giving 
examples from the West. The “other” of these ideal templates has been 
continuously defined via depicting the spontaneous spaces (gecekondu 
neighborhoods) emerging within the system that are inconsistent with the ideals of 
the modernization. In that respect, public discourse usually neglects the 
embeddedness of socio-spatial transformations of these space(s) in the changing 
context of the country.  
 
Modern life style as imposed by Republican Regime, from the beginning, had 
captured serious irreconcilabilities with the context of everyday life in large cities 
of the country. Public approach blames rural-to-urban migrants as the main reason 
behind the intensification of these irreconcilabilities. It attributes these 
irreconcilabilities to the intrinsic marginal qualities of gecekondu settlements rather 
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than the impediments embedded in the attempt to impose a context-free modern 
space from top to down. There had emerged a certain uneasiness and neglect on the 
part of the Republican elites and politicians about the emergence of these spaces. 
Alongside this uneasiness there had also been a wishful and optimistic public 
perception that was based on a belief on the transitory qualities of these 
settlements. Since these were the initial years of migration and these settlements 
were few in number, they were considered as transitory structures that would be 
integrated into cities in time. In addition, the rural-to-urban migration was also 
considered as reversible by means of macro economic and political strategies.  
 
Contrary to the early estimates, the rate of rural-to-urban migration had 
increased with the populist concerns of political actors of multi-party period that 
was initiated by Democrat Party’s (DP) coming to power in 1950.  The politicians 
began to realize the increasing effect of gecekondu settlements in defining the fate 
of politics. DP’s approach in relation to the increasing potential vote of gecekondu 
settlements in determining the course of politics had been considered by the party 
through an integrative political discourse capturing urban and rural poor.  The 
number of gecekondus in the periphery of the cities had increased during those 
years. Therefore the loose settlements of gecekondu houses in the periphery of the 
cities were met by a greater public attention, which had signified mainly the 
transitory character of these settlements like the approaches during Single Party 
regime. However, closer encounters between rural migrants and the “urbanites”, 
who had deeply internalized Republican ideals and been educated in accordance 
with its doctrines, led to the emergence of a biased approach about gecekondu 
settlements in public discourse.  The elitist bias fed by the modernization ideals of 
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Republican Regime took on a more concrete and conservative form during this 
period.  
 
The urban elites who took critical posts were severely critical of these 
settlements and gecekondu lifestyle. Gecekondus were considered as deviant and 
ugly spaces that ought to disappear from the face of beautiful cities. The definition 
of gecekondu settlements as the “other” of Turkish modernization has taken place 
within such a context that solidifies the framework of modernist space and lifestyle 
that have been unattainable to a large extent in reality. This representation of 
gecekondu settlements and gecekondulus as the other of Turkish modernization in 
public discourse attribute a false homogeneity to gecekondu society and to 
settlements.  
 
As mentioned above the academic works mostly in the disciplines of 
sociology, political science, urban planning and economy have considered the 
emergence of gecekondu settlements in the periphery of the large cities as an 
important subject matter during the 1950s and 1960s. The official history of 
gecekondu settlements offered in academic works presupposes a certain 
discontinuity between the formation of gecekondus in the periphery of the cities 
and the development of city space in general. The presupposition resides in 
attributing a certain artificial autonomy to these settlements and the people living 
there. In some of the academic works, the emergence of settlements like gecekondu 
was not linked to the political and economic conditions but rather to the attributes 
of gecekondulus themselves. In this outlook, the causes leading to the emergence 
of gecekondu settlements are limited to gecekondulus as if their existence is 
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autonomous from the rest of the society. This is the most important point that will 
be criticized in the context of the thesis. Academic works in this period capture a 
belief in the transitory and rural character of these settlements. Within this context, 
the everyday habits and tastes of gecekondu families are described in a discourse of 
degradation so as to solidify the “rural other” of the modernization process (Tok, 
1999: 47).  
 
The second period runs from 1966 to 1980. In 1966, gecekondu law no. 775 
was promulgated as the earliest legal document denoting the first formal 
recognition of low-income settlements with its publicly known name, gecekondu. 
This period ends in 1980 when the political and economic structure was totally 
changed by the intervention of military in democracy. This period witnessed the 
extreme polarization of politics between right wing and left wing ideologies. 
Gecekondu space, like other places in the cities was dominated by violence and the 
struggle between these extreme political groups. This seems to be closely related to 
strengthening of the image of the gecekondulus as a “political target” during this 
period. The political parties intensified their dealings with gecekondu settlements 
that had triggered the emergence of radical politics in gecekondu settlements.  
 
Another important characteristics of this period is the deconstruction of the 
homogenizing effect of gecekondu identity previously imposed on gecekondu 
dwellers as the “rural other” by public discourse. The struggles between radical 
militant groups and the extreme politicization of gecekondu settlements led to the 
development of awareness about the heterogeneity of gecekondu dwellers in 
hometown, sectarian and ethnic terms.  In public approach, these differences had 
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been considered as triggering the emergence of serious conflicts particularly in 
these marginal spaces in comparison to the other neighborhoods in the city. In 
addition to the political cleavages, the religious cleavages became part of the 
political competition. The sectarian differences and close encounters between Alevi 
and Sünni3 communities in gecekondu settlements were articulated with the 
political struggles between left and right. The fights between the leftist and rightist 
militant groups had found support mainly amongst Alevi and Sünni communities in 
gecekondu settlements respectively. Public discourse, unlike its emphasis of the 
“rural other” as a homogenous group having “inferior” cultural qualities in 
previous decades, had overemphasized the sectarian and ethnic differences among 
gecekondu society in the 1970s to point out the threatening and conflict-ridden 
qualities of these settlements for national unity.  
 
                                                 
3 Alevi people living in Ankara gecekondus appear to be descendants of rebellious tribal groups 
that were religiously affiliated with the Sfavids (Bruinessen, 1996: 7). Their native language is 
Turkish and they have migrated from Central Anatolian provinces. The practices of Alevism greatly 
differ from the Sünni Islamic practices. Prayer (namaz), the fast in Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca 
and zakat that are binding duties of Sünni Islam are either not practiced by Alevi groups or 
practiced in different ways and times. Alevis have their own practices like ceremonial meeting 
namely Cem. The ceremony is conducted in the place called Cemevi meaning Cem House. Alevis 
often built this place as to be used specifically for Cem ceremonies. However, there are cases in 
which big salon of a house or other suitable places may be used for Cem ceremonies. The Alevis do 
not go to Cemevi in the way orthodox Sünnis go to the mosque. Unlike a mosque or church, 
Cemevi is not a place where one goes for prayer and in order to comfort her/himself through 
prayer. Contrary to that in order one to go to Cemevi, one need to have a peaceful conscience at 
first (Çamuroğlu, 2000: 83). Rather than performing the external (zahir) demands of Islam Alevis 
claim to live according to the inner (batin) demands of religion (Bruinessen, 1996: 7). In that sense 
to be a good person and development of personal morality come before everything else in Alevi 
belief system and practices. The interpersonal relations within the community; their survival with 
mutual respect and appreciating good humane characteristics like, tolerance, equality and freedom 
constitute the backbone of Alevi ethical system. Approach to gender differences constitutes another 
important difference between Alevi and Sünni belief systems. Alevi approach to woman inhabits 
liberal and egalitarian elements; therefore among migrant communities in cities Alevi women are 
most of the time more educated, more occupied and expressive than Sünni women. Before the 
1950s where Alevi and Sünni people mostly lived in villages of their own, these identities had not 
let to any conflict ridden situation between groups. However, after the 1950s with the intense rural-
to-urban migration these identities came into close contact in gecekondu settlements constructed in 
the periphery of the cities.  
 
 
 11
The third feature of transforming public discourse about gecekondu 
settlements in second period is related to the commercialization of the gecekondu. 
In the early years of rural-to-urban migration, gecekondu settlements were mainly 
built to meet the immediate needs and for direct use of migrants. At that time, 
gecekondu had no or little market value. However, from the 1970s onwards, we 
can talk about the commercialization of gecekondu settlements due to the 
continuous migratory flow into these settlements and the transformation of 
gecekondu land and house into main sources of economic gain particularly for the 
early settled gecekondu dwellers. The perception of gecekondu settlements as 
shelters for the poor in the early periods of gecekondu formation was accompanied 
by a belief in the transitory qualities of these settlements. In public debate, this 
belief had also changed during the 1970s owing to the commercialization of these 
settlements. Besides that, in this period gecekondus had taken the form of extended 
neighborhoods constituting large gecekondu regions circulating the big cities.   
 
The third period starts in 1980 and covers the years until now. At the 
beginning of the third period, gecekondus had been legalized to a large extent with 
the implementation of neoliberal policies by the early 1980s. The modernization 
ideal foreseeing the integration of gecekondu settlements with the “modern” urban 
space totally failed. The evidence of failed integration can be found in the 
permanency of these settlements and their continuous growth in various socio-
spatial forms.  
 
In this period, new academic efforts to redefine and understand the changes 
in gecekondu spaces became widespread. “Gecekondu” in its original meaning has 
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become insufficient to define all low-income settlements in the periphery of the 
cities. On the one hand, there are neighborhoods that were once gecekondu 
settlements but had been legalized to a large extent during that period. They still 
keep their traditional physical appearance composed of single-story gecekondu 
houses with gardens. On the other hand, there is another type of low-income 
settlement that has been illegally built after the 1980s with the intense rapid rural-
to-urban migration to large industrial cities such as İstanbul, İzmir, Diyarbakır, and 
Mersin. These newly emerged low-income settlements reflect a scene of 
unorganized two or three story houses with amorphous and unfinished outlook.  
 
In the cities mentioned above, the rural to urban migration has been 
intensified particularly after the 1980s as a result of forced migration. Therefore the 
newcomer migrants are mostly Kurds in ethnic origin. The ethnic cleavage seems 
to be added to the political and religious cleavages of low-income settlements from 
the perspective of public perception. The presence of Kurdish migrants in 
increasing numbers has triggered the anxiety in public perception about how urban 
life has been threatened in the 1990s. In fact, a new term “varoş” appeared within 
this context, and has gained an extensive usage after the first half of the 1990s 
(Etöz, 2000). In relation to that anxiety, the debates of varoş or its representation in 
public debates from middle class perspective seem to incorporate, in some cases, 
racist overtones employing even arbitrary classifications between “White Turks” 
and “Black Turks”, which will be explained in detail in the second chapter. Varoş, 
as used in place or with the concept gecekondu, is usually associated with the 
newly emerging illegal settlements. However, varoş also signifies the bad tastes, 
marginal and criminal life styles that are associated with all low-income 
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settlements, new or old, without exception. Public representation has defined all 
low-income settlements as the shelter for criminal acts relating that to the poor 
living conditions in these spaces, which was actually a consequence of neoliberal 
economic policies. 
 
Moreover, the electoral success of the conservative Islamist parties in both 
local and national elections in the 1990s - mainly with the support of low-income 
settlements- has led to the emergence of a new cleavage; Islamist versus secular.4 
The increasing power and influence of Sünni Islam on everyday life and the 
increasing intensity of tariqat membership in low-income neighborhoods had 
invoked anxiety among the secularists, mostly the Republican urban elites. Low-
income settlements as sheltering these communities were perceived as a threat in 
accordance with this general perception. “Urbanites” who perceive secularism as 
their and nation’s defining identity, position themselves against “ethnically 
distinct” and “religiously fundamentalist” gecekondulus this time.  
 
As briefly explained above, urban middle class perspective in Turkish public 
discourse had defined its “other” differently over time depending on the context 
but with strong reference to gecekondu spaces most of the time. This has been done 
mostly with certain neglect of the interconnectedness between the socio-spatial 
transformations in low-income settlements and macro political economic strategies 
by attributing an atomistic quality to the agency of “gecekondu” inhabitants. The 
                                                 
4 According to many students of Turkish politics, Islamist vs Secular division constitutes a significant 
explanatory factor in the political spectrum in Turkey. In general, Islamists have been seen as a threat 
to secular characteristics of the Turkish state. Islamist political parties are not radical movements 
trying to change the legal and political systems rather, they are arguing for a conservative society 
based on Sünni values.  For a detailed analysis of the issue see Ergun Özbudun, 2000. In general, 
Islamists have been seen as a threat to secular characteristics of the Turkish state. 
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correlation between the acts of gecekondulus and state policies was invisible in the 
public discourse about gecekondu just like the spaces and people who live in these 
neighborhoods. Given that, I would like to analyze in detail some moments through 
the historical narratives of gecekondulus whereby, the acts in the strategic realm, -
the realm of politicians, state bureaucrats, urban planners and intellectuals- in 
defining gecekondu space and the tactical everyday acts of gecekondu inhabitants, 
who have used the impediments and loopholes of strategical realm, are 
dialectically intertwined. In the following section, I will introduce the research 
questions that reflect the problems of the representation of gecekondu settlements 
in public debate over time via a critical local history of a typical gecekondu 
neighborhood.    
 
 
1.1.2 Research Objectives  
This thesis intends to discuss two main objectives. First of all, the study aims to 
show the dynamics and patterns by which the strategic interventions in local space 
and tactical acts of the migrants in producing their locality are closely 
interconnected. This interconnectedness between strategical and tactical realm 
will be analyzed mainly through the local spatial history of a typical gecekondu 
neighborhood. In order to analyze this relationship, I have conducted in-depth 
interviews and observations in Boğaziçi, a neighborhood of Mamak district of 
Ankara. Mamak is a typical “gecekondu” locality which comprises mainly one-
story gecekondu houses with small gardens that had been legalized approximately 
20 years ago, nevertheless have kept their traditional physical forms. Boğaziçi 
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neighborhood, the research setting, is an old gecekondu neighborhood having a 50 
years history. My sample, in that sense, covers inhabitants who have witnessed 
each of the three periods of gecekondu development as was explained in the 
previous section.  
 
Revealing the interconnectedness between strategical and tactical realm will 
also signify the parallel moments in the spatial transformation of the designated 
research setting and city space in general. This transformation indicates that the 
production of gecekondu space as a process can only be understood as an 
integrated part of the general political, social and economic context of Ankara. 
Therefore the transformation of the neighborhood space from predominantly a 
natural space5 in the 1950s to a radically political space in the late 1970s and to an 
economically and religiously dominated space beginning by the 1980s gives clues 
about this interconnectedness and continuity between the macro socio-political 
developments in Turkey and in the local history of gecekondu neighborhood.  
 
The second main objective of this thesis is to expose an alternative local 
historical reading of the formation of a gecekondu space as a response to modernist 
consideration of gecekondu development in Turkey. This alternative historical 
reading will depend on a narration of the “social spatialization” in the 
neighborhood. Social spatialization as used by Shields (1991, 2006) refers to an 
ongoing social construction of the spatial at the level of social imaginary and 
                                                 
5 With reference to the initial settlement period, the respondents mainly narrate the locality with 
reference to its natural qualities. Natural factors had determined the course of spatialization mostly 
during that period.  
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representations as well as real interventions in the form of social practices 
producing a built environment (Shields, 1991: 31). To put it differently, the 
concept signifies the process in which social and spatial have continuously defined 
each other in the locality in close interconnectedness with the general context of 
urbanization in the city. The analysis of social spatialization, so as to put an 
alternative history of the locality, has twofold implications for this thesis.  
 
First of all, the spontaneity as the defining and intrinsic quality of gecekondu 
settlements as different from other “more planned” neighborhoods of the city will 
be made explicit. This spontaneity is not only closely related to the tactical acts of 
the migrants in relation to the strategical realm, but is also related to certain spatial 
contingencies emerging in the course of social spatialization. Understanding this 
spontaneity intrinsic to gecekondu settlements makes it possible to reveal the 
causes behind the biased estimates of strategical planning policies, which are 
developed in accordance with modernization principles.  
 
Secondly, the examination of social spatialization considering the 
interconnectedness of tactic and strategy on the vertical level will also highlight the 
competition between different groups along hometown and sectarian identities on 
the horizontal level during the formation of neighborhood space. In other words, 
the power relations between different groups in the locality have a strong 
connection with these groups’ diverse ways of forming relations with the actors of 
the strategical realm. The ethnic identities through hometown and sectarian 
affiliations directly define the course of spatial production in the locality. Since, 
migrants use these identities as a means to perform certain tactics in dealing with 
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strategical realm depending on the nature of identity politics as defined by the 
strategical realm at that particular moment. Strategical acts have attributed certain 
values and meanings to these ethnic identities in conjunction with policy interests, 
which enable migrants to use these identities as tactics in dealing with the 
strategical realm and other etnhic identities in the locality. In that respect, the 
nature of competition between these groups in the course of social spatialization in 
the locality seems to depend strongly on general socio-political context of the city 
and the country at that particular moment. In that sense, the local historical reading 
of social spatialization following the route mentioned above will also exemplify the 
nature of encounters between different groups in the neighborhood at different 
moments of this process. As mentioned above, public representation had either 
under or overemphasized the heterogeneity of gecekondu society. The elite 
perception either defines gecekondu society as a homogenous one by attributing a 
socio-cultural otherness to the whole gecekondu society or exaggerates the 
threatening qualities of close encounters between conflict ridden identities in 
gecekondu setting to define it as an illegal or criminal space. The narration of the 
course of social spatialization in the research setting signifies the fact that the 
hometown, ethnic and sectarian differences have played important roles as 
variables that have defined the context of encounters between different groups at 
certain moments of spatial production. These encounters, however, may sometimes 
take a strong tone of conflict and struggle or, in other times, may necessitate 
compromises in the 50 years history of the research setting.  
 
The secondary objective of this thesis, stemming from the main objectives, is 
to provide a spatial approach as a methodological and analytical tool to the study of 
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low-income settlements. As will be demonstrated with research data, low-income 
settlements have strong spontaneous quality based on spatial contingency. Spatial 
approach allows us to reveal characteristics of gecekondu settlements. I mainly 
benefit from the conceptual and theoretical framework as offered in debates on 
urban (socio)-spatial production in modern societies both at conceptual and 
methodological levels. In that sense, first of all, I will explain the conceptual 
framework of the thesis and define the concepts and the outlook that I am going to 
employ in the course of the thesis. Secondly, I will define the methodological 
approach of the thesis that attempts to reconcile the local historical reading in a 
neighborhood depending on the narratives of the respondents and the spatial 
analysis that accompany and constitute the core of this reading.  
 
 
1.1.3 Conceptual Framework 
 
The thesis seeks to bring a criticism to the exclusionary and blaming modernist 
discourse on gecekondu space and gecekondulu on a number of points as 
mentioned above. In this process, gecekondulu is defined by public representation 
either as the main culprit of the mal-urbanization within the “blaming the victim” 
tradition or as the idle, marginal and passive beneficiaries of Turkish urbanization. 
In either case, the formation of gecekondu space and city space seems to be thought 
apart, concealing or neglecting the paradoxes and impediments of modernist 
planning activity and the politics of urbanization in Turkey. In conjunction with the 
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research interests, the critical literature on the modernist planning of urban space 
and everyday life constitutes the main inspiration and conceptual framework of the 
thesis. The critique that Henri Lefebvre (1998) poses to the production of space in 
Western capitalist societies in his groundbreaking book, “The Production of Space” 
constitutes one of the main inspirations for the thesis. The recent debates in critical 
spatial theory that are enriched not only by the premises but also with the criticisms 
of Lefebvre’s theory construct the conceptual and theoretical skeleton of the thesis. 
 
The core of the conceptual structure of the thesis consists of a critical 
synthesis of Henri Lefebvre’s theory on the production of space in modern 
capitalist societies, -the building stone of critical Marxist geography- supported 
with Michel De Certeau’s (1984) theory on the practice of everyday life that aims 
at bringing an alternative historical reading. The main objective of this section is to 
show the relevance of the literature with the research interests of the thesis and to 
make explicit the conceptual and methodological concerns that had played 
important roles in the research design. In order to accomplish this task, I will 
define certain concepts that I am going to use and refer to in the course of the 
thesis. The meaning of (social) space, production of space, social spatialization, 
spatial triad, strategy, tactic and spontaneity will be discussed at length in 
connection to their theoretical claims.  
 
 
 
 20
 1.1.3.1 “Social Spatialization” as a Conceptual Alternative to 
“Production of Space” 
 
Lefebvre’s main objective in his book “The Production of Space” is to show and 
criticize how state rationalism and power attempt to bring a unified and 
homogenous society into perfection by producing a peculiar space in accordance 
with its objectives in modern capitalist societies (Lefebvre, 1998: 281). While 
doing that he puts his novel definition of “space” at the center of modern 
geographical thought and points out the vitality of spatial analysis in any social 
scientific research. In his theory of space, Lefebvre (1998: 8) challenges previous 
definitions of “space”. He criticizes Cartesian dualist understanding, where space is 
defined as an object against subject dominating all senses and bodies. This 
criticism of Lefebvre seems to be mainly inspired by late Heidegger’s emerging 
interest in space besides time. Heidegger treats questions of spatiality as equally 
important to those of temporality. As Elden (2004: 92) mentions, Heidegger 
criticizes the understanding of space, like time in a narrow, calculative, 
mathematical sense, which is divorced from our experience of space in our 
everyday dealings with the world where we act and react to objects within it in a 
lived, experiential way, instead of abstracting them in a Cartesian grid of 
coordinates.  
 
 21
The second main definition of space to which Lefebvre channels criticism is 
Aristotelian space. This is an empiricist space whose reason of existence is reduced 
to the classification and naming the evidences of senses rather than having an 
absolute existence. Lefebvre opposes such a definition of space mainly with 
reference to the status of space in defining the context of everyday dealings with 
the world for people. 
 
Thirdly, Lefebvre criticizes Kantian space where space is defined as the 
apriori realm of consciousness and separated along with time from the empirical 
sphere. The epistemologico-philosophical notion of space in general, fetishizes a 
mental realm that comes to envelop the social and physical ones, which is 
challenged by Lefebvre for their neglect of the practical and material qualities of 
space (Lefebvre, 1998: 5). According to Lefebvre, recognition of space mainly as a 
mental realm leads to a gap between the theoretical (mental and social space of 
philosophers) and practical (space of people dealing with material things). 
Therefore, theoretical unity should be considered between cosmos (physical 
nature), mental, logical and formal abstractions and social spaces (Lefebvre, 1998: 
11). He attempts to integrate social practices, perceptions and representations 
within the definition of space rather than defining space only as an object or 
physical container of social practices. In that respect, he initiates a third position 
between positivistic geography dealing with space mainly with reference to its 
physical qualities and humanistic geography dealing with particular places and the 
cultural meaning and values attributed to these places lacking a systematic 
approach. He offers a combination of materialism, existentialism and 
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phenomenology6 to come up with a more effective and dynamic definition of 
space.  
 
Hence Lefebvre’s definition of space is found quite extensive and inclusive. 
His definition of space is considered by many so inclusive that the whole theory is 
thought to instigate a fetishization of space over time. In fact, space having an 
equal status with time can only be considered as having positional and contingent 
effects on the context of social relations for some (see Sayer, 1985). The reason 
behind the criticisms directed to Lefebvre is the importance he attributes to the 
transforming capacities of space in altering the course of social relations in any 
mode of production. He makes an extended criticism of modernist production of 
space as part, parcel and the most important determinant and transformer of 
capitalist relations of production. Particularly, when he contextualizes his analysis 
in relation to urban space, he signifies the dynamic and dialectic relation of space 
with the social, emphasizing the defining aspects of spatial contingencies on urban 
development. Lefebvre’s analysis of space and its production in capitalist society 
point out space’s intrinsic capacity to alter the whole context of social relations of 
production in the following manner: 
         
Space has a sort of reality of its own, a reality clearly distinct from, yet much 
like, those assumed in the same global process by commodities, money and 
capital… space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and action… in 
addition to being a means of production, it is also a means of control, and of 
domination, of power… Is this space an abstract one? Yes, but it is also 
“real” in the sense in which concrete abstractions such as commodities and 
                                                 
6 “Implicated in this project was Lefebvre’s own particular brand of Marxism which stressed the 
importance of everyday life, of alienation and of the writings of the early humanist Marx. 
Consequently, his project on space does not simply reduce the mental to the material in a “vulgar” 
Marxist fashion. For Lefebvre, the realms of perception, symbolism and imagination although 
distinguishable, are not separable from physical and social space.” (Merrifield, 1993:523)  
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money are real. Is it then concrete? Yes, though not in the sense that an object 
or product is concrete. Is it instrumental? Undoubtedly, but, like knowledge, 
it extends beyond instrumentality (Lefebvre, 1998: 26, 27).    
 
 
His theory on space reflects the power of the production of space as the 
explicit/implicit manifestation of multifaceted class interests. That is the reason 
why he uses space with the concept production as showing the “social” and 
“power” ingredients embedded in the spatial. He defines “(social) space as a 
(social) product” (Lefebvre, 1998: 26). Lefebvre’s using of “social” in brackets 
does not signify the fact that space has a detachable social component, on the 
contrary, points out as the first step in his theoretical premise that “space” and 
“social” in the modern world are impossible to tell apart. That is the reason why he 
uses the concept of space while dealing with modernity always with the 
complementary verb “production”7. First implication of his theory that space is a 
social product, supposes the disappearance of (physical) natural space with the 
growing effect of capitalist spatial production. In capitalist system nature comes 
close to its defeat and destruction more than ever. However, the disappearing 
natural space by creating certain spatial contingencies may, in some cases, alter the 
course of social relations of capitalist production and reproduction.   
                                                 
7 He makes a distinction between “production” and “work” where he defines production in the 
service of repetition mainly as part of capitalist system. He attributes work all the creativity. 
Therefore, pre-industrial cities and their spatial qualities are mainly identified within the sphere of 
work and creativity but the aspects of modern space are identified with the verb production in 
Lefebvre’s terminology (Lefebvre, 1998: 77).  He makes a similar distinction between domination 
and appropriation of space. According to Lefebvre, domination of space is mainly a quality of 
capitalist production unlike the appropriation of space. “Domination by technology tends towards 
non-appropriation- i.e. towards destruction… There is a conflict between domination and 
appropriation. This conflict takes place in space”. (Lefebvre, 1998: 343) Appropriated space is a 
natural space in order to serve the needs and possibilities of a group that it has been appropriated by 
that group (Lefebvre, 1998: 166). Lefebvre sees the resistance capabilities of the powerless in 
modern societies in their capacity to appropriate space and challenge the abstract space as produced 
by capitalist power holders.  
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 Second implication of the theory supposes that every mode of production 
produces a space of its own (Lefebvre, 1998: 32). To put differently, every power 
structure in order to impose its power in an efficient way should produce its own 
space. The space that is produced by capitalist production relations in modern 
times to sustain the continuity of the system is called an “abstract space”8 by 
Lefebvre. In order to prevent any kind of mass revolts, the “abstract space” of 
capitalism should conceal relations of exploitation and alienation in everyday life. 
Therefore the “abstract space” of capitalism is “buttressed by non-critical (positive) 
knowledge backed by a frightening capacity for violence and maintained by a 
bureaucracy which has laid hold of the gains of capitalism” as defined by Lefebvre 
(1998: 52). The Republican Regime’s attempt of creating a modernist space seem 
to include production of such an abstract space that serves the interest of 
Republican Regime to create a homogenous and modernist physical and social 
space in the course of nation building as mentioned in the introduction of this 
chapter.   
 
If space is a product of our knowledge, then it must be expected to reproduce 
and expound the process of production (Lefebvre, 1998: 36). Third implication of 
the theory gives important clues about Lefebvre’s notion of space not only as a 
social product but also as having a reality of its own, particularly within the context 
                                                 
8 Abstract space “as a product of violence and war is political; instituted by a state, is institutional. 
On first inspection it appears homogenous; indeed it serves those forces, which make a tabula rasa of 
whatever stands in their way, of whatever threatens them- in short of differences (Lefebvre, 1998: 
285). In order to understand Lefebvre’s definition of abstract space, there is a need to understand the 
difference he supposes between domination and appropriation. Abstract space of capitalism 
dominates rather that appropriates.  
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of its capacity to define the reproduction of social relations. Edwards Soja (1985), a 
leading interpreter of Lefebvre’s theory develops the term socio-spatial dialectics 
particularly with reference to this precept of Lefebvre. The production of space 
refers and occupies what Soja calls socio-spatial dialectic in which space is 
conceptualized both as the medium and the outcome of social action, which 
according to him connect social and spatial structures in such away that the former 
appears in its concrete form in the latter (Soja, 1985: 94). Soja’s basic premises 
upon which the “material interpretation of spatiality” is built, reformulate the 
understanding of the production of space in Lefebvrian sense. Soja lists the 
qualities of “concrete spatiality” in the following manner:  
 
1) Spatiality is a substantiated social product, part of a “second nature” which 
incorporates as it socializes and transforms both physical and cognitive space; 
2) As a social product, spatiality is simultaneously the medium and the 
outcome … social action and relationship; 3) This spatio-temporal 
structuration of social life defines how social action and relationship are 
materially constituted, made concrete; 4) The constitution/concretization 
process is problematic, filled with contradiction, conflict, and struggle; 5) 
Conflict and contradiction arise primarily from the duality of produced space 
as both outcome-embodiment-product and medium-presupposition-producer; 
6) Concrete spatiality is thus a competitive arena for both social production 
and reproduction, for social practices aimed either at maintenance and 
reinforcement of existing spatiality or at significant restructuring and possible 
transformation; 7) The temporality of social life, from the routines and events 
of day-to-day activity to the longer-run making of history, is rooted in  
spatial contingency in much the same way that spatiality of social life is 
rooted in temporal/historical contingency; 8) The materialist interpretation 
history and the interpretation of spatiality are inseparably intertwined and 
theoretically concomitant, with no inherent priorization of one over the other 
(Soja, 1985: 98- 99, emphasis mine). 
 
 
Soja’s reformulation of Lefebvrian understanding of the production of space 
acknowledges the defining capacity of space in the reproduction of social relations 
and the effect of spatial contingencies in producing unintended effects. These 
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spatial contingences may alter development schemas in urban context just like the 
historical contingencies may alter the spatial relations of production in such a 
reformulation.   
 
By introducing such a broad and dynamic definition of space, Lefebvre wants 
to transcend the Marxist dichotomies and binary oppositions between proletariat 
and bourgeoisie, wages and profit, or productive labor and parasitism. This is done 
by integrating a third element that is land with its determining capacities into two 
means of production or moments of capitalism, namely labor and capital by 
Lefebvre (1998: 228). He attempts to go beyond the weaknesses of Marxist 
formulation of capitalist relations of production by integrating the “production of 
space” into this formulation. However, the “production of space” in Lefebvrian 
reformulation emphasizes mainly the capitalists’ power and capacity in producing 
a totalizing space dominating all other space(s). This reformulation, however, 
leaves his argument hostage to misinterpretation and reduction back to established 
Marxist concepts of production according to Shields (2006: 154). In fact, 
Lefebvre’s broad definition of space and the capacity of spatial relations in altering 
the course of social relations should transcend such a homogenous and one-way 
formulation of power relations of “producing space”. Therefore, according to 
Shields, an important reviewer of Lefebvre’s contribution to spatial theory, there 
emerges a desperate need of a vocabulary to conceptualize the varied production 
and consumption of varied spaces, places and landscapes. He explains this need to 
reconceptualize Lefebvre’s term of “production of space” in the following manner:   
 
Lefebvre is referring to not only the empirical disposition of things in the 
landscape as “space” (the physical aspect) but also attitudes and habitual 
practices. His metaphoric l’espace might be better understood as the 
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spatialization of social order. In this movement to space, abstract structures 
such as “culture” become concrete practices and arrangements in space. 
Social action involves not just a rhythm but also geometry and spacing. 
Spatialization also captures the processual nature of l’espace that Lefebvre 
insists is a matter of ongoing activities. That is, it is not just an achieved 
order in the built environment, or an ideology, but also an order that is itself 
always undergoing change from within through actions and innovations of 
social agents (Shields, 2006: 155, emphasis mine).  
 
 
 
As mentioned by Shields, unlike the critics of Lefebvre who point out the 
weaknesses of his Marxist framework, Lefebvre appreciates the actions and 
innovations of social agents within the context of his critique to structuralism. 
Particularly when he refers to urban space and its modernist production and 
planning, he signifies the irreconcilability of the planning attempts of the center 
vis-à-vis the spatial practices of the “users” in everyday life. The power of the 
“users” is implicit in their ability to appropriate alternative spaces in congruence 
with their needs against modernist attempt of spatial production according to 
Lefebvre. This has close connection with the creativity and dynamism he attributes 
to the social agency and the capacity of the “users” in altering the course of spatial 
production. However, this aspect of his theory seems to remain open to misreading 
owing to his conceptualization of capitalist space as a totalizing space assimilating 
all “other” spatial experiences as defined via the term “production of space”. The 
main reason behind Shields’ attempt to put the term “social spatialization” in place 
of the “production of space” is to overcome such a misleading reading of 
Lefebvre’s theory. He wants to overcome the internal conceptual contradictions of 
Lefebvre’s terminology in order to strengthen Lefebvre’s critique of modernist, 
rationalist system of capitalist production via the novel understanding of dialectical 
relation of the social and spatial. Social spatialization in that respect not only 
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designates the physical environment but the process in which social practices, 
social imaginary and spatial constructions are in continuous interplay.  
 
Shields (1991: 31) defines “social spatialization” as the ongoing and 
processual social construction of the spatial at the level of social imaginary 
(collective mythologies, presuppositions) as well as interventions in landscape (for 
example, built environment). Social spatialization as a process also includes 
contingency and spontaneity as emerged from the spatial determination of the 
social relations, which constitutes the core of Lefebvre’s novel definition of space 
as will be detailed in the following pages. The term “social spatialization” will be 
preferred in place of “production of space” in most part of this thesis with 
reference to the discussion above. Lefebvre’s formulation of spatial production in 
interconnection with social signifies a variety of power positions and interests, 
rather than referring to a homogenous realm with a unilateral power structure. In 
relation to that, I will introduce Lefebvre’s spatial triad, which will be referred 
quite often throughout the thesis.  
 
 
 
1.1.3.2 Spatial Triad  
 
Lefebvre’s main criticism to modernist urban planning is made explicit through his 
formulation of a spatial triad. According to Lefebvre, every society has its peculiar 
spatial code and this spatial code can be defined with a spatial triad.  In this triad, 
space is defined as an outcome of the dialectic interplay of the three moments of 
social spatialization or acts of social agency. First component of the triad is spatial 
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practice that is society’s space. Society produces it slowly and surely as it masters 
and appropriates it in everyday life. That can be defined as an externalized material 
or built environment. This is the perceived space in which there is a close 
connection between “daily reality” (daily routine) and “urban reality” (the routes 
and networks which link up the places set aside for work, private life and leisure 
(Lefebvre, 1998: 37, 50). The reproduction of social relations by means of real 
interruptions and activities in space happens to take place in this aspect of the 
spatial triad.  
 
Second component of the triad is the representations of space (conceived 
space) that is the space of planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social 
engineers. This is the part where a conceptual model used to direct practice is 
imposed by modernist or capitalist agency. “This space comprises the various 
arcane signs, jargons, codifications, objectified representations used and produced 
by these agents.” (Merrifield, 1993: 523) The second part of the triad constitutes 
the core of Lefebvre’s criticism that is posed to modernist planning strategy and its  
incompatibly with the lived space or the space of everyday life. The problem under 
capitalism is the primacy given to the determining capacity of the conceived part of 
spatial triad.  
 
The third component of the triad is representational space (lived space) that 
is space directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the 
space of “inhabitants” and “users”, but also some artists. It is the sphere where the 
lived social relations of users in relation to the environment are conceptualized 
(Lefebvre, 1998: 38, 39; Gottdiener, 1993: 131). This is the space of “users” or the 
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“inhabitants” and where Lefebvre sees the source of potential challenge to the 
existing rationalist system and also the potential to create difference.  
 
Lefebvre offers such a spatial triad to explain the production of space in a 
capitalist society and the power relations between different agents in such a 
framework. This triplicate integrates a dynamism and expansion to the dialectics of 
social and spatial. It avoids, at the same time, a degeneration of the discussions of 
the dualistic socio-spatial dialectic into a reductionist and unproductive debate over 
the primacy of social over space or vice-versa (Shields, 1991: 56). According to 
Lefebvre, these three aspects –perceived, conceived and lived- go together and 
there are no antagonisms, oppositions and contrasts between these three moments 
of the triad, there are rather echoes, repercussions and mirror effects.  
 
The reason why Lefebvre sees no antagonisms between these three aspects 
may depend on his overemphasis of the power of capitalist system creating a 
totalizing space where the “users” in the representational space have little 
maneuver area to affect the agency in the other two realms, representations of 
space and spatial practice. In that respect, Lefebvre defines the representational 
space as the dominated and hence passively experienced space, the space of the 
“users” rather than the “producers”, which the imagination seeks to change and 
appropriate (Lefebvre, 1998: 39). This is the most criticized and problematic part 
of Lefebvre’s theory in general but also for the objectives of the thesis. To 
exemplify the potential of gecekondu inhabitants to produce their own space 
through using the means and loopholes in the modernist planning and policies 
necessitates conceptually an opening in this part of Lefebvre’s theory. In order to 
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overcome this theoretical impediment, De Certeau’s distinction between strategy 
and tactic will be synthesized with Lefebvre’s triad with a critical rereading of both 
theories, which will constitute the subject matter of the following sections. Shields 
(2006) also directs his main criticism to Lefebvre at that point. As indicated by 
Lefebvre, capitalist system produces an abstract space that is imposed as a 
hegemonic and totalizing space as mentioned in the previous section. This leads to 
much tortuous writing and a tendency to reduce the contemporary social 
spatialization to a capitalist strategy. Yet, a close reading of Lefebvre’s triad also 
signifies the potential he sees mainly in the realm of representational space as 
mentioned above. As stated by him, the producers of space have always acted in 
accordance with a representation -very difficult to challenge- and users, on the 
other hand, “passively experienced whatever was imposed upon them in as much 
as it was more or less thoroughly inserted into or justified by their representational 
space” (Lefebvre, 1998: 43, 44). In this statement, Lefebvre makes explicit the 
necessary condition behind users’ acceptance of what was imposed upon them. If 
the space of the “producers” (representations of space) is in great disharmony with 
the representational space of the “users”, than the users may act to create a 
maneuver space for themselves, which is again limited by the knowledge and 
power of the “producers” (Lefebvre, 1998: 50). Still the existence of a 
representational space having a certain capacity to create a differential space poses 
one of the most important challenges to capitalist system’s producing a unified and 
homogenous space.  
 
To sum up, Lefebvre’s triad is important in his critique to structuralism in 
general and structural Marxism in particular. He opposes all dualities and 
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dichotomist reading of power relations and structures by exhibiting a triad of 
spatial production. The creativity of social agency is appreciated in his theory on 
space yet it is not easy to get this fact out of his way of stating the power of 
capitalist system in creating an abstract space that is overemphasized and portrayed 
as imposing its representations on the “users”. The reader may have a sense 
throughout the book about the impossibilities of “powerless” or “users” to resist or 
about their lack of potential to create a resistant space. As Shields mentions, 
despite this difficulty “The Production of Space” is “devoted to developing a 
radical phenomenology of space as a humanistic basis from which to launch a 
critique of the denial of individual and community’s “right to space” under the 
abstract spatialization embodied in capitalism and technocratic knowledge 
structures of the state” (Shields, 2006: 146). In that respect, the book with his 
theoretical elegance offers wide ranging conceptual and methodological tools for 
criticizing the modernist planning and the potential of representational spaces in 
creating a spontaneity and difference sometimes even by means of the structural 
weaknesses of rational and bureaucratic planning. This constitutes the main reason 
behind such a detailed reading of Lefebvre’s critique of modernist attempt of 
producing space in relation to the interests of the thesis. 
 
 
1.1.3.3 Spatial Spontaneity  
 
There is a strong possibility of spontaneity in every holistic urban planning attempt 
even in cases where the agency of the conceived realm is powerful enough to 
impose its space. The sources of spontaneity in Lefebvre’s triad lie in the 
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components of “representational space”. “Representational space” of Lefebvre’s 
triad is;  
 
Fully “lived” space (l’espace vécu)… It is an essential terrain of struggle on 
the way to realizing ourselves as “total persons”… This sphere offers 
complex re-coded and even decoded versions of lived spatializations, veiled 
criticism of dominant social orders and of the categories of social thought 
often expressed in aesthetic terms as symbolic resistance… Also included in 
this aspect are clandestine and underground spatial practices, which suggest 
and prompt alternative (revolutionary) restructurings of institutionalized 
discourses of space and new modes of spatial praxis, such as squatters, illegal 
aliens, and third world slum dwellers, who fashion a spatial presence and 
practice outside the norms of prevailing  (enforced) social spatialization 
(Shields, 2006: 164).  
 
 
 
As mentioned in the above anecdote, the component of “space of 
representation” or “representational space” in Lefebvre’s triad unlike the criticisms 
posed, offers an opening for possible resistances and spontaneities within the 
represented and practiced space of the hegemonic power. This potential of 
spontaneity in the production of capitalist space is signified a number of times in 
his book, “The Production of Space”.  In his wording, growth of the forces of 
production does not directly in a causal fashion lead to a particular space or time. 
Mediation and mediators, so as the action of groups, the factors within knowledge, 
within ideology, within the domain of representations, in short, the “human 
agency” has to be taken into consideration in order to understand this process 
(Lefebvre, 1998: 77). Soja’s interpretation and reformulation of socio-spatial 
dialectic as mainly inspired by Lefebvre foresee such a potential of spontaneity in 
the production of space. The spontaneity emerged outside the context of 
modernist’s representations of space is both due to the inherent qualities of space 
and its production and also the unintended consequences of the spatial acts of 
human agency. In that respect, Soja acknowledges space an equal status with time 
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in the emergence of contingencies as mentioned in previous sections. In order to 
emphasize it again, according to Soja (1985: 94), the temporality of social life, 
from the routines and events of day-to-day activity to the longer-run making of 
history, is rooted in spatial contingency in much the same way that spatiality of 
social life is rooted in temporal/historical contingency.  This is mainly related to 
the peculiar qualities of space as produced in modern society. As maintained by 
Lefebvre, space as a social product is not only the outcome of the social action but 
it has a peculiarity differentiating it from other products of capitalism, which is its 
capacity to produce and reproduce social relations while being produced. This 
premise brings the contingency on the forefront of the theoretical debate that aims 
to articulate new geographical approaches with critical social theory. In that 
respect, Derek Gregory (1985) suggests that the centrality of space in human 
affairs could be translated into and/or articulated with the premises of structuration 
theory. In structuration theory, language of agency and the bounded contingency of 
practical life are reconceptualized through spatial structures. 
  
Lefebvre’s reference to the spatial spontaneity and contingency of everyday 
life in modernity owes to Nietszche’s conception of everyday life. Nietzschean 
definition of modern world as an “assertion of life and lived against political and 
economic processes” seemed to inspire Lefebvre’s integration of the “lived” as the 
most important aspect of the spatial triad acknowledging potential of users’ agency 
to create differential spaces as resistant spaces (Elden, 2004: 87). By accepting the 
importance of reversibility and instability in everyday life, Lefebvre provides an 
extended place in his theory to the spontaneity embedded in these appropriated 
spaces. Lefebvre gives references to shantytowns in explicating spatial spontaneity. 
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Yet, the emphasis of the hegemonic power of the center is made explicit vis-à-vis 
the resisting power of these spaces in his theory. As stated by him, the differences 
(squatters, shanty towns) endure on the margins of the homogenized realm 
(modern urban space) either in the form of resistances or in the form of 
externalities (lateral, heterotopical, heterological). However, for Lefebvre, sooner 
or later, the existing center and the forces of homogenization must seek to absorb 
all such differences and they will succeed if differential spaces keep a defensive 
posture rather than a counter action (Lefebvre, 1998: 373). As will be criticized in 
the following sections in a more explicit manner, the “center” or the sphere of 
“representations of space” is defined with an overall mission of homogenization 
and production of the “abstract space” of capitalism as defined by Lefebvre. 
However, it is important to note that, in some cases the system to define and 
legitimize its “space” may also be willing to keep its “other” as in the form of 
differential spaces.  
 
Lefebvre’s perception about the irreconcilability between the space of 
producers and users defines the abstract space of capitalism almost as pseudo 
space. In that respect, spontaneous architecture and planning in shantytowns prove 
greatly superior to the organization of space by specialists according to Lefebvre 
(1998: 347). Lefebvre gives Oscar Niemeyer’s Brasilia as an example to such 
planned spaces into which a faithfully technocratic and state bureaucratic society 
had been projected and he states that there is an almost self consciously comic 
aspect to the process (Lefebvre, 1998: 313). Brasilia carries important similarities 
with rationality implicit in the construction of Ankara. The irreconcilability of the 
perceived and the lived in the course of the planning and construction of Ankara 
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will be discussed in detail in the third chapter by relying mainly on Lefebvrian 
conceptual framework.  
 
The emergence of the gecekondu settlements in the heart of a rational 
implication of a westernization project, Ankara city, even in the early years of 
city’s establishment can be considered as a good example to the potential of spatial 
spontaneity embedded in all modernist attempt of producing space. Such 
spontaneous spatial formations manifest a social life far more intense than the 
bourgeois districts of the cities and reflect an appropriation of a remarkably high 
order according to Lefebvre. This approach of Lefebvre is paraphrased by Shields 
in the following manner:  
 
Slums, barrios and favelas are seen by Lefebvre as localized 
“reappropriations” of space that may furnish examples of such 
“representational spaces” or “spaces of representation” by which certain sites 
are removed or severed from the governing spatialization and returned to the 
realm of “communitas”. These are prophetic, temporary autonomous zones. 
Lefebvre differentiates the popular appropriation of space from the 
dominated space of the nation state or of the capitalist city. The latter is the 
site of hegemonic forces of capital, the former site of possible emergent 
spatial revolutions (Shields, 2006: 165).  
 
The attribution of Lefebvre to these spontaneous spaces the potential of 
spatial revolution against the abstract space of capitalism can also be 
acknowledged as his emotional appeal to Marx’s conception of alienation. In his 
criticism to everyday life, he signifies the alienation by referring to the fragmented 
quality of individual life (Shields, 2006: 73). Similar approaches to the study of the 
spontaneous spaces in third world cities that have attributed these spaces a 
potential of resistance against the homogenizing power of the center are highly 
criticized as romanticizing the problems of squatter settlements neglecting the 
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systematic problems in political, economic and social terms. These approaches are 
also criticized for the fact that they attribute positive and transformative potential 
to the spontaneous settlements. However, from another way around, to understand 
and explain the socio-spatial dynamics behind the emergence of these spontaneous 
spaces in which the artificial aspects of modernist planning are also made explicit 
would greatly contribute to develop a more inclusive and democratic approach in 
urban governance. Since the agency of residents in squatter type of settlements 
seems to be quite effective in defining the construction of these spaces when 
compared to other districts in the city, one needs to have a track of local knowledge 
explicating the socio-spatial dynamics between groups.  
 
Particularly by the 1980s, with the increasing effect of neoliberal policies in 
Turkey and in many countries, the spontaneity/contingency issue has centralized 
recent debates in geographical theory on urban space. Groth&Corjin (2005: 506), 
in a recent case study on the reappropriation of urban residual spaces9 in everyday 
life that pose an alternative local planning agenda by civil or informal actors 
coming from outside the official, institutionalized domain of urban planning and 
urban politics. According to the authors, the three cases from Helsinki, Berlin and 
Brussels constitute examples to spaces which do not speak the traditional language 
of planning, thus allowing a “spontaneous urbanity” to arise which has been open 
to constant change, flexible, almost personalized transformation of space 
(Groth&Corjin, 2005: 509). Such studies that emphasize the spontaneous 
appropriation of certain spaces as an alternative to the central planning attempts 
                                                 
9 “Urban residual spaces” refer to abandoned industrial areas- i.e. interstitial sites that are weak in 
spatial terms may, due to their indeterminate character provide opportunities for new, transitional 
reappropriations (Groth and Corjin, 2005: 506).  
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brings two closely related themes into the forefront of spatial theory: the 
peculiarities of space as capturing the potential of creating contingency more than 
the other commodities of capitalism and the agency of the “weak” or “users” in 
Lefebvrian sense in playing with such contingency. Particularly, the debates on the 
neoliberal reorganization of urban space recently rely on this aspect of 
spatialization.  
 
The formation and transformation of urban space have been predominantly 
defined by free market mechanisms that have been coupled with neoliberal opening 
of urban space to national and international investment as mentioned by such 
debates. However, as a spatially embedded commodity, real estate embodies a 
crucial paradox (Weber, 2004: 174). Despite the fact that real estate has always 
attracted a range of investors-from the small-scale speculator to the largest 
insurance companies- the shifting values in urban space can easily make real estate 
in certain locations to acquire uneven negative and positive values. Such uneven 
shifts in market value of real estates stem from the inflexible nature of real estate as 
a commodity that resists frequent modifications. “These qualities make the 
commodity of real estate very sensitive to devolarization, especially in contrast to 
machinery and other forms of fixed capital.” (Weber, 2004: 174) Besides, the 
distinction between use and exchange value of real estate may cause a problem if 
one considers the inherent resistance of it to modification. The peculiar qualities of 
real estate seem to trigger struggles and competition between different interest 
groups on urban space. Those people with emotional attachment to place and those 
without such attachments may stand against each other in this competition (Weber, 
2004: 172). As will be made explicit in the empirical chapters, the neoliberal 
 39
policies on gecekondu settlements have also led to such contingent results in local 
context in relation to the inherent qualities of space. With the legalization of most 
classical gecekondu settlements as a consequence of neoliberal policies, some 
gecekondu settlements that have been evaluated as favorable by large-scale 
investors were opened to competitive market mechanisms. Or else, some 
gecekondu settlements due to their low market value in congruence with their 
location vis-à-vis favorable spaces hardly experienced rapid apartmentalization 
process. Other than that, the clashing interest of local groups in these spontaneous 
spaces may also bring about unintended and contingent spatial developments in 
such a neoliberal context. The spatial practice of local actors and their attribution 
of use and exchange value to certain places in gecekondu neighborhoods when 
combined with the asymmetrical power relations in localities contribute to the 
spontaneity of these neighborhoods. In that sense, the spatial acts of the inhabitants 
of gecekondu settlements gain considerable importance when the potential of 
spontaneity embedded in these neighborhoods is taken into consideration.  
 
 
1.1.3.4. Strategy versus Tactic  
 
Understanding the creative and transformative agency of local actors regarding 
their potential to create spontaneity, De Certeau’s critique of everyday life and the 
concepts that are developed by him are resourceful for this thesis. De Certeau has 
also built his arguments on Lefebvre’s general critique to abstract space of 
capitalism. This will constitute the subject matter of this section.    
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Michel De Certeau, in his book “The Practice of Everyday Life” (1984) 
brings a similar criticism with Lefebvre (mentioning his inspiration from Lefebvre) 
to everyday life as organized by capitalism and the domination of modernist 
strategist acts in defining a totalizing space for the “consumers” with a different 
vocabulary than Lefebvre. The rationalization of the city, in a very similar fashion 
with Lefebvre’s critique, seems to be mystified by the strategist discourse 
according to De Certeau. As indicated by him (1984: 94), the city founded by 
utopian and urbanist discourse is defined by the possibility of a threefold operation.  
 
First of all, the strategy should produce its own space in which rational 
organization must repress all the physical, mental and political pollutions that 
would comprise it. Secondly, univocal scientific strategies must replace the tactics 
of users who take advantage of “opportunities”. Finally, universal, anonymous 
subject which is the city itself should be created and thereby it gradually becomes 
possible to attribute to it all the functions and predicates that were previously 
scattered and assigned to many different real subjects.  
 
However, as De Certeau indicated, modernization praxis and paradigm 
mainly bring the cul-de-sac (dead end) of the functionalist organization. 
Functionalist organization by “privileging progress, (i.e., time), causes the 
condition of its own possibility- space itself- to be forgotten; space thus becomes a 
blind spot in a scientific and political technology” (De Certeau, 1984: 95). This 
inherent inability of the modernization ideal to realize itself leads to a dualism and 
a distinction between “strategy” and “tactic” as defined by De Certeau.  
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The distinction between strategy and tactic is the near correspondence of the 
distinction as supposed by Lefebvre between the realm of “producers” and “users”. 
As stated by De Certeau, the possibility of any strategic act to realize itself, there 
needs to be a defined and planned space. Lefebvre also refers to the realm of 
strategy at some point of his discussions on the production of space where he 
signifies the close and necessary relation between strategy and occupying a certain 
space. The goal of any strategy, for him, is to occupy space by the varied means of 
politics and war (Lefebvre, 1998: 366). The agency of “representations of space” 
or its correspondence in De Certeau’s terminology, “strategic realm” is able to 
produce, tabulate, and impose spaces (De Certeau, 1984: 30). The actors who take 
part in the macro planning activity (urban planners, bureaucrats, technocrats, social 
engineers, academics) who have the ability to conceptualize space in Lefebvrian 
sense have the economic and political power to develop strategies. As in 
management, every strategic rationalization seeks first of all to distinguish its own 
place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from an environment or in other 
words from the context of actually existing social relations (De Certeau, 1984: 36).  
 
On the other hand, the space of the tactic is the space of the other (weak), it 
does not, therefore, “have the options of planning a general strategy and viewing 
the adversary as a whole within a district, visible, and objectifiable space.” (De 
Certeau, 1984: 37) Tactics of the weak can only use manipulate and divert these 
spaces of power. Tactics are procedures that gain validity and success mostly in 
relation to their efficient usage of time and their ability in turning an instant 
intervention into a favorable situation where the rapidity of the movements may 
change the organization of a space, which paves the way for the successful 
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application of a tactic (De Certeau, 1984: 38). De Certeau makes relatively a more 
noticeable emphasis when compared to Lefebvre on the autonomy or tactical 
power of the “weak” to alter the space of strategy by employing the very tools of 
the strategical realm. The common position as held by Lefebvre and De Certeau is 
that they have transformed the concept of space and “taken it beyond the 
formalistic axioms of geometry, transforming the ephemeral character of 
spatialization into a dynamic enigma” (Van Loon, 2002: 90).  
 
The distinction between strategy and tactic by De Certeau is conceptually to 
be resourceful to define the acts of gecekondulus in the process of diverting the 
modernist space of strategy, which is by its nature open to exploitation and 
diversion due to its irreconcilability with the actually existing social relations. 
Baydar (1997) has first used the conceptual framework of De Certeau in relation to 
gecekondu dwellers. As stated by Gülsüm Baydar (1997: 203), although 
gecekondulus lack necessary power to “strategically” utilize and manipulate local 
political institutions in their service, they “display ingenious tactics” in which they 
“turn events into opportunities and make use of the strong”. In a sense, migrants 
“lend a political dimension to everyday practices” and they protect early gecekondu 
dwellings by using “tactical operations against the relentless strategies of city 
fathers.” (Baydar, 1997: 203)  
 
De Certeau also gives examples from the squatter type of formations while 
mentioning about the tactical realm. He signifies the potential of political agency 
with a stronger emphasis than Lefebvre by giving references to the maneuver 
capacity of the users within the strategical space and their potential of diverting the 
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space. Still he defines tactical acts mainly within the realm of consumption rather 
than production. De Certeau, in a number of points throughout his discussion give 
examples from the migrant dwellings in France referring to these people’s 
consuming and diverting city’s space in accordance with their cultural prerequisites 
similar to his following anecdote:  
 
Thus a North African living in Paris of Roubaix (France) insinuates into the 
system imposed on him by the construction of a low-income housing 
development or of the French language the ways of “dwelling” (in a house or 
in a language) peculiar to his native Kabylia. He superimposes them, by that 
combination, creates for himself a space in which he can find ways of using 
the constraining order of the place or of the language. Without leaving the 
place where he has no chance but to live and which lays down its law for 
him, he establishes within it a degree of plurality and creativity. By an art of 
being in between, he draws unexpected results from his situation (De 
Certeau, 1984: 30).  
 
 
He gives the above example to the tactic of the powerless and their potential 
of creating certain spaces of their own. However, De Certeau defines these 
dwellings mainly in the context of time-sensitive tactical acts of consuming the 
dominant space rather than defining these dwellings as more permanent socio-
spatial forms that have some potential to influence the strategical realm. If we are 
to take and employ De Certeauan theoretical framework to understand and 
conceptualize social spatialization in gecekondu settlements, his distinction 
between strategy and tactic can be criticized on a number of points with an iterative 
consideration of empirical feedbacks. In that respect the critical and merged 
reading of Lefebvre’s theory on production of space and De Certeau’s distinction 
between strategy and tactic will be employed throughout the thesis regarding the 
empirical findings by critically analyzing these two theories.   
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However, even before going into the evaluation of empirical data, certain 
criticisms can be brought to both De Certeau and Lefebvre in terms of their 
conception of power relations and the dualism they cannot avoid with a supposition 
of a clear distinction between strategical and tactical realm with such a power 
conception.  
 
The supposition of dualism between tactical and strategical realm has been 
defined with a quiet static understanding of power relations. Although one of De 
Certeau’s main objective is to point out the potential moments in alternative 
reading of history when the tactics of the “weak” divert the dominating space in 
various ways, his overemphasis of the power of the strategical realm to impose its 
hegemony over the “users” or “consumers” seems to sabotage this objective to a 
certain extent. The limits of the tactical realm are so often emphasized by De 
Certeau that even the ways in which strategical and tactical realm interact in the 
practical context seem to be neglected. Lacking a place of its own, lacking a view 
of the whole, limited by the blindness, limited by the possibilities of the moment, a 
tactic is determined by the absence of power just as a strategy is organized by the 
postulation of power according to De Certeau (1984, 38). 
 
The reciprocal relation between the formation of strategy and employment of 
tactics seems to be neglected in such an attribution of perfection and homogeneity 
to the power structure of the strategical realm. Different definitions of power make 
it possible to understand the dynamism and reciprocity between strategical and 
tactical realm. Ewick and Silbey (2003) conduct a qualitative research that depends 
on respondents’ stories about their dealings and encounters with law. Individuals 
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employ the opportunities of the strategical realm to develop resistant acts. Their 
aim is to analyze the individual narratives of resistances. Ewick and Silbey (2003) 
give direct references to the terminology of De Certeau in their study with these 
narratives. Depending on a case, they try to transcend the limitations of De 
Certeau’s theory and offer new ways of looking the relation between tactical and 
strategical realms, which seem also very beneficial to mention here for the 
objectives of this thesis. According to the authors, acknowledgment of power not 
as a thing to posses, but as a probabilistic social relationship will help one to see 
the interconnections between the strategical and tactical realm. Power is a series of 
transactions whose consequences are contingent upon the contribution of all the 
parties, those who turn out to be more powerful (superordinate) and those who turn 
out to be less powerful (subordinate) according to the authors. This is a relational 
and processive understanding of power. In that respect, there needs to be 
reciprocity and close alliance between the institutional structures of the strategical 
realm and resistance. Resistance, as much as power, is contingent upon the 
structural resources available to the relational participants (Ewick and Silbey, 
2003: 1335). Within such a framework they define certain patterns of acts of 
resistance as individuals deal with law. They name these patterns as the “typical 
reversals of conventional features” of structural relations. As mentioned above, the 
tactical realm is mainly operationalized by the efficient usage of time. However, 
Ewick and Silbey (2003: 1350, 1351) go beyond the possible patterns of resistant 
acts by introducing tactics that depend on different sources, like “masquerade” that 
is playing with social roles; “rule literalness” that is playing with rules; “foot 
dragging” that is playing with time and “colonizing space”.  
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The intentional change of social roles in order to deal with law is called as 
“masquerade”. The tactic of “rule literalness” depends on two sources as stated by 
the authors. First possibility of resistance may emerge from the incompleteness and 
opening in any rule system that provide opportunities for the “weak” to exploit. 
This incompleteness may emerge from a lacuna in the system of rules, by virtue of 
not being governed or defined (Ewick and Silbey, 2003: 1353). Second source 
might involve subverting the purpose of rule by rigidly observing it. “Foot 
dragging” is the resister’s playing with the rationalized time of the modernist 
strategy that defines and controls behavior in terms of time (Ewick and Silbey, 
2003: 1359). Fourthly “colonizing space” is to produce spaces of resistance.  
 
With such a novel typology of tactical acts, the limitations of tactic as defined 
by De Certeau seem to be transcended. Burkitt (2004) brings a similar criticism to 
De Certeau’s conception of everyday life. According to Burkitt, De Certeau’s 
definition of tactics as temporary, dispersed and lacking a colonized space should 
be rethought. The practices tactical in nature (unofficial) do have their spaces and, 
moreover, the way time and space is combined in such practices differentiate them 
from official practices (Burkitt, 2004: 216). In this understanding, (2004: 224) 
independent from the official or unofficial nature of some practices, within 
everyday life, some practices are fixed more in geographical space and relatively 
frozen in time, while other more fleeting experiences are quick to pass and do not 
have such a materialization in geographical space.  
 
To conclude, both Lefebvre and De Certeau seem to accept an asymmetrical 
power relation in advantage to the agency of the conceived realm or strategical 
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realm.  Lefebvre acknowledges the repercussions between the three components of 
the triad. According to Lefebvre, the study of space must account for both 
“representational spaces” (lived) and “representations of space” (conceived) but 
above all for their interrelationships and their links with “spatial practice.” 
(Lefebvre, 1998: 116) However, he also overemphasizes the power of social 
engineering projects to create a totalizing and homogenizing space.  De Certeau 
leaves a relatively more extended and flexible place to tactical act’s capacity to 
divert space from within the system, but still the potential and ability of users to 
create their own space are to a large extent neglected by an identification of the act 
of consumption with the “weak”.   
 
As will be pointed out by the findings of the research in the following 
chapters, a critical reconsideration of the strategical and tactical realm is necessary. 
First of all, there is a need to reconsider the theoretical dualism between strategy 
and tactic because evidence from the research implies their interconnected nature. 
Within the context of this interconnectedness, it will be argued that not only the 
acts in tactical realm need to take into consideration the strategical realm, but also 
the strategy defines itself and its “other” by taking into account the nature of the 
incidents in tactical realm.  
 
Secondly, the diversity and dynamism of power positions should be taken 
into account within each realm. The diverse and reciprocal ways of actors’ dealing 
or relating with the actors in their or other realms of the spatial triad should be 
considered. This examination on the empirical level would also bring up the need 
for new concepts to define acts of gecekondulus vis-à-vis the actors in the realm of 
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strategy on the vertical level or the “other” groups in the realm of tactic on the 
horizontal level. Since the main motivation behind the research is to understand the 
nature of social spatialization in the neighborhood rather than the power relations 
between different groups based on hemşehri, sectarian or ethnic lines, this 
examination will be made by showing certain examples to the shifting nature of the 
relations between the groups with reference to the critical moments in the course of 
spatial history. Such a dynamic model of social spatialization would be helpful to 
bring a dynamic approach to shifting group identities and changing boundaries 
between groups depending on the context of relationship at different moments of 
social spatialization.  
 
Within the context of the reconsideration of the theoretical frameworks 
offered by Lefebvre and De Certeau, certain empirical cases will play a vital 
contributory role. Therefore in empirical cases, I will draw attention to the local 
groups who had been positioned within the tactical realm at certain moments of 
social spatialization as totally lacking relations with the actors in the strategical 
realm. Their developed socio-political relations with the actors in the strategical 
realm on the vertical level had brought about these groups’ gaining power in time. 
This had turned their actions into near-strategical nature as a consequence of this 
shift in power relations.  
 
It will also be exemplified by empirical cases that tactical acts of the 
powerless in their attempt to create a space for themselves may influence the 
planning acts of the strategical realm in the coming decades in spite of the strong 
definition of gecekondu settlements as the “other” of the modernist space. The 
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empirical cases will also pose examples by which the homogenous definition of 
each realm is challenged. The changing relations of power in the tactical realm 
between hemşehri, sectarian and ethnic groups depending on strategical context 
and spontaneous and contingent nature of social spatialization will also be 
discussed within the context of such theoretical reconsideration.  
 
The study of tactical forms of resistance is generally criticized by some 
scholars in two main respects as defined by Ewick and Sibley (2003: 1330). First, 
the purpose of these resistant acts can never be clearly defined; therefore it is not 
always clear how the practitioners of such acts interpret what they are doing. In 
that respect, there is a danger to attribute a greater agency and an over developed 
oppositional consciousness to these acts by the researcher.  
 
Second critique supposes that focus on everyday resistance abandons a vision 
of transformative politics by a preoccupation with what appear to be individual, 
often momentary trivial acts (Ewick&Silbey, 2003: 1330). In conjunction with 
these criticisms the authors point out the significance to tackle the traces of the 
reciprocal relations between resistance and the realm of power where the resistance 
does not seize upon lapses of power so much as it relies on the persistence of and 
familiarity with a particular social organization. While keeping such a conceptual 
framework in mind, the reading of the local historical dynamics of social 
spatialization in a gecekondu neighborhood will be done mainly by analyzing 
tactical acts as an embedded and connected part and parcel of the system rather 
than a marginal and ineffective part of the city. The acts of migrants in 
appropriation of gecekondu lands, construction of their gecekondus, claiming 
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certain services like water, electricity, transportation, their construction of religious 
spaces and associations that affect the course of spatial development, are all 
considered within the context of analysis. Rather than romanticizing such acts, also 
pointed out by Baydar (1997: 208), it is important to understand the intertwined 
nature of tactic and strategy in compliance with the research interests.   
 
 
1.2 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS 
 
1.2.1 Definition of the Research Setting   
 
The large segment of the designated research setting is included within the official 
boundaries of Boğaziçi neighborhood that is located on the edge of Samsun 
Highway, -the main highway that connects Ankara with other central Anatolian 
towns and cities from which the rural-to-urban migration to Ankara had mainly 
taken place- and extends towards Nato Highway. The research had been chiefly 
conducted in Boğaziçi neighborhood including the places just on the boundary 
between Boğaziçi and adjacent neighborhoods. Some cases are also used from the 
places that are close to Boğaziçi in these adjacent neighborhoods namely 
Akşemsettin, Duralialıç and Fahri Korutürk. Since the main objective of the thesis 
is to write a spatial history of the locality rather than a specific neighborhood, the 
research is not restricted to Boğaziçi only.  
 
 
The locality is considered officially as a part of Nato Highway region 
constituting an important component of Mamak municipal district. The reasons 
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behind selecting Mamak gecekondu region in congruence with the research 
interests are diverse closely related to the certain pecularities and commonalities of 
Mamak vis-à-vis other gecekondu districts. Mamak is one of the largest squatter 
districts in Ankara and has been recognized as the oldest and typical squatter 
district by public knowledge in Turkey. It is composed of fifty-six neighborhoods 
and six villages each of with an approximate population of ten thousand people and 
positioned in the east side of Ankara Metropolitan area (see, Mamak Belediyesi, 
2001). Mamak as one of the most famous and large gecekondu districts in the 
periphery of Ankara, the heart of Westernization project, had long been a symbolic 
space of the “traditional” life styles, radical political resistance and poverty. As 
such it challenges the modernist image of the city in the fifty years of gecekondu 
history. This constitutes one of the main reasons behind the identification of the 
district with gecekondu phenomenon in public perception more readily than the 
other gecekondu districts of Ankara city. The region has been considered as a 
typical gecekondu district for the fact that the growth of the region exemplifies well 
the peripheral pattern of gecekondu expansion, which was the mostly encountered 
pattern in Turkey. Gecekondu districts that have been grown closer to the city 
center might not have witnessed all the processes in the growth and production of a 
typical peripheral gecekondu district capturing a certain autonomy and spontaneity. 
On the other hand, Mamak gecekondu region as a peculiar case constitutes one of 
the rare examples to the unintended growth of a gecekondu district as a challenge 
to and from within the radically modernist production of urban space. As a by 
product of the highly modernist interventions in space in the service of producing a 
modern western city, the growth of Mamak gecekondu region has witnessed, at the 
same time, the modernization history of Turkey. Locating on the gateway of many 
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central Anatolian cities and towns to Ankara, Mamak region started to take 
migration beginning by the early 1950s, whose history will be discussed at length 
in the third chapter. 
 
There are also diverse reasons behind the selection of the specific 
neighborhood as suitable for research interests. First, the locality has hosted a large 
market place that is composed of nearly 150 shops and workshops. The market had 
long kept its status as the only market in a vast area including customers from the 
majority of the neighborhoods in Mamak. The unanticipated presence of the 
market place that is constituted by the striking co-existence of many shops, 
branches of national and international brands, alongside the very small shops of 
traditional craftsmen or the ones that sell goods particular to the needs of squatter 
life in a quite classical neighborhood of typical gecekondu houses inevitably 
attracts the interest of a researcher who wants to conduct a study on spatial history. 
The market place is situated on two edges of the main road that divides Boğaziçi 
and Fahri Korutürk neighborhoods into two all along a valley. The spatial history 
of the market place has witnessed a transformation from a river that had played a 
predominant role in the social spatialization of the neighborhood to a crowded 
market place that has constituted the focal point of social interaction for years. 
Market place and the social dynamics that had affected its development constitute 
the core of social spatialization in the locality. To understand these dynamics will 
hopefully highlight the interconnected nature of these peculiar or spontaneous 
developments in the locality and the context of urbanization in the city in general.  
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The second reason behind the selection of this particular locality is the 
socially heterogeneous quality of this setting in terms of mainly hometown and 
sectarian differences. As will be supported by the empirical findings, these 
differences in social terms play a crucial role in the spontaneous social 
spatialization in this locality. In qualitative type of research like this one, it seems 
crucial from the beginning to find out, if differences of gender, ethnicity or class 
matter also for those studied (Emerson, et al., 1995: 135). In that respect, 
particularly in the first phases of the research, I had paid close attention to any 
occasion upon which people explicitly talk about or describe their relationships in 
the history of social spatialization with reference to hemşehri, sectarian or ethnic 
differences. I encounter, almost in all cases, a clear awareness and perception about 
their and “other”s hemşehri and sectarian identities. In that respect, hemşehri and 
sectarian identities seem to come to the forefront of the narratives explicitly in 
most cases.  
 
Third reason behind the selection of this particular setting is the 50 years 
history of the neighborhood that witnesses the three periods of gecekondu in 
Turkey. The emergence and development of this classical gecekondu setting from 
the 1950s to present is quite dissimilar to the newly emerging illegal settlements by 
the 1980s that are usually defined with the concept “gecekondu” but show 
important variations from classical gecekondu districts. Most of the gecekondu 
houses in Mamak have been legalized owing to their fifty years history by means 
of gecekondu amnesty laws. However, still in the designated research setting, as a 
consequence of inconvenient geographical landscape for construction of 
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apartments and other social reasons10, thousands of typical one-story gecekondu 
houses dominate the scene. Newly emerging illegal settlements in İstanbul, İzmir, 
Diyarbakır and Mersin have constituted a research interest for a number of studies 
in recent years. However, in order to do an alternative reading of official 
gecekondu history by posing challenges to it, there seems to be a need to choose a 
locality that has a long history and carries the traces of a classical gecekondu 
setting.  
 
The hemşehri and sectarian identities are taken as important variables in this 
research constituting the main axis of competition and cooperation in the process 
of social spatialization. For that reason it is crucial to make explicit the common 
meanings attributed to being from certain hometowns that symbolize certain 
political and sectarian affiliations. The choice of migrants to live close to their 
hemşehris makes the social heterogeneity of the region spatially detectable. This 
squatter region similar with other gecekondu settlements of Ankara inhabits 
migrants mainly from the villages and towns of central Anatolian provinces 
namely, Kırşehir, Kırıkkale, Çankırı, Çorum, Yozgat, Sivas, and Ankara. There is 
also a large community of migrants from Tunceli who had settled in the region as a 
consequence of in-city migration in the early 1960s. At this point, it is worth to 
mention that some provinces are categorized in a particular way depending on the 
provinces’ identification with certain political ideologies (leftist/rightist) and/or the 
dense presence of sectarian populations (Sünni/Alevi). Likewise migrants 
categorize each other in accordance with their hometowns.  
                                                 
10 The resistance of local actors and other socio-spatial factors may constitute a barrier against the 
application of construction plans properly in spite of the legalization of gecekondu lands and houses 
in these neighborhoods. This issue will be discussed in detail in chapter six.   
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 The migrants from Kırşehir are the most densely represented migrant 
community in the region. Migrants from Kırşehir in the neighborhood are all Sünni 
in sectarian origin and they are also known for their support to Islamist political 
parties starting from the early 1990s. In their everyday lives, they exhibit a 
conservative and religious lifestyle. Besides that, as will be mentioned in detail in 
the empirical chapters, due to some socio-spatial factors, they are one of the most 
influential groups in defining the social space of the neighborhood. In spite of the 
fact that most of them have a center right approach in politics, they did not take 
active part in the political struggles of the 1970s on side of ultra nationalist militant 
groups.  
 
Migrants from Kırıkkale are the second most densely represented group in 
the region. They are mostly Sünni in sectarian origin; however, there are also 
migrants from some Alevi villages of Kırıkkale in the region. Kırıkkale is still 
generally identified with nationalism in migrants’ perception.  
 
Third largest migrant groups are from Çankırı, Çorum, Sivas and Yozgat. 
These provinces are represented in the region by their heterogeneous sectarian 
structure. There are migrants both from the Alevi and Sünni villages of these 
provinces. As will be made explicit in the empirical chapters, the migrants of these 
provinces, regardless of their political inclinations, had suffered from the political 
struggles of the late 1970s relatively more in comparison to other hemşehri 
communities, which are homogenously represented in sectarian terms. Sünni 
migrants of Yozgat, both in their own or other migrants’ narratives are identified 
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mainly with ultra-nationalist and extreme rightist politics as with the Sünni 
migrants of Çankırı. Sivas is mainly identified with leftist politics and Alevism due 
to the dense presence of Alevi villages within its boundaries. Alevi migrants of 
Sivas and Çorum seem to constitute communities that had taken part in or given 
support to the leftist militant groups of the 1970s. Particularly Alevis of Sivas due 
to their extensive support to leftist political struggle are identified as the “other” of 
the neighborhood. This perception is not only accepted by the conservative Sünni 
communities but also by “acculturated”11 Alevi communities of heterogeneously 
represented central Anatolian provinces. 
 
The last large community analyzed in this study is composed of migrants 
from Tunceli. Migrants from Tunceli are distinguished from other migrants 
analyzed in this thesis because of their Kurdish identity. In addition, in terms of 
their sectarian affiliation they are Alevis. They seem to be perceived as the most 
distant “other” by Sünni migrants. Depending on my observations in the region, the 
social relations between migrants of Tunceli with other migrants retain the most 
distant quality within the general context of the socio-spatial composition of the 
region. They also seem to be physically the most isolated community as they had 
settled on places close to the upper sides of the hills that are topographically most 
difficult to settle in the region.  
 
As it is clear from the above description of migrant features in the region, 
there is a high level of heterogeneity. This heterogeneity, within the context of the 
third research interest of the thesis mentioned above will hopefully provide a 
                                                 
11 Some Alevis of Çorum, Yozgat and Sivas due to the social pressure of their Sünni hemşehris go to 
mosque and fast during the Ramadan, which are not Alevi ways of praying.    
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context to understand the nature of different encounters among the members of 
these communities at some critical moments of social spatialization in the locality. 
 
 
1.2.2 Methodological Framework  
 
As discussed within the framework of conceptual and theoretical structure of the 
thesis, the main objective of the research is to trace the course of social 
spatialization in the locality. This will be done by mainly relying on the migrants’ 
narratives about individual and neighborhood histories. However, it is crucial to 
note that this will not be a detailed local history or report of all aspects of social 
spatialization and in that sense the historical account of all places that can be 
considered as the focal point of social interaction in the neighborhood. Rather, it 
will be an endeavor to signify some moments of social spatialization that seems 
worth to mention by the respondents as part of their individual history in the course 
of social spatialization. In that respect, these moments that may constitute 
examples to the research objectives of the thesis and in that respect some spaces, be 
it the components of market place, religious places, village associations, schools or 
spaces of transportation would be brought into discussion to the extent they had 
taken place in the stories of the migrants. Rather than making a sample of these 
particular places in the locality and tracing all instances of social spatialization in 
them from the beginning, this will be a research of social spatialization through the 
narratives of migrants. Therefore some particular spaces were given extended place 
when compared to others in the research due to their frequent citing in the stories.  
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Individual narratives will be employed on two different levels in analytical 
terms. At the first level, the peculiarity of individual stories or the perception or 
memory of the same incidents differently by each respondent is evaluated as 
crucial in understanding the nature of encounters between different groups in the 
course of social spatialization. This also gives clues about the dynamics of 
spontaneity embedded in this process. The respondents, in some cases, may 
manipulate history of the neighborhood and their place in it by having certain 
agendas in their minds. Narratives of the same incident differently by individual 
respondents may depend on personal histories of migration, class, gender, religious 
affiliation, age and so on (Ley and Mountz, 2001: 240). In the context of the thesis, 
these differences in interpretations will be analyzed to evaluate the way 
respondents situate themselves depending on their hemşehri and sectarian identities 
in the social spatialization of the locality.  
 
At the second level, the totality of narratives in combination with my 
observations and interpretations constitute the building blocks of my reading of the 
actual course of social spatialization in the neighborhood. As mentioned above, 
researcher may encounter with different interpretations of the same incidents. 
“These different versions might be grounded in some of the details not present in 
the other, to order actions in slightly different ways and to offer different 
interpretations of cause and responsibility.” (Emerson, et al, 1995: 117) In that 
respect, the totality of the narratives may substantiate the author’s making up of a 
story of social spatialization.  
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De Certeau states that one must locate a scientific model to explain the 
relation between narration and tactics (spatial practice), in which the theory of 
practices takes precisely the form of a way of narrating them (De Certeau, 1984: 
80). In that respect, rather than searching a secret or reality that exist behind all 
stories, for De Certeau, tales and stories should already be considered as practices. 
Ewick and Silbey (2003: 1345), in their research mentioned above, accept a similar 
position with De Certeau in which case, the stories speak for themselves. They 
search for the examples of how respondents manipulate the structural means and 
system of the strategical realm to develop resistant acts. The authors find certain 
instances in the stories as constituting examples to the way respondents deal with 
law. In this thesis too, the significance and meanings respondents attribute to 
certain moments of social spatialization are allowed to determine the course of 
story. In that respect, rather than attributing an important place to certain 
components of public space from the beginning, the signified spaces that had taken 
place in the stories of migrants were given predominance as mentioned above. 
However, beyond that, to appreciate the need for a second level of analysis that 
contains the interpretations and the conclusions of the researcher regarding the 
conceptual and theoretical framework s/he is dealing with seem to be necessary 
within the context of this research. This seems to be an important methodological 
concern shared by most researchers. As Emerson et al. (1995: 139) mention 
indigenous categories can only provide a starting point. More than identifying 
these member’s categories there is a need to specify the conditions under which 
people actually invoke and apply such terms in interaction with others. Shields 
shares a similar position in his spatial research by mentioning that pure 
hermeneutic would be inadequate if one is striving for a more broadly based 
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sociological explanation (Shields, 1991: 26). In that respect, Giddens’ double 
hermeneutic, which involves both the entering and grasping the frame of meaning 
adopted by the actors themselves in the production of social life, and reconstituting 
these within new frames of meaning according to the analyst’s technical, 
conceptual schemas seems to be relevant with regard to the objectives of the thesis 
(Shields, 1991: 20). Insiders may ascribe to particular discourses about places as a 
mark of their insider status; however, there is a need for the researcher to 
understand the “real” dynamics underlying such discourses. As mentioned above, 
these dynamics can only be traced through interpreting the totality of narratives 
about the social spatialization, as will be the case in the thesis. It is quite difficult to 
sustain some balance between these two levels of analysis. An overemphasis of the 
scholarly framework would distort the narratives of the insiders; but to simply 
present member’s categories exclusively would produce texts devoid of relevance 
and interest to scholarly audiences (Emerson, et al., 1995: 169, 170).  
 
Considering these methodological difficulties, it is crucial to come up with a 
thematic analytical spatial story of the research setting where key patterns, 
processes and regularities of social spatialization in the locality would be searched 
mainly in relation with the first research objective of the thesis mentioned in the 
section of research problem above. It is also important to tackle certain critical 
instances and moments in the course of social spatialization that may constitute 
examples mainly to the second and third research interests of the thesis.    
 
Besides considering “space” as an object of study in tracing some moments 
of social spatialization, “spatial approach” is accepted as a methodological and 
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analytical tool in the thesis. Spatial approach, both as a theoretical and 
methodological tool, seems to suit quite well to the study of a gecekondu locality 
due to peculiar qualities of gecekondu neighborhoods. The innate nature of the 
formation of gecekondu settlements necessarily incorporates a certain 
appropriation of and/or competition over space. The embedded spontaneity in these 
settlements is mainly related to this competition as will be elaborated with the 
findings of the research. Spontaneity in the locality is also related to migrants’ 
active agency in the process social spatialization. In other words, the migrants 
behave simultaneously as planners, constructors and inhabitants of their space for a 
certain period. In that respect, the competition over and production of space 
constitute the primary concerns for the migrants in their everyday lives.  
 
 
1.2.3 Research Methods  
 
By applying qualitative research methods such as semi-structured long interviews, 
informal talks and observation as in the form of participating in some daily 
occasions of the respondents, the oral spatial history of the neighborhood and the 
way individuals situate themselves in this history had been elaborated in the course 
of the research. The priority that is given to the narratives of the individuals as 
mentioned above makes qualitative research techniques appropriate and relevant 
for the purposes of this study. The research started in the summer of 2002 and with 
certain intervals it had lasted until the summer of 2005. I had paid daily visits to the 
region and tried to spend with the respondents as much time as possible. In most 
cases, I try to arrange more than one meeting with each respondent. Because, in 
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many cases, the things people say may not coincide with the things they really 
think and certain time is needed to form a trust relation as an “outsider” researcher. 
In that respect, the participation in some daily occasions with the respondents or to 
have informal conversations with them seems to be vital for the purposes of the 
research. In order to get “member’s meanings”, rather than asking directly about 
their ideas on certain issues, to observe and record naturally occurring talk and 
interaction can be more resourceful (Emerson, et al., 1995: 140). Since some of the 
data concerns politically and religiously sensitive issues, informal talks and 
participatory observation have been more useful than formal interviews for the 
purposes of this research.  
 
The “outsider” researcher role can also be acknowledged as an advantage for 
the fact that it sustains a certain comfort for the studied to express themselves in a 
more explicit manner. In some cases, as Mohammad (2001: 109) mentions, the 
positioning of the researcher as an “insider” may also have an effect of making the 
researcher appear too close for comfort, making people wary of sharing 
information. Due to the anxiety on part of the respondents in making their past 
experiences in the neighborhood and ideas about certain issues explicit particularly 
with regard to their relations with “other” groups, I, most of the time, avoid using 
tape recorder and try to comfort respondents by means of informal talks.   
 
One of the main objectives of the interviews is to learn about the life histories 
of the individuals in connection with the spatial history in the region (see Apendix 
A and B). Therefore, as will be mentioned in the section on sampling issue, old 
people who have a track of history in the locality had been given priority while 
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conducting interviews or conversations. Mostly, I have conducted semi-structured 
interviews with one respondent at a time. However, I have not insisted on 
conducting individual interviews if there was a couple or a group of men or women 
who wished to express their experiences or opinions as a group. Particularly in 
attempts to reach historical accounts, the conversations and debates within the 
group lead to the surfacing of many memories, otherwise may remain tacit. Crang 
(2001: 217), in a similar research conducted by local history groups mentions the 
importance of group study in local history research. As stated by Crang, 
remembering the past is a social undertaking, about establishing and sharing senses 
of the past to produce “social memory”. The naturally occurring informal talks and 
disputes between the individuals might make explicit the real incidents and ideas 
implicit in the historical accounts of social spatialization. The intention behind the 
application of semi-structured interviews is not to cut the natural flow of the 
conversations. In order to manage the information with reference to the incidents 
and memories those seem to be emphasized more by the respondents, I have 
restructured the interviews in the course of the dialogue.  
 
Considering the heterogeneity of the region in sectarian terms, it is important 
not to form closer relations with people from one of these sectarian groups when 
compared to the other. Forming an honest relation by making my identity as a 
researcher explicit makes all stages of the study easier. Besides these, official maps 
of the neighborhood and the municipal documents related to the planning of the 
designated settlement constitute another source of data.         
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 1.2.4 Sampling, Data Analysis and Some Weaknesses of the 
Research 
 
There are two main groups of respondents selected as convenient with the 
objectives of the research. First group comprises the migrants who can be accepted 
as either the active or more powerful agents who have the ability to act near-
strategically as defined in the conceptual framework. Shop owners who seem to be 
the most effective group and behave as the main power holders both in conjunction 
with their economic assets and networks in local politics mainly constitute this 
group. Shop owners are also critical as a group in order to attain the information on 
the history of social spatialization in the market that constitutes the core of the 
research due to the importance and centrality of the place as the focal point of 
social interaction. In that respect, shop owners constitute the first group of 
population in accordance with the objectives of the research. In order to attain a 
representative sample by considering the different functions shops perform, the 
country of origin and sectarian affiliation of the owners and the years spent in the 
neighborhood, the purposeful sampling12 method is used. Since the research 
mainly traces the spatial history, the shops and workshops that have a relatively 
longer history are given priority to be considered within the sample. 15 in depth 
                                                 
12 “This is a strategy in which particular settings, persons or events are selected deliberately in order 
to provide important information that can’t be gotten as well from other choices.” (Maxwell, 1996: 
70) As defined by Maxwell there are at least four possible goals for purposeful sampling. Firstly, by 
means of purposeful sampling, the representativeness or typicality of the settings, individuals, or 
activities can be selected. Secondly, the heterogeneity of the population can be sustained through 
purposeful sampling. The third possible goal of purposeful sampling is to examine the cases that are 
essential for the theoretical and conceptual framework employed by the researcher. Fourthly, 
purposeful sampling can be critical to provide the possibility of comparison to exemplify the 
differences between different settings and individuals (Maxwell, 1996: 71, 72).  
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interviews were conducted with shop owners. In proportion with the dense 
representation of shop owners from Kırşehir in the market, five shop owners from 
Kırşehir were taken in the sample. Two shop owners from Yozgat, three shop 
owners from Ankara, two shop owners from Çorum, two shop owners from 
Çankırı and one shop owner from Kayseri were interviewed. Besides the 
interviews, I had spent a certain amount of time in each shop to witness the daily 
routine and the relationship between customers and shop owners. During my stays 
in the shop, informal talks with the shop owners provide crucial knowledge in 
understanding the dynamics of social spatialization.  
 
The ordinary inhabitants of the region constitute the second population of 
informants. 33 in-depth interviews are conducted within this group. Similar to the 
concerns as in the first group of population, the period of stay in the locality, 
hometown and sectarian affiliations constitute the main concern during the 
sampling process. In order to attain the second group of respondents, a 
combination of random and purposive sampling method is used. Since the 
inhabitants from the same hometowns mainly choose to settle close to each other, it 
is possible to clearly demarcate spatial concentration of migrants from the same 
hemşehri groups. Considering the provincial distribution of the migrants in certain 
hemşehri regions, I select a random house in each region and take information 
about the families who may have suitable qualities from these randomly selected 
families. In a sense, these randomly selected houses constitute keys to other 
families of the same hometown who have considerably longer history in the region 
and are from certain sectarian identity. In each region a number of families were 
selected by using different key informants who were randomly selected. This is 
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done in order to avoid key informant bias. Qualitative researchers, as some cases 
show, may rely on a small number of informants either in the process of taking 
guidance as to make purposeful sampling or in the course of gathering the major 
part of their data (Maxwell, 1996: 73). Particularly, in gecekondu research, the key 
informant bias may imprison the researcher in a closed and small hemşehri, kinship 
or sectarian group. The main concern while choosing families in each hemşehri 
locality is to reach houses those are spatially distant from each other. The main 
objective behind such a concern is to have a track of social spatialization in the 
broadest sense. A number of families are selected as cases for their spatial location 
near families from the opposite sect in order to constitute examples to the processes 
and meanings of being neighbors with the opposite sect in the course of social 
spatialization.   
 
By employing such a method, 13 Alevi and 20 Sünni respondents were 
interviewed. 16 of the interviewees are women while 17 are men. There are seven 
migrants from Kırşehir, six from Yozgat, five from Kırıkkale, four from Çorum, 
four from Tunceli, three from Sivas one from Kastamonu, two from villages of 
Ankara present in the sample. Almost all of the respondents are above the age 40, 
who had spent considerable time in the neighborhood.  In the composition of the 
sample interviewees, older people had been particularly looked for. In that respect, 
migrants interviewed are the early comers to the region rather than the latecomers 
and tenants. Therefore there seems to be a bias in the research from the beginning 
since almost all of the respondents in the sample are relatively powerful groups as 
the early comers accumulate wealth, experience and social and political network in 
the city. Besides these two important groups of respondents, with the orientation of 
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the narratives, a number of interviews with key people who have played important 
roles in the course of social spatialization had also been conducted.  
 
Hometown and sectarian differences of being Alevi and Sünni are taken as 
important variables that affect the relationship between groups in the course of 
social spatialization and taken on different meanings and tones depending on the 
context of social spatialization. In this research, group identity or the definitions of 
“us” and “them” in the narratives of the respondents even in the beginning of the 
research had been considered as context dependent and showing variations 
depending on spatio-temporal factors. In the later stages of the research, the 
empirical data also support my theoretical acceptance of constructivist view of 
identity from the beginning of the research.  In such a view, ethnic boundaries are 
the outcome of social interaction between groups. “The criteria that are used to 
categorize “Us” and “Them” are not objective differences, but features that the 
actors themselves regard as significant. Ethnic boundaries in this view are not 
given, but constructed, manipulated, subject to change and situational.” 
(Erdentuğ&Colombjin, 2002: 10) Even the simple definition of identity seeks this 
kind of reciprocity and construction rather than a consequence of given reality. 
Social identity includes our understanding of who we are as a group and definition 
of the other group for us, reciprocally; vice-versa is also true for the other group’s 
definition of their identity (Jenkins, 1996: 5). However, it is important to mention 
that these definitions by their nature depend on the context of the social interaction. 
In that respect, identity can only be taken as a process; as being; or becoming. 
There needs to be certain remembering and sharing in a group for the sake of the 
continuation of such collective identities. However, these rememberings and 
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sharings may have shifting meanings over time. Sometimes, one definition of “us” 
or “them” for a group may be contested by another definition of “us” and “them” 
that is substantiated from another identity source for the same group. In that 
respect, collective identities are generated in transaction and interaction and are, at 
least potentially, flexible, situational and negotiable (Jenkins, 1996: 102).   
 
The identity issue and hometown and sectarian commonalities as the most 
often mentioned identity references in the narratives are regarded mainly in such a 
constructivist manner throughout the thesis. It is also important to note that the 
basic objective of the thesis is not to deal with the definitions or interpretations of 
identities. Rather I take identity definitions as variables or/and reasons behind the 
situational positioning of groups depending on the spatio-temporal context of the 
locality. Therefore, there will be no detailed references to the theoretical literature 
on identity and no closer interpretation of and narrative analysis related to identity 
definitions will be made throughout the thesis.   
 
I initiated data analysis with a thorough reading of all the field notes and 
defined certain categories and themes through this reading. As mentioned by 
Maxwell (1996: 79), the key feature of most qualitative study is their relying 
initially and mostly on the data gathered in the process of defining codes for 
analysis in an inductive fashion. This inductive approach seems to be the dominant 
form in qualitative type of study in congruence with the nature of it as it is mainly 
grounded in the data. In a research having an important historical component like 
this, the initial categorization of the field-notes by putting the data into temporal 
units before a more specific and thematic coding helps a lot. This also contributes 
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to coming up with a thematic story at the last stage of the writing process. After the 
first and second revision of the field-notes, at the stage of initial thematic coding of 
the data, there emerged a need also to utilize existing literature and theory on 
which the research interest had been built. Coding process necessitates mainly a 
categorization of data, overall review of existing theory in interaction with research 
data and the consideration of conceptual structure of the people studied that is emic 
categories. As Crang mentions sometimes quantification of the qualitative data like 
content analysis can be resourceful in following the trace of repeated memories, 
emotions, processes and incidents in local historical research (Crang, 2001: 227). 
In the writing process, sometimes there emerges a need to reconsider the codes. In 
turn, the data analysis also necessitates a reconsideration of the conceptual 
framework in iterative fashion.       
 
The main important difficulty in the field emerges from the perception of 
certain issues and certain moments as in a quite sensitive mood by the migrants. 
These sensitive memories and issues particularly related to the late 1970s where 
the struggle between leftist and rightist militant groups had radically politicized 
make the process of gathering data quite difficult in some cases. Particularly, 
related to this particular period, they behave and speak quite timid about sharing 
their sufferings. They also do not want to make explicit their perception and real 
ideas about other sectarian and hemşehri groups and their tactical acts that include 
informal moments in the course of social spatialization. In order not to take the risk 
of losing many instances of social spatialization by disturbing the natural flow of 
the conversation, I avoid using tape recorder in most cases. Rather I take instant 
notes in the course of the interviews and prepare field-notes for my each visit to the 
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region about the feelings I get from the conversations and also about the attitudes 
and emotions of the respondents. Therefore, I wrote my field-notes compiling the 
notes that I had taken during the conversation as immediately as possible, 
sometimes even in the bus on my way to home.  
 
Second important difficulty is related to gathering information about religious 
spaces and practices particularly from the Alevi respondents. Alevis’ place for 
prayer Cemevi13 is still not considered as a legally recognized place for prayer due 
to the domination of Sünni interpretation of Islam in state policies about religion. 
There is only one Cemevi in the region that is not recognized officially but 
informally functions as a cultural foundation for Alevi people, but they conduct 
religious gatherings in it. The participation in such gatherings or to take detailed 
information about the construction of Cemevi has been a quiet difficult process for 
me. Moreover, to behave quite insistent in order to gather knowledge might have 
caused suspicion within both Alevi and Sünni communities. This might also have 
restricted the possibility of gathering knowledge from people about other, less 
sensitive issues.  
 
The formal places of prayer for Sünni population are the two mosques in the 
settlement. Since men use the mosques mostly, the informal religious gatherings at 
home constitute an important part of the religious life for Sünni women. However, 
these informal gatherings at home have also been under close surveillance of 
                                                 
13 The Alevis do not use Cemevi in the way orthodox Sünnis use mosque. Unlike a mosque or church, 
Cemevi is not a place where one conducts prayer in order to comfort her/his conscience. In order one 
to go to Cemevi, at first, one need to be peaceful. Cemevi is a multivocal place. In most of the Alevi 
villages, Cemevi is used for purposes other than religious ceremonies in normal times (see, 
Çamuroğlu, 2000: 83). 
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security forces. In that respect, I could only participate in two religious gatherings 
at home. Since it is difficult define public and private realms in gecekondu 
settlements, such gatherings are also considered as public issues therefore 
considered as important parts of recent social spatialization in the neighborhood. 
However, Sünni women also behave timid to share information about these 
gatherings. Village associations of Sünni migrants, which are usually used as 
coffeehouses by men due to their status as manly spaces, had been very difficult for 
a woman researcher to sustain long hours of participation in the daily routines 
there. In spite of all these difficulties, not to be so insistent on attaining certain 
knowledge and entering in certain spaces had helped me to sustain a trust 
relationship and to gather in depth knowledge about other aspects of social 
spatialization, which in turn sustain important clues about these sensitive issues in 
the course of the research.  
 
 
1.2.5 An outline of the thesis 
 
The main contribution of this thesis is to reveal some instances about the 
interdependent nature of the formation of gecekondu settlements and planning of 
city space in general with a new framework appreciating the reciprocity between 
tactical acts of gecekondulu and the agency of strategical realm. Gecekondulu 
rather than being a marginal actor tactically employs the structural means of the 
strategical realm for the sake of constructing informal gecekondu space. Any 
planning practice that wants to attain success should consider local knowledge in 
these neighborhoods where spontaneity plays a crucial in social spatialization of 
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them. Spontaneous and contingent development in these settlements is very much 
an embedded part of local social dynamics between different groups in the locality. 
So hopefully, a sketch of social spatialization with a retrospective perspective in 
one of the oldest and typical gecekondu settlements will shed light on these local 
dynamics that have taken different forms over time. Local knowledge and the ways 
offered to attain it in this thesis would hopefully sustain a piece of information for 
the ones interested in new ways of urban planning and politics. This way of 
gathering local information will hopefully contribute to a new understanding that 
shifts the analytical focus from “government” to “governance”, and takes a critical 
stand with regard to holistic conceptions of urban planning (Groth&Corjin, 2005: 
504). Democratic and more inclusive ways of local governance will be possible by 
gathering pieces of local knowledge together. This thesis will hopefully provide a 
piece of local knowledge in the service of urban policies and planning.  
 
With such a conceptual and methodological agenda in mind, the second 
chapter is devoted to the critical historical sketch of how gecekondu neighborhoods 
have been represented in public discourse in parallel to the socio-spatial 
developments in them. While doing that the hesitant approach of politicians to 
gecekondu issue would be problematized within an overview of gecekondu laws 
and politics. The third chapter includes a critical and a detailed reading of planning 
and construction of Ankara city and the emergence of spontaneous spaces in the 
periphery of the city as a paradox and impediment of this planning activity. The 
initial settlement years in the designated research setting will be elaborated in 
chapter four. The settlement decisions of migrants, construction of gecekondu 
houses and the development of the basic socio-spatial schema of research setting 
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will be elaborated with reference to the dialectical interaction between migrants’ 
tactical acts and natural factors as the most important spatial determinants of the 
time.  Chapter five is devoted to an analysis of the political turmoil of the 1970s in 
the neighborhood. The effect of the open and harsh struggles between leftist and 
rightist groups will be portrayed by an examination of radically political social 
spatialization in the locality. The changing context of power relations due to 
tactical wars on the horizontal level will also be considered. The changing context 
of social spatialization due to neoliberal policies and identity politics beginning by 
the 1980s will be examined in the context of chapter six. It will be a showcase to 
explicate the transition from a “space of politics” to a “politics of space” in the 
course of social spatialization in the neighborhood. The spontaneity and 
contingency embedded in spatialization during that period will be extensively 
evaluated. The religiously dominated identity perceptions will be elaborated in 
relation to the socio-spatial context of the period. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
STRATEGICAL REALM’S DISCOURSE OF GECEKONDU 
SETTLEMENTS 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The sixty years history of gecekondu settlements in Turkey is considered as the 
most important side effect of the rapid urbanization process, which has been itself 
embedded in the political and economic context of the country sharing similar and 
in some cases, common instances with many of the developing countries’ histories. 
During the long history of gecekondu in Turkey, however, different interpretations 
of this statement have delineated various ways of representing these settlements. 
As briefly mentioned in chapter one, the system related causes of gecekondu 
construction in Turkey have been underemphasized in most early academic 
research and also in public debate. This approach has attributed an overburdening 
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responsibility to the migrants as the main aggravators of the mal-urbanization in 
Turkish cities. On the other extreme, the modernist public approach had attributed 
a totally effective agency to the actors who have the authority to represent space in 
the strategical realm. In so doing, the acts of representing, producing, tabulating, 
planning and imposing spaces by a bundle of agents such as urban planners, 
politicians, state bureaucrats and scientists have been considered as to transform 
gecekondu settlements into modern districts overtime effectively. Such an 
approach neglects potential spontaneity embedded in the social spatialization of 
gecekondu space, which depends considerably on the capabilities of local agency.  
 
Considering the weaknesses of these two approaches, the socio-spatial 
transformations in gecekondu settlements will be dealt with by taking the changing 
political and economic context of the country into account. The simultaneous 
analysis of the legal context in dealing with gecekondu spaces and the changing 
representations of gecekondu space will constitute the core of this chapter. I intend 
to accomplish this objective by dividing gecekondu history in Turkey into three 
main phases showing certain correspondences with the phases of social 
spatialization as signified by the respondents of the research.  
 
The first period covers the years between 1940 and 1966. This period 
signifies the first encounters with gecekondu settlements. Though gecekondu 
settlements had become widespread through the end of this period and the concept 
of gecekondu had been used in public debates that criticize the policies about these 
settlements, the “gecekondu” had not been acknowledged formally until 1966, the 
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year when the first law about gecekondu settlements was issued. The period covers 
Republican Regime’s policies of constructing a modern life style through urban 
planning and also the transition to multiparty politics, which had altered the policy 
of urbanization in a dramatic manner.  
 
The second period includes the years between 1966 and 1980. This period 
covers the most dynamic years in the socio-spatial transformation and the rapid 
spread of gecekondu settlements in the periphery of the cities. This period 
witnessed the ossification of gecekondu settlements in the physical, political, 
economic, social context of large cities in spite of the fact that they had been 
represented as marginal spaces in public and academic debates. Political and 
economic instability in the 1970s had led to radical struggles going on between 
extreme leftist and rightist militant groups in all towns and cities of the country. 
Gecekondu spaces have also been subject to this struggle, even more than the other 
places, due to the close encounters between Sünni groups claiming extreme rightist 
and ultra-nationalist ideologies and Alevi groups appropriating extreme leftist 
ideologies in the neighborhoods. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, these 
were the years in which the homogenous identity imposed on gecekondu society as 
the “rural other” have been severely damaged as a consequence of the conflict-
ridden encounters between different identity groups in gecekondu settlements.  
 
Third period starts with 1980 the year denoting the military intervention. The 
intervention was carried out with the pronounced aim of restoring democracy in the 
politically unstable context of the country. It paved the way for a new phase in 
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Turkish history, which has been dominated by the neoliberal policies of the first 
civil government. This neoliberal approach to economy and politics transforms the 
whole estate system and gecekondu neighborhoods are also included in the context 
of this transformation. The socio-spatial transformations in these settlements had 
hardened the content and intensity of exclusionary representations about gecekondu 
neighborhoods in public debate. The intense proliferation of illegal settlements in 
the periphery of large cities after the 1980s that have shown great variations from 
the socio-spatial emergence and qualities of classical gecekondu settlements have 
made the analysis of representation of low-income settlements in public debate a 
more complicated issue.  
 
 
2.2 1940-1966: The Period of First Encounters  
 
2.2.1 Rural-to-Urban Migration and the Initial Emergence of 
Gecekondu Settlements 
 
The period between 1940 and 1966 witnessed the implementation of important 
economic and structural reforms with the aim of integrating Turkey with the world 
economy. The single party regime that had lasted until the late 1940s sought statist 
economic and cultural policies, which aimed to construct a national industry 
depending on country’s own resources and implemented a civilized life style 
modeling west. Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) statist, centralist and 
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protectionist economic policies of import substitution and intense control of 
agricultural production including the forced collection of farm produce had 
alienated mainly the landlords and peasants. This alienation had prepared the 
context for a warm welcome and popular support for Democrat Party (DP), the 
victor of the first elections of multi-party period held in 1950 (Ahmad, 1993:102). 
As an alternative to the statist policies of CHP, DP seemed to integrate a more 
liberal approach to economy and society. The first seeds of the process of 
integration with west through Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan had already 
been sawn during the single party era. DP carried on the integration, which 
constituted the core of its party program and the party played a major role in this 
integration process. However, in time, with its repressive, populist and hesitant 
policies it was accused of carrying similar policies with CHP in alienating masses. 
During the DP rule, the control of economy was to a large extent left to western 
powers. Economy was dependent on the export of raw materials and food to 
Europe [the demand for food was high during post war years in Europe, but 
declined in succeeding years] and on highly mechanized but not effective and 
productive agriculture.  
 
The unproductiveness of agriculture depended on the continuing dominance 
of landlords at the local level and populist unstable economic policies at the 
national level. With the aim of avoiding landlord domination in the countryside, 
CHP put a land reform bill into effect in 1945. This bill foresaw a dramatic 
structural transformation in traditional means and relations of agricultural 
production. It aimed at preventing local and parochial loyalties mainly among rural 
population and breaking the political hold of the landlords in rural regions by 
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transforming Turkey into a republic of independent peasant proprietors (Ahmad, 
1993: 103). However, due to the populist bias of DP, the conditions of this bill 
could not be properly implemented. The bill that foresaw the distribution of 
privately and state owned land to peasants and the improvement in the conditions 
of peasants worked in the opposite way as a result of the political pressure and the 
power of landlords.14 Another factor that further complicated and hardened the 
conditions of peasants and turned most of them into landless farm laborers was the 
intense mechanization of agriculture with the introduction of 42,000 tractors into 
Turkish agriculture by Marshall Plan. This further deteriorated the conditions of 
peasants vis-a-vis landlords by making them dependent also for technology on 
landlords. Change of the social balances in the countryside played an important 
role in the rural-to-urban migration. Another important factor contributing to the 
scale of rural-to-urban migration was the expansion of transportation facilities with 
the construction of road networks by US aid during DP era. This development 
increased the mobility of peasants and enabled them to encounter towns and cities 
that are close to them.  
 
There had emerged two different spatial models of urbanization out of these 
developments that might take place simultaneously or follow each other 
sequentially through different migratory patterns. First model of urbanization 
emerged as a consequence of the increasing encounters of villagers with near 
towns. These encounters had enlivened the economic life in terms of trade based 
                                                 
14 “Between 1947 and 1962 only about 1.8 million hectares were distributed to 360,000 families with 
only 8,600 being taken from privately owned land. The peasants again lost. The state owned lands, 
which were distributed, had been essential to sustain the landless or near-landless peasants who had 
used them for communal grazing. These people were reduced to the status of farm laborers, or they 
migrated to cities in search for work” (Ahmad, 1993: 116).    
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on agricultural goods and led to the gradual settlement of the villagers in these 
towns temporarily or permanently. This brought the transition of these small towns 
into city status with the increase in their population. Tümertekin considers Turkish 
urbanization, preeminently, as a consequence of this transformation. This trend 
brought a relatively balanced distribution of cities and population in the 1950s 
(1973: 120). The urbanization of the country particularly in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s was by means of the acquisition of small rural towns, city status. These 
small cities had been the first stop for the migrants on the way to large cities in the 
west that are İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Second spatial model of urbanization 
owes to intense rural-to-urban or urban-to-urban migration beginning by the late 
1950s and continued through the 1960s. This led to the rapid growth of largest 
industrial cities that had paved the way to an uneven regional development.  
 
The early phases of being present in cities for the migrants attributed an in-
between position to them. Usually the male members of the households migrated to 
city while leaving the women and children back in the village. There were mainly 
two patterns of migration in the 1950s. First one is the “migration from village to a 
smaller town then to a city, namely indirect migration; and the second one is the 
“migration from village or small towns directly to a city” (Karpat, 1976: 26). 
Within the context of the indirect migration, there appears an extended space for 
the migrants to accumulate knowledge and experience about social networks and 
connections in the large cities during their stay in the towns. Indirect migration also 
brought about the first model of urbanization mentioned above contributing to the 
transformation of small towns into cities.  
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 In both of these migratory trends, migrants protect their strong links with 
their villages and if they have a land in the village, it is possible to talk about a dual 
earning for the families. With the expanding knowledge of migrants in the city, the 
migration took a more permanent character. The migration process that was 
directed mainly by the “push factors”15 started to take more permanent form that 
was directed by the combination of push and pull factors. This transformation led 
to a chain kind of migration in which the forerunner migrants in the city share their 
knowledge and material sources with their hemşehri -fellow countrymen- in order 
to make them settled as their neighbors in city. As will be discussed in chapter 
four, the migration dynamics that contributed to the emergence of the designated 
research setting do not fit clearly to these defined migratory trends. Interestingly 
rather than an urban work, the urban agriculture in the periphery of Ankara had led 
to a seasonal form of migration in the 1940s that had constituted the basis of 
permanent migration of families in the late 1950s.  As defined by İçduygu and 
Ünalan (1997: 41) there are multiple forms of internal migration in Turkey. These 
are interregional seasonal migration from rural to urban places; seasonal rural to 
rural migration; migration from urban to urban; migration from urban to rural and 
particularly after the late 1980s the forced migration from Eastern parts of the 
country (İçduygu&Ünalan, 1997: 41). The form of early migration in the 
designated research setting seems to be seasonal rural-to-“rural periphery” of 
Ankara.  
                                                 
15 Push factors can be defined as the insufficient living conditions in the rural context. Pull factors 
can be defined as the attractive opportunities of the urban environment. Pull factors were the facilities 
and services urban context provided for the migrants. These can be listed as the education and health 
facilities, the wide range of employment opportunities and entertainment facilities in cities.  
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 In sum, the reasons behind rapid urbanization can be listed as the agricultural 
mechanization and the structural transformations following that, like the 
encouragement of cash crops production by state, the changing social relations in 
rural settlements working to peasants’ disadvantage while making landlords more 
powerful socially and economically vis-a-vis peasants; better opportunities of 
health and other social service provision in cities; high chances of mobility due to 
both the governmental policies that were permissive rather than oppressive towards 
migrants and the construction of roads that made people more mobile (Danielson 
and Keleş, 1985: 33; Kıray, 1998). What makes Turkish gecekondu formation a 
peculiar and rapid experience was the distinct quality of land ownership patterns in 
Turkey. There are state lands in the periphery of Turkish cities much more than the 
privately owned land, which can be considered as a consequence of the land 
system, which has been inherited from Ottoman Empire (Friedrich Ebert, 1996:5). 
It is important to remember the fact that even in the early periods of rural-to-urban 
migration in Turkey, gecekondu population in three largest cities of the country 
namely Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir constituted respectively 59%, 45%, and 33% of 
total city populations16.  
 
These developments led to the emergence of gecekondu settlements starting 
from the 1950s in the periphery of large cities. However, before that, even during 
the single party era, it was possible to encounter illegal shelters with very poor 
conditions in large cities. According to the journalistic interviews conducted in 
                                                 
16 See the reports on gecekondus in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir that were prepared by the Ministry of 
Reconstruction & Resettlement General Directorate of Housing in 1966.  
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Altındağ neighborhood of Ankara in 1947, 40,000 people were estimated to live in 
cave-like shelters there, tins covering their roofs getting light only through small 
holes dig on these tin roofs (Şenyapılı, 1998: 302). The emergence of these 
settlements was the consequence of the beginning of migration mainly as a result 
of push factors. In those years, CHP practiced statist and centralist policy of 
industrialization. Therefore, for the migrants there had been no or little vacancies 
in the sector of heavy industry that was rarely present in most of the cities. There 
were also no service sector jobs during that period in the largest cities of Turkey. 
Migrants whether seasonal or permanent had settled either in shelters mentioned 
above or rent rooms with desperate conditions in some low-income neighborhoods 
at the center of the cities.   
 
There were three low-income groups in Ankara living in illegal settlements or 
under difficult conditions. The first group was the low-income state officials 
employed in Ankara’s large bureaucratic sector. The second one was the rural 
migrants coming from near towns and cities to Ankara, from the cities of central 
Anatolia. The third group was the native Ankara dwellers or rural migrants 
resettled by state forces as a result of war, natural disaster or in the process of the 
construction planning of Ankara city (Şenyapılı, 1998: 304). These groups were the 
main actors of gecekondu construction in Ankara. As was the case in İstanbul, 
Ankara’s gecekondu settlements have intensely grown towards the end of 1950s.  
 
Considering the emergence of illegal shelters in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir as 
early as the late 1940s and early 1950s when the effects of Republican attempts to 
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produce modernist urban space in physical and social terms had been still fresh and 
strong, it is important to reemphasize the criticisms posed to Lefebvre’s and De 
Certeau’s attribution of perfection and homogeneity to the power of strategical 
realm. As mentioned above, the policies of governments to modernize and 
industrialize the country through a statist agenda during the Single Party era 
inevitably led to the transformation of the structure of agricultural production. In 
fact, these policies of modernization implemented by the CHP particularly towards 
the 1950s paradoxically had certain populist aspects and concerns to avoid the 
alienation of influential social classes. These populist concerns had gained impetus 
with the DP’s ascendance to power.  
 
Even in the early years of Republican Regime, the populist concerns of 
political actors had fragmented the modernist and homogenizing discourse and 
practice of the strategical realm. This fragmentation had taken a more intense form 
during the DP era as a consequence of the increasing responsiveness of political 
actors to migrant masses in the city.  The emergence of illegal shelters in big cities 
has various causes: rural-to-urban migration as a consequence of the agricultural 
reforms; the insufficiency of the industrial sector to provide jobs for the migrants; 
speculative nature of urban real estate system in big cities that had prevented the 
development of efficient social housing policies. The legal measures that were 
adopted in relation to urban problems particularly beginning by the DP period 
triggered the expansion of these illegal shelters. The initial fragmentation in the 
strategical realm mainly by means of political actors’ populist bias had gone 
together with the strong and ardent modernist discourse on part of state bureaucrats 
and academics in relation to rural-to-urban migration.   
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 2.2.2 Legal Strategies with Regard to Spontaneous Spaces: Un-
Stating Gecekondu  
 
DP came to power by taking the votes of masses and, in cities, the votes of 
gecekondu dwellers who had been alienated by the policies of CHP for long. 
Consequently, they could not stay irresponsive to the demands of gecekondu 
settlers, a condition that led to the utilization of populist policies by the party. 
Therefore DP era is to be considered as the breaking point in gecekondu history 
that had transformed the form of gecekondu settlements from houses or sheds 
scattered loosely in space as seen in the late 1940s to more permanent and 
established neighborhoods in the 1950s (Şenyapılı, 1998: 309). In an environment 
where the old “modernist” city inhabitants, the media and governors all were in 
strong opposition to the emergence of gecekondu settlements, Şenyapılı points out 
politicians’ overlook of these settlement’s rapid growth. As stated by her, this was 
not only related to the vote potential of these settlements, but also related to the 
economic functions they have performed from the 1950s onwards in large cities 
(Şenyapılı, 1998: 310).  
 
Before DP era, during the single party regime, the illegal settlements were 
given references in construction laws but the political measures taken could not be 
effective. State tried to prevent constructions and social happenings taking place 
outside the framework of the planned urban space mainly in a formalistic manner. 
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The statist and regulatory policies had shown itself in the form of legal 
arrangements that dealt with eradicating the preliminary symptoms rather than the 
causes of mal-urbanization during those years (Heper, 1978: 12). Between 1930 
and 1950, five major laws dealing with the land and housing issues and aiming at 
preventing the illegal house construction were implemented.  
 
The first group of laws pursued the well functioning of real estate system by 
making some re-organizations in the ownership patterns of the state lands. In order 
to halt land speculation and to put the functioning of real estate market in order, the 
laws foresaw the transmission of the possession rights of these state owned lands to 
municipalities. In this way, the municipalities were obliged to buy the state lands 
on credit, develop it according to plans and resell it.  
 
The two laws complementing this one came in 1948. The former foresaw the 
transition of the ownership of some treasury lands to Ankara Municipality on credit 
that would be paid in installments of ten years. In so doing, the law enabled Ankara 
Municipality to allocate and transfer part of its land under special circumstances 
for the ones who wanted to build their own houses (Heper, 1978: 18). Its 
complementary law came in the same year. The law encouraged house construction 
by municipalities and extended the jurisdiction of the previous law to all the 
municipalities in Turkey (Heper, 1978: 18). The first successful example of social 
housing, Yenimahalle district was constructed by means of these two laws. Second 
group of regulations foresaw the demolition of houses that had been built without 
construction permit. They were promulgated after the municipal laws, which 
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showed the inability of the previous laws to avoid the construction of illegal 
housing.  
 
The law that supposes the demolition of buildings without construction 
permits came in 1949. It directly targeted gecekondu houses which became “highly 
visible” to the ones who believed in the transitory character of these settlements. 
Second law was established in 1953 and envisioned the provision of social housing 
to the ones who had built unhealthy houses without permits (Heper, 1978: 20).    
 
However, due to the lack of resources and technical manpower, these laws 
could not be carried out properly as the succeeding laws in the following five 
decades would not be realized for similar reasons but with the addition of populist 
concerns. The ineffectiveness and inability of the strategical realm to handle these 
spontaneous spaces was not only related to the internal impediments and 
contradicting interests of the actors in this realm but also to the changing socio-
political conditions of gecekondu settlements. The number of gecekondu houses 
had increased dramatically particularly in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It became 
difficult for state officials to apply police measures in a context where the 
resistance of the migrants had taken a stronger form with high degree of solidarity 
among hemşehri groups. This was the period in which gecekondu settlers had also 
become aware of their political bargaining power in demand of electricity, water 
and other infrastructural services for their neighborhoods. More and more political 
actors had adopted populist approach towards gecekondu dwellers with the 
increasing bargaining power of gecekondulu.  
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 The internal impediments of the strategical realm in terms of lacking material 
resources had been compensated by other factors like the clashing interests of the 
actors in the strategical realm. At the local level, the civil servants, who were in 
charge of the implementation of legal rules in relation to illegal housing, may 
overlook some cases. This was an important phenomenon, which I also 
encountered in the course of the research. There were many reasons for this. First, 
since some of the civil servants themselves were gecekondu dwellers it was 
difficult for them to implement the demolition decisions. They did not want to give 
harm to other gecekondu dwellers sharing the same fate with them. Second, for 
many of the civil servants, the demolition activity turned into a means of obtaining 
economic benefit by taking bribe from the migrants. Third, in some rare cases a 
strong resistance in hemşehri or neighbor groups met the officials, which made the 
implementation of the demolition decisions difficult. In some cases, the demolition 
decisions were implemented partially, like destroying some part of the house, 
which would not lead physically to the demolition of the whole building.  
 
During the DP era, three construction laws were promulgated and these laws 
provided official pardon to the already emerged illegal low-income settlements in 
the peripheries of the cities. These laws avoided using the label of gecekondu that 
had become widespread in public use during those years. There was a common 
condition in almost all of these urban planning laws.17 The amnesty was valid for 
                                                 
17  “During the period between 1948 and 1966 three construction laws have been issued. In 1953 law 
number 6188 encouraging apartment constructions was put into effect and forgave illegally 
constructed houses that have been built until that time. Following that law number 7367 issued in 
1959 which foresaw the distribution of state owned lands out of the municipal boundaries to poor 
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the illegal houses that had been built before the law became effective. In spite of 
this condition, however, the laws by no means had any dissuasive effect. As a 
consequence of populist policies, migrants could easily make future estimations 
that governments would make new amnesty laws with almost every coming 
election. However, despite DP’s populist policies and their effective role in the 
increasing proliferation of gecekondus in the periphery of the cities, DP’s approach 
to urban planning had taken a “despotically modernist” turn particularly towards 
the end of their ruling period. Similar to Single Party regime’s policies, they would 
like to erase traces of the past and poverty. Accordingly, DP implemented 
formalistic policies that make Ankara and İstanbul resemble to modern European 
metropolises (Şenol- Cantek, 2006: 51).  
 
As this section reveals, the agency of the strategical realm has not represented 
a uniform attitude and intention with regard to low-income settlements. This 
inconsistency has two basic causes: Contradicting concerns of the political actors 
and state bureaucrats and the changing social and political context over time. In 
this initial period, the legal measures that were taken in relation to urban problems 
and planning were mainly formalistic in nature and contain a certain disregard of 
illegal shelters emerging at the center and periphery of the cities. Legal 
indifference had gone together with the strongly modernist approach on the part of 
state elites in their attempts to represent the modernist urban space by indicating 
the “other” of this space, namely gecekondu houses and gecekondulus.   
 
                                                                                                                                         
people. In 1963, another law that guarantees service provision to houses, which were officially 
lacking municipal permission for residing was issued” (Ekinci, 1998: 194).    
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 2.2.3 The Elitist Approaches to the Initial Formations of 
Gecekondu Settlements 
 
The emergence of gecekondu settlements in the periphery of the cities, particularly 
in Ankara that was planned as the core project of Republican Regime to impose a 
Western life style on society had been met by public and academic attention in the 
1950s and 60s with a strong emphasis on uneasiness and degradation related to 
these settlements and rural lifestyle there. Such a strong reactionary representation 
of low-income settlements in the center and periphery of the cities and a neglect of 
the system related causes of their emergence had gone together with an optimistic 
belief in the transitory character of these settlements.  Parallel to the policies 
dealing with the problems of urbanization in an insincere manner as mentioned 
above, the public approach had foreseen possible solutions to the problem by 
getting rid of the visible consequences of the problem that were gecekondu 
settlements, rather than the problem itself. In spite of its failures, formalist 
approach in urban planning and policies has been dominant from the 1940s until 
present. Particularly, between 1955 and 1960, under the name of construction 
movement, big boulevards have been built in Ankara and İstanbul (Şenyapılı, 
1981: 8). This can be considered as part of the hesitant approach of DP squeezed 
between its early populist and late modernist policies. The elitist bias fed by the 
modernization ideals of Republican Regime had taken a more concrete and 
conservative form during those years. It may be considered as a result of the closer 
encounters between the “urbanite” part of the society who had highly internalized 
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the modernization principles and values and had been educated. As Şenyapılı 
(1981) mentions the ones who tried to point out the system related causes of 
migration and gecekondu construction had been held subject to legal investigation 
in the early periods of gecekondu construction within the framework of this elitist 
approach. The uneasiness on part of the elites about the presence of gecekondu 
settlers in the city had been first pronounced in the late 1940s as the forerunner of 
the degrading representation, which would continue its effect in the following 
years. Metin Toker, a journalist, in an article published on 28 September 1948, 
pointed out in a quite unpleasant manner the existence of gecekondu settlements 
side by side with İstanbul’s most refined and beautiful middle class neighborhood 
Şişli. (Şenyapılı, 1998: 308). One year later, the same journalist, by referring to 
İstanbul city governor Fahrettin Kerim Gökay wrote in the following manner: 
“Governor Gökay seems to protect gecekondu constructors; we have no words to 
say. However, the gecekondus that have their own laws, order and cabinet today, if 
[they] create their own police forces or military tomorrow, this is nothing to be 
surprised about” (Şenyapılı, 1998: 308). The academic and public representation in 
the following years defined gecekondu development as a threat. These were the 
initial years of gecekondu construction, characterized by a wishful and optimistic 
discourse on the transitory and reversible character of these settlements and 
migration process. There were some propositions about forbidding the entrances to 
large cities or giving visa for entering İstanbul or Ankara.  
 
The belief in the transitory and rural character of these settlements was given 
reference also in academic works. A research conducted by Yasa in 1964 captured 
certain stereotypical representations of migrants with reference to their rural life 
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styles in a degrading manner (Yasa, 1970, 1973). Migrant women working in 
middle class houses as domestic laborers were referred to as junk dealers because 
of the fact that they wore the leftovers of middle class families on their rural 
clothes, which was a very ugly outlook threatening the modernist perception of 
aesthetic (Yasa, 1970: 11). According to the premises of the study, gecekondu 
family had to integrate with city life in order not to threaten the security in the 
urban environment. The inherent assumption was that gecekondu families who 
were in the middle of their process of transition caused social unease and insecurity 
in the city. Eating, dressing and entertainment habits of gecekondu family were 
described in a discourse of degradation in order to mark the “rural other” of the 
modernization process. The strongly elitist and modernist ingredient in academic 
studies have continued its existence in the following decades with an emphasis on 
the necessity of integration of these settlements with city space in physical and 
social sense. The academic and public approach dominated by the problem of 
integration neglects the dynamics behind the rapid growth of gecekondu 
settlements in the 1960s and 1970s.   
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 2.3 1966-1980: The Period of Settled Gecekondu Neighborhoods  
 
2.3.1 Rapidly Spreading and Socio-spatially Transforming 
Gecekondu Settlements   
 
The first formal acknowledgement of squatter settlements with the publicly known 
name “gecekondu” in 1966 with “gecekondu law” seems to reflect the collapse of 
the belief in the transitory character of these settlements in the periphery of the 
cities on the discursive level. This change of approach has a strong factual reason. 
The percentage of gecekondu population in total urban population increased 
rapidly during those years. In the year 1955, the share of gecekondu population in 
city population was 4.7%; in 1960 this percentage shifted to 16.4% and in the 
following five-year period the percentage changed from 16.4% to 22.9% (Keleş, 
1993: 383). If we reflect these percentages only in large cities like Ankara, for 
example, we see that, in 1955, the percentage of gecekondu population in city’s 
total population was 21.8%. This percentage shifted to 56% in 1960, 57.4% in 
1966, 60.6% in1970, 64.9% in 1975, 68.4% in 1978 and 72.4 in 1980 (Keleş, 1993: 
384). It is possible to argue that, during that period gecekondu settlements 
experienced an immense growth incomparable with other periods in gecekondu 
history. This period not only witnessed the growth and getting crowded of these 
neighborhoods but also the maturation of gecekondu dwellers’ experiences in the 
city environment.  
 94
 Beginning from the deputy elections of 1969, in the national and municipal 
elections of 1973, 1975 and 1977 migrants played more effective roles with the 
population increases in these settlements. The effectiveness of right-wing politics 
in local governing had been replaced by the domination of left-wing politics with 
the support of gecekondu dwellers (Keleş, 1993: 389). Politicians could not remain 
irresponsive to the demands of gecekondu population for two reasons. First of all, 
the population of these settlements had shown serious increase during that period 
as mentioned above. Particularly in local elections, gecekondu dwellers had the 
power to determine the fate of elections alone. Secondly, gecekondu population 
gained enough experience in the city environment during those years in order to 
use their political power tactically for bargaining purposes in attaining 
infrastructural services. This was the period signifying the beginning of reciprocity 
between tactical and strategical realm that would gain certain intensity in the 
following decades as will be discussed in depth in chapter six by referring to 
research data.  
 
This phase in gecekondu history also witnessed the deconstruction of 
homogenous identity imposed upon gecekondu dwellers as the “rural other” by the 
elitist discourse as mentioned in the introductory chapter of the thesis. The 
heterogeneity in terms of ethnic, sectarian and hometown identities became 
apparent due to a number of developments. The main reason behind this was the 
emergence of conflicts between different groups as a result of the radical 
politicization of gecekondu space. Radical politicization of gecekondu space 
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happened to take place by the operation of two factors. First of all, favoritism 
(particilik), which means the unequal municipal treatment of different regions in 
gecekondu neighborhoods according to their political affiliation in terms of 
providing services, emerged during that period in a strong form. The municipal 
services like constructing roads, parks, schools, water, electricity and sewer 
systems and providing transportation facilities constituted a bargaining power for 
both gecekondu dwellers and local politicians before the elections. We observed an 
intimate dialogue between political candidates and gecekondu inhabitants during 
those years.  
 
Second important underlying reason behind the politicization of these 
settlements was the economic and political depression in the country. During the 
period between 1950 and 1970, Turkish economy experienced rapid growth. 
However, this growth was mainly financed by foreign debt. In 1970, for the sake of 
encouraging investments, the Turkish lira was devalued. However, after the 
military memorandum in 1971, the government ended the policy of encouraging 
investments, by showing budgetary deficit as a reason for that. The unsustainable 
economic policies, low productivity and inability to control inflation prepared the 
ground for the economic and political crises for the period between 1975 and 1980. 
The rate of people who work in marginal sectors and being unemployed increased 
considerably in 1978 when compared to the late 1960s. The poverty experienced 
during those years eased the manipulation of gecekondu population by radical 
political parties. In other words, class based politics had triggered the radical 
politicization of sectarian, ethnic and hemşehri differences in gecekondu society. 
Economic instability was accompanied with political instability in such a way that 
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this period witnessed the extreme polarization of politics between right wing and 
left wing ideologies. A number of extremist youth groups on the left, and the Grey 
Wolves and fundamentalists on the right did not experience any trouble recruiting 
youngsters who had few or no career prospects due to economic crisis (Zürcher, 
1998: 276). The radical left considered the Alevis as natural allies due to the 
affinity emerged from the egalitarian and humanist nature of Alevi belief system. 
Alevism substituted its religious content to political ideology of socialism during 
the 1970s and they mainly define themselves with the ethical framework of 
extreme-leftist politics (Çamuroğlu, 2000: 15). “The fascist and religious extreme 
right, on the other hand, oriented their recruiting efforts on Sünni Muslims of the 
mixed regions by fanning their fear and hatred of the Alevis, thus, provoking 
violent incidents.” (Bruinessen, 1996: 8) The sectarian difference of Alevism and 
Sünnism took on a political character. Gecekondu space like other places in cities 
was dominated by violence and struggle going on between these two extreme 
groups. The main difference of gecekondu spaces from other neighborhoods in the 
city is the close encounters between different sectarian and hemşehri groups in the 
spontaneously developed space of these neighborhoods.  
 
The politicization of the neighborhoods that began with favoritism gained 
impetus with the ongoing violent struggles between Alevi and Sünni groups. Two 
groups define their boundaries in neighborhoods and the entrance to each other’s 
regions was severely forbidden. In that sense, neighborhood inhabitants should 
take into consideration these regions in relation to their sectarian affinity when they 
determine their everyday routes in the neighborhood. These severe conflicts 
between two groups had taken new forms in the following years. In academic 
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literature of the period, it is hard to encounter this part of gecekondu history. 
However, the heterogeneous nature of gecekondu society in terms of ethnic, 
sectarian and hometown identities would constitute the main subject matter in 
gecekondu research after 1980 that would be dealt in the following pages. But for 
now, it is possible to claim that the deconstruction process of the representation of 
gecekondu spaces under the homogenous category of “rural other” in public 
discourse started during the 1970s. 
 
There are reasons other than the politicization of gecekondu space, which 
contributes to this deconstruction. Starting from the early 1970s, when forerunner 
migrants had reached to a certain level of economic and social well being, we can 
talk about the commercialization of gecekondu settlements. This was due to the 
continuous migratory flow to these settlements and the perception of early 
gecekondu settlers, the land and house ownership as the main sources of economic 
gain. Therefore every migrant, particularly, the early comers looked for ways to 
benefit from real estate at the utmost possible level. As an example, if they have 
one house with three rooms they may rent one of the rooms to a newcomer 
migrant. They employ all the chances to build a second gecekondu in their garden 
as in the form of the continuation of their houses for the sake of giving it for rent. 
This increased the number of tenants in gecekondu neighborhoods. Scarcity of 
urban land prevented newcomers from making profits out of land or house as the 
early comers had done. As a result there emerged important transformations in 
estate system, which provided restricted chance to newcomer migrants and put 
them economically in a very different position than the early comers.    
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 When we look at the gecekondu settlements from a general perspective, there 
emerged differences between them in terms of their location in the city. Şenyapılı 
pointed out three different forms of development among gecekondu settlements 
during that period (Şenyapılı, 1998: 311). The gecekondu settlements, which were 
not so big and drawn near to city center with the growth of cities in all directions, 
were partly or wholly reconstructed as modern neighborhoods. They became 
composed of apartment houses constructed by big construction firms. Second type 
of gecekondu settlements was again closer to city center but their land values were 
not so high. They were located close to lower middle class neighborhoods. They 
had been left by the first settlers in years who moved to close by middle class 
neighborhoods. Gecekondu houses were rented to newcomer migrants in this type 
of neighborhoods. Since land values did not show a remarkable increase there, rent 
became the only gain for the migrants. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, 
designated research setting have experienced such a spatialization in which early 
comer migrants had rented their houses to the new comer migrants and had moved 
to lower middle class suburban districts. Third group of gecekondu settlements 
were the ones located in the periphery of the cities. During the period between 
1970 and 1980 the inhabitants of peripheral gecekondu settlements themselves had 
initiated the transformation in their settlements (Şenyapılı, 1998: 311). This is the 
reason why the peripheral settlements as in the case of my research setting had 
been transformed mostly by the initiative of their settlers. They shaped their space 
according to their own needs and this is the reason why gecekondu settlements 
mostly had their own centers close by.   
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To sum up, gecekondu population attained an experiential maturity in the city 
environment during that period. Their numerical importance and accumulated 
knowledge on the political and economic relations in the city turned them into 
participating agents having the capacity to divert the strategical acts of planning. 
The homogenous identity of rural other has been deconstructed as a result of the 
visibility of differences among gecekondu population. This deconstruction is 
represented in public discourse with an overemphasis on the marginal qualities of 
gecekondu society. The ruthless political struggles between left wing and right 
wing groups through cultural identities of Alevism and Sünnism had made 
sectarian, ethnic and hemşehri differences within gecekondu society visible and 
politically significant. What is more, there emerged differences with respect to 
economic and social positions of migrants due to the variations regarding timing of 
migration or diverse occupational chances that urban context had provided. 
 
 
2.3.2 Strategies of Planning: Dealing with an Immense Gecekondu 
Problem 
 
The year 1963 was the beginning of the planned period that witnessed the 
implementation of five-year development plans, which continued in the following 
four decades and resulted from the need for a macro planning activity. These 
strategical plans include the systematic projections in order to allocate the 
resources reasonably in the service activities. In the five-year development plans, 
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the issue of rapid urbanization and accompanying problems were given priority. 
Nevertheless, the issues were considered in a formalistic manner in these plans in 
congruence with the general strategical outlook to gecekondu problem.  
 
In the first five-year development plan covering the years between 1963 and 
1967, the general objective was to prevent the uneven regional development and 
attain a balanced growth that would, in turn, end the problems of rapid urbanization 
in large cities. In order to tackle these objectives, investment schemas were 
prepared; nonetheless, they could not be properly carried out. In relation to 
gecekondu, three principals were foreseen, improvement of gecekondus’ condition 
where it is possible to do that; demolition of the houses in bad condition with no 
hope of improvement and assured prevention of further gecekondu construction 
(Keleş, 1993: 394, 395). In accordance with these principles gecekondu law 
number 775 was put into effect in 1966. This law is important and different than 
other laws. As mentioned previously, this was the first formal acknowledgement of 
gecekondu settlements and second it brought a detailed trilateral plan to gecekondu 
issue, though takes the issue more as a physical problem rather than social. It 
transferred the ownership rights of state lands within the municipal boundaries to 
municipalities in order to appoint them as the direct responsible from the 
application of the law. After this law was put into effect, the gecekondu 
settlements, that were elected as the regions to be improved had been legalized in 
time and a degree of development was sustained in those regions. However, this 
law could not avoid the further proliferation of gecekondu settlements, although 
municipalities took the law seriously. The narratives in the research setting verified 
the intense supervisions of local government during that period. Most of them 
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mentioned the year 1968 as the most difficult year for constructing a new 
gecekondu. The state officials, in some regions, including the research setting, 
pitched tents stayed there for days in order to observe and control the construction 
activities going on at nights in 1968.  
 
The following five-year plans until 1983 could not develop a permanent 
solution to gecekondu issue due to the amnesty laws implemented in 1976 and 
1983. Though, the rate of rural-to urban migration decreased as a result of the 
urban unrest experienced in large cities, the proliferation of gecekondu settlements 
could not be prevented as a result of populist concerns and also the centralist 
system of local governing lacking financial resources to prepare or apply 
construction plans in an efficient way. The transition of municipalities from center-
right parties to social democrat mayors in the 1970s in big cities led to the opening 
of the centralist system of local governing to debate. “CHP mayors were voted into 
the office in major cities like Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir. These mayors started to 
play a more visible role both in national and local politics.” (Ergüder, 1987: 16) 
Particularly the financial dependency of municipalities on center was severely 
criticized by CHP mayors; however, until 1980 they continued to be dependent for 
external funds on state (Heper, 1989; Görmez, 1997). Populism dominated the 
scene of gecekondu policies in Turkey. Therefore the planning activity and the 
laws could not be easily applied. The resistance of gecekondu population and their 
ability to bargain constitutes the basis of populism. In 1969, the voter turnout of 
İstanbul and Ankara squatters were 51% and 59.7% respectively. Considering the 
increasing importance of urban votes, squatter votes had become quite critical for 
the political actors (Danielson and Keleş, 1985: 101). The political context of the 
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country and the demands of gecekondulu had affected the nature of the measures 
taken by the politicians. With the shifting balance of urban population in favor of 
the rural migrants with respect to old city dwellers during the 1960s and early 
1970s in largest cities, the attitudes and actions of politicians had taken a hesitant 
form. From the 1960s onwards, the gecekondu laws provided amnesties for 
gecekondu houses that had been already constructed and sustained sufficient living 
conditions. The aim of these official pardons was to include already constructed 
gecekondus within the context of construction plans, thereby preventing further 
proliferation of gecekondu settlements. However, on the tactical level, these 
strategical decisions brought about unexpected consequences. Amnesty laws most 
of the time had prompted the rate of rural-to urban migration and, in relation to 
that, the expansion of gecekondu settlements. The vote seeking political activities 
as in the form amnesty laws triggered the expectation of legalization on part of the 
gecekondu dwellers.  
 
During the second period, the legal context of urban planning policies 
particularly in relation to the problem of gecekondu settlements prepared a suitable 
context for the proliferation of gecekondu settlements in the peripheries of the 
cities. The construction, planning and amnesty laws were promulgated in order to 
consider gecekondu settlements within the formal context of urban planning. 
However, the apparent intention of the amnesty laws mentioned above had an 
implicit populist content and concern on part of political actors. The political actors 
used the amnesty expectations of migrants at every election. On the other hand, the 
gecekondulus, who had attained a certain experiential maturity in political and 
economic terms in the city, became aware of their bargaining power vis-à-vis 
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politicians. These developments had further triggered the conflicting interests of 
different actors in the strategical realm. The public and academic approach to 
gecekondu settlements were still shaped by modernist concerns; however political 
actors started to attain a hesitant legal and planning approach to the development of 
gecekondu settlements. From time to time, the politicians internalized the 
modernist approach in relation to gecekondu settlements with regard to changing 
economic and political context.      
 
 
2.3.3. Public and Academic Approach to Gecekondu Settlements 
Dominated by the Problem of Integration 
 
Notwithstanding the increasing reciprocity between the tactical and strategical 
realm and the growing participatory agency of the migrants in local politics, the 
question of integration of gecekondu population with city life still dominated the 
academic approach during these years. The research conducted at the time had 
been under the strong effect of modernization approach as was the case in previous 
decades. In that respect, the studies seem to accept the “urban” and “urbanite” 
conceptions in Western literature and apply theoretical urbanization templates and 
model there to Turkish experience of urbanization. The degree of integration is 
measured by applying such behavioral models to the lives of gecekondu 
inhabitants. In most cases, the ideal templates do not reciprocate with the lives, 
cultural preferences of migrants and the way they integrate with urban economic 
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and political context in these studies. Then gecekondu population is represented as 
marginal to city context in these studies.  
 
The marginality debate dominated Latin American urbanization literature 
during the 1970s in a very similar sense with Turkish case. Basic premises of 
marginality debate can be listed as follows. First of all, urban poor is culturally 
marginal for the fact that they cannot develop urban cultural habits because of their 
traditional or rural cultural backgrounds and because of the poverty they 
experience in urban context. Secondly, they are politically marginal in the sense 
that they have a tendency to support radical and marginal groups. Their political 
marginality may be a consequence of another fact that they are ignorant about and 
indifferent to political issues in such an understanding. Third premise of the 
marginality debate is that they are economically marginal, since they cannot take 
part efficiently in the formal part of the economy (see Lewis, 1970; Türkdoğan, 
1977). 
 
It would be helpful to examine these marginality tenets with regard to the 
Turkish context. The premise of cultural marginality, as mentioned in the previous 
pages, can be accepted as a product of modernization ideal and the ideal of 
attaining a uniform culture. However, to marginalize rural traditional background 
of Turkey needs to be evaluated as an ideological choice of the researcher fed by 
the social distance between him/herself and the migrants considering the fact that 
urbanization in the modern sense has been a quiet new phenomenon in Turkish 
history. The culturalism dominating gecekondu literature in the 1970s did not 
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present gecekondu “people’s way of life” as the cultural preferences of these 
people, but as the product of poverty, ignorance or fatalism. However, it is a fact 
that migrant communities seem to hold to some of their cultural values, and 
construct peculiar and spontaneous spaces in the city in cultural terms. Insistence 
of migrants to protect their “traditional” cultural practices is not related to their 
deprived position in the production and consumption side of economy as put 
forward by some studies (see, Kartal 1982). Nor it is related to their poverty 
leading to fatalist and ignorant life style among migrants (see, Türkdoğan, 1977; 
Yasa 1970). The choice of migrants in cultural terms finds its expression mostly in 
the way they produce and reproduce their everyday spaces. Moreover, this process 
does not signify in reality a “gecekondu way of life” that can be homogenously 
defined. This production and reproduction process is kept always alive via the 
cultural differences of hemşehri groups and constant competition in the course of 
social spatialization as discussed in the first chapter. Paradoxically, the cultural 
marginality debate that attributes an otherness to gecekondu settlements, in some 
cases refers to a homogenous “gecekondu way of life” rural in character vis-à-vis 
urban culture or, in other cases, to conflict-ridden encounters between different 
cultural identities (sectarian, ethnic or hometown) and their threatening qualities 
for national unity. The definitions in public discourse can be accepted as context 
dependent but always have been part of “othering” process. Academic studies 
relying on a cultural marginality premise also have some structural and 
methodological problems. They make an abstract comparison between migrants 
and “native” city population without ever comparing them empirically. There is no 
research in urbanization literature for that period that makes a real comparison 
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between the everyday lives of the squatter inhabitants and middle class residents of 
the city.  
 
Political marginality premise also needs to be critically evaluated. As in 
congruence with the political developments summarized in the previous sections, it 
is not possible to label gecekondu inhabitants as politically marginal. Rather they 
tactically use local political means and participate in city politics more than the 
middle classes in urban context. As some in-depth research indicate, migrants from 
the early periods of rural-to-urban migration have certain knowledge about how 
modern bureaucratic institutions function. In spite of the fact that they may depend 
on their acquaintances and communal networks18 as buffer mechanisms in their 
encounters with the bureaucratic organizations, they have at least theoretical 
knowledge about how to deal with the system there in case of difficulty (Heper, 
1983; Karpat, 1976).  
 
Economic marginality thesis supposes migrants’ participation in the informal 
part of the economy, as an indicator of their economic marginality. However, 
during those years, the informal part of the economy had played a key role in the 
rapid industrialization and urbanization of the country. Particularly in the 1960s 
and 1970s, gecekondu inhabitants provided the supply of cheap and flexible labor 
seek by the economic system. On the other hand, as Şenyapılı (1978) mentioned, in 
the consumption sphere of economy they can be considered as quite integrated in 
                                                 
18 Communal networks are most of the time organized along the lines of being from the same origin 
(province or village) in gecekondu settlements. These networks help migrants to solve their problems 
with state institutions or other problems related to city life.    
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the general consumption patterns of city population. Other than that, during the 
period between 1966 and 1975 early comer migrants were occupied in more 
organized jobs in service, construction and transportation sectors. The 
underemployment experienced in jobs like street hawking, porting, boot blacking, 
parking lot attending and care taking had been handed over to the newcomer 
migrants. This fact is also supported by the life stories of the migrants in the 
research setting.  
 
To sum up, the general approach that evaluates integration as the main 
problem of Turkish urbanization regards all the positive changes in the socio-
economic position of migrants during the time spent in the city as positive steps 
taken on the way to modernization and integration with city life. The second or 
third generation migrants are supposed to be fully urbanized when compared to the 
older population according to the premises of these studies which, hardly coincide 
with the actual situation (see, Sencer 1979: 277; Kartal 1982: 141). As these 
studies are often quantitative in nature and target large samples, the indicators of 
integration rely on some predetermined suppositions and models of ideal urban life 
and behavioral patterns (being well-informed political voters, going to the theater 
and movies regularly and working in regular jobs of formal economy and dressing 
in certain ways, for example) in political, cultural and economic terms.  However, 
urban behavioral patterns in these three aspects were defined with a strong 
reference to the “West” and to the modernization ideal of the Republican Regime. 
This line of thinking defines “urban” behavior in terms of select cultural 
ideas/ideals about civilized living and looks down on the inhabitants of squatter 
settlements as lacking in competence to assimilate “urban life styles” (see, Yasa, 
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1970, 1973; Türkdoğan, 1977; Kartal, 1982). Although these studies provide rich 
data about the socioeconomic conditions of migrant population (like the income 
levels of the families, migration data, demographic data about families, data about 
the physical appearance of gecekondu, etc.) they could barely develop an insight 
into the everyday lives of the gecekondu inhabitants. Moreover, except for some 
studies, which take the economic and political context of the country into 
consideration and retain a relational approach to the experiences of gecekondu 
inhabitants with the agents of the city, most studies examine the settlements in the 
periphery of the cities and the life of their inhabitants by considering a certain 
degree of isolation on part of the migrants from city life in geographical, social, 
cultural and political sense simultaneously.  
 
The most important response to marginality debate in urbanization literature 
was posed by Perlman (1976) in her book “The Myth of Marginality” as a product 
of the research she had conducted in Rio de Janerio’s squatters. Roberts (1978), 
one of the most referred urban sociologists on Latin American urbanization, in a 
very similar vein, analyzed the underestimation on part of elitist approaches about 
the resourcefulness of the poor and the extent to which they participate actively in 
urban economic and political life. Similar understandings began to dominate urban 
literature after the 1980s with the closure of the distance between the researcher 
and the researched in Turkish literature and with the dominance of ethnographic 
methods. In the period between 1940 and 1980, the academic and public 
approaches have quite similar concerns and an elitist perspective shapes them. 
However, in the coming decade we encounter a serious disjuncture between 
approaches of academic works and public debate about “gecekondu settlements.”  
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 2.4. 1980-Present Time: Further Commercialization of 
“Gecekondu” Space 
 
2.4.1 Neoliberal Economic and Social Policies 
 
After the military intervention of 1980, the restoring of the civil rule had taken a 
few years under the supervision of the National Security Council, the agent of the 
intervention. The political parties of the 1970s and their leaders were banned from 
politics for a ten-year time. A new constitution was implemented in 1981, which 
was restrictive in democratic rights and values compared to the 1960 constitution. 
New parties were founded under the close surveillance of National Security 
Council. There were three parties at that time, namely, The Nationalist Democracy 
Party led by retired General Sunalp occupying right; Turgut Özal’s Motherland 
Party occupying center and Populist Party led by Necdet Calp, a former private 
secretary to İsmet İnönü, with the aim of filling the vacuum left by the CHP 
(Ahmad, 1993: 189). Within these three parties Motherland Party (ANAP) of Özal 
differed from the other two by its liberal approach. The political strategy in the 
1980s was defined by seemingly two contradicting tendencies. On the one hand, 
the military regime had taken significant repressive measures in the service of 
depoliticization policies that aim at mainly disintegrating radical politics and 
struggles taking place in public context. Such an agenda includes quite remarkable 
interventions in the everyday lives of the citizens in social and political terms, 
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which will be detailed below. On the other hand, the same political strategy had 
given support to first elected government who was a champion of economic 
liberalism, aiming at total integration with the world economy (Ayata, 1997: 59). 
The reason of National Security Council’s permitting the liberal policies of the 
government within the quite submissive context of the strategical realm was 
accepted as closely related to the western support for Özal’s party, especially 
among the financial circles (Ahmad, 1993: 189). The liberal anti-statist and anti-
bureaucratic political agenda of Özal brought him the victory in 1983 election, 
which also reflected the covert intention of people who were uncomfortable with 
the military’s continuing interest and intervention in politics. However, the 
neoliberal agenda of Özal’s party showed great correspondence and continuity with 
the depoliticization policies of the military regime in the aftermath of the 
intervention, which will be exemplified with the narratives of the migrants in the 
following chapters. As a matter of fact, neoliberal economic agenda including 
seemingly paradoxical instances, fit quite well with the depoliticization policies of 
post coup d’état period. As Peck and Tickell (2004: 42) mentions, by its definition, 
neoliberalism contains processes of liberal economic management together with 
strongly interventionist social agenda, which can be seemingly paradoxical. 
However, liberal economic processes that are increasingly technocratic in form and 
therefore superficially “depoliticized” seem to have a complementary relation with 
a deeply interventionist agenda about some selective social issues like crime, 
immigration, welfare reform, urban order and surveillance, and community 
regeneration. In a similar vein, Turgut Özal put the liberal economic agenda in 
combination with interventionist social policies into effect after the 1983 election.  
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The neoliberal policies of ANAP initiated many transformations in the 
political, social and economic life of the country and the transformations in 
gecekondu space was not an exception to that general course of events. 
Particularly, the legitimacy crises ANAP had experienced just after the election and 
the populist policies connected with it had altered the relations of production of 
gecekondu space dramatically. First visible effect of these policies on the socio-
spatial transformation of gecekondu settlement had become apparent with the 
populist concerns of the party related to the 1984 municipal elections with the 
inclusion of two other political parties in the elections. The party put gecekondu 
law number 2981 into effect eight months before the municipal elections. The law 
had two important differences from other amnesty laws, which were at the same 
time the underlying reasons behind the milestone effect of this law in the history of 
gecekondu. The law foresees the distribution of title deeds to gecekondu settlers 
who build their houses on state owned lands, lands of foundations or municipal 
lands with the condition that the settlers would pay the price of the land they had 
already appropriated. In order to be considered eligible to take title deeds, the 
settlers are not supposed to own another house or a piece of land in the same 
municipal district they are located in. The law acknowledges ownership rights to 
the settlers who have built their houses on privately owned lands with the condition 
of taking the consent of the landowner. Like other amnesty laws, the official 
objective of that law is to take gecekondu settlements within the context of official 
planning. However, the extensive consideration of law to include almost all of 
gecekondu settlements within its context, the timing of it and the way it had been 
applied denote the possible implicit populist concerns of the party. The law could 
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not reach its objectives due to the way it had been carried out in quite parallel to its 
neoliberal agenda.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned law, two-tiered municipal system was 
established in 1984 just a few weeks before the local elections. This system aiming 
at general decentralization in the administration of local governments was applied 
in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. A number of district municipalities were established 
within each of these metropolitan municipalities (Heper, 1987: 4). “ANAP thought 
devolving of powers to the localities would promote political democracy and make 
delivering of more and better services possible.” (Heper, 1989: 7) However, the 
internal impediments of this system when combined with the amnesty law 
mentioned above, there emerged an extended space of maneuver for the tactical 
acts of the migrants. Internal impediments of the system seem to be closely related 
to the financial dependency of district municipalities on the metropolitan 
municipality. Two-tiered municipal system was established with the aim of 
bringing a general decentralization and autonomy to local government system in 
theory. This objective could hardly be realized in practice. The financial 
dependency when combined with the fiscal gaps and inefficiencies, the district 
mayors was put into a position to exploit the differences and conflicts among 
various agencies of the central government. As stated by Öncü (1998: 54) in the 
absence of a substantial influx of public resources from the center, the 
“underpinnings of clientalistic power at the local level have come to rely 
increasingly upon selective implementation of regulatory and bureaucratic codes”. 
Under these circumstances, there emerges incidents of repetitive budgeting and 
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people may push their personal demands through clientalistic channels (Heper, 
1987: 2).  
 
If the political affiliations of the metropolitan and district mayor are different 
from each other than the resources of metropolitan municipality are distributed 
unevenly in most cases. “Even within the ranks of the same party, district mayors 
and the metropolitan mayor may potentially come into conflict in what one may 
call ‘the rush to deliver services’ and reap the ensuing political harvest.” (Ergüder, 
1989: 37) As stated by Ergüder (1989: 43), metropolitan municipality claims 
ownership for popular practices and passes the responsibility for unpopular 
practices (such as gecekondu demolition) to the districts. Such a responsible 
authority problem triggers favoritism both on part of the district mayors and 
gecekondulu.  
 
This problem is also supported by the findings of the research. The mayor of 
the recent district municipality is harshly criticized by the respondents due to the 
repressive controls of illegal construction, incidents of demolition and inability of 
the mayor in dealing with the complicated problems of the localities. On the other 
hand, metropolitan mayor, Melih Gökçek, in almost all of the narratives is 
represented as a quite successful local governor due to the spectacular aspects of 
the services he provides to Mamak in the form of the construction of highways or 
big recreational areas. In fact, these two mayors are from the ranks of Islamist 
parties.  
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There are also cases where the district and metropolitan mayors behave in 
harmony and are within the ranks of the same party. In that case, the nepotistic 
policies to one ethnic or sectarian group in localities may easily be employed due 
to the backing of the central government. The main consequence of these 
developments has been the growing dominance of favoritism in local politics. 
Selective implementation of building, zoning, and planning codes seems to be the 
main instrument through which nepotistic policies have been carried out in 
neighborhoods (Öncü, 1998: 55).  
 
These nepotistic policies have been seriously effective in the course of the 
legalization process in the 1980s as was also gathered from the narratives of the 
migrants. Parallel to the neoliberal approach of ANAP, the designation of the 
gecekondu settlers who are proper to be given title deeds and all the bureaucratic 
work were left to the initiative of certified private technical offices under oath. As 
stated by Keleş (1984) the responsibility of construction reform plan, an issue of 
public concern, was left to the initiative of private offices and this brought about 
some misuses. Until the application of the formal construction plans to these 
settlements, as an assurance of giving the official title deeds, these technical offices 
under the oath acted as intermediaries with the responsibility of determining the 
ones who would take a special certificate called “tapu tahsis belgesi”. After the 
consideration of gecekondu houses within the scope of municipal construction and 
reform plans, these special certificates would turn into real title deeds.  
 
 115
The law also contributed to the further commercialization of real estate 
system in gecekondu settlements, something far beyond the commercialization 
process beginning in the late 1970s. This was due to the fact that permission was 
given to the construction of four-story apartment houses on the lands that were 
considered as appropriate to give title deeds. This law and the related successive 
laws issued during the 1983-1988 period, in general aimed at the rapid legalization 
of gecekondu settlements and the transformation of these settlements into 
organized districts composed of apartment houses. Nevertheless, the initiation of 
the transformation activity was left to the internal dynamics of the settlements and 
the planning activity was supposed to come after this initiation (Şenyapılı, 1998: 
312). The neoliberal policies of legalization of gecekondu settlements and 
decentralization of the municipal system seemed to have an implicit objective of 
bringing spontaneous apartmentalization in these districts, which was intended to 
lower the costs of planning and construction of organized and planned apartment 
districts. Permission given to construct four-story houses was assumed to activate 
the internal dynamics in local land market and attract the interest of construction 
firms in such an understanding.  
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 2.4.2 Changing Physical and Social Space of “Gecekondu” and 
Identity Politics 
 
These developments had led to the whole alteration and intense commercialization 
of land ownership patterns as a totally a new phenomenon (see Erder, 1997, 1996; 
Işık&Pınarcıoğlu, 2001). First of all, two phases of gecekondu production, which 
were once considered as the indivisible parts of one process, that are the 
appropriation of land and the construction of the house have been separated. New 
actors had emerged as the appropriators of lands in big plots. They divided these 
lands into small parcels, an illegal activity according to construction law, and sold 
them to latecomer migrants. The land appropriation stage has started to capture 
mafia like, speculative and illegal relations (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001: 160). 
Secondly, the construction of houses together with labor and construction materials 
has been commercialized. There emerged a new construction sector in which 
gecekondu has become a commodity to a large extent. In that context, the newly 
emerging low-income settlements that have been constructed as a consequence of 
such a process reflect a quite different outlook than the classical gecekondu 
settlements. The recently constructed illegal settlements in particularly İstanbul, 
İzmir, Diyarbakır and Mersin have quite distinct qualities from the classical 
gecekondu settlements. These settlements are subject to continuous and high rates 
of migration therefore experience a strong pressure on physical space. As defined 
by Keyder (2005: 127) “today’s peripheral neighborhoods are distinguished by the 
unfinishedness of three and four-story buildings, constructed out of cheap concrete 
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and brick and often lacking a final plastering, that are located haphazardly within 
what seem to be random settlement patterns.” Another important peculiarity of 
these settlements originates from the legal status of these settlements. The houses 
in these settlements are mostly unlawful in nature. In most of the classical 
gecekondu neighborhoods, however, particularly as a result of the amnesty laws 
established after 1980, gecekondulus got their legal title deeds and construction 
permits, with the exception of some houses topographically built on dangerous 
sites. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the designated research setting is such 
a mostly formalized classical gecekondu setting, which is quite different than these 
newly emerged illegal settlements in socio-spatial terms.  
 
The socio-economic differences that were starting to emerge in the previous 
decade were intensified as a result of the further commercialization of the 
construction process. Particularly in these newly emerging illegal settlements but 
also in classical gecekondu settlements, the pattern in which an early comer 
migrant owns more than one house has become widespread. As a result of this 
process, the number of tenants has increased rapidly (see Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 
2001: 162 and Gökçe, 1993: 160). This economic difference between newcomer 
and early comer migrants is accepted as the two sides of the same and dynamic 
process. Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001) refer to this process as “poverty in rotation.” A 
new phase in the social spatialization of low-income settlements emerged as a 
result of the economic and social deprivations experienced in low-income 
settlements, combined with the strengthening of identity politics within the context 
of close encounters between different hemşehri, sectarian and ethnic groups in 
urban context.   
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 Identity politics has gained impetus by the mid-1980s as a reaction against 
both the increasing inequalities and intense depoliticization policies through locally 
suppressive means and with the implementation of neoliberal policies. Identity 
politics has been materialized around three main axes (Ayata, 1997: 60). First of 
all, the predominance given to the Sünni interpretation of Islam as an antidote to 
mainly leftist politics by military regime has given rise to Islamic 
“fundamentalism” within the context of depoliticization policies of state.  
 
Kurdish uprisings in the Southeastern part of Turkey constitute the second 
axis of identity politics emerged after the 1980s. The fighting between state 
security forces and Kurdish separatists that aim at founding an independent 
Kurdish state in the region have had serious impacts on the post-1980 form of 
rural-to-urban migration. Kurds of eastern and southeastern provinces 
predominated rural-to urban migration of 1990s. As stated by Keyder (2005: 131), 
compared to the previous flows of migration, push factors have become more 
important than the pull factors in this recent type of migration. The newcomers’ 
decision to migrate lacks any preparation, previous knowledge or social connection 
in the city. “This devastation is primarily due to the ethnic/separatist war, itself in 
part related, in various ways, to globalization and the collapse of national 
developmentalism.” (Keyder, 2005: 131) The problem of urban ethnicity had 
become visible with the increasing rate of migration of mainly Kurdish population 
to largest cities as a result of forced migration (Ayata, 1997: 62). This had two-fold 
consequences for Kurdish migrants. On the one hand, the increasing interaction 
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with other groups in the city context produces an awareness of their differences, 
leading to a strong sense of “them” and “us”. On the other hand, they become 
aware of the existence of other Kurds from different regions of the country. This 
closeness in language and life conditions leads them to perceive themselves as 
collectives, some developing a “minority consciousness.” (Ayata, 1997: 63) The 
economic deprivations of Kurdish people in the urban context as a consequence of 
the forced migration constitute another source that strengthens the identity 
definitions through class awareness. Arising anti-Kurdish sentiment in public 
perception, sow the seeds of conflict in mainly urban context, when combined with 
the restrictions of state on making the Kurdish ethnic identity explicit in public 
space (Ayata, 1997: 64).   
 
Third axis of identity politics, which constitutes the main interest for the 
thesis, is closely related to the Sünnification of state via the policies of military 
regime and the governments succeeding it. Alevis as the most densely represented 
sect in Turkey after Sünnis have felt themselves threatened by this process. The 
close encounters between Alevis and Sünnis in the urban context, which took a 
conflict-ridden dimension with the struggles between leftist and rightist militants in 
the 1970s have entered into a new phase after the 1980s. The main strategy of state 
in privileging Sünni interpretation of Islam has been Ministry of Education’s 
granting secondary education privileges to religious schools. As stated by Ayata 
(1997: 69), the number of mosques and religious personnel multiplied and the State 
Directorate of Religious Affairs became an influential body employing almost 
90,000 civil servants. Building mosques even in Alevi villages, the opening up of 
Quran courses and making compulsory religious courses in Sünni content in high 
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schools can be counted among these strategies emphasizing Sünni interpretation of 
Islam over Alevi. Religiosity among mainly Sünni people increased parallel to the 
institutionalized religion. The spread of tariqat organizations and informal religious 
gatherings mainly among women particularly in low-income settlements have 
become widespread with the supporting policies of the strategical realm.  
 
The structural transformation in the municipal system regarding identity 
politics led to the shift of populism from national to local political context (Işık and 
Pınarcıoğlu, 2001: 166). In this context, strategy’s way of dealing with clashing 
identities at the local level has had certain impacts on the nature of social 
encounters between different sectarian groups.  Coalition governments have 
defined the period between 1991 and 2002. “The sovereignty of state imposition 
around the axis of the rising Kurdish question and Pan-Islamism and the 
sovereignty of market mechanisms around the issues of stability measures and 
structural adjustment programs were the two most important phenomenon of the 
time” (Yaşlı, 2004: 43). The victory of Welfare Party (RP), conservative Islamist 
party, in 1994 municipal elections in the largest of cities of Turkey has weakened 
Alevi claims in social spatialization of low-income settlements as a consequence of 
the display of favoritism. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came 
to power alone in the 2002 national election constructed its election strategy on 
populist criticism of neoliberal strategy and artificially constructed identity politics 
mainly with regard to Kurdish issue. Advocates of change who formed an 
opposition to the old ways of governing within the former Islamist Virtue Party, 
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the successor of the Welfare Party19 founded AKP. It took 35% of the votes in the 
elections and gained the capacity to change even the constitution owing to its 
overwhelming majority in the National Assembly (Yaşlı 2004: 39). The success of 
AKP “was considered by many to be a consequence of the rhetoric appropriated by 
the party in relation to the peripheral settlements.” (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 97). 
In addition to the populist image making, party’s harsh criticism of free market 
thinking and its stress on social justice strengthened their base to a large extent. 
 
However, the upcoming political strategies of AKP have reflected serious 
contrasts to their election discourse of social justice and poverty in recent years like 
the previous governments in Turkey. “Particularly their ambition to integrate the 
country with the world economy and liberalize the economy, including the opening 
up of urban land to market mechanisms and the operation of global and national 
private market mechanisms seems remarkable.” (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 98) As 
stated by Keyder (2005: 130), formerly populist politicians now mainly refer to 
market-mediated demands rather than the potential constituency of newcomer 
migrants. In that respect, they have shifted their allegiances from populist 
developmentalism to neighborhood upgrading under capitalist logic according to 
the author. The display of neoliberal policies and the neglect of welfare and 
poverty policies in the late party program of AKP have devastating effects mainly 
for Alevis and latecomer migrants mainly Kurd in ethnic origin as the most 
disadvantaged two groups of the 1990s.  Until the 1980s, with the rising tide of 
social democracy in politics, Alevis became a politically significant group due to 
                                                 
19 Welfare Party was banned from active politics by the decision of Constitutional Court in 1998 with 
claim of becoming the centre of activities contrary to the principles of secularism. 
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their inclination towards leftist politics (Ayata, 1997: 67). However, as a 
consequence of the developments mentioned above, Alevis’ determining agency in 
local politics has declined to a large extent. The sectarian identities have been 
revitalized and repoliticized with reference to their religious content due to these 
processes. It is worth to mention that Alevism has reconstructed its identity by the 
initiatives of Alevi organizations and intellectuals in spite of the fact that they 
might not agree on a uniform representation of Alevism against strong Sünni 
domination. As will be made explicit in the empirical chapters, the competition 
between sectarian and hemşehri groups has become more embedded in the social 
spatialization process during this period due to the increasing reciprocity between 
strategical and tactical realms.  
 
 
2.4.3 “Varoş” Replacing “Gecekondu”: Representing Low-Income 
Settlements as “Illegal” 
 
Beginning by the 1980s, due to the political and economic context mentioned 
above, the social and spatial distance between low-income settlements and upper-
middle and upper class residential areas has further extended. In congruence with 
the irreconcilable social distance between these two groups, “urban elite” 
perspective seems to be shaped by a stronger threat perception about low-income 
settlements. One of the important material reasons of such a negative approach 
towards low-income settlements is the economic and social polarization and its 
reflection in the landscape of cities as a serious spatial segregation. “New enclaves 
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for the wealthier sections of the society emerge in the valuable periphery of the 
cities, while the urban poor reside in topographically the most unsuitable places for 
settlement.” (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 91) The periphery of the cities, which once 
attracted little attention from the high-income classes, has become valuable estate 
as a consequence of the fact that suburban, socially hygienic life has become 
trendy in the 1990s. That development has brought the two socially most 
dissociated groups together as the main interest groups of the peripheral land. The 
upper economic classes used their political and economic influence while the low-
income groups have transformed their spaces and appropriate new lands in the 
valuable periphery through mafia like organizations (Şenyapılı, 1998: 311). In 
some cases, the physical distance between these groups becomes minimized, which 
increases the degree of uneasiness on both sides. Inevitably, a new social and legal 
imaginary that has been internalized by politicians and residents alike’ has emerged 
in these years (Keyder, 2005: 130). “Hitherto seen as poor people without 
resources to find adequate shelters, the migrants are now regarded as invaders of 
public property and beneficiaries of unfair privilege” (Keyder, 2005: 130). This 
may be considered as one of the important reasons behind the appearance of 
discriminatory jargon in public debates about illegal settlements particularly after 
the 1980s showing gecekondu settlers as undeserving profiteers of the informal 
estate system as a consequence of changing construction processes and relations in 
illegal settlements.  This jargon has gained a new form in the 1990s with the 
widespread usage of the term varoş in place or with gecekondu. Varoş as a concept 
has a stronger emphasis on culturally pejorative, illegal, criminal or underground 
aspects of these settlements when compared to the concept gecekondu. The 
negative public perception about peripheral settlements that have been reshaped 
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around the new term varoş and the novel usage of gecekondu loaded with new 
meanings have a strong homogenizing effect. They dissolve all the differences 
between old classical gecekondu settlements that have been legalized to a large 
extent and the new illegal neighborhoods emerged in the largest cities of Turkey 
after the 1980s. Therefore, varoş and the representations identified with the term 
that mainly define culturally inferior and criminal lifestyles with reference to the 
newly emerging illegal settlements have started to define all low-income 
settlements including the already legalized classical gecekondu districts. The 
representations on gecekondu and varoş point out the illegality of peripheral 
neighborhoods in a number of ways in public debate.  
 
First and foremost, peripheral settlements are portrayed as illegal primarily 
referring to the illegal network of their construction including illegal actors like 
land mafia and speculators. The second source of illegality defined discursively has 
references to the tension-laden encounters between different ethnic and sectarian 
groups in low-income settlements. In the third sense, there emerged a portrayal of 
illegality mainly with reference to the criminal nature of these places as sheltering 
poor people.  
 
The illegality in the first sense is related to the processes of the construction 
of peripheral settlements. In this realm, public discussions give references mainly 
to the concept gecekondu rather than varoş in defining low-income settlements. 
Gecekondu is mainly identified with illegal construction, its problems and 
demolition incidents. Some stories implicitly make allusion to represent gecekondu 
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settlers as undeserving beneficiaries of urban land and at the same time aggressive 
actors in demolition incidents (Hürriyet [İstanbul daily]: 1 August 2002). It is 
considered as the space providing illegal rent for a network of illegal actors and its 
inhabitants. It is interesting to note that in parallel to the policy changes on part of 
AKP, their approach and acts regarding low-income settlements have also reflected 
a certain transformation from rhetoric of social justice and social deprivation to a 
discourse almost hostile towards illegal housing and settlement (Demirtaş and Şen, 
2007: 98). The classical elitist approach to gecekondu settlements, giving 
references to the importance of migration control to large cities or to gecekondu 
development as an important impediment to civilization seem to be appropriated by 
Erdoğan in a number of public speeches (Sabah, 1 November 2003; Zaman 
[İstanbul daily, Islamic in orientation], 27 September 2005). He refers to 
uncontrolled rural-to-urban migration as presenting a serious security threat to the 
order of the cities, and for that reason he envisioned visa (nakil il-muhaberi) 
application during emigration to large cities as essential. Paradoxically, this 
approach change has gone together with intense media interest in Erdoğan and his 
family’s visits to poor families in gecekondu neighborhoods, particularly during 
Ramadan (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 99). This perception change on part of the 
party has a strong connection with their policies regarding EU integration as well 
as with the neoliberal urban policies they put into operation. In spite of the 
breakdown of the alliance between populist policies of governments and 
gecekondulu due to the nature of new populism20, middle class spectacles still 
perceive gecekondulu as the main beneficiaries of the rent of urban land (Demirtaş 
                                                 
20 New populism due to its compromise with global and national capitalists regarding urban land 
prefers to break an important part of its alliance with gecekondu settlers, since the politicians no 
longer want to offer state land and services to them. 
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and Şen, 2007: 99). However, as mentioned above, illegal construction is severely 
criticized by the government nowadays and demolition decisions are carried out 
with force despite the serious protests and resistance of informal settlers.   
 
The illegality in the second sense is related to the potential of low-income 
settlements to create a tension between different ethnic and sectarian groups having 
close encounters. Due to the dense settlement patterns and the ineffectiveness of 
old migration and settlement processes, the migrants most of the time cannot find 
chances to settle with their fellow country people, as in the case of classical 
gecekondu settlements up until the late 1970s (Tok, 1999: 83). Identity politics had 
also contributed to public approach of the conflict-ridden encounters in these 
settlements. Particularly in the newly emerged illegal settlements, extensive 
identities, in other words, ethnic and sectarian identities carry greater importance 
than classical identity formations around small hemşehri communities (Güneş-
Ayata, 1990-91). Such existence of close encounters between these identities 
seems to contribute to the claims about the illegitimacy of these places. The usage 
of varoş is mainly encountered in such a context signifying the socially isolated 
and closed communities and their potential threat to peace and national unity. 
Particularly, Gazi neighbourhood affair and the incidents that took place on 
Workers’ Day, May 1, 1996 triggered the anxiety of “urbanites”. Gazi 
neighborhood, a low-income unplanned settlement of İstanbul, was held to have a 
population of 100,000 when it appeared at the forefront of public debate on 12 
March 1995. Most of the neighborhood’s settlers had migrated from southeastern 
Anatolia and they were Alevi and Kurd in origin (Şahin, 2000: 61). A small group 
of people whose identities were not determined attacked four coffee houses mainly 
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used by Alevis and a Cemevi with machine guns and killed some people there. As a 
result, Alevis living in the neighborhood, together with other Alevis and leftist 
groups from different regions of Turkey and İstanbul, while protesting the event, 
also protested the indifferent attitude of the police forces and fought with police. 
These struggles turned into serious fights between the groups. The harsh response 
of police forces in repressing the protests contributed to the warlike nature of the 
event. The event paved the way for a renewed public perception of gecekondu 
settlements. The Gazi affair was seen in newspapers predominantly as the 
explosion (boom) of gecekondu (Hürriyet: 15 March 1995; Sabah: 19 March 
1995). Although, essays about the affair appeared to avoid using provocative 
remarks, they implicitly identified the neighborhood with violent events by 
referring to the inherent qualities of gecekondu. The history, social, cultural and 
economic structure of the neighborhood was defined as carrying the potential for 
such conflict, crime and violence anyway.  
 
The second event that triggered the perception of peripheral districts as 
inhabiting tension-laden relations took place on May 1, 1996. Thousands of 
workers from gecekondu neighborhoods alongside with many leftist organizations 
and militants of some illegal organizations initiated a march to Kadıköy, an 
important middle class district in İstanbul, in order to celebrate Workers’ Day. 
However, the celebrations turned into a struggle between demonstrators and police 
forces towards the end of the meeting. Some of the demonstrators attacked the 
police, nearby shops, and banks located on both sides of the road. After these two 
events varoş has been used more often in public discourse. The news and editorials 
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on political conflicts and social tension in peripheral spaces often make use of 
varoş rather than gecekondu.  
 
The third source of illegality depends on the poor living conditions in the 
newly emerged low-income settlements and their potential for criminal acts out of 
poverty. Crime is often discussed with reference to varoş youths who are portrayed 
as having a tendency for criminal acts since they are the ones who are affected 
most from under-consumption in the city (Zaman: 16 February 2003). The 
increasing rate of crime in large cities is explained almost always with reference to 
the numerical dominance of peripheral settlers and the dangers associated with that 
condition (see the editorial of Erol Katırcıoğlu, Radikal: 24 April 2004). The 
commonly used verb with varoş in public debate in the 2000s is “invasion”, 
referring to invasion of both city spaces and culture. Gecekondu retains its meaning 
mainly as a spatial signifier of peripheral life. Rather than defining particularly the 
peripheral space, varoş started to be used to refer to a way of life, a culture 
predominantly carrying inferior and negative qualities in contrast to high urban 
culture. A way of life associated mainly with crime, violence, undesirable tastes 
and unjust earnings have dominated the definition of varoş in the 2000s (Hürriyet: 
31 July 2002). Its strong cultural connotation makes the usage of the term vaguer in 
identifying all inferior aspects in the definition of popular culture with the concept. 
The identification of the term with a particular way of life or certain tastes, and 
therefore its transmission to cultural realm mostly brings about the emergence of a 
representation capturing racist overtones. Etöz (2000: 51) points out the observable 
fact that varoşlu have been labeled as “black Turks” vis-à-vis “white Turks” in 
news and editorials beginning from the late 1990s. This discursive division 
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between “black” and “white Turks” though encapsulating ethnic meanings and 
indicating a distinction between Kurdish21 and Turkish identities encompasses this 
distinction by classifying people if they appropriate urban traits and way of life or 
not. Therefore the racist overtones in the dominant discourse, besides referring to 
an ethnic distinction, introduce a novel form of urban racism by supposing a 
distinction between “urbanites” and “varoşlu”. It is interesting to note that early 
comer migrants of gecekondu settlements perceive the latecomer poor population 
in a somewhat similar manner.  
 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
As stated earlier representation of gecekondu space over time constitutes the 
subject matter of this chapter. The “representation of gecekondu space” within a 
Lefebvrian understanding has never been a homogenous domain. The actors who 
have taken active role in representing gecekondu space through the acts of 
planning, developing policies, ordering and defining gecekondu, had accepted 
different subject positions such as modernists, populists, urban elitists, etc. Subject 
positions of representative actors change in relation to their interests vis-à-vis the 
shifting social and economic context of the country. These various attempts of 
representing the “other” of the modernist urbanization had been realized also in 
                                                 
21 Therefore it mainly refers to the rural-to-urban migrants from the eastern and southeastern parts of 
Turkey 
 130
accordance with the changing socio-spatial context of gecekondu settlements over 
time.  
 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the strategical approach of the 
politicians, state bureaucrats, urban planners and academics in dealing with 
gecekondu space, and tactical acts of migrants exhibit an intertwined character. The 
dialectical interaction between the “representations of space” (conceived space) 
and the “representational space” (lived space) in Lefebvrian sense had led to the 
emergence of certain “spatial practices” as the third component of spatial triad. In 
other words, the dialectical interaction between representing gecekondu space and 
representational gecekondu space as lived through the acts and conceptualizations 
of gecekondulu in everyday life have led to the emergence of certain spatial 
practices which have not been always in conjunction with the suppositions and 
estimates of strategical realm.  
 
What further complicates the picture is the continuous interaction between 
the various actors in opposing realms. It is necessary to remind that these actors 
have different subject and power positions in each realm of the spatial triad. 
Lefebvre and De Certeau overemphasize the determining capacity and power of 
strategical realm in producing a modernist space in comparison to the capabilities 
of tactical realm. Furthermore, Lefebvre and De Certeau mainly attribute 
homogeneity to these two realms. However, as this chapter discusses in detail, the 
growing experiential and political power of migrants in the city context had 
increased the reciprocity between strategical and tactical realms. This reciprocity 
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had further fragmented the strategical realm, which had never presented a totally 
homogenous picture even in the early Republican period. The strategical realm had 
been fragmented around different interests and subject positions in relation to the 
changing socio-spatial composition of gecekondu space.  
 
In the first period of gecekondu history, the political actors, Republican 
bureaucrats, journalists and academics had internalized quasi-uniform discourse 
about gecekondu space that was shaped around the modernist and elitist perception 
of the time. Different from the first period in the second period, the political actors 
had internalized a more hesitant subject position with regard to gecekondulus 
around populist concerns. In that period, gecekondu settlements had become more 
visible and had rapidly proliferated in the periphery of the cities. Moreover, 
migrants had gained capacity and knowledge to employ the loopholes of the 
strategical realm by means of favoritism that had been dominating Turkish politics. 
The academic approach during that period began to signify the system related 
causes of gecekondu growth but still they emphasized the integration problem of 
gecekondulu as the most important urban problem within a modernist perspective. 
As for the third period, with the increasing visibility of ethnic, sectarian and 
hemşehri heterogeneity in low-income settlements and the increasing effect of 
identity politics, the threat perception around illegal aspects of gecekondu space 
dominates the public discourse. The middle class spectacles represent gecekondu 
space as an illegal space in terms of its inhabiting conflict-ridden ethnic 
encounters, poverty and capitalist, mafia-like construction processes. In the post-
1980 period, however, academic approach to low-income settlements, has 
abandoned its modernist and elitist conceptual schema to a large extent. Recently, 
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in-depth ethnographic methods have gained validity in understanding the dynamics 
of low-income settlements. Political actors’ approach to low-income settlements 
had taken more hesitant forms with their squeeze between the demands of global 
capital, urban middle and upper middle class interests and low-income settlements.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF MAMAK GECEKONDU REGION IN 
ANKARA, THE HEART OF A WESTERNIZATION PROJECT 
 
 
 
3.1 An Overview of Ankara’s Urban History 
 
Republican Regime’s attempt of constructing a modern capital in Ankara after the 
independence war is depicted often in the writings of many historians as an 
endeavor to build totally a new and modern space from nothing. Pre-Republican 
Ankara is portrayed as a small town carrying the traces of Independence War in 
these writings. Early urban experiences of the town are underestimated with a 
prominence given to its construction as a Western and modern urban space by the 
Republican Regime. However, according to archeological evidence, the history of 
this small town dates back to 3000 B.C., even before the Hittites. Its 
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acknowledgement as an urban settlement dates back to as early as Phrygian 
civilization (Balcıoğlu, 1993: 62).  
 
Under the Roman and Byzantine rules, Ankara employed a predominant 
position due to its critical geographical location. Particularly, under the Byzantine 
rule, the city was given outmost importance in relation to its location on one of the 
most important long-distance interregional trade routes connecting Byzantium later 
on Constantinople to the Eastern frontiers (Balcıoğlu, 1993: 63). Under the Seljuk 
rule, the city occupied a secondary importance. However, Ahilik system, a guilt 
organization of the time, which was developed as a result of the need to unite all 
the craftsmen and artisans of Turkic communities migrating from Central Asia to 
Anatolia, was developed mainly in Ankara (Balcıoğlu, 1993: 63). This increased 
the commercial importance of the city, and also led to the development of the 
social organization in the city contributing to its urban characteristics.  
 
Ankara had retained its importance as a trade and production center during 
the Ottoman rule as specialized in woolen fabrics and leather production. 
Particularly, in the first quarter of the 20th century, Ankara became an important 
center for the production of raw and semi-finished materials like many other 
Anatolian cities (Balcıoğlu, 1993: 65). Angora wool was the most important of 
these products that ascribed a privileged economic status to the city. This process 
had modernized local production forms and enriched certain classes of non-Muslim 
origin like Greeks, Armenians and Jews. At the beginning of the 20th century the 
class structure of Ankara was composed of these non-Muslim merchant groups, 
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government officials, impoverished craftsmen and petty merchants. With the loss 
of the monopoly of the Angora wool, the changing context of the European 
economy and the shifting status of Ankara in it, the lively economic atmosphere of 
the town started to fade a way particularly in the last decades of the Ottoman era 
(Çağlar, 2001: 38). “It became a small Ottoman town severely damaged by the fire 
of 1915” (Çağlar, 2001: 38). Towards the end of War of Independence, as was the 
case in many other towns of Anatolia, non-Muslim merchant population started to 
leave the country and this led to the gradual transition of commercial activities to 
Turkish population.  
 
Soon after the War of Independence, both because of the economic 
consequences of the war and the structural changes in the economic life of the city 
due this emigration, Ankara had experienced its most stagnant period in economic 
and social terms. The Turkish population of the city mainly dealt with rural 
activities (agriculture and livestock) at the time and the social organization of the 
city had lost its sophisticated nature in comparison to previous periods.  
 
To give a brief account of the pre-Republican history of the city seems 
important to me for one important reason. The social and economic context of the 
city was largely undermined within the framework of the Republican Regime’s 
planning experience as if it was an empty space devoid of already existing “urban 
traits” and relations. The new lifestyle and the physical space constructed 
accordingly were imposed upon the native population, which led to their alienation 
to a large extent. This seems to be closely related to the inherent qualities of 
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modernist planning strategy of Republican Regime that inevitably brought about an 
irreconcilability between the realm of “representation of space” (perceived space) 
and “representational space” (lived space) in Lefebvrian sense. The social duality 
between “natives” and the “outsiders” in the early years of the construction of 
Ankara as a capital city reflected the intrinsic limits of the planning activity that 
was founded upon this irreconcilability between two realms of the space. 
Moreover, the social duality led to a split in the “social” and “physical” space of 
the city and the social spatialization following the initial planning years witnessed 
a process of contesting spaces.  
 
3.2. The Historical Reasons behind the Strategy of Constructing a 
“Modern” Space in Ankara 
 
The construction of the new capital city from a 20,000 populated small Anatolian 
town includes many contradictory processes. The main reason behind the decision 
of moving the capital city from İstanbul to Ankara can be considered as the young 
nation’s search for a new national identity outside İstanbul, the symbolic and the 
political center of Ottoman Empire. Similar to the history of Ankara, the planning 
experiences in capital cities like Canberra, Brasilia or Islamabad, served the 
purpose of accelerating the process of nation building by constructing a new 
physical environment that reflects the new life style of the nation (Tankut, 1990, 
28). Particularly, when the historical and symbolic importance of İstanbul is taken 
into account, this decision indicates a radical break from the past. Republican 
Regime’s objective of constructing a modern capital and developing the region 
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may also emerge from a need to construct an alternative to İstanbul city 
economically and symbolically.  
 
Ankara with its central position in Anatolia and its proximity to other 
Anatolian towns that had been long neglected by the semi-colonial economic and 
political policies of Ottoman state was accepted by Republican Regime as carrying 
the potential for better embracing the country (Altaban, 1998: 42). Rather than 
paving the way to the intensification of inter-regional communication and the 
development of trade including all Anatolian towns, the economic policies of the 
time improved communication between İstanbul and European countries mostly. 
This triggered the uneven regional development in favor of İstanbul and weakened 
the economic and communicative ties between İstanbul and other Anatolian towns. 
Therefore Ankara’s favorable geopolitical position during the War of 
Independence as the last stop on the railway that had sustained transportation and 
communication between İstanbul and Anatolia since 1892, constituted another 
reason for its selection as the capital city of the young Republic (Erim, 1993: 76).  
 
Moreover, considering the importance young Republican Regime had given 
to the ideal of secularism, Ankara had to be constructed as a strong secular 
alternative to İstanbul, which used to symbolize the religious importance of the 
Caliphate.  
 
The construction of Ankara as a modernist practice and ideal integrates two 
different attitudes towards the Western world.  As mentioned above, it is important 
 138
to construct a capital city and a civilized model of life for the young nation far 
away from İstanbul, which was associated at the time with Sultanate regime and its 
dependencies on Western imperialist powers. At the same time, as a nation that 
turned its face to the western civilization, this new city needed the recognition from 
the Western civilized world as the center of the new nation, which was in the 
process of finding its place in the modern world.  
 
Yet, the political reservations of European states in recognizing Ankara in 
place of İstanbul finds its expression in their hesitancy of moving their embassies 
to this “desperate” and “primitive” eastern town. It is easy to find the expression of 
this hesitancy in the memories of the early visitors to Ankara. Foreign visitors and 
officials described life conditions in Ankara as hard and unbearable. D.V. Mikusch, 
a foreign official, explained the alienating aspects of life for the foreigners in 
Ankara as follows: “life dozes in a slowness that is peculiar to Eastern people in 
Ankara” (Evren, 1998: 49). However, for the students coming from the other towns 
of Anatolia to Ankara for education, the town symbolized civilization with its 
small restaurants developed from traditional cook places, schools built from hewn 
stones and big streets with dirt and mud (Evren, 1998: 44). Falih Rıfkı Atay, a 
bureaucrat of the young Republic, defined Ankara as a symbol for the whole 
country outside the ramparts of İstanbul.  
 
The European states led by England, campaigned against the idea of 
recognizing Ankara as the capital city (see Şimşir, 1988: 266, 267). In relation to 
that, another strong rationale emerged from the practical need of satisfying the 
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needs of foreign bureaucrats by constructing a modern infrastructure in the city on 
part of the Republican Regime besides the ideal of constructing a modern life style 
for the nation. This whole project can be summed up as an attempt to westernize 
the city against and for the Western world.  
 
There were four main social groups in Ankara in the early 1920s. Besides the 
“natives” of the city, there were three major groups namely, the students and 
migrants coming from other small Anatolian towns, the foreign officials, and 
Turkish bureaucrats. There was an emergent need of accommodation for these 
three groups. Foreign officials most of the time visited Ankara temporarily and 
returned to their countries after they had finished their work. In that sense, the first 
modern buildings of Ankara were the service providers like hotels and restaurants 
(see Evren, 1998). These modern buildings also provided a space for the western 
style of urban entertainment that the Republican Regime imposed as the life style 
of the new nation. As an example, Ankara Palas, the first hotel of the city hosted 
many Western style dance parties given by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk reflecting the 
new life style of the nation. As stated by Baydar (1997: 197), the interior space of 
Ankara Palas was produced by mechanisms of control, the gaze of those who are 
denied entry, and the power of these outsiders’ imagination. “For the privileged 
inhabitants of Ankara, dressed elegantly in accordance with the fashion pages of 
local newspapers that brought the latest news from Paris, and having adopted 
appropriate codes of behavior based on how-to books on “modern manners”, 
ballroom dancing was part of a performance that they rehearsed only ambivalently” 
(Baydar, 1997: 198). At the opening night of the Ankara Palas, a ball was 
organized. Karaosmanoğlu, in his novel “Ankara” portrays the social and cultural 
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distance between the high state officials and the local population who constitutes 
the fourth social group in Ankara at that time by referring to this reception:  
 
In their European style dresses and accessories, the guests arrive. The 
luxurious cars are all parked in front of the hotel. The native population stares 
at the ball crowd with wonder, astonishment and disgrace having very little 
idea of what is going on inside the hotel (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 116,117).  
 
 
 
The social distance and life style differences between the natives of Ankara 
and the newcomers to the city from the beginning decreased the possibilities of 
close social encounters. In cases where the natives and newcomers needed to 
communicate with each other the differences in their dialects might cause 
uneasiness. As stated by Evren (1998: 67) referring to the anecdotes of Falih Rıfkı 
Atay, the local people perceived the newcomers to the city as strangers and did not 
want to talk to them. Even if they had to talk, they never understood each other 
because of the differences in the dialect.  
 
Turkish bureaucrats in Ankara city had their mission to carry on the Western 
life style to the possible extent as the main disciples of the new regime and its 
modernist framework (Şenol-Cantek, 2006: 46). However, adapting to the modern 
daily habits in the context of male-female relations, entertainment, and 
consumption was very difficult even for the state officials and bureaucrats due to 
social and economic reasons. Thus, it is understandable that these new habits were 
accepted as ridiculous and intolerable by natives of Ankara who were shaped by 
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the qualities of Anatolian culture and the prohibitions of Islam. Even witnessing 
these changes was unbearable for some of the natives of the city (Şenol-Cantek, 
2003).    
 
The social and cultural distance between the local people and “Western 
strangers” and the neglect of city’s social context by modernist planning strategy of 
Republican Regime constituted at the same time its main weaknesses. As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, the “production of space” in Lefebvrian 
formulation emphasizes the power and capacity of the strategical realm to produce 
a totalizing space dominating all other spaces. The spontaneous nature of “other 
spaces” or the “daily urban reality” is ascribed limited power to divert urban space 
in Lefebvrian spatial triad. In the cities like Ankara, which was planned as to be the 
modernist space of developing nations, the spontaneous spaces divert and colonize 
the strategical modernist space more in comparison to western cities. This is due to 
the total neglect and assimilation of the “lived space” by the agents of the 
“conceived space” in such planned cities of developing nations. The causes of such 
neglecting will be discussed in detail below. It is important to note that this kind of 
neglect brings about paradoxically certain impediments for the ability of strategical 
agency to produce a totalizing space.  
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 3.3 The Weaknesses of the Planning Strategy  
 
Strategical planning can be considered as the main component of any 
modernization ideal and practice. Ankara had become a platform for a significant 
planning activity from the 1920s to the 1940s. After the initial construction of 
some hotels, restaurants and other emergent service providing buildings that are 
considered as the representatives of the First National Architectural Period, a large-
scale planning activity set in motion (Evren, 174). The products of this early period 
clearly reflect the ideal of Republican regime to reach a synthesis between East and 
West. The planning experiences of the European cities constituted the main model 
for the planning of Ankara in the coming decade. A competition was held in 1928 
among a small number of architects and Herman Jansen was selected as the creator 
and carrier of the construction activity. His plan was set in motion legally in 1932. 
The plan included everything from the estimation of city’s population growth in 20 
years time to the construction of every neighborhood that were organized 
separately for different social groups in society like high and middle ranked 
bureaucrats, workers, university teachers and students. Jansen’s preliminary plan 
included basic principles as mentioned below:  
 
He proposed the citadel as the center of the city, surrounded with new 
districts. The traditional structure of the city would be renovated day by day 
with the connection of the new parts using the existing road patterns, and 
extending these roads to the new structure of the city. At the southern part of 
the city, Jansen proposed a governmental district in “Yenişehir” [“New city” 
was the planned city that would be constructed on the empty lands circulating 
the “old city”] newly constructed part of the city, consisting of grand plazas 
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and monumental buildings connected to the Taşhan square [the center of the 
“old” or existing city] and the traditional fabric with a wide axis. He proposed 
low-density residential districts with houses of one or two stories placed in 
gardens in “Yenişehir” (Çağlar, 2001: 54)  
 
 
The structural and juridical arrangements were made in order to allocate a 
large amount of state financial resources to the service of this construction and to 
centralize the decision making process. During this period, the main institution 
assembling the financial and political capacity to prepare and employ the plan is 
Ankara Construction Directorship (Bademli, 1987: 107). The application of the 
plan had a highly centralized administrative structure.  
 
The premises of the plan particularly in relation to the spatial development of 
the city on the main axis between two centers of Ankara namely Ulus and Kızılay 
had been realized to a large extent. Today, still these two centers constitute the 
main connection axis of the city. However, some neighborhoods that were present 
in the actual plan could not be constructed. Furthermore, the planners could not 
control the unintended growth and construction held outside the planned 
boundaries of the city. There were many reasons for the partial realization of the 
plan.  
 
The population growth and the rate of migration were high above the 
estimation of the planners. They could not construct worker and university 
neighborhoods that were in the original plan since rural-to-urban migrants had built 
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their gecekondus on the lands that were legally expropriated by the state for the 
construction of these neighborhoods (Yavuz, 1952: 54). The growth of Ankara, the 
capital city, a city of attraction due to the concentration of bureaucratic posts and 
many vacant positions, could not be well envisioned by the planners. At the 
beginning of the 1920s Ankara’s population was estimated to be 20,000 people. 
This number reached to 75,000 in 1927 and 290,000 in 1950. The development rate 
of Ankara surpassed the ratios in İstanbul and İzmir during the first decades of the 
Republican Regime (Atalan, 1998: 47). Between the years 1927 and 1950 the 
populations of İstanbul and Ankara had increased up to 42% and 48% respectively. 
For the migrants who came to the city particularly with no jobs or a job prospects, 
there was little chance of owning or renting a house in the legal districts of the city. 
The real estate prices and rents were high during those years even for the middle 
ranked state officials. Beginning from the early periods of planning activity this 
unforeseen development led to the emergence of illegal settlement areas.  
 
These settlements were perceived as temporary structures by state officials, 
which met the accommodation needs of the migrants of that period as mentioned in 
the previous chapter. In that sense, they were regarded as providing a more 
practical solution to the housing problem of the migrants in large cities of Turkey. 
The politicians were unwilling to demolish these neighborhoods for that reason 
(Tankut, 1990: 108).  
 
Land speculation constituted the main reason behind tremendous value 
increases in land and housing prices. It constituted the second main impediment for 
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the plan. During the period between the late 1920s and 1940s the natives of Ankara 
and the state officials who had owned some lands benefited from the speculative 
nature of the real estate market to the extent that their economic power, experience 
and relations permitted them (Yavuz, 1952: 63). The native population of Ankara 
could not strategically evaluate the benefits of the land speculation or projected the 
future value of their lands well most of the time. An anecdote told by Erim (1993: 
76), a witness of the period, demonstrates how ignorant and naïve the native 
population of Ankara were in the decision making process about their lands. A 
local man who had a large plot of land on today’s Atatürk Boulevard, one of the 
symbols of the Republican’s Regime’s new Ankara, did not want to sell his land to 
another native and sold it to an “outsider”. He explained his reluctance to sell this 
plot of land to his native friend in the following manner:  
“Look, my father cultivated that field, and after him I cultivated it and you 
know very well that it hasn’t done any good to us, so you should feel yourself 
lucky. You are a local man. Why should I sell this useless plot of land to 
you?” which became gold, of course, in terms of land speculation in a few 
years time (Erim, 1993: 76).    
 
 
Land speculation can also be accepted as the underlying cause of the housing 
shortage that had been felt mainly during the late 1930s and early 1940s. The price 
of land with construction permits boosted during those years, which led to the 
slowing down of construction activities in general. This also limited constructors’ 
ability in utilizing the empty and available lands for construction that constituted 
three fourths of the land with permit (Atalan, 1998: 48). Erim’s (son of a 
bureaucrat) childhood memories reflected the consequences of housing shortage in 
the following manner:  
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The rents were very high and landlords wanted lump cash payment before 
moving to the houses. It was like an auction… The one who offered the 
highest price as lump payment rented the house (Erim, 1993: 77). 
 
 
Due to that, sharing houses with another family has been an often-
encountered fact for civil servants even for the ones occupying important positions.  
The reaction against Jansen plan and the unwillingness of the bureaucrats to 
cooperate with planners can be counted as another reason behind the failure of the 
plan. The nationalist upsurge among both bureaucrats and planners of the time 
constituted the basis of the reactions against Jansen and his team. This was an 
attack against the dominance and delegated power of western planners in urban 
planning. Jansen had been criticized harshly particularly after the 1929 economic 
depression on financial grounds. The criticism was due to a general reaction 
against the allocation of nation’s resources to foreign planners. Most 
parliamentarians emphasized the importance of using local human and material 
resources. Jansen’s neglect of the lower- class neighborhoods of Ankara, namely 
the old city lacking basic infrastructure, had constituted the main point of criticism 
in the parliament (see Tankut, 1990: 68). The preliminary plan of Jansen whose 
basic principles are mentioned above differed at some important points from his 
master plan. In the preliminary plan he had proposed the reconciliation of the old 
and new parts of the city however; in the master plan he decided a sharp separation 
of the old and new sections of the city (Çağlar, 2001: 97). This sharp distinction in 
physical space brought a fragmentation in social spaces of the local people and 
outsiders symbolizing the traditional and modern face of the city respectively. Yet, 
it is also worth to mention the role of the parliamentarians on this significant 
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change of the plan. Young Republic and its parliamentarians agreed to leave the 
old city outside the scope of the plan because of the high land values there in the 
initial periods of the planning.  
 
Starting from the time Jansen’s plan was accepted, the local or national 
efforts aiming to change the plan for different purposes have also emerged. Some 
high-ranking bureaucrats of young Republican Regime benefited most from the 
speculative inclinations as mentioned above. Particularly, after 1935, these 
speculative practices and decisions had brought about organized and unorganized 
developments that were totally out of plan’s context. Bahçelievler, Beşevler and 
Çankaya neighborhoods that are important middle and upper-middle class districts 
of today’s Ankara were constructed as a result of such a process (Bademli, 1987: 
107). Jansen was criticized also by the national architectures in the late 1930’s for 
constructing houses and neighborhoods that were not suitable for Turkish life style. 
As a consequence of the criticisms and the difficulties in the application of the 
plan, Jansen was removed from the responsibility of implementing the plan in 
1938. He also mentioned his dissatisfaction with the unintended developments out 
of the context of his plan in Ankara at that time before his removal from office by 
stating his wish that he wanted his signature to be removed from the plan.  
 
To sum up, the main impediments behind the planning activity of Ankara can 
be categorized into two groups. The limitations intrinsic to any social engineering 
or modernization project constitute the first group of impediments. The 
modernization ideals and practices, as was the case in the construction of “modern” 
Ankara, did not take into account the social and spatial context in which the model 
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was conceived. To represent a modern space, the strategical realm needs to define 
its other. Most of the time, the “old” and “traditional” social and spatial structures 
of old Ankara were considered within the realm of this definition of “other” from a 
modernist perspective. In order for a modernization discourse to become eternal 
and powerful this othering process needed to be kept alive. As pointed out by 
Helvacıoğlu (2002: 138), unlike the modernization premises dominating 1960s 
public discourse, the conceptual difficulty to call Ankara as a modern city was not 
a consequence of the presence of “backward” spaces in the form gecekondu 
settlements in it, but rather it was due to the impossibility of realizing a 
hypermodern imagination. In that sense, pre-Republican social and spatial context 
of Ankara had been hardly given any reference through planning process. The 
social and cultural duality in the city as well as the ongoing power of the 
modernization ideology on urban policy making contributed further to problems of 
the planning in the following decades. As stated by Balcıoğlu (1993: 78), at one 
stage during Nevzat Tandoğan’s administration, in order to take a stroll on Atatürk 
Boulevard, a man had to wear a tie, and if he did not have one, he was not allowed 
to walk on the Boulevard. To create a new life style via the imposed modernist 
space of Ankara might reach to such extremes.  
 
As mentioned above, the influence of land speculation, high rate of migration 
and reactions towards planning activities affected the course of events. The 
spontaneous social spatialization had most of the time preceded the plan. 
Therefore, the planning practices in most cases followed these unintended 
developments even at the very beginning of the highly centralized and powerful 
first planning period of the Republican Regime. As a consequence of these 
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developments, there appeared four “cities” in Ankara in time whose spatial 
characteristics and conditions of production differed significantly from each other 
(Bademli, 1993). First of these cities was the “old city” or the historical city that 
can be depicted as follows with reference to its structure in the 1920s:  
 
The urban structure was mainly comprised of housing districts upon the hill 
where the citadel is placed, and adjacent residential and commercial districts 
surrounding the citadel. Residential districts comprised of an organic and 
compact layout with its dusty winding streets and simple mud-brick houses of 
one or two stories, which were mostly destroyed by the fire in 1915. The 
administrative center of Ankara was Taşhan Plaza located in the west end of 
the city, surrounded by wetlands on the West and connected to the station 
building in its south-west with the station avenue. Around the plaza there 
existed Darül-Muallimin (School of Teachers), the Building of İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti [The building would be used as the National Assembly 
Building, after Atatürk gathered the Assembly in Ankara], Millet Bahçesi 
(People’s Garden), Taşhan, Hükümet Binası (House of Government), and the 
post office (Çağlar, 2001: 44). 
 
 
Bademli calls “old Ankara” as the city that was neglected by the Republican 
Regime. Old Ankara had turned into the commercial center of peripheral 
settlements in the following years. Second city was Yenişehir, the new city, which 
had been constructed by the initiation of Republican Regime as the socio-spatial 
symbol of modern life style at the south of the old Ankara city in the 1930’s. This 
city among others displays most the Western urban structures and life style.  In the 
late 1940s and early 1950s a third city that Bademli calls as the “instant city” 
surrounded both the old and the new city (Bademli, 1993: 69). This instant city was 
composed mainly of gecekondu settlements. In the 1950s and 1960s the destruction 
of old quarters in order to build new apartment houses created another Ankara, 
which was named by Bademli as the “re-worked Ankara” or the fourth city.  
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 3.4 Spontaneous Social Spatialization Altering the Course and 
Implementation of Planning   
 
The emergence of “instant” Ankara in Bademli’s words has played a key role in 
the transformation of public space and the planning activities in the years to come. 
In this part, I will examine two incidents of spontaneous spatialization that had 
serious impacts on Ankara’s public space by means of the development of 
peripheral settlements. First, I will elaborate on the spontaneous development of 
the routes of public transportation in Ankara. Second, I will examine the 
transforming meaning and functions attributed to two city centers of Ankara as a 
consequence of the unintended social spatialization. 
 
In the 1920s, Ankara was mainly a city of pedestrians in accordance to its 
topography and its size (Tekeli, 1987: 65). With the rapid increase in population 
towards the end of the 1930s, the vineyard houses that were located quite far away 
from the city center and used on seasonal basis mainly by the families of 
bureaucrats were transformed into permanent neighborhoods. Transportation had 
become an important issue after that. The small entrepreneurs who gave 
transportation service with small buses called “kaptı-kaçtı” constituted the main 
agency of public transportation during those years (Tekeli, 1987: 65). The world 
economic depression had prevented the municipality from taking efficient 
measures regarding transportation until 1935. With the initiation of municipal bus 
services in the 1960s, the rate of private initiatives in public transportation was 
reduced to 35% (Tekeli, 1987: 65). However, in post Second World War years, the 
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share of municipality in public transportation facilities have experienced 
retrogression both due to the low production ratio of vehicles and spare parts in the 
world and the fire that led to the demise of public buses in Ankara (Tekeli, 1987: 
67). Between 1950 and 1954, Turkey increased its import opportunities and this 
had enlivened both public and private transportation facilities. However, when we 
look at the history of transportation and the share of private initiatives in public 
transportation in general, it is easy to observe that they had played an essential role 
in Ankara’s transportation. The main reason behind that can be put as the rapid 
population increase experienced particularly after the 1950s and the instant 
development of peripheral gecekondu settlements as a consequence of that. The 
official public transportation services similar to the planning practices followed 
spontaneous social spatialization of the city. The municipal supply always 
remained insufficient.  
 
The deficiencies of municipal services were supplemented by local private 
initiatives. With the rapid increase of population in Ankara, private minibuses had 
increased in number, which predominantly provided service to gecekondu 
neighborhoods. The normal capacity of minibuses is 14 passengers; however they 
often take passengers on foot beyond their permitted capacity. The emergence of 
private entrepreneurs servicing to middle and upper middle class districts follows a 
similar pattern with the minibuses servicing to gecekondu settlements. The cars 
named as “dolmuş” gave service to these middle class neighborhoods for years 
(Tekeli, 1987: 68). “Dolmuş” as a concept refers to the quality of the transportation 
service. These cars similar to “shared taxis” do not start giving service before they 
are fully occupied by the passengers. Therefore there are no standard time 
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schedules for their arrival and departure. Dolmuşes that gave services to middle 
class districts were different from minibuses of the time. They were normal cars 
unlike the minibuses that have the capacity of up to four passengers. In the 1970s 
the small entrepreneurs, with their minibuses and dolmuşes have predominated the 
scene of city transportation (Tekeli, 1987: 68). They seemed to be symbols of the 
spontaneous aspects of spatialization in the city. Today, dolmuşes as small cars no 
longer give service in Ankara. Rather minibuses today give services to all 
neighborhoods, whether middle class or low-income settlements. Dolmuş had been 
erased from the scene of public transportation from the early 1980s onwards. 
Minibuses as well as private buses affiliated with municipality in administrative 
terms and public municipal buses still retain their share and importance in public 
transportation. The emergence of private buses corresponds to the 1980s when the 
public transformation investments had experienced a second phase of stagnation, 
because of the economic stability programs. During the 1980s the composition of 
small entrepreneurs had changed and private public buses as compensating both 
minibuses and municipal buses had entered into the transportation sector as an 
important agent. Municipalities have controlled and supervised private buses. For 
that reason particularly in the early periods of their emergence, they had been 
prevented from giving service to the most profitable routes by the municipality 
(Tekeli, 1987: 69). However, in time they had taken a greater share from public 
transportation and have continued to give service until present. It is possible to 
observe that, with the neoliberal policies put into action in the 1980s, private 
initiatives have taken an essential part in public transportation. However, even 
from the 1950s onwards, private initiatives have fulfilled essential roles in public 
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transportation. Particularly, minibuses have constituted the main means of 
transportation between peripheral settlements and the central districts.  
 
To tackle the transportation history seems to be crucial in one important 
respect. Particularly, in understanding the transformative capacity of gecekondu 
spaces on the formation of city space, the history of transportation provides 
important clues. The unintended and instant developments in the periphery of the 
city necessitated emergent provision of some services that could not be sustained 
both financially and planning-wise by the municipality. These local private 
initiatives that had emerged as a consequence of gecekondu formation had 
determined the shaping of city space later. Planners have taken primarily the 
already constructed minibus routes connecting peripheral and central districts into 
consideration while deciding on the official public transformation routes of the city 
(Tekeli, 1987: 70). These routes mainly extend from centers to peripheral 
settlements. The account of the shaping of the transportation routes exemplifies the 
impacts of the spontaneous social spatialization on the strategical realm via the 
spatial practices of the “lived space”. The private initiatives of transportation 
instantly developed as to give service to gecekondu settlements seem to constitute 
the primary reference for planning attempts in the coming period.  
 
The transforming functions and meanings attributed to two city centers in 
Ankara, namely Ulus and Kızılay constituted the second realm in which 
spontaneous spatialization was effective. Ulus was the center of “old city” and also 
served as the only center in the early periods of the Republican Regime. Although 
there was an attempt of creating a new center in the Yenişehir district by the 
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Republican Regime, Ulus had continued to be the center of state bureaucracy and a 
critical component of city space providing recreational and shopping facilities for 
many years. However, with the production22 of Kızılay as the center of the new 
city and with the impact of gecekondu development in the peripheral lands that are 
closer to Ulus rather than Kızılay on the axis combining peripheral lands with these 
two centers, symbolic and economic space of Ulus went through a significant 
transformation. It had lost its attraction as a shopping center for middle and upper 
classes in time.  
 
Beginning in the 1970s, Ulus started to be associated more with peripheral 
settlements rather than the middle class districts. Kızılay has served as the center of 
middle and upper middle classes until recently. Today, Kızılay also is subject to 
transformation and it starts to serve as the center for lower-middle classes and 
peripheral settlements like Ulus. In spite of the fact that Ulus has protected its 
status as a commercial district until present day, the nature of social spatialization 
changed in conformity with the introduction of new consumption patterns and 
customer profile by the 1970s. Although the economic profile of the region has 
changed significantly, the commercial activities have survived to concentrate more 
in Ulus than Kızılay. On the other hand, the bureaucratic posts constitute a greater 
share of working population in Kızılay due to the positioning of state buildings 
there in accordance with the premises of Jansen’s plan (Akçura, 1971: 101, 109).  
 
In the 1970s with the increasing utilization of Ulus by gecekondu settlers, a 
functional spatial duality emerged in the district. The small retail and wholesale 
                                                 
22 “Production” here denotes the constructed nature of Kızılay from nothing as a center of modern 
Ankara in Lefebvrian sense as mentioned in the first chapter. 
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trading in some parts of the region give service to all the groups in the city, while 
in other parts of Ulus, the supply is peculiar to gecekondu settlers’ needs and tastes 
(Akçura, 1971: 121,122). Kızılay had reflected a more homogenous picture in that 
sense during the 1970s and 1980s. This emerges from the fact that mainly the 
middle and upper middle classes of Ankara had used Kızılay as their center 
(Akçura, 1971: 126). Activities and services peculiar to middle class life have 
dominated the scene of Kızılay during those years. According to statistics of the 
year 1969, the ratio of hairdresser shops servicing to women was 66.7% in Kızılay 
to 33.3% in Ulus; the ratio of associations was 65. 8% in Kızılay to 34.8% in Ulus; 
the ratio of sheep and goats trading was 0% in Kızılay to 100% in Ulus or the ratio 
of psychiatrists was 54.3% in Kızılay to 45.7% in Ulus (Akçura, 1971: 126).  
 
In addition, the quality of the activities differs greatly in these two centers. 
For example, the associations of artisans, small merchants, and people coming 
from the same village were located in Ulus in congruence with the physical 
proximity of Ulus with low-income settlements. The associations that can be 
considered as more institutionalized and modern, such as Lawyers’ Association, 
Women Associations, and Turk-German Friendship association, were located in 
Kızılay (Akçura, 1971: 127).  
 
The impact of peripheral settlements on the transformation of Ulus was 
obvious in Ankara. The most important reason behind that was physical proximity 
of Ulus to most of the peripheral settlements as stated above and the railway 
connecting Mamak, one of the largest gecekondu districts and Ulus easily. Since 
the roads from the peripheral settlements intersect all in Ulus first and the way to 
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Kızılay is available only through Ulus, Ulus has transformed from the center of the 
Republican Regime’s Ankara to the center of gecekondu settlements in time 
(Akçura, 1971: 92). The boulevards that were designed to distance the new city 
from the old city within the context of the “monumental narrative” as told by the 
Republican Regime, paradoxically functioned as “ connections enabling the flow 
between” the centers of old city and new city, Ulus and Kızılay respectively 
(Baydar, 1997: 195). The presence of the boulevards enabling the flow between 
Ulus and Kızılay has constituted the main reason behind the recent shifts in the 
functions of Kızılay and its giving service to the inhabitants of peripheral 
settlements who become more mobile.      
 
 
3.5 “Post-Planning” Planning Strategies in Ankara  
 
The plan that became official in 1957 after Jansen’s plan was called as Yücel-
Uybadin plan associated with the names of its planners. The political context of 
urban planning had been transformed to a large extent in chorus with the 
application of this plan in Ankara. During those years, DP gave İstanbul priority in 
terms of urban development and therefore, investments were mainly shifted to 
İstanbul. Under the banner of a new planning, big boulevards were constructed and 
legal expropriations were realized particularly in İstanbul (Altaban, 1998:52).  
 
Yücel-Uybadin’s construction plan can be given as an important example to 
the planning tradition in Turkey that most of the time follows spontaneous social 
spatialization. Yücel-Uybadin plan’s main practice and objective were to 
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restructure and order the unintended development and to prevent further gecekondu 
development particularly in topographically unsuitable areas (Altaban, 1987: 134). 
Within the framework of the plan, they foresaw the organization of some 
unintended residential areas including Mamak region and villages close to it like 
Üreğil and Kayaş (Altaban, 1987: 134).  
 
Sharing the common fate with Jansen’s plan, Yücel-Uybadin plan was unable 
to make appropriate estimation on demographic development and real estate and 
housing dynamics in Ankara. More than half of the population was living in the 
three-four kilometers wide peripheral zones circulating the city in the north and 
south directions mainly on the most sloppy and highest regions of the city where 
settlement was dangerous to a large extent at the time (Altaban, 1987: 134). In the 
period between the years 1956 and 1969, low-income families who were unable to 
find suitable places for themselves in the formal settlement areas of the city, settled 
illegally in sloppy districts like Balgat, Dikmen, Aşağı and Yukarı Öveçler, 
Abidinpaşa, Nato Highway, and Samsun Highway.  
 
The plan could not take all these regions into its framework as a result of 
certain legal and practical limitations. The planners were constrained legally to 
realize planning only within the boundaries of municipality (Bademli, 1987: 107). 
That is the reason why they could not find a chance to do planning in many of the 
unofficial settlements outside the boundaries of municipality. Moreover, they could 
not plan new residential districts as Jansen intended; they rather concentrated on 
reforming the already constructed settlements. Due to the limitations of it, the plan 
envisioned 750,000 populated, uni-centered, homogenous city neglecting 
 158
gecekondu settlements to a large extent (Bademli, 1987: 107). With the law that 
was issued in 1965 under the name of ‘Story Ownership Law’ (Kat Mülkiyeti 
Yasası), the construction of multiple owner apartment houses in building plots has 
become possible (Atalan, 1998: 55). This further deteriorated the applicability of 
laws associated with Yücel-Uybadin plan, because it triggered rapid development 
of many new middle class neighborhoods. Since the plan ignores gecekondu 
neighborhoods to a large extent, the need for new and additional regional and 
partial construction plans and applications become inevitable (Bademli, 1987: 
109).     
 
The transition of municipal posts to social democratic parties initiated an 
advantageous period for the urban planning activities of Ankara. The planning 
activity conducted by Ankara Regulative Planning Office foresaw the planned 
decentralization of the city on west corridors in 1973. Between the years 1969 and 
1984, Ankara Metropolitan Planning Office emerged as the main agent of planning 
within the structure of Construction and Housing Ministry to sustain the 
coordination between Ankara Construction Directorship and Ankara Municipality. 
3208 hectares of land were nationalized in order to construct gecekondu prevention 
regions in Ankara between the years 1965 and 1976 (Türel, 1987: 61). Some parts 
of these nationalized lands were utilized effectively by applying housing projects 
for low-income families while the migrants for the sake of constructing gecekondu 
houses appropriated others and led to a failure of the projects in some regions 
(Türel, 1987:61). In spite of the fact that many gecekondu prevention regions have 
been put into action during the period between 1965 and 1980, the number of 
gecekondus had increased tremendously at the time and 175,000 new additional 
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gecekondus have been constructed. This fact points out the failure of gecekondu 
prevention projects that aim at transforming gecekondu areas into housing estates 
for low-income population. On the contrary, these projects further triggered and 
eased gecekondu construction by creating a supply of state owned lands in many 
regions that can be appropriated for gecekondu construction due to the 
inconvenient and inefficient functioning of these projects. Migrants tactically 
utilize the delays in the application of these projects by colonizing these spaces.  
 
In spite of the unintended developments in city’s spatial transformation 
during those years, Ankara Regulative Planning Schema that was prepared and 
applied during the era, where social democratic parties in general took posts in 
municipalities, have been acknowledged as bringing a dynamic and realistic 
approach to planning by urban scientists. Ankara Metropolitan Planning Office 
worked in coordination with Ankara Construction Directorship, Ankara 
Municipality, universities and other public institutions. The plan envisioned the 
development of Ankara successfully. The population estimate of the plan, as an 
example worked out quite well when compared to preceding planning experiences. 
Ankara Metropolitan Regulative Plan attained success on many projects like 
Sincan gecekondu prevention area, Batıkent, Ankara Industrial District and similar 
developments.  
 
However, the development of gecekondu regions could not be prevented. On 
the contrary, it gained further impetus during those years due to a number of 
reasons. As mentioned in the previous chapter, gecekondu houses particularly 
towards the end of 1970s began to be constructed for investment purposes besides 
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the aim of pure sheltering. Particularly, in neighborhoods that were legalized to a 
large extent and had transportation and infra-structural facilities, settlers were more 
inclined to build second gecekondus or additional stories. Vedat Dalokay has 
accomplished many infra-structural improvements in gecekondu settlements in the 
1970s. Some respondents of the research emphasize Dalokay’s municipal period 
with happy remembrance due to the projects that had been carried out in 
coordination with the local people. Dalokay’s municipal understanding and 
practice seemed to give outmost priority to the aim of providing services beginning 
from the peripheral settlements to city center (Atalan, 1998: 58). The infra-
structural services provided during this period contributed to the values of land and 
housing in gecekondu settlements positively. Loose control on gecekondu 
construction for different reasons when combined with the factor of increasing 
market values of these neighborhoods due the completion of services had led to the 
construction of new gecekondus there for investment purposes during the period 
(Türel, 1987: 62). The approach to planning had transformed in a positive sense 
during those years, however, populist policies and applications had been carried 
out with regard to gecekondu settlements. The responsibility was given mainly to 
metropolitan municipality to prepare and apply construction plans by 1984. Since 
then, the burden over municipalities in terms of responsibility has increased 
tremendously.    
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 3.6 The Remarkable Spontaneous Social Spatialization in the 
Periphery: The Development of Mamak Gecekondu Region 
 
Mamak is a huge gecekondu district where 95% of region was composed of 
gecekondu houses. According to 1990-population census, the population of the 
central Mamak district was put forward as 401,584 while the population of towns 
and villages that were considered as part of Mamak were 10,600 (Mamak 
Belediyesi, 1992: 5). The region covers an area of 16,126 while 6000 hectares of it 
was settlement area. Elmadağ, a small mountain of winter sports, has a boundary 
with Mamak on the east; Altındağ, an important neighborhood of “old Ankara”, on 
north and northwest; and Çankaya, the middle and upper middle class district of 
today’s Ankara, on south and southwest.  
 
To tackle the development of Mamak as a huge gecekondu region in which 
Boğaziçi neighborhood is located, is important to understand the emergence of 
peripheral gecekondu settlements in Ankara. The region today called as Mamak, 
was a village of Ankara in 1884. After the establishment of Republican Regime, 
Mamak village was acknowledged as a neighborhood of Ankara. The region is 
located in the eastern part of Ankara. This peripheral settlement was part of 
Çankaya administrative district in the late 1940s and early 1950s. From the 1950s 
onwards, there emerged gecekondu settlements in this region. In time, the 
population of Mamak village and other villages on two sides of Samsun Highway 
has increased due to the migratory flow (Mamak Municipality, 1992:5).  
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The farthest village on the axis of Samsun Highway to the center was Kayaş. 
In the west side of Ankara, Kayaş was a quite distant and isolated rural settlement 
in the 1950s. Then there were the villages of Araplar and Üreğil. Mamak village 
was located closest to the central districts like Cebeci on the axis of Samsun 
Highway. Over time, these villages were transformed into large gecekondu 
neighborhoods and the distances between them had been closed with the rapid 
expansion of each neighborhood. Parallel to Samsun Highway on the southern face 
of Mamak, small gecekondu settlements have expanded and formed today’s 
Tuzluçayır and Nato Highway regions that are quite close to Çankaya district an 
upper-middle and upper class district of Ankara for now. The rural spaces 
extending from Kayaş village to the center of Mamak in three kilometers range has 
been occupied by gecekondu settlements from both directions towards the end of 
1960s (Akçura, 1971: 72). It is difficult to find out which neighborhood had 
developed first. Forerunner migrants selected certain lands close by the villages by 
taking into account various factors such as financial concerns, natural risks, 
transportation parameters and suggestions of their acquaintances. In terms of 
landownership patterns, the region reflects a dual character. Some parts of it were 
state owned lands while other parts were vineyards that were privately owned by 
the villagers. In that respect, the migrants either appropriated state owned lands or 
bought lands from the villagers in order to construct their houses.  
 
Rural-to-urban migrants arriving city by means of Samsun Highway 
preferred Mamak region that is located close on the way to their hometowns as a 
suitable place to settle. Due to the economic difficulties migrants had experienced 
particularly in the initial stages of the settlement, the physical proximity and the 
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easily attained transportation facilities connecting Mamak and their hometowns 
constituted the major factor defining their settlement decisions. They can go to 
their hometowns easily as the residents of Mamak, since the intercity buses operate 
on Samsun Highway. As mentioned above, this was an important phenomenon in 
the early periods of the rural-to-urban migration when people still protected their 
close social and economic ties with their villages, which have survived by losing 
intensity and taking new forms until now.  
 
The migrants in Mamak, to large extent, work in long distances to their 
settlement, because the region lacks any close by commercial districts. In Jansen’s 
plan, Mamak region was described in relation to vineyards and gardens and this 
status of Mamak as green belt was supposed to be preserved according to the 
premises of the plan. The planners left no place to commercial districts in the plan 
therefore no large commercial districts emerged in the region according to Mamak 
Municipality activity report 1992 (Mamak Municipality, 1992: 42). In the general 
land use map of Ankara of the 1960s (Akçura, 1971: 75) it was easy to observe the 
distance between the commercial districts and Mamak. Therefore, being close to 
cheap transportation services seemed to constitute an important concern for the 
migrants. Mamak was connected to Ulus, one of the two centers of Ankara at that 
time –the center of the Republican Regime at first then the center of the fringes- by 
railway. This made the transportation costs for gecekondu dwellers affordable. 
Travel to work and emergent shopping needs were sustained by railway at the time. 
Except for the gecekondu districts at the center, no other peripheral gecekondu 
district could utilize railway in the 1960s and the 1970s. In that respect, the 
expansion of Mamak as a huge region does not seem to be a coincidence.    
 164
 3.7 Municipal Experiences of Mamak Region 
 
During DP era, only 3.5% of Mamak region had construction permit. As 
mentioned above, in the years where the influence of social democratic tradition 
had been felt in local governing, there has been greater attention paid to peripheral 
settlements. In order to increase the intensity of dialogue of these regions with the 
central districts, both physical construction projects and social projects have been 
put on the agenda. The transportation facilities have increased and infrastructural 
services were provided in peripheral settlements as a consequence of the self-help 
community projects by the municipality.   
 
With the establishment of two-tiered municipal system, five main settlement 
areas in Ankara gained their status as autonomous administrative districts, which 
have their own district municipalities but connected to Metropolitan Municipality 
financially and administratively. Law number 2963 acknowledged Mamak as one 
of the administrative districts of Ankara with Yenimahalle, Çankaya, Altındağ and 
Keçiören.  
 
After 1984 with the assembling of Mamak Municipality, the effects of local 
policies in the social spatialization of the region have increased. The first mayor of 
Mamak Municipality is from ANAP. The first municipal period has been highly 
criticized in the activity report of the succeeding period of social democratic local 
government in Mamak. According to the activity report of 1992 where mayor from 
a social democratic political party was in charge, the preceding period 1984-1989 
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is defined as the one during which the construction plans had not been properly 
prepared and applied (Mamak Municipality, 1992: 42). The civil servants whom I 
interviewed in Mamak Municipality mentioned the fact that they had started their 
careers in 1989 in Mamak Municipality with the appointment of the social 
democratic party. In that respect, they were also critical about ANAP period and the 
administration of Gazi Şahin who came duty as the mayor of Virtue Party, an 
Islamist party descendant of the conservative factions of Welfare Party in 1999. 
Gazi Şahin is still the mayor of Mamak as a member of ruling AKP since 2003. 
(Zaman Daily, 16.08.2003) 
 
The difficulties I encountered in the search of documents and planning 
practices for each municipal period and the complaints of municipal officials from 
different parties about each others’ political interventions in the region reflected the 
nature and effect of favoritism in local politics. Each municipal period of different 
political parties neglects, denies, criticizes and conceals implicitly or explicitly the 
experiences and actions of the preceding local government. Moreover, with every 
new administration, a serious number of municipal officials are taken from the duty 
and new ones are appointed under the administration of new local government. The 
underestimation of the policies of preceding local governments by the new local 
government when combined with estrangement of the experienced personnel who 
are the members of the opponent parties lead to the loss of accumulated local 
knowledge about the region and social structure of gecekondu settlements. This 
fact when combined with the difficulties in determining the complicated nature of 
landownership patterns in the region brought about the improper implementation of 
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construction laws and policies. This fact further triggered the emergence of 
unplanned and unintended spatial developments.  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 1984 gecekondu law initiated an 
immense legalization act in gecekondu settlements. During the ANAP Period, 
Mamak Municipality distributed “tapu tahsis belgesi” through the mediation of 
private technical offices under the oath without making a prior in-depth 
investigation of the complicated land ownership patterns in the region. In a sense, 
municipality applied the law without a serious consideration of local context. The 
tactical acts of some migrants who were economically and politically more 
powerful had turned the legalization process into their advantage within the context 
of nepotistic policies.  
 
The most ironic aspect of the research conducted in Mamak Municipality is 
to observe the hesitancy of municipal officials who criticized favoritism going on 
in Mamak for years in a very harsh manner on the one hand, but mentioned the 
incidents showing how they internalize favoritism in their individual lives on the 
other. When they talked to each other following the end of our formal interview, 
they narrated how they had requested from the demolition officials to ignore places 
where their relatives were residing during those years.   
 
The common objective of all municipal periods is to transform Mamak and 
make it an integrated part of the city. Therefore mayors give outmost importance to 
the construction of modern recreational public places and the realization of urban 
renewal projects that aim to solve all the complications of land and house 
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ownership patterns in the neighborhoods and open them to modern construction 
systematically.  
 
In the early 1990s, under the administration of the mayor from social 
democrat political party, the issue of legalizing the gecekondus and distributing 
title deeds according to 1984 gecekondu law had been completed to a large extent. 
The places legalized for construction have increased to 77% during this period and 
gecekondu dwellers were given title deeds. Private offices under oath defined or 
measured the amount of the land gecekondu dwellers have right to own legally. 
They did it by determining the size of the plot on which gecekondu house had been 
built by mainly taking the word of the gecekondu dwellers as essential. This 
practice was intrinsically open to exploitation both on the part of the gecekondu 
dwellers and architects and engineers making the measurements as mentioned in 
the previous chapter. The gecekondu dwellers may cheat officials on the previous 
status of the land on which they have built their houses. They may declare the 
previous status of the land as owned by state or municipality. However, some of 
these lands turned out to be privately owned lands. This caused a major problem 
for municipalities because people who were the real owners of these lands 
explicated their claims by carrying the issue to the court. This constitutes the main 
impediment behind planning activity of the municipalities and opening of these 
regions to formal construction. According to the sayings of the municipal officials 
who took active parts in the legalization process, they experienced a real difficulty 
in the process of distributing title deeds. The declarations of the gecekondu 
inhabitants about the status of the land on which they built their houses may not 
coincide with the truth.  
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 Urban renewal projects particularly in Alevi dominated neighborhoods have 
been initiated during social democrat municipal period. The activity reports related 
to that period also give clues about favoritism in forms of giving service mainly to 
Alevi dominated neighborhoods. Due to Alevi-Sünni conflict in the region, 
municipal officials might get reaction from gecekondu inhabitants in some cases as 
a result of the prejudices on part of each party. Social democrat officials told about 
incidents where they were threatened by guns and were targeted as “unbelievers” 
during the application of a destruction decision of a mosque in a Sünni dominated 
neighborhood on the land that is topographically unsuitable for construction. The 
demolition of gecekondus that are occupied by the people, who are in opposition 
with the ideological stand of the mayor, led to a reaction on part of the migrants. 
Such demolitions foremost mean a loss of their home for the inhabitants, besides 
they take the application of civil servants as an attack towards them by their 
political and sectarian rivals.  
 
In recent years, when the activity reports of the religiously oriented mayor are 
examined, it is possible to talk about a concentration of municipal services in 
certain Sünni dominated neighborhoods. The urban renewal projects going on in 
many neighborhoods constitute the main issue in the agenda of the Mamak 
Municipality. The activity reports reflect the main objective of urban renewal 
projects in the region as constituting healthy and sustainable living environments 
by solving the landownership problems of jointly owned lands (Mamak Belediyesi, 
2001: 113,114). Green areas and recreational spaces are supposed to be 
implemented within the framework of this new approach of urban renewal projects. 
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Particularly in the parts that are very close to Çankaya district, urban renewal 
projects like Doğukent (East city) and Ege neighborhood are given outmost 
importance. Because this reflects the chance for Mamak to change its image as a 
gecekondu district and also symbolizes the integration of the region with the city as 
mentioned by municipal documents. These two projects are located very close to 
Mamak-Çankaya viaduct reducing the physical and hopefully social distance 
between two different regions of Ankara.  
 
To sum up, the local municipal history is full of anecdotes about Alevi-Sünni 
conflict and favoritist policies that have been operated by municipal governments. 
Favoritism seems to constitute the main impediment behind healthy planning of the 
region and triggers the uneven development. Therefore, some neighborhoods as a 
result of their late integration into the legal estate market of the city deprive of the 
material and social benefits coming with systematic construction. The planning 
activity in Mamak region like the macro planning activities in Ankara, most of the 
time, follows the unintended developments rather than avoiding or preceding them. 
There are legal and institutional drawbacks to the planning activity besides the 
operation of local agents. 
 
Favoritism in politics has contributed to the spontaneity in peripheral 
settlements. Migrants, in some cases, tactically use favoritism to their benefits, 
while these acts may work to disadvantage of other groups. Favoritist policies still 
dominate local politics. However, realizing important urban renewal projects in 
certain neighborhoods mean a lot to both inhabitants of the region and mayors 
regardless of their sectarian and political affiliations. Since they help the 
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integration of Mamak with the city from the perspective of locals, though Mamak 
as huge gecekondu region have for long transformed the public and political space 
of the city.    
 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
The construction of Ankara as the capital city of the Young Republic can be 
accepted as constituting one of the few examples for the imposition of a radically 
modernist nationalist social and physical space from top to down with a serious 
neglect of the existing social context of the city. Ankara’s urban history, which 
dates back to Phrygians, and the town’s local people, their representational spaces 
and spatial practices were neglected to a large extent in such an imposition of 
holistic modernist project. However, the material conditions within which Western 
modernity flourished, such as industrialization, “the autonomous bourgeoisie 
subject and a full-fledged capitalist economy did not exist in Turkey” (Çağlar, 
2001: 41).  
 
The motivations behind the need to create such a western city reflect the 
traces of the uneasy and hesitant relation of the Republican Regime with the 
Western European cities. As stated by Sibel Bozdoğan (1997: 137) “Turkish 
architectural culture of the 1930s adopted the formal and scientific precepts of 
Western modernism and yet posited itself as an anti-imperialist, anti-Orientalist, 
and anticolonialist expressions of independence, identity and subjecthood.” That is 
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the reason why the construction of Ankara representing the modern Turkish state 
can be accepted as an act for and against the Western world.  
 
The attempt of Republican Regime to build a model city exposing modern 
urban space and lifestyle and the continuing effect of such radically modernist 
ideal create a big rupture between the “lived” and “conceived” space of the city. As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, on the word of Lefebvre, the three aspects 
of his spatial triad- perceived, conceived and lived- go together and there are no 
antagonisms, oppositions and contrasts between these three moments of the triad, 
rather there are echoes, repercussions and mirror effects. This model of Lefebvre 
seems to be valid within the context of his references to mainly Western capitalist 
cities. However, in planned cities of developing nations, like Ankara, Islamabad, 
Canberra and Brasilia, there seems to be antagonisms, oppositions and contrasts 
between the three moments of the triad. This is the underlying reason behind the 
intrinsic impediment and failure of such radically modernist planning experiences. 
In addition to the inherent limitations of modernization strategy, there is a second 
reason of the failure, which is the financial and technical incapability of the 
developing states. The planning and construction of Ankara reflect well these 
impediments of strategical realm.  
 
Within such a context the representational spaces or the lived spatial practices 
of the “weak” may attain capabilities not only to divert strategical space but in 
some cases to affect the course of planning activity which was the case in Ankara 
city. The emergence of gecekondu spaces that were dependent on the limitations of 
the strategical planning policies over time seems to alter the course of post-
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planning planning practices. The transportation routes and changing functions of 
the two centers of planned Ankara can be given as examples to the capabilities of 
tactical acts in creating spatial practices that bring about contested spaces in the 
city.  
 
The spontaneity embedded in the appropriated nature of gecekondu 
settlements had further strengthened with the emergence of favoritism in local 
politics after the early 1980s. This will be dealt with in detail in empirical chapters 
referring to the experiences and insiders’ views in Boğaziçi neighborhood of 
Ankara.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
INITIAL PHASES OF SOCIAL SPATIALIZATION: NATURAL 
SPACE 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter attempts to evaluate the initial phases of social spatialization in the 
designated research setting. The transformation of the research site from the 
vineyards and farms of Üreğil villagers, mainly a natural space, to a gecekondu 
region will be narrated. This narration includes the incidents pointing out the 
interconnected histories of the development of gecekondu space and Ankara. As 
well, the spontaneous quality of the spatial development in the neighborhood will 
be undertaken by referring to the spatial practices and tactics that gecekondu 
people employ from within the system.  
 
As mentioned in chapter one, critical evaluation of De Certeau’s concepts of 
tactic and strategy via Lefebvre’s critique of modernist production of space would 
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constitute the theoretical framework of this analysis. Both of the theories, as 
critical of everyday life in modernity appreciate the potential of “tactics” (De 
Certeau) or “users” (Lefebvre) in their capacity to create differential spaces within 
the system. However, in both theories this capacity is portrayed in a highly limited 
manner by an overemphasis of unilateral power relations between strategical and 
tactical realms, attributing a limited agency to the tactical realm. They both give 
references to squatter type settlements in their ability to create a differential spatial 
trajectory within modernist space of strategy however, they mainly define these 
spontaneous spaces as receptive or submissive.  
 
As will be made explicit by the empirical findings of the research, the tactical 
acts of migrants from within the system via the everyday social spatialization of the 
locality seem to have a significant impact on the realm of strategical planning and 
have a transformative power, though limited, on city space. By having such a 
theoretical agenda in mind, I will elaborate on the narratives involving the years 
1950s and 1960s, the initial settlement years in the neighborhood.  
 
I will handle the research data related to this period on two different levels. 
First of all, I attempt to pursue the history of spatialization in the region depending 
on the totality of individual narratives and life stories. Since this study has a local 
historical dimension, the narratives of the respondents function as the main source 
of information in understanding the nature of social spatialization in the 
neighborhood.  
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At the second level, in combination with the theoretical framework 
mentioned above, I try to exemplify how migrants define their acts of survival, 
with regard to both natural factors and supervision of security forces in the initial 
years of settlement and in the process of constructing their illegal shelters. These 
acts of survival will be narrated within the context of their positioning with regard 
to the realm of strategy and to the acts of other groups in the initial years of social 
spatialization.   
 
To accomplish this task, first of all, I will assess how different groups of 
migrants at specific periods employ certain tactics with regard to the strategical 
realm on the vertical level. The traces of the weaknesses of modernist planning 
attempts and policies from the viewpoints of the gecekondulus will be exposed 
through this assessment.  
 
Secondly, with reference to the acts of gecekondulu on the vertical level, I 
will consider how power relations between different groups in the neighborhood 
were operated by means of employing tactics vis-à-vis each other on the horizontal 
level. Some groups, depending on the context and time, may find chances to make 
near-strategic acts23 in social spatialization of the locality with regard to the less 
powerful groups in the neighborhood. The less powerful groups depending on the 
context seem to act within this near-strategical space of the more powerful groups. 
Similar to the vertical model of strategy and tactic, the tactical acts of the less 
powerful groups within gecekondu society may bring unintended consequences for 
                                                 
23 I use the term near-strategical acts referring to tactics of more powerful groups vis-à-vis the less 
powerful ones in the neighborhood. They have the ability to make future projections and shape the 
(social) space of the research setting to an extent. This ability on part of the powerful groups 
necessitates a concept that transcends the concept of tactic as defined by De Certeau.   
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the more powerful groups that may change power relations in favor of less 
powerful groups in the coming decade.  
 
The spontaneity of these settlements seems to emerge from these power 
relations at the horizontal and vertical levels. To signify the spontaneity embedded 
in the social spatialization of these settlements is not for the sake of exaggerating 
the power of the weak but to point out the loopholes of strategy particularly in 
creating a modernist space as was the case in Ankara. The most important 
impediment of the modernist strategy specific to Ankara was to undermine the 
social context of the city while planning and implementing a hypermodern space 
from top to down. The strategy excluded certain groups from the beginning by 
creating an urban space suitable for the middle class western urban life. This aspect 
of strategic planning when combined with other impediments of urban policy and 
planning as discussed in chapter three seem to provide a more extended space for 
the tactics of gecekondulu. Gecekondu construction was an unlawful process at 
first. However, this informality or unlawfulness cannot be defined outside and 
marginal to the formal procedures and institutions of planning and urbanization 
policies.       
 
When the urbanization history in Ankara and in other cities of Turkey is 
taken into consideration, it becomes explicit that, strategy of planning, to a large 
extent follow the spontaneous developments. As Tekeli mentions “the ex-post 
regularization of unplanned, de facto developments” is one of most important 
planning activities that constitutes the planning cycle in Turkey (quoted from 
Keskinok, 1997: 86). Therefore it seems impossible to think strategy apart from the 
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tactic of the “other”. The early history of Boğaziçi will be narrated within such a 
theoretical framework.  
 
 
4.2 Survival Tactics within the Space of Strategic Loopholes: 
Urban Agriculture, Railway and Highway   
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ankara was a planned capital and was 
constructed mainly as the center of state bureaucracy. Outside the “urban center” 
that was built and planned by the Kemalist Regime, the spaces in the periphery of 
the city exhibited mostly “rural” qualities. Although an immense planning and 
construction activity in Ankara had been taken place mainly by the design of urban 
middle class residential and bureaucratic districts, a large amount of land in the 
periphery of the city was left outside the context of planning practically as 
unorganized and unmanageable natural spaces in the 1950s and 1960s. This seems 
to be one of the very initial omissions of planning in dealing with the issue of 
gecekondu during those years.  
 
There were farms and vineyards as the lands of small villages in the 
periphery of the city in combination with state owned lands. The vineyards and 
farms were mainly concentrated nearby the branches of Hatip River from Cebeci 
neighborhood to Kayaş village where the vineyards of Üreğil villagers had also 
been present. The vineyards of Üreğil villagers would later constitute the lands of 
Boğaziçi gecekondu neighborhood. In general, the periphery of Ankara city 
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inhabited villages and therefore on lands certain agricultural activities had been 
carried on up until the 1960s. When compared to İstanbul, the development of 
industrial and finance sector was negligible in Ankara in spite of state initiatives in 
founding an industrial infrastructure. The periphery of Ankara at the time was 
taken into the context of the plan as the green belt of the city. Even after the 
planning activity had been put into action, the rural activity in the periphery of the 
city had constituted a pull factor for the migrants coming from the villages in 
closer towns and cities as seasonal labors.  
 
The document representing the municipal boundaries of Ankara in 1926 cited 
the vineyards and farms of Üreğil villagers as Davulcu Bağları (Davulcu 
Vineyards) within the limits of the city (Şenyapılı, 2004: 307). In the 1930s there 
have been two important villages other than Üreğil in the region namely Kayaş and 
Araplar. These three villages had been grown into large neighborhoods associated 
with their original names today as mentioned above. Üreğil villagers owned big 
plots of land and dealt with large-scale agricultural activities that seek serious labor 
force in the early Republican Period. As the village’s latest landlord’s son, who is 
95 years old narrates, there were four or five seasonal rural laborers staying in 
every house of the village in the most demanding periods of the agricultural 
calendar24. Üreğil villagers raised tobacco for Tekel. It was the state firm that was 
the only producer of tobacco products and alcoholic drinks at the time. 
Additionally, villagers had raised variety of vegetables and sold them to the 
military headquarters nearby and also at vegetable bazaar in the old city center.  
 
                                                 
24 Extract from field research note no.44, 17 May 2004. 
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As mentioned in the second chapter, many of the classical gecekondu studies 
supposing a transitory model in migrants’ adaptation to city assess rural-to-urban 
migrant’s involvement with rural activities in the early settlement period in the city 
as a resistance to give up their rural ways of life or an adaptive/supporting 
economic activity for self-consumption. Certainly these findings have a validity 
varying from the historical context of one gecekondu district to another. However, 
the course of events might follow a different path as in the case of the formation of 
the research setting. Contrary to the conventional studies, the large-scale 
agricultural activities in the peripheral villages of Ankara directly brought about 
the first encounters of the migrants with an “urban” context. The underlying 
motivation behind migration decision of the early comer migrants depends on the 
supply of rural activities on the edge of Ankara. This process contradicts with the 
modernization approach in general that delineates agriculture and urbanization as 
conflicting issues. 
 
The first residents of Boğaziçi neighborhood had been the temporary farm 
laborers worked for Üreğil villagers. The migrants constituting the majority of the 
neighborhood today, people from Cemele village of Kırşehir province, worked 
once as farm laborers in the farms of Üreğil villagers. They were the ones who laid 
the foundation of the setting. The vineyards of Üreğil villagers in combination with 
state owned lands had been appropriated by the migrants from Kırşehir and close 
villages of Ankara first and migrants from Kırıkkale, Çorum, Yozgat, Çankırı, 
Sivas and Tunceli later.  
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The journeys of migrants from Cemele/Kırşehir to Üreğil had lasted four or 
five days in those days. Therefore laborers from Cemele, most of the time stayed in 
houses of Üreğil villagers. This intimate relation between Üreğil villagers and 
migrants from Cemele explains villagers’ decision of selling small plots of land 
from their vineyards to migrants in the subsequent years. The forerunner Cemele 
migrants started to inhabit the region in order to build their gecekondu houses by 
constituting a small community at the time as mentioned above. The first 
gecekondus in the neighborhood were those built on the vineyards or farms of the 
“native” Üreğil villagers.  
 
As was described in the introductory chapter, a long street now divides 
Boğaziçi neighborhood -located in a small valley and was once a river- where the 
market place is situated. The vineyards of Üreğil villagers were placed on two 
faces of the valley in the early settlement years and that was the reason why today 
migrants from Kırşehir mainly reside in there. As understood from the narratives of 
the first comer migrants, Üreğil villagers were more willing to offer their lands 
from their vineyards rather than from farms due to the low agricultural economic 
value of vineyards for them. That is the reason why they could be sold so easily to 
the seasonal laborers partly as a show of respect on part of Üreğil villagers.  
 
Over time, this process had taken impetus; the relatives of the migrants 
continued to migrate and buy lands from villagers or, in some cases, built their 
houses on state owned lands next to vineyards and farms. The migrants employed 
tactics as in the form of “colonizing space” initially during that period. This was 
the first attempt of migrants in their search for a place for themselves in the city. 
 181
The main motivation behind the early comer migrants was not to search for an 
“urban” job but rather to work in the rural type of jobs in the natural space of the 
research setting. Even the empirical studies that consider the interconnectedness of 
the formation of gecekondus with economic and political context of the city 
suppose a certain discontinuity between urban and rural contexts. In explaining the 
history of gecekondu formation in Ankara, Şenyapılı (1985: 114; 1998: 305; 2004: 
73) defines the early comer migrants from the villages close to Ankara, searching 
for seasonal “urban” works in addition to their rural incomes in the village as the 
main actors of gecekondu formation in the topographically unsuitable places to 
settle like Mamak. The temporary visit of rural migrants in search for a job in 
Ankara was linked to the push factors in the village by Şenyapılı and she did not 
give any account of these temporary workers employed in the rural type of 
facilities in the periphery of the “planned city”.  
 
The topographically unsuitable places for settlement have constituted a 
suitable natural habitat for urban agriculture and animal husbandry in Mamak 
gecekondu region in the 1940s and 1950s. Even the contemporary literature on 
shanty towns in Latin America and other third world cities explicates that urban 
agriculture at the edge of cities on lands and water areas in the urbanized sphere 
that are available for agricultural use of surfaces constitute the main source of 
income or subsistence for poor people (Madaleno, 2000: 73). Similar to this recent 
finding, urban agriculture and animal husbandry in the periphery of Mamak had 
constituted the main means of survival in the most depressing period of the 
neighborhood history as defined by migrants. The misery of those early years was 
related to the poverty coupled with unavailability of certain services in the 
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neighborhood. The basic needs of survival like dwelling, nourishment and heating 
constituted the main concerns in a natural environment. Due to these early 
deprivations, the relations with nature in the initial periods of settlement inhabit 
both a struggle given to the wild aspects of it and at the same time the utilization of 
its resources to the fullest extent. These survival tactics with regard to nature made 
use of the space of strategy that had been left as unorganized and uncontrolled by 
the planning practice itself even after the settlement of migrants there.  
 
Migrants dealt with small or medium-scale animal husbandry by utilizing the 
natural environment around them; and/or worked as wage agricultural laborers in 
the farms of the villagers; and/or they grew up vegetables, fruit trees in their 
gardens for their subsistence. An anecdote about the utilization of natural resources 
around by an old woman migrated from a close village of Ankara to the region is 
given below. This anecdote is also important in understanding the poverty 
experienced by many families particularly in the early years of settlement:   
 
My God keeps us away from returning to these days. We experienced great               
difficulty at the time. On the other hand, the taste of yogurt and milk was 
different and everything was fresh then. When we first come here, there were 
vineyards and orchards everywhere. Your uncle [referring to his husband] 
sold butter at the time. We heated the house with tezek (dried cow dung). We 
burned them in the stove. We cut grass and thresh in the farms here, work as 
laborers. My dear. Life was hard back then. We lived a life of misery at the 
time.25  
 
 
Particularly in the narratives and memories of women, the early years of 
settlement covers an extended place. In the natural flow of the structured or 
                                                 
25 Extract from field research note no. 11, 4 March 2003 (Interview with an old lady from the village 
of Ankara. His son has a big store selling house appliances and owns a big apartment house in the 
neighborhood). 
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unstructured interviews with old women, they usually gave references to these 
early years most in a highly emotional manner. This seems to have a relationship 
with the fact that women had extended role and overload in household’s economy 
during those years. In fact, survival by appropriating26 the means of natural space 
in Lefebvrian sense constitutes the main concern of migrants’ daily lives in 
“urban” context. The appropriation of nature includes tactical decisions and 
behavior that comes with the possibilities and limitations natural space provides. 
The domestic works that exhibit such tactical acts in relation to the nature had an 
extended role in everyday life. Hence the importance of women’s labor in the 
course of these tactical relations with nature made the experience of women 
demanding and especially remarkable for women.  
 
Not only women, but also children were active in doing agricultural and 
stockbreeding activities. Putting animals out to posture was one of the main 
activities conducted by the children. Particularly the respondents above the age of 
50 when asked about the general physical condition of the neighborhood in the 
1950s describe the wild aspects nature and animal-breeding experiences similar to 
the following anecdote:   
  
We bought cows, and went to put animals out to pasture. We went to the hills              
opposite. We took them to the municipal garbage dam. That is to say, we 
began to do stockbreeding. We sold their milk. Since here was all green at the 
time, feeding them costed little. We were so poor then. When we went to 
school with my brother, the flies set down on us since we smelled like milk.27  
                                                 
26 Lefebvre supposes a distinction between domination and appropriation of space. Domination by 
technology that is affiliated with capitalism’s strategical abstract space tends towards non-
appropriation, destruction (Lefebvre, 1998: 343). Appropriated space is a natural space in order to 
serve the needs and possibilities of a group (Lefebvre, 1998: 166). Rather than dominating the space 
by employing future projected strategies, migrants appropriate the resources of natural space as an 
immediate tactic for survival considering the deprivations of initial settlement period.  
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To sum up, the available natural space in the periphery of the city and the 
ongoing rural practices in the periphery constituted a habitat and a means of 
survival for migrants. As mentioned in the second chapter, due to the planning 
priorities and conditions of the city industrial development in Ankara was highly 
limited providing job opportunities mainly in three sectors as construction, trading 
and service in the 1940s (Şenyapılı, 2004: 73, 170). In the coming decades, the low 
profile service jobs in state sector and trading had constituted a remarkable part in 
gecekondu society’s occupational composition parallel to their experiential 
maturity in the city. As gathered from research data, economic dealing with animal 
husbandry and agriculture in gecekondu space seem to last longer than 
conventionally defined as a means to accumulate capital for other jobs particularly 
in trading sector. The early experiences of the migrants in “rural” environment in 
the periphery of the city not only raise certain questions about the supposed 
dichotomy between rural and urban spheres but also about conventionally defined 
ways for gecekondulu in integrating with the job market of the city. Agricultural 
activity in the periphery of Ankara constituted the primary step in their integration 
with city economy.   
 
In addition to the availability of natural space in the periphery of Ankara, the 
development of Mamak as a large gecekondu region has two reasons with strong 
spatial references on a macro scale. As mentioned in the previous chapter, first one 
                                                                                                                                         
27 Extract from field research note no. 7, 16 Oct. 2002 (Interview with the owner of a bakkal). 
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is the presence of the intercity train service in Mamak that has sustained cheap 
transportation to city center from periphery since the 1930s. The migrants often 
mentioned the presence of railway as constituting one of the main motivations 
behind their settlement decisions.  
 
The second reason is the presence of Samsun Highway dividing Mamak 
region into two large portions and its status as the main highway connecting region 
to neighboring Central Anatolian cities from which most of the settlers of Mamak 
had migrated. As Mike Davis (2006: 27) puts forward precisely, housing choice is 
a result of confusing trade-offs for the migrants everywhere in the Third World. 
“For some people, a location near a job- say, in a produce market or train station- is 
even more important than a roof” (Davis, 2006: 27). Spatial proximity to cheap 
means of transportation in two directions, both to the city center and to their 
villages in their hometowns constitute the main motivation behind migrants’ 
settlement decisions that is an often-mentioned fact during the course of the 
research.  Mamak region is the most suitable place to settle for the migrants in case 
they want to visit their villages of origin as easily as possible. Some respondents 
mention spatial proximity by making jokes about these initial choices of where to 
settle. When I asked a middle-aged man his ideas about settling in Boğaziçi, he 
answered in the following manner: 
 
I often get angry with my father. As if there was nowhere, other than 
Boğaziçi, they had come and settled here. But my father was unemployed at 
the time and they should be thinking that living in a gecekondu settlement 
would be easier and suitable. I often teased my father by saying: “On the way 
to Ankara from Kayaş, you saw city sign and immediately settled here, I 
think.” It was a gecekondu settlement at the time and everywhere was 
vineyards and orchards. Here was the river. There was no road at the time. 
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My father should be thinking that he could work in the farms here. If he had 
settled in a different neighborhood he might have lived in real poverty.28  
 
Nevertheless, the construction of the intercity railway in the late 1930s and 
highway in the 1950s mainly emanated from the objectives of a modernist strategic 
planning. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the development and improvement 
of the railway was one of the main strategies of the Republican Regime in their 
attempt to open the introverted and conservative structure of Ankara as a central 
Anatolian city to the modern world in social and economic terms (Şenol-Cantek, 
2003: 42). Towards the end of the 1930s train station was opened in Cebeci and the 
railway route between Mamak and Kayaş had been started mainly to carry the 
middle class families of the new Republican capital to picnic areas in Kayaş that 
was one of the main natural recreational spaces in those days. Unintended with the 
planning objectives of the subway, initial tactical decisions of the migrants in the 
city brought about the emergence of gecekondu settlements as spontaneous spaces 
in that particular region. 
  
Similar to the railway construction, Samsun Highway was constructed as part 
of such modernist-planning attempt. As mentioned in the second chapter, DP had a 
hesitant approach to low-income settlements and urbanization policies in general. 
In spite of their early populist policies and their condoning gecekondu construction 
in the periphery of the city, their urban policies in the late 1950s had included 
radically and despotically modernist interventions in urban space. The construction 
of big boulevards, highways and modernist buildings and demolitions in the 
“cancerous” neighborhoods in late Menderes’s terms, were the main activities of 
                                                 
28 Extract from field research note no. 28, 17 June 2003 (Interview with a shop owner from Yozgat). 
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DP’s urban political agenda in those years. The construction of Samsun Highway 
was part of this radical modernist agenda of DP. However, over time, the 
construction of Samsun Highway had also brought unintended consequences for 
the agents of strategical planning particularly by altering the real estate values in 
the region.  
 
Boğaziçi neighborhood in close connection with the ownership patterns of the 
vineyards has developed from the areas closer to the main road in the 1940s. The 
natives of the Üreğil village owned all lands on two sides of the Samsun Highway 
from Boğaziçi neighborhood to Kayaş that was approximately two kilometers in 
length. The growth of the small and scattered migrant communities on those lands 
into the emergence of Boğaziçi and other neighborhoods had taken impetus 
beginning by 1952 with the construction of the highway. The value increases in 
real estate, with the construction of highway nearby, brought about the declining 
importance of agriculture in the region. Consequently, the villagers in the periphery 
sold their lands to the migrants coming in large numbers from different parts of 
Central Anatolia and from other gecekondu neighborhoods of Ankara. In a context 
where agriculture in the periphery of Ankara had begun to lose its economic 
significance compared to previous years, gecekondu construction had followed a 
more rapid course beginning by the late 1950s. Besides, the first gecekondu law 
that particularly gave references to the unlawful settlements of Ankara passed in 
1948. By means of the law, these unlawful settlements that had been diffused in a 
650-hectare area were taken within the context of amnesty. Mamak-Belkeriz 
gecekondu region was one of the places that were taken in the context of amnesty 
(Şenyapılı, 2004: 133,135). This also had a triggering effect on the development of 
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Boğaziçi neighborhood in the 1950s within the context of this dialectical 
relationship between strategy and tactic on the vertical level.    
 
 
4.3 Gecekondu Construction: Tactic versus Strategy on the Vertical 
Level    
 
As a consequence of the intensity of gecekondu construction during that period, DP 
government had taken more severe legal measures in the late 1950s in accordance 
with its hesitant approach. In that period, the demolition incidents in Ankara have 
increased in number. Menderes made declarations that the city had been long left 
uncontrolled and the neighborhoods that he thought as the sources of crime should 
be tamed (Şenol-Cantek, 2006: 51). These severe measures and the similar ones 
following it in the subsequent years could not avoid the accelerated growth of 
gecekondu construction as mentioned in chapter two. The narratives of the 
respondents about the construction of their gecekondus provide some insights 
about the loopholes in the legal application of laws and tactics of gecekondulu that 
utilize these loopholes which made the growth of gecekondu spaces inevitable.      
 
As understood from the accounts of the migrants, the relationship between 
them and state officials in duty of demolition seems to be an unwritten game with 
agreed rules and mutual understanding at an informal level. Each of the parties 
performed in order to avoid the tension on part of the other. In that way migrants 
prevented any punishment or violent act. The relationship between state officials 
who were responsible from the supervision of unlawful constructions and migrants 
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were in general unexpectedly “loose” or “unmanageable”. Migrants mentioned the 
informal nature of the relationship that was mainly a consequence of the financial 
interests of officials. Officials often took bribe from migrants in order to overlook 
the illegal activity. The second reason of this informal relation was the emotional 
bond between the migrants and some officials who were also gecekondulu and 
shared the same experience of surviving in the city.  
 
In some cases, where the relationship between parties took on a problematic 
nature, the incompatibility usually did not emerge from the proper applications of 
the rules and procedures by the officials but from the tightening of this loose 
relationship as a result of some personal issue between the migrant and official 
totally out of its legal context. Depending on the narratives of the migrants, this 
tightening may have different sources, like sectarian or hometown differences 
between parties, false performances on part of each party in violation of the game-
like relationship or a personal dislike. There was only one unfortunate event 
encountered in the narratives of the respondents where a gecekondu dweller 
murdered an official after his fourth attempt of demolition. This incident was 
related to migrant’s refusal of giving bribe to the official and announcement of 
official’s asking for bribe to public. In this event, the rules of the game-like 
interaction between gecekondulu and official were totally broken. Despite the 
sensitiveness of the issue, giving and taking bribe was made totally explicit in the 
stories of the respondents. The demolition incidents reached their peak point in 
1961 just after the military intervention during the temporary government of Cemal 
Gürsel.  An old woman mentioned the importance of giving bribe in protecting 
one’s gecekondu during that specific period in the following manner:  
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 The military intervention had just been taken place when we came here. 
Soldiers used to come here, we served tea, and they said nothing about our 
gecekondu. Then, one day while I carried a very heavy wool bed on my back, 
I saw the demolishers around our house. I was scared; I remained motionless 
for a very long time with the bed on my back. Now and back then the 
demolishers have only had one worry. When you give money, nobody 
demolishes your house. When they run out of money, they come for 
destruction.29  
 
 
In sum, depending on the stories of demolition by gecekondulu, each party 
acts in compliance with the invisible and silent rules of the game under normal 
conditions. The most often voiced tactic of the officials was to destroy some part of 
gecekondu that did not lead to the total destruction of the house. In doing so, they 
accomplished the duty of demolition seemingly, but they gave no real harm to the 
gecekondu dweller since the damage could be repaired in a couple of hours.  
 
Consequently, gecekondu construction and its prevention from demolition 
can be read as a showcase of gecekondulu’s tactics for survival within the system. 
In that sense, it seems convenient in that part of the chapter to give a more in-depth 
account of the tactics gecekondulu employ while constructing their houses and the 
consequences of these tactics. As tackled from the narratives of the respondents, 
first one of these tactics was to construct gecekondus in a very limited time span so 
that they could avoid the “selective” attention of officials whose duty was to apply 
demolition decisions. The attention of the officials can be defined as “selective” 
because, as extracted from the construction stories, the demolition priority was 
given to the houses that had been most recently built or that had not been 
                                                 
29 Extract from field research note no. 36, 20 July 2003 (Interview with an old lady from 
Kırşehir/Cemele).  
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completed yet. The criterion of living in a gecekondu for a long time is narrated as 
to be one of the most important excuses for the migrants to resist the demolition 
decision. In that sense, the gecekondus that were built most recently carry greater 
risk of demolition when compared to others. The municipal officials point out a 
practice, which they had often encountered, during demolition incidents. Just after 
constructing their gecekondus, migrants plant already grown flowers in their 
gardens that they have borrowed from their neighbors in order to give the 
impression that they have stayed at the house for months.30   
 
Second tactic of migrants in relation to the second condition of being 
“selective” on part of the officials was to build houses as small as possible, mostly 
in shape of “coal cellar” rather than a house. The initial construction of the house 
in the form of “coal cellar” as commonly named by gecekondulus may serve as a 
legitimate reason for officials to ignore the house. Almost all of the respondents 
pronounce a resemblance between the initial shapes of their house with coal cellar. 
“We built the house as a coal-cellar at first” is an often-mentioned sentence at the 
beginning of the construction stories. The resemblance of the house to a coal cellar 
would constitute an excuse for them in the game-like relationship they have formed 
with the official as mentioned above. The late comer migrants most of the time 
construct their houses near their hemşehri’s already established gecekondus so that 
they can present the small house as the coal cellar of the big gecekondu to the 
officials. In that sense, the late coming migrants were obliged to use the near-
strategical spaces of early comer migrants as a survival tactic in order to escape 
from the demolition incidents. Unless the family is wealthy enough to build a two 
                                                 
30 Extracted from field research note no. 43, 15 Jan.2004.  
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or three room gecekondu at one night, the gecekondu houses were constructed as 
small one-room building at first. Gecekondus had taken their final form after the 
addition of rooms convenient with the needs of the family in time. As similar to 
development of these neighborhoods in an unplanned and spontaneous fashion, the 
construction of each gecekondu house totally depends on the experience of 
building, destroying and rebuilding. The outlook of gecekondu reflects the effects 
of this experimental and unplanned construction process.  
 
The third tactic, and may be the most important one for migrants, was to 
choose the most suitable place to build their gecekondus not only to escape from 
the attention of officials but also to sustain the best possible living standards. The 
third decision can only be defined as a tactic if we approach it from the perspective 
of relations between state officials and gecekondulu. However, if we consider the 
power relations within the community, the decisions of settlement contain some 
near-strategic acts of future calculations for more powerful groups like the early 
comer migrants or the migrants from hometowns who are densely represented in 
the neighborhood. I would like to give an extended account of the first and third 
tactics below.  
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4.3.1 “GECE KONDU” Built Overnight by Community: Hemşehri 
Relations Employed as Tactics Operating on the Vertical and 
Horizontal Level 
 
As mentioned above, the houses under construction had a higher risk of being torn 
down when compared to the completed ones. Gecekondu law number 486 gave full 
authorization to state officials about the demolition of gecekondus that were under 
construction. For the completed ones, though, officials should have a court 
decision, which was a difficult, and long process. Mostly it ended up with the 
protection of the house (Şenyapılı, 2004: 191). Therefore, the demolition priority 
under normal circumstances was mainly given to the houses under construction. 
Therefore it was essential to complete the construction invisibly. This invisibility 
could only be sustained at nights and through rapid construction. Gecekondu 
construction depends on the good management of time. The concept of “gece 
kondu” itself reflects its ontological status of existence that depends predominantly 
on time rather than space. In that sense, the early conditions of its existence very 
much coincides with the concept of tactic as defined De Certeau. In that definition, 
the weak or the “other” of the modernist discourse could only find some place in 
the space of strategy by consuming it or in Lefebvrian terms by appropriating it in 
a differential manner by means of the good management of time. Therefore, as 
defined by the migrants, there was an immediate necessity to move into the house 
after the construction, so that, the officials would have an impression that the 
migrants had long been living in the house. As told by an old couple, moving into 
the house immediately seems to be a necessity for the migrants at the time:  
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When we first come here, we cut trees, bought briquette and sand. We 
gathered all our friends and acquaintances and worked collectively. Then the 
demolishers came. To prevent the demolition, we put haircloth and oar on the 
house under construction. We needed to move in immediately but we were 
afraid; the construction was new and everywhere was wet. We couldn’t go in; 
we thought it was going to fall down. My brother stayed in, the first night, in 
order to prevent the demolition.31  
 
 
The rapid construction can only be sustained with the unconditional help 
gathered from community. Depending on the accounts of the migrants, if no 
attempt of demolition takes place, there needs ten or more people to complete a 
gecekondu with two rooms in one night. When I asked the migrants to tell their 
experiences of gecekondu construction, they mostly referred to the miserable 
conditions and deprivations at the time. Most of the migrants defined this period as 
their most desperate and poor period in the region. The feeling of poverty not only 
emerged from the fact that it was very difficult to attain water, construction 
materials or tools at the time but as the narratives indicate it was also difficult to 
get help in terms of human labor. The well to-do migrants told that they had come 
to the region with a certain amount of money and these migrants mostly mentioned 
their hiring workers during gecekondu construction besides the help of close 
relatives. However, poor migrants were in direct need of all the material and non-
material help, they could get. It was at that point, while they were talking about 
these needs, the definitions of close community were made with reference to the 
nature of the help, if there was any. I felt the effect of power relations and 
competition for scarce resources between different groups initially at that point of 
the conversation though they rarely gave any references to power relations and 
                                                 
31 Extract from field research note no. 31, 26 June 2003 (Interview with an old couple from Yozgat).  
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competition explicitly. They rather use a wording that associates their feelings of 
disappointment, helplessness, loneliness, and shame.  An old woman from a small 
town of Ankara lacking a community of villagers or relatives describes their 
feeling of loneliness in the late 1950s as follows: 
 
When we first settled here I never went out of the house. Nobody helped me 
at the time. There were people mostly from Kırşehir. Anyway there were very 
few people around here at the time. They never helped. I still do not visit 
them and they do not visit me. I only got a water cauldron from a neighbor 
once. That was all.32  
 
The early comer migrants appropriated the resources of natural space and 
constructed a working system of survival for themselves and their community. As 
mentioned above, migrants from Cemele village of Kırşehir were the founders of 
the neighborhood. They were powerful because of their early appropriation of 
resources and having a large community of villagers who provided unconditional 
help to each other. Therefore, the acts of these relatively powerful groups due to 
their experiences in the neighborhood and Ankara included some near-strategical 
calculations rather than tactical acts. The reason why I call the acts of early comer 
migrants as near-strategical is that they seemed to appropriate and control space 
with some future projections and calculations. They began to control the social 
spatialization in the neighborhood to the benefit of their hemşehris which actually 
goes beyond the definition of tactic in De Certeauan terms.  
 
Early and well-to-do migrants dig wells in their gardens. As gathered from 
the narratives of the respondents, most of the time, they want to reserve this source 
only for their close relatives rather than neighbors. Permission to use these wells 
                                                 
32 Extract from field research note no. 11, 4 March 2003.  
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seemed to constitute the main source of conflict in public space during those years. 
In most cases, the house owner gave permission only to the relatives or close 
villagers. As a consequence of that, many neighbors and mainly women had fights 
with each other over the issue of water. A shop owner from Yozgat gave an 
example of these conflicts referring to his mother’s experience:      
              
When we settled here, naturally, we had no water. My mother often narrated 
an incident that she went to a house of our neighbor behind and took water 
from their well. According to the saying of my mother, the owner of the 
house took the water bucket from her hand and poured it on the ground with 
anger. I remember how upset she had become from time to time remembering 
that incident. The reason for that is we are from Yozgat. 90% of the 
population here is from Kırşehir. People from Kırşehir don’t wish people 
from Yozgat or Kırıkkale to have settled here.33  
 
 
 
As understood from the stories of the migrants, even the migrants from 
Kırşehir among themselves were reluctant to share their resources and labor if they 
are not from the same village or close community. When the nature of solidarity 
among Kırşehirlis is examined through their stories, they rarely voice their 
reluctance to share resources with their neighbors from other hometowns in a strict 
manner. However, this emerges as a fact from their narratives that there had been 
solidarity only among close kin where all the migrants have had scarce resources in 
the 1950s and early 1960s.  
 
The definition of being hemşehri literally refers to being from the same 
hometown or in other words to the migrants coming from the same province like 
from Kırşehir, Kırıkkale, Çankırı, Çorum, Yozgat and Sivas. The definitions of 
                                                 
33 Extract from field research note no. 28, 17 June 2003.  
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hemşehri in relation to the representations of each province in the narratives of 
neighborhood inhabitants and stereotypes about these provinces are discussed in 
detail in the first chapter of the thesis. During the initial period of settlement, 
unlike its conventional meaning, hemşehri as a concept refers to a more restricted 
group like extended family, relatives or to people from the same village in the 
narratives of the migrants. This definition refers to a more restricted community 
that is considered as hemşehri.  
 
This becomes apparent with the stories of migrants who had migrated from 
the densely represented provinces in the region like Kırşehir and Kırıkkale, but had 
been excluded from the close community network due their being from another 
town or village of the same province. Wife of the first bakkal and a well-known 
person in the neighborhood expresses her feeling of loneliness with reference to 
this limited definition of hemşehri in the following manner:              
 
There were people from Kırşehir. But nobody helped us [during the 
construction of their houses and bakkal]. Though we earned less at the time, 
we always had money, although we suffered a lot we were never in need of 
anybody, thank god... There are a lot of people from Kırşehir in the 
neighborhood, but they are from a different town. We’re from Kaman 
[another town of Kırşehir]. People from Kaman are not considered as 
Kırşehirli according to people from Cemele.34           
 
 
Unconditional mutual material and nonmaterial help and solidarity are highly 
encountered in the narratives of people migrated from the same and densely 
represented villages. As mentioned above, this help is unconditional and contains 
the sharing of all resources and putting all opportunities to use for mutual benefit. 
                                                 
34 Extract from field research note no. 33, 30 June 2003.  
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The most significant incident through which one can understand the nature of 
solidarity among migrants of close kin and relatives is gecekondu construction due 
to the necessity of rapid construction. The difficulties of attaining water for the 
sake of constructing gecekondu and doing domestic works are the most often 
evoked memory in the narratives of the elderly women. Particularly women refer to 
the solidarity among close kin or migrants from the same village. Women mostly 
make the restricted definitions of hemşehri since women have most of the time a 
more restricted social environment when compared to men. Even, as concluded by 
the findings of some research, women due to their restricted living environment, 
consider neighboring relations even more important than relations with relatives 
when compared to men (Gökçe et. al, 1993: 332, 333). They acknowledge people 
as their hemşehris only when they are relatives or from close kin. If they come to 
have acquaintances from other villages or provinces even from other sectarian 
identities, this is due to the physical proximity of living close together for years as 
neighbors, which is actually a result of involuntary or contingent location. This will 
be dealt with in detail in the following sections. As proved by the research of 
Gökçe (1993: 297) the main means of solidarity in the neighborhood depends on 
the relations between relatives and hemşehris.    
 
Consequently migrants from towns, other than the ones mostly represented in 
the region, usually mentioned incidents of having hired waged laborers in 
constructing their gecekondus rather than having taken help from their hemşehris in 
the broader sense of the term. In some cases, out of poverty, they could not employ 
workers. In migrants’ accounts, their relatives from the village temporarily came 
for help and they overworked in order to finish construction as quickly as possible. 
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These people mentioned almost no incidence of taking help from neighbors during 
the construction activity. In cases where the migrants are from the close villages of 
Ankara, they mentioned the daily visits of women in the family to meet the service 
needs of the construction activity and workers. These migrants who can be defined 
as “outsiders” depending on their common feeling of loneliness and helplessness 
gave references to the cooperation and help among themselves in the early periods 
of settlement. The “outsiders” who were left as in minority position mainly vis-à-
vis migrants from Cemele/Kırşehir helped each other under the identity of being 
neighbors. An old man from a village of Yozgat under-represented in the region 
explained the difficulties he faced in the initial periods of settlement in the 
following manner:  
 
I went to a meeting in my child’s school and complained about the laziness of 
my son to the teacher. He said: “don’t say anything bad to the child. Two 
students are successful in this class and one of them is your child, encourage 
him”. Then I came home… We had no electricity at the time but I thought 
that I had to get electricity so that my child could work. There was electricity 
in the neighborhood but we had no money to take it in the house. We had a 
very good neighbor who is from Çorum. He helped me and gave me 
electricity from his house with a cable. They told him that the municipality 
might have punished him for that, but he accepted it. He was really a very 
good man. 35
 
 
However, the nature of help among “outsiders” seemed to be different from 
the one among close kin or people from the same village. Giving and asking for 
help was narrated as less straight forward, the frequency of requesting help was 
less and the quality of help was limited by giving some tools or permitting the 
newcomer to use the resources of their houses in return for money like using the 
                                                 
35 Extract from filed research note no. 22, 3 May 2003.  
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well or electricity for a certain period of time. The lady from Kırşehir/Kaman 
described the form of getting help from her neighbors of other towns in the 
following manner:  
 
We had a lady here, a good neighbor. In our first night here, she took my girls                     
and gave hostage to them. She was a woman from Koçhisar [a town of 
Ankara]. We had no flooding water at the time. I wanted their hosepipe. I told 
her to control her water meter [so that she could pay the price of water back]. 
They also gave us a glass of tea. I could never forget this kindness.36
 
 
During the course of the research the migrants often mentioned the 
importance of hemşehrilik, particularly in relation to the early periods of the 
settlement. Hemşehris at the initial stages of the settlement refer to more intimate 
associates like the relatives and villagers who can be considered within the frame 
of close kin according to the findings of the research. 
 
In a recent study on a gecekondu settlement in Ankara, it has been pointed 
out that hemşehri, which once meant “being from the same country of origin”, in 
time takes an extended meaning for gecekondu settlers, as “being from the same 
ethnic or sectarian group” (see, Ayata, 1991). This finding holds true also for more 
recent definition of hemşehri in Boğaziçi neighborhood. However, during the 
initial settlement process and construction of gecekondu houses, neither the people 
from the same province nor people from the same religious sect just depending on 
these identities felt themselves as obliged to help each other. This finding of the 
research is supported by the earliest and one of the most sophisticated gecekondu 
                                                 
 
36 Extract from field research note no. 33, 30 June 2003. 
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research of Karpat (1976).  He finds out that the scope of and closeness generated 
by hemşehrilik grows in direct proportion to the distance from the original place. 
“For Turkish villagers and their relatives and hemşehris in the city, blood and 
communal ties provide the only basis for mutual help and solidarity until these are 
superseded by or fused into other relations and identities of urban and national 
origin” (Karpat, 1976: 85, 86).  
 
The lack of water, electricity, and construction materials in the early periods 
of the settlement put great pressure on the everyday lives of the migrants. The most 
important tactic, which was to finish construction as soon as possible, could only 
be sustained by the unconditional help of such community that was defined in a 
strict and limited way by the migrants.  
 
 
4.3.2 Near-Strategical Acts Defining Community Settlement 
 
The second important tactic in gecekondulu’s dealing with the system was to settle 
in suitable places where they could prevent their gecekondus from demolition and 
from possible natural disasters easily. However, migrants made the decision of 
where to settle in a rush, most of the time under a certain time pressure by making 
an assessment of existing material conditions and opportunities at hand rather than 
spending a certain amount of time for future projection.  
 
Depending on the narratives of the migrants, the opportunities at hand were 
mainly shaped by their early comer hemşehris. These early comer hemşehris most 
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of the time provided suitable lands to buy or to settle on to the newcomers. The 
decision to construct a house among hemşehri community was often voiced by the 
respondents with an emphasis to the feeling of security during the research. To live 
within the community make their claims stronger vis-à-vis the system as believed 
by the migrants, therefore this was the most important tactic employed by 
gecekondulus in the initial years of settlement. Second tactical decision is related to 
the concerns of natural risks. To calculate the best possible place to settle 
considering the past stories of disasters as was the case in Boğaziçi and 
topographical risks seemed to effect their settlement decisions. Thirdly, certain 
tactics were employed by the migrants to appropriate the largest possible plot of 
land by constructing some part of their gecekondus on the land they bought from 
the villagers and some on state owned lands. Fourthly, as mentioned above, the 
concerns about being close to cheap transportation services defined the decisions of 
where to settle.  
 
Many migrants, however, cannot apply these tactics with a future projection. 
The possibility on part of the migrants to take these decisions was mainly related to 
the financial, communal and experiential power they had. In most of the cases, one 
or more of these decisions do not depend on migrant’s “free” choice but on the 
opportunities and conditions of the time and place. The early comer migrants and 
the people from hometowns that were densely represented in the neighborhood 
could make such tactical decisions, while others seemed to lack the means to 
consider all of them in the initial settlement period.  
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In that sense, people from Kırşehir/Cemele and Krıkkkale/Halitli, the early 
comer and densely represented groups often gave positive references to their 
communal settlement patterns as an advantage particularly with reference to certain 
moments of social spatialization like the insecure environment of the radically 
politicized space of the late 1970s. When I analyze the socio-spatial settlement 
patterns in the region, these two communities seem to position in a more 
concentrated manner when compared to the migrants coming from other 
hometowns. As will be discussed later, this makes them well equipped with a 
certain power to resist any outside interference as a community. The ontological 
insecurity felt by migrants as a consequence of the unguaranteed living conditions 
within the space of strategy and the risks of natural space made communal 
concentration inevitable.  
 
In that respect, the leading migrants from Kırşehir, having a strong financial 
position bought large plots of land from Üreğil villagers just to sell these lands to 
their hemşehris in order to live close to their acquaintances. This tactical act had 
turned into a near-strategical one with the growing control of these migrants over 
space. Other migrants, particularly the ones that I called as “outsiders” above 
hardly made such strategic plans, rather they have used the opportunities at hand in 
a limited time span. To put such spatial boundaries for the community has been 
replicated by different hemşehri groups in time, which had made the dialogue 
between different hemşehri and sectarian groups difficult. Such spontaneous social 
spatialization alters the direction of power relations depending on the political, 
economic and social context at the time. The effect of it was mainly felt in the 
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social space of the neighborhood in the 1970s that will be dealt with in the 
following chapter.  
 
To sum up, the leading role of the early comer migrants, might relate to their 
early arrival to the region or/and to their economic power or/and to the 
entrepreneur qualities they have and/or to the respect they have in relation to their 
social network in village or city. An old woman who is the wife of a contractor 
from Kırşehir/Cemele describes her husband’s attitude towards his hemşehris as 
follows:  
 
He bought all the lands from the top of the street up to here. [She refers to the 
lands on two edges of a street like 100 meters long. There are approximately 
thirty houses of Kırşheir/Cemele migrants.] Then he sold these lands only to 
our hemşehris so as to make them our neighbors. He bought them from an 
Üreğil villager, a respected man and sold them to our hemşehris from the 
price he had bought, with no profit. He gave land only to our people from the 
village.37  
 
 
An important Kırşehir/Cemele community formation in the region seems to 
be made possible with the efforts of people like the contractor mentioned above or 
with the attempts of wealthy people in the community. Strict social control seemed 
to be empowered during the period in order not to permit the entrance of outsiders 
and their constructing gecekondu houses in the community area. In almost every 
decision of settling or migrating to a certain region, the prior settlement of a 
relative group or people of close community (villager) have played the defining 
role. Karpat defines these migrants as kurucular (founders) and he states their role 
                                                 
37 Extract from field research note no. 41, 19 Aug. 2003. 
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in shaping the space of the neighborhood as vital (1976: 80) similar to the findings 
of the research.  
 
Accordingly, the migrants who mentioned about their financial sufferings in 
the early settlement period chose places to settle considering certain parameters, 
like the cost of the land, conditions of purchase and hemşehri links and help. In that 
sense, particularly the migrants from certain villages of Ankara, Yozgat, Çorum 
and Çankırı who emphasized their poverty at the time, preferred to settle in places 
where land was rather cheap. The land values were very much affected by the 
considerations of natural factors in the early settlement period. As mentioned 
above, the natural space and its appropriation in certain ways had constituted the 
main concern for migrants in those years.  
 
The main component of nature in the late 1950s and early 1960s that 
occupies the most extended place in the memories of the migrants is the river and 
the stories about it. The migrants signify the river that run through a valley cutting 
the neighborhood into two sloppy parts as one of the most important natural 
reference point in their everyday lives. The narratives of the migrants about the 
early physical condition of the neighborhood begin most of the time with a highly 
emotional mentioning of river and the several incidents related to its flooding. The 
river flooding, which was the main concern at the time influenced the course of 
spatial development in the neighborhood to a large extent. River flooding avoided 
migrants to settle nearby river and this risk perception led to a decline in the value 
of lands on two sides of the river. As understood from the narratives of the 
respondents, the decision about where to settle was taken mainly with reference to 
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their positioning vis-à-vis the river. The lands that were near river and a little bit 
upper parts were the old vineyard areas, which were mainly private property. The 
lands that were closer to the top of the two hills were mostly state owned lands and 
topographically unsuitable or difficult to settle lands in the region. In the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, the cheapest lands in the region were the ones near the river due to 
the often-encountered risk of river flooding. Therefore migrants who were poor in 
the 1960s mentioned their preference of either the lands just besides the river or the 
state owned lands on top of the hills. This was due to the natural difficulties and 
easy and economic availability of state owned lands there.  
 
The vineyards in between were the most expensive lands where it was 
accepted as both naturally “safe” and easy to settle in the early settlement period. 
Therefore relatively wealthy migrants from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale appropriated 
them. The early settlement pattern in the neighborhood contains all these rationales 
that were mainly related to the limitations and opportunities of natural space as 
tackled out from the stories of the respondents. These near-strategical acts of 
relatively powerful groups in avoiding to settle near river were narrated with a 
serious regret in the coming decades for them in their own words. Since, due to the 
spontaneous development in the region, the lands between river and top of the hills 
that were once considered as ideal therefore expensive places to settle had lagged 
behind the value of lands nearby river by remarkable value increases and the 
construction of market place there. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the land 
of the region exhibits a mixed structure in landownership patterns. The planning 
practices and the municipal interventions of municipality from top to down also 
played a role in the changing and unintended value increases. These value 
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increases seem to contradict with the early and near-strategic estimates of well to 
do migrants, which will be dealt with in the following chapter.    
 
Thirdly, the size and nature of plots that had been selected might incorporate 
some tactical decisions to utilize the loopholes in the landownership patterns. As 
mentioned above, the early comer migrants mainly preferred to buy privately 
owned lands of Üreğil villagers rather than the state owned lands on the sloppy 
parts of the hill. State owned lands on the upper parts of the hill topographically 
exhibited undeserved qualities for settling on. However, there were also state 
owned lands left in-between the farms and vineyards of Üreğil villagers. Migrants 
who purchased lands from the villagers considered the location of these state 
owned lands vis-à-vis the land they bought. This consideration was related to their 
desire of extending their rights to the land by appropriating the state owned lands 
near the plots they bought from the villagers. They mentioned their desire to build 
gecekondus on such lands that show a pattern of mixed ownership so that they 
could legalize the state owned lands appropriated and add them to their property in 
the coming elections with amnesty laws. Thus some migrants constructed their 
houses not on the land to which they had legal title deeds but on these state owned 
lands nearby their land. The land officially owned constitutes the garden of their 
gecekondus.38 Migrants knew that the next amnesty law that was going to be 
established would legalize this unlawful appropriation for the sake of the 
gecekondu house constructed on it. In this way they would extend the size of their 
land by paying very little money to state:  
 
                                                 
38 This act can be considered as a tactic of “colonizing space” that seems to transcend the limits of De 
Certeauan definition of tactic.   
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We encouraged our father to buy land here because everybody from the 
village had already bought land in Boğaziçi. He did so. Then we came and 
bought briquette. We constructed the house mainly on the state owned parts 
of the land, a little bit behind by paying attention. We left the land with title 
deed as garden of our gecekondu.39  
 
 
Migrants were aware of the fact that if they could preserve their gecekondus 
until the approaching election, the amnesty law would legalize their gecekondus. 
Their near-strategical acts consider a good estimation strategy’s habit of 
overlooking the unlawful happenings.   
 
 
4.4 The Story of the River: The Beginning of the Journey from 
Natural Space to Market Place  
 
The river that once runs all the way through the valley at the center of the 
neighborhood occupies the most extended place in the memories and narratives of 
the migrants. Particularly, migrant’s early memories about the neighborhood 
include certain references to the river or incidents related to it. The nature of these 
memories changes, depending on the gender, age, or economic well being of the 
migrant. Particularly, elderly women, migrants who were children at the time being 
and poor families who had settled near river reserve an extended place to river in 
their memories.  
 
                                                 
 
39 Extract from the field research no. 29, 20 June 2003.  
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In the late 1950s and early 1960s, river had constituted a place to socialize for 
women while washing clothes there. They mentioned about their singing folk 
songs together with other women or drinking tea or their having picnic near the 
river. As understood from their narratives spatial relations in the village were 
replicated in the urban setting in the first settlement years mainly due to the 
resemblance of gecekondu space and village. The primordial characteristics of the 
two spaces, the resources they provide and the qualities they maintain, which 
define the relationship between women and space and the definition of work, were 
very much the same. For migrants, river provided many opportunities in the early 
periods of the settlement as sustaining water and sand for the construction of 
gecekondu houses. The migrants used the sand for the construction of their houses 
and some poor families sold sand to the factories nearby and earned money out of 
that. A shop owner form Çorum described the poverty they had experienced during 
the initial years of settlement and their use of river as follows:  
 
I went to junior high school in Mamak. Though the bus ticket was 25 kuruş at 
the time, I often could not afford it with my pocket money. Therefore I often 
walked from the school to Boğaziçi [the center of Mamak is approximately 
five kilometers a way from the neighborhood]. There was one pair of shoes 
we shared with my brother in those years. In one occasion, my father could 
not afford to buy me uniform and was very upset. I pulled sand from river 
that come closer to our house with flooding and sold it in barrels. Ooo, I 
made a lot of money out of that [he laughs] and bought the school uniform 
myself that year.40       
 
 
The river as the most important provider of natural resources for construction 
like sand and water had been a focal point spatially in the lives of the migrants 
through the 1960s. Their survival tactics include a necessary and strong relation of 
                                                 
40 Extract from field research note no. 7, 16 Oct. 2002.   
 210
utilizing the resources of nature. The natural resources led to the construction of 
small workshops and factories nearby river.  These small workshops like 
ironworker, sand factories, hardware stores or lumber merchant were narrated as 
the forerunner components of the market place. These workshops were vital for the 
migrants due to the continuous construction activity in the region either in the form 
of constructing new gecekondus or doing improvements and additions in the 
already built houses. The necessities of daily life and their unique articulation to 
natural space determine the course of development and social space in the region 
during these early years of settlement.  
 
As mentioned before, the river had intimidating effects due to the risk of 
flooding in the memories of the migrants. Due to this risk, the plots on two sides of 
the river were the cheapest when compared to privately owned lands in other parts 
of the neighborhood in the early years of the settlement. The first known flooding 
took place on September 11th of 1957 in Hatip River and its branches all over 
Mamak due to heavy hailing. The height of the torrent reached to three meters high 
in Kayaş and affected all the way Mamak to Kayaş. This was a real disaster, which 
resulted with the death of 133 migrants (Şenol-Cantek, 2006: 59). Zafer and Ulus 
daily newspapers -sympathizers of Democrat Party and Republican People’s Party 
respectively- initiated a public debate about this incidence.  After the flooding had 
taken place, the governor of Ankara mentioned that the improvement and 
demolition policies of DP had dramatically reduced the loss of flooding. The 
closure of the upper part of the river due to the improvement plans of DP was said 
to lessen the damages of the flooding (Şenol-Cantek, 2006: 58). The daily, Ulus, on 
the other hand severely criticized these declarations of the governor in the highly 
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critical atmosphere of public debate on “despotically modernist” and formalist 
policies of DP. Ulus represented the declarations of governor as an attempt to 
legitimize and facilitate the coming demolition decisions by DP (Şenol-Cantek, 
2006: 59). It is important to note here that RPP, a party that was once the ardent 
carrier of modernist urban policies criticized the demolition decisions of DP with 
reference to that incident. DP, on the other hand, unlike its early populist approach 
to gecekondulus seemed to internalize quite modernist and formalist approach in 
those years with regard to gecekondu settlements. This case reflect well the hesitant 
approach all political parties with regard to gecekondu settlements over time with 
the changing political and economic context.  
 
The flooding did not give much harm in Boğaziçi, since the river in Boğaziçi 
was only a small branch of Hatip River. But still, over flooding left a residue in the 
memories of the migrants. In most cases, poor families lacking close and strong 
hemşehri ties and networks settled lands nearby river. While well to do migrants 
from Kırşehir/Cemele and Kırıkkale/Halitli preferred safe places. Old muhtar of 
Boğaziçi from Kırıkkale/Halitli defined their settlement history as a hemşehri 
community in the following manner:   
 
An old man from our village had come here first. He had a house nearby river 
in the village and he had suffered from flooding so much there. Therefore, he 
preferred upper parts in order to settle. That is the reason why we are all here 
now.41    
 
 
An old man from Kırşehir expressed their settlement decisions in a very 
similar manner as follows:  
                                                 
41 Extract from field research note no. 29, 20 June 2003. 
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When we first come here, we thought to get a land near river. There was a 
man who wanted to sell a plot. He wanted 825 kuruş [he refers to the cheap 
values of land nearby river] for each square meter. At that time a flooding 
occurred and your aunt [referring to his wife] was so scared and we couldn’t 
buy the land. Now it is so difficult for us to climb that hill. In case, we want 
to do some amendments in the house we couldn’t carry sand and construction 
materials up here.42  
 
 
The settlement decisions of migrants from Kırşehir have constituted their 
main regrets in life in the following years with the unintended value increases 
nearby the river. The poor families, on the other hand, could afford to buy these 
places not only because the land values there were cheaper but also some 
influential actors played the creditor and mediator role in the exchange of these 
lands between Üreğil villagers and migrants.  
 
One of the most important actors was family X from a village of Çankırı. 
Since the family is from Çankırı, they can be considered in the category of 
“outsiders” vis-à-vis the migrants of Kırşehir. The power of the family, in that 
sense, did not emerge from the support they got from their hemşehri community in 
the region. However, they had a peculiar position and were respected by migrants 
even from Kırşehir due to the certain reasons in their story of settling the region. 
 
They were one of the poorest families in the neighborhood in the early 1960s. 
When they first migrated to Ankara as three brothers, they began to work in a 
bakery in Hamamönü. The owner of the bakery offered them a room to stay. Over 
time, they began to sell bread and small subsistence goods to gecekondu 
                                                 
 
42 Extract from field research note no. 36, 20 July 2003. 
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neighborhoods in the periphery of the city on a horse coach in the 1950s. Boğaziçi 
was one of these neighborhoods. Every migrant in Boğaziçi, mostly Kırşehirlis 
knew them at the time due to their supply of subsistence goods that were terribly 
needed at the time. Then they opened a small bakkal in the neighborhood nearby 
river due to the low prices of lands there and the central position of the lands close 
to river as stated by a member of the family. They built one extra room in the shop 
and stayed in this room at nights. One member of the family mentioned the 
unconditional help shown by the neighbors to them during the construction of their 
gecekondu bakkal in the following manner: 
 
We bought materials from the warehouse and we dried bricks. Everybody 
helped. We also worked at nights while doing the construction. Once a 
watchman came and he got angry with us, because we did construction at 
night. We had a neighbor from Kırşehir. He told the watchmen not to pick on 
us. Women from the houses around came and they asked us what our needs 
were. “Mud brick and water or pickax and shovel?” At that time everything 
was problem; water was a problem, there were wells everywhere.43  
 
 
Sliding from the general pattern, the family had been given great assistance in 
their attempts to build a gecekondu bakkal, though they were outsiders vis-à-vis 
extended hemşehri groups. As mentioned above, this seemed interesting 
considering the fact that people were generally unwilling to offer unconditional 
help to their neighbors unless they were from the same village. This support can be 
considered as a consequence of the services offered to migrants in the early period 
of the settlement by the family, which was repeatedly brought up by respondents 
during the interviews. Besides that, there was only one bakkal during those years in 
the neighborhood. As stated by the member of the family, the migrants met their 
                                                 
43 Extract from field research note no. 16, 8 Apr. 2003.   
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constructing a second bakkal in the region in a quite pleasant way due to the 
desperate need of basic subsistence goods in the neighborhood in the late 1950s. In 
spite of the poverty family experienced during their early years in city, as time 
passes, due to their good estimates of the needs of the neighborhood they had 
opened other shops and even two cinemas in the neighborhood in the 1970s.  
 
After having earned certain capital from their bakkal, they bought farms and 
vineyards of Üreğil villagers in big plots or appropriated state owned lands and 
built houses nearby river or in places close to river for the newcomer migrants who 
were in need. They sold gecekondu houses to the poor in installments. They called 
themselves as being in the real estate business during the interview. However, 
more than what a real estate agent would have done, they have managed and 
controlled the social space of the region by selling land and house to certain 
people. Depending on the narratives of the migrants who bought lands from the 
family, it had become obvious during the course of gecekondu legalization in the 
late 1980s that the family did not own all the lands they had sold to the migrants. 
When we consider the fact that the lands of the region reflected a mixed nature of 
private and state owned lands, the family seemed to use the state owned extension 
of the land they bought from the villagers in order to make gecekondus and shops 
on it and sell them. Particularly the shop owners from the villages of Çankırı, 
Çorum, Yozgat, Kayseri or Ankara, who are considerably rich when compared to 
other shop owners now, generally mentioned their purchase of land or gecekondu 
shop with the credit of family X. This made the social scene of the market more 
heterogeneous. The family seemed to contribute to the value increases of lands 
near river by means of helping poor migrants in opening different shops. The 
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emergence and growth of market place in turn contributed to their wealth and 
political connections, which made them even stronger in time. The construction of 
a big market place in the region was also due to their constituting an example to the 
newcomer migrants and their help to the entrepreneurs who were the members of 
the poor families. A wealthy shop owner from Ankara/Kalecik who owned one of 
the five apartment houses in the market place narrates the help of the family during 
their early settlement period. As stated by this shop owner, the family not only 
provided credit opportunities in the purchase of their shop but also introduced them 
who was the trustworthy customer and who was not. Actually the family seemed to 
serve as “landlords” in gecekondu as defined by Şenyapılı (2004: 193). These 
landlords usually appropriate state owned lands or purchase others and sell them to 
the newcomers. In some occasions, they built houses and sell these ready houses on 
credit. As parallel to the general pattern, family X also opened warehouse shops 
where they sold construction materials in addition to their role as a mediator for the 
new comer migrants by providing entrance to the region. They sustained financial 
favor to the ones who took a bunch of their services.     
 
The river and its transformation from a part of natural space to a market place 
seem to deserve attention to understand the spontaneous spatial development in the 
region and unintended consequences of near-strategic acts on part of powerful 
actors like the family X. Another reason that speeded up the development of 
market place was the transformation of the riverbed and its branches flowing from 
the top of the hills to the main paths and routes of the migrants through the way to 
train station. The common route following river had turned into a big main street in 
time.  
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 As a result of these factors, unlike the estimates and near-strategic acts of 
Kırşehirlis in the initial period of the settlement, values of lands nearby river had 
increased considerably. This constitutes one of the most important regrets in the 
lives of Kırşehirli migrants. Though, migrants from Kırşehir constituted the most 
advantageous group in economic terms in the early settlement period, they have the 
lands on two sides of the river snatched to the “outsider” migrants. Therefore they 
could not show much presence in the shaping of the public space of the 
neighborhood. Most of the shop owners of Kırşehir origin bought or rented shops 
from the market in the 1980s from the increased prices of real estate. Their 
authority in controlling the development of public space was negligible when 
compared to their numerical presence in the neighborhood. On the other hand, the 
poor migrants who signified their poverty in the early periods and who are from the 
close villages of Ankara, Çorum, Çankırı and Yozgat gained economic power due 
to their settlement nearby river and their opening shops there. The near-strategical 
acts of family X constituted the main reason behind these people’s gaining power 
in time.  
              
As will be explained in the following chapters, the near-strategical acts of 
family X gave them a certain control over the shaping of social space of the region. 
The family behaved as the most influential agent in the construction of market 
place by controlling the purchase of land and construction and by guiding the 
newly arriving shop owners in terms of social relations as stated by many shop 
owners.  
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The story of an Alevi shop owner explicates the family’s attempts to control 
the social spatialization in the region. He mentioned how his father had to put up a 
fight to own a house and a shop nearby river and how other shop owners excluded 
them as a result of their struggle with family X. There are only four or five Alevi 
shops at market place composed of nearly 150 shops now. The general exclusion of 
the lately arriving Alevi families from Çorum, Sivas and Tunceli from the most 
valuable and central lands of the region due to their sectarian identity and timing of 
migration would have spatial consequences in the subsequent decades, which 
would be dealt with in the following chapters 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
 
This chapter was an attempt to read the spatial development of Boğaziçi 
neighborhood in the early settlement period. I try to assess the relationship between 
the strategical realm, the realm of “modern”, “urban space” as represented and 
dominated by planners, national and local urban policies; and the tactical realm, the 
realm of migrants’ acts in appropriating the space of nature. The narratives of 
migrants related to the initial settlement years in the region make it possible for me 
to read the interconnected and dialectical histories of “strategy” and “tactic”. This 
dialectical history referring to the case of Boğaziçi necessitates a critical review of 
the theories by Lefebvre and De Certeau and a reconsideration of the power of 
strategy and tactic vis-à-vis each other.  
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A horizontal model of power displays between migrants is added to the 
vertical model considering the limitations of the latter. The tactical acts of migrants 
vis-à-vis each other on the horizontal level and vis-à-vis the space of strategy on 
the vertical level seem to signify a dynamic model. The dynamism in the model 
and the spatial contingencies that led to unintended consequences seem to 
constitute the main reason behind the spontaneous development of the region.  
 
The spatial contingencies emerged out of the weaknesses of planning and 
urbanization strategies of Republican Regime in Ankara were considered with 
reference to the survival tactics of migrants in Boğaziçi and the spontaneous 
development of the neighborhood. The impediments of strategy in making future 
projections about the spontaneous spatial developments and the tactical acts of 
migrants and state officials within the loopholes of the system were exemplified by 
the incidents from the lives of Boğaziçi dwellers.  
 
The tactical decisions of early comer migrants seem to transcend the 
definition of tactic by De Certeau. These “tactics” on part of the powerful migrants 
can be defined more properly as near-strategic acts of colonizing neighborhood 
space. In this early period, the natural determinants constitute the context of the 
power relations on the horizontal level. However, just like the vertical model of 
power relations, the near-strategic acts would lead to unintended consequences for 
the powerful groups, like the change of real estate values due to certain spatial 
factors in the early settlement period. The shaping of social space of the 
neighborhood by these near-strategical acts on the horizontal and strategical acts on 
the vertical level seems to contribute to the dynamic nature of power relations. The 
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early comer migrants from Kırşehir/Cemele, Kırıkkale/ Halitli and the family X 
seem to operate on the near-strategical level in the 1960s in shaping the social 
space of the region. However, the unintended consequences of these acts will 
necessitate a reconsideration of the nature of social spatialization in the subsequent 
decades. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE 1970S: THE IMPACTS OF RADICAL POLITICS ON 
SOCIAL SPATIALIZATION IN THE LOCALITY 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter seeks to narrate the story of social spatialization in the neighborhood 
in the 1970s where the public space of the neighborhood had been radically 
politicized. It also examines the consequences of this political transformation. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the tactics employed by the migrants on the 
horizontal and vertical level vis-à-vis each other and the interventions of strategic 
agency give social spatialization in Boğaziçi a spontaneous quality.  
 
The near-strategical acts of the founders in the 1960s had led to the exclusion 
of certain groups from the most critical aspects of the neighborhood space near 
river basin that had gained considerable value in time. This exclusion had affected 
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the course of spatialization in the late 1960s and 1970s where the public space had 
been radically politicized due to the macro economic and political developments in 
the country. With the radical politicization of space, the groups who had some 
power to define the course of social spatialization in the previous decade had come 
under pressure of the previously excluded groups. This was mostly due to the fact 
that the spontaneity had reached its peak point in terms of its impacts on social 
spatialization in the locality during the 1970s. The limited capacity and the political 
bias of the state to intervene in the sphere of the tactical realm added to the degree 
of spontaneity. The power relations and radically political struggles between 
militant groups seemed to define the context of social spatialization in the locality 
almost alone in the 1970s. This attributed certain autonomy and peculiarity to 
gecekondu spaces as different from middle upper middle class districts of the city 
during the period. The nature of social spatialization in the 1970s in the 
neighborhood will be evaluated with such theoretical concerns in this chapter.  
 
The respondents narrate the period with a strong emotional depiction of the 
political struggles, which took place in the public space of the neighborhood. As 
different from the narratives on the previous decade, there emerges an implicit 
reference to the identities of Alevism and Sünnism as to denote “us” and “them” 
that were made explicit with reference to the political identities of being leftist and 
rightist. The Sünni or Alevi respondents do not approve the struggles going on 
between young leftist and rightist militants in the public space of the neighborhood 
in the 1970s. Yet for them this period signifies the moment where they initially 
locate themselves and their hemşehri community within these extended political 
identities of left and right associated with Alevism and Sünnism respectively in 
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their narratives. In that sense, in the memories of the inhabitants, this period almost 
in all cases is narrated with reference to the politically overloaded identities of 
Alevism and Sünnism. The politicization of sectarian identities and as a 
consequence, the hemşehri identifications were closely related to the macro 
political developments of Turkey at the time.  
 
 
5.2. An Overview of the Political Context in the late 1960s and 
1970s 
 
The 1960 military coup against DP rule paved the way for a period of two decades 
of economic and political crisis in the history of the country. The 1961 constitution 
after the military coup included the bill of civil liberties due to its preparation by a 
commission of university professors. The opportunities the constitution had 
provided were only fully exploited from the mid-1960s onwards in political terms 
(Zürcher, 1998: 257, 266). Political debating societies (Fikir Klüpleri) sprang up at 
all the major universities (Zürcher, 1998: 268). However, the liberty of the period 
in terms of diverse groups to express themselves when combined with economic 
crisis and the increasing rate of rural-to-urban migration where gecekondu 
neighborhoods in cities had become ethnically more diverse spaces, led to the 
surfacing of competing claims. The political landscape of the later 1960s had 
shown extreme diversity with parties and illegal groups proliferating on the 
extreme left and right of the political continuum where the two major parties 
positioned on the right and left of center. These were JP (Justice Party) and RPP 
respectively.  
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 JP under the leadership of Demirel won the 1965 parliamentary election with 
the 52.9% majority of the votes. As stated by Zürcher (1998: 263, 264) Demirel to 
keep the party’s integrity with a very wide range of social groups (coalition of 
industrialists, small traders and artisans, peasants and large landowners, religious 
reactionaries and Western oriented liberals) foresaw two strategies. Zürcher defines 
these policies as tactics. However, within the framework of this thesis, these 
policies are considered conceptually macro strategies of Demirel government.  
 
First, he emphasized the Islamic character of the party and the way it stood 
for traditional values and second, he kept up a constant campaign of anti-
communist propaganda and of harassment of leftist movements (Zürcher, 1998: 
263, 264). These two tactics seem to reflect the general approach and affiliations of 
the state in dealing with the politically radical atmosphere of the late 1960s and 
1970s. As mentioned in the second chapter, the combination of a persistent balance 
of payments deficit and an industry that is dependent on foreign inputs, made the 
Turkish economy extremely vulnerable. More than the social unrest or even the 
violence in the streets, it was the growing economic crisis, which defined the 
governments of the later 1970s (Zürcher, 1998: 280).  
 
During those years there was a struggle between rightist and leftist militants 
in order to control certain spaces in the city. However, as considered by many, the 
struggle between right and left was an unequal one. The police and the security 
forces had become advocates of Türkeş’s MHP (Nationalist Action Party) during 
the “Nationalist Front” governments of years between 1974 and 1977. “Even under 
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Ecevit’s government (the party of center left), state forces had remained heavily 
infiltrated by fascists who shielded and protected the Grey Wolves (the youth 
organizations of ultra nationalists) in 1978 and 1979.” (Zürcher, 1998: 276) The 
growing repression on leftist groups by ultra nationalist rightist groups and state 
security forces associated themselves mostly with nationalist ideology paved the 
way to political polarization and radicalism in the country. Despite the fact that 
Alevis supported DP in 1950 as a reaction to the authoritarian and centralist 
policies of RPP, beginning by 1957 they had directed their support to RPP again. 
In the late 1960s, Alevi youths had become, to a large extent, acquainted with 
socialism and extreme leftist politics. Gecekondulus began to vote heavily for 
leftist parties, gecekondu spaces gained an oppositional position to the system 
(Aslan, 2004: 81). Meanwhile the ultra-nationalists mobilized Sünni population 
around MHP with policies that equated anti-communism with anti-Alevism” 
(Göner, 2005: 110). As will be mentioned in the following pages, such 
identification of communism with Alevism had turned the identities of Alevism and 
Sünnism into conflict-ridden identities even for the majority of gecekondulus who 
did not hold any active and obvious political position.   
 
In congruence with the general context of the country, the public space of 
Boğaziçi neighborhood is narrated as the arena of competition and struggles 
between leftist and rightist groups in individual stories of the migrants. The 
developments that brought about the politicization of public space were closely 
related to the general political context of the country as mentioned above. 
However, the way the political struggles between groups had taken place in 
gecekondu neighborhoods involve a certain form of spontaneity. The struggles 
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between extreme militant groups seemed to take place in a more direct and harsher 
manner in these neighborhoods. In his evaluation of the 1970s, Zürcher pointed out 
that traditional culture in which honor and shame, an extreme contrast between 
one’s family or clan and outsiders, made the political extremism in Turkey so 
exceptionally violent (Zürcher, 1998: 277). Traditional conflicts seemed to be 
taken political connotations in gecekondu settlements and some cities where the 
encounters between Alevi and Sünni populations were spatially close. The most 
serious and bloody clashes between Alevi and Sünni groups took place in anti-
Alevi pogroms in the provinces of Malatya, Kahramanmaraş and Çorum 
(Bruinessen, 1996: 8). The Maraş Massacre of 1978, in which 109 people were 
killed, was directed against Alevi neighborhoods in the city of Maraş (Göner, 2005: 
115). The spontaneity of these settlements that differentiates them from other 
neighborhoods of the city was related to this condition of heterogeneity in terms of 
sectarian identities. In most cases, this had contributed to the negative image of 
gecekondu neighborhoods in public debate as potential shelters for illegal and 
conflict-ridden identities and groups. As mentioned in the second chapter, this 
perception in public discourse that had emerged in the late 1970s has continued its 
existence by taking different forms until now. 
 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter and will be exemplified in the 
following chapter, the definition of sectarian or hometown identities in the 
narratives of the respondents may show variations depending on the social context 
and time. The nature of struggles between leftist and rightist groups might also 
show variations from one gecekondu neighborhood to another. In that sense, the 
narratives about the neighborhood of the 1970s will hopefully give clues about the 
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reasons behind such spontaneous happenings that set apart these neighborhoods not 
only from the middle class neighborhoods of the city but also from other 
gecekondu neighborhoods in the city.    
 
Depending on the narratives of the migrants, this was a period where state 
intervention in neighborhood space seemed to be relatively insignificant in 
security, supervision and planning wise when compared to other periods. 
Particularly, due to the insufficiency and political bias of state security forces, 
gecekondu neighborhoods except the ones dominated by Alevis were left to their 
own dynamics. The struggles between state forces and militants of Alevi 
dominated; therefore leftist neighborhoods might take a quite violent form. As 
Zürcher mentioned, the authorities were not able to restore order in these 
neighborhoods. In some cases, whole neighborhoods, might come under the control 
of one or the other of competing groups and were declared “liberated areas” 
(Zürcher, 1998: 277). However, Boğaziçi was considered as a Sünni dominated 
neighborhood. In that respect, despite the activities of leftist militants in the 
locality it was left to a large extent to its own dynamics by state forces. This 
contributed to the spontaneity of the locality.  
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, Boğaziçi was also socially composed of 
different ethnic groups that can be identified mainly through hometown 
connections. The (socio)-spatial encounters between such groups and the immunity 
they had due to the limitations of strategic power to deal with the tactical acts of 
gecekondulu at the time contributed to the spontaneous spatialization of gecekondu 
settlements. Beginning by the 1970s the social heterogeneity of the neighborhood 
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had further increased with the second wave of migration mostly from Alevi villages 
of Çorum and Sivas. There also came a large group of Alevi/Kurd migrants of 
Tunceli from another gecekondu neighborhood of Ankara called Yenidoğan to 
Boğaziçi by an in-city, chain form of migration. As Yılmaz (2005: 151) mentioned 
the Alevis who had lived in their villages as closed and homogenous communities 
and had migrated to the cities later than Sünnis, could not find suitable 
environment to realize their practices. Considering the obstacles to practice their 
peculiar religious practices and to make their Alevi identity explicit, the socio-
economic conditions of the Alevis were not well to do as the latecomer migrants to 
the city when compared to Sünnis (Yılmaz, 2005: 181). “Their gradual integration 
into the wider society, migration to the towns, education, careers in public service 
brought them in closer contact and sometimes in direct competition, with strict 
Sünnis from whom they remained socially separated for centuries” (Bruinessen, 
1996: 8). As proved by the research of Gökçe et. al (1993), ethnic and sectarian 
groups as a result of their latecomer status and minority position may mention their 
conscious preference of close relations only with relatives and close hemşehri 
community rather than neighbors (Gökçe, 1993: 289, 292).  
 
Only from the 1961 onwards, Alevis founded associations, vaqıfs, cem houses 
and political parties as to make their voices heard (Yılmaz, 2005: 181). 
Consequently, in the case of Boğaziçi, the increasing heterogeneity of the 
neighborhood when combined with the socio-spatial consequences of exclusionary 
near-strategical acts of the powerful groups in the preceding decade seem to 
determine the way the competition between groups had taken place in the 1970s.  
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Depending on the narratives of shop owners in relation to the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, both hometown commonalities and sectarian identities had played 
important role in the construction and enlargement of market place. The conflict 
and uneasiness between different groups in the enlargement period of the market 
place in the 1960s as gathered from the narratives, explain to an extent the ever-
expanding politicization of the market place, the most important component of 
public space in the coming years. In that sense, the powerful groups who had taken 
near-strategical decisions in shaping up of market place in the 1960s had suffered 
most from the political struggles of the 1970s.  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there was explicit outsider-outsider 
solidarity in the market place. As was explained, family X from Çankırı was the 
main actor playing the role of mediator by giving financial and social help for land 
provision and shop construction particularly in the narratives of the “outsider” shop 
owners from Yozgat, Çorum, Çankırı and the villages of Ankara. There are almost 
no hemşehri bonds between the family and the migrants who took help from the 
family. As Erder (1996: 73) mentioned in her field research findings, there needs to 
be no direct hemşehri relations between the founders and the inhabitants. Thus, the 
founders in her research setting had no hemşehris in the region. The family had a 
similar status in the research setting by having no hemşehri community. As already 
mentioned in the previous chapter, their acceptance by Boğaziçi inhabitants 
depends on certain other factors. However, this does not mean that hemşehri 
identities defined through sectarian lines had no effect on the preferences of the 
family in their provision of certain services to the newcomers. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, beginning from the very initial phases of the production of 
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market place to the early 1970s, the family did not welcome Alevi migrants to settle 
near the river. It is interesting to note that few Alevi shops already existing are 
located in a place close to Samsun Highway, the entrance of the neighborhood. In 
other words, the lands and shops of the family seem to constitute the boundary 
between few Alevi shop owners and the other Sünni shop owners. Beginning from 
the lands owned by the family to the center of the market place there is only one 
Alevi shop. The family seems to constitute spatially the main barrier on the 
enlargement of the Alevi lands to Sünni dominated places. Kırşehirli shop owners 
and other Sünni “outsiders” also did not welcome Alevi shop owners. There is no 
case I encountered that a Sünni landowner or a shop owner has sold his plot or 
shop to an Alevi person. In few incidents, some early comer Alevi migrants 
appropriated the lands near the river and they were able to open shops in the 
market place. During my interviews with the Alevi shop owners and inhabitants, 
nevertheless, there was no explicit reference to the reactionary attitudes of Sünnis 
during the settlement process. Yet they have often mentioned about the 
disadvantageous position of Alevis vis-à-vis Sünnis with respect to settlement 
conditions.  
 
The entrance of the market place is not that valuable when compared to other 
lands in the market because flooding had given serious harm to that part. The Alevi 
inhabitants due to their position as latecomers had resided in topographically the 
most disadvantageous parts of the neighborhood. Alevi shop owners both as a 
consequence of their latecomer position and because of the resistance of Sünni 
shop owners could not settle places close to the center of market place. The 
exceptionally rare representation of Alevi shop owners in the market place seems to 
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prove this fact. It is also possible to get clues about the sufferings of Alevi shop 
owners embedded in the narratives of the migrants portraying the scene of market 
place in the early 1970s. Some shops owned by Kurds or Alevis are counted as 
present in the market in the late 1960s and early 1970s but they are reported as 
having been closed then. When I search for the reasons of their closure as 
perceived by the respondents by asking further questions, a Sünni woman44, as an 
example, told that a Kurd/Alevi bakkal left because they could not stand the 
attitudes of other shop owners. Some others mentioned about the difficulties of 
Alevis’ presence in the market where the majority of shop owners are Sünni.  
               
Unintentionally, the near-strategic attempts of the founders to control the 
social space of the market and the general discomfort of Sünni shop owners with 
respect to Alevis could not prevent the place to turn into the fortress of leftists in 
the late 1970s. On the contrary, these exclusionary acts seem to have a close 
relation with the fact that these founding shop owners mention their sufferings 
most in relation to the years of political turmoil when compared to other shop 
owners. This may also explain the willingness of leftist militants to control the 
region for the period of political unrest besides other socio-spatial reasons. One of 
these reasons is that the spatial push of Alevis to the part close to Samsun Highway 
instigates the close encounters between Alevis and Üreğil neighborhood, the space 
of extreme rightist and ultra-nationalist militants. Such positioning of Alevis had 
made train station nearby Samsun Highway and the market place as the main 
grounds of political fights and violence, which will be dealt in detail in the 
following pages.    
                                                 
44 Extract from field research note no. 39, 15 Aug. 2003. 
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5.3. The Story of the River: The Expansion of Market Place and Its 
Becoming as the Focal Point of Political Struggles in the 1970s  
 
The “bridge” on Samsun Highway that was once constructed for the sake of 
crossing the river flowing from Boğaziçi to Üreğil is signified as the symbolizing 
the boundary between Boğaziçi and Üreğil neighborhoods in the definitions of the 
migrants. The narration of the neighborhood in the 1970s almost in all cases 
includes a reference to the bridge separating the political spaces of extreme right 
and left in socio-spatial terms.  
 
On the other side of the bridge on Samsun Highway, in the settlement of 
Üreğil close to the train station, most of the residents had been Sünni in origin. The 
place reflects a more homogenous social composition when compared to Boğaziçi. 
The extreme nationalist militant groups had controlled the public space there in the 
late 1970s. On the contrary, the leftist groups due to dense presence of Alevi 
population in the settlements close by Boğaziçi neighborhood have dominated the 
market place in Boğaziçi. Though, the market space and the places close to it were 
mainly occupied by migrants from Kırşehir, Alevis settled densely on the hills, on 
two sides of the road.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, natural factors determined most of the 
decisions of the early migrants. The physical form of the riverbed constituted the 
main reference point for the migrants in their settlement process. The walking 
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paths following river and its branches that run from the hills down to the valley had 
turned into the main roads and streets in the following years. The presence of the 
river just in the middle of the neighborhood and its proximity to Samsun Highway 
had made the paths on two sides of the river as the main route used by many people 
during the day, connecting the far away neighborhoods to the railway station. The 
only way to the train station had passed over the market place and people living in 
all the neighborhoods around the research setting in approximately one-kilometer 
range are narrated to use this route in the 1960s and 1970s. Particularly in the 
1970s where the population of the region and their rate of employment in jobs at 
state sector in city center had increased, the market place had become the 
predominant part of public space. The residents of the neighborhoods on the upper 
parts of the region that inhabit Alevi residents mostly who do not pay any trip to the 
neighborhood at the moment had to pass the market twice a day in the old days 
according to the sayings of shop owners and inhabitants of the neighborhood.  
 
There were minibuses primarily on Samsun Highway in the 1970s. However, 
as often mentioned by the respondents, a very few number of dolmuşs had entered 
into the neighborhood and upper parts of the region during that period. Depending 
on the narratives of the respondents, people did not prefer to take these dolmuşs 
since they did not feel comfortable for two reasons. Mainly women mentioned their 
hesitancy and anxiety about using them because of the position of drivers as total 
“strangers” to them. These distant social encounters between the migrants and 
drivers had led to the emergence of concerns related to the security and cost of 
transportation on part of the migrants. In a sense, migrants mentioned their early 
uneasiness in relation to dolmuşs mainly with reference to the indefiniteness of the 
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relation depending on the informal nature of the dolmuş transportation when 
compared to the train. As indicated by a shopowner45, dolmuş owners might rent 
drivers from locality as a tactic so as to sustain intimacy and acquaintance. 
 
Secondly, people had economic concerns about the cost of transportation 
with dolmuşs. The train at the time was mentioned by all to be to be cheapest 
means of transportation. Due to train’s status as the predominant means of 
transportation, Alevi people residing on the upper parts of the neighborhood also 
shopped from the market. This is not the case now with the expanding possibilities 
of transportation and shopping in different locations nearby. In that sense, many 
shop owners described the period with a longing for the early 1970s as the liveliest 
period of the market when their earnings were high. An old shop owner having a 
warehouse narrated the period as follows:  
 
In the past [referring to the late 1960 and early 70s] this place was livelier 
than any other place. It was very good… Everybody got off the train down 
close at the bridge. When minibuses had increased in number, they began to 
go to upper places. Now a person can go from the front of his house directly 
to Ulus by minibuses. In case where we accept to sell things on credit or if 
there is an emergent need, they come and shop from here46.  
 
 
A similar yearning for good old days is observed during the informal 
conversations with many shop owners. Particularly the ones who experience 
serious economic difficulty at the moment gave references to these years. 
Ironically when the shop owners are asked about their most depressing years in the 
region, they mentioned 1978 and 1979, when political struggles on the streets had 
                                                 
45 Extract from the field research note no. 34, 3 July 2003. 
 
46 Extract from the field research note no. 30, 25 June 2003. 
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reached its peak point. The passing five or six years had changed the political and 
social atmosphere of the neighborhood dramatically.   
 
As will be mentioned in detail in the following chapter, the usage of the 
market place by the residents of the closer areas had lost its intensity due to a 
number of reasons. Firstly, with enriching transportation facilities, the market place 
lost its status as the only available route to the railway. Secondly, Nato Highway 
had emerged as an alternative route to the city center serving the needs of Boğaziçi 
and residents of other neighborhoods living on the upper parts of the hills. Thirdly, 
after the political turmoil years of the 1970s, the identities of Alevism and Sünnism 
had been made explicit in defining “us” and “them” in a more sharpened and 
exclusionary manner. This had further alienated Alevi residents from using the 
Sünni dominated market place.   
 
 
5.4. Struggles between Leftists and Rightists Dominating Social 
Spatialization   
 
It is important to recall that shop owners who mentioned their sufferings most in 
the late 1970s are the ones socially and spatially close to the family of X. They 
point out the main reasons behind their sufferings as their identification with the 
rightist ideology either as a result of their hometowns’ identification with ultra-
nationalist politics or the political stands of the people who pay visits to their 
shops. These shop owners told their experiences about these years as the most 
depressing ones in their individual histories. Most of them including the member of 
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X family explained their identification with rightist politics as a false impression 
on part of the leftists. However, during the interviews they often gave clues about 
their political standing and their negative approach to leftists in those years. A 
number of respondents mentioned the incidents where the shops of the family had 
been bombed for several times in the late 1970s. A member of the family also 
brought up the incidents of bombing during the interview and he related the issue 
to the identification of their shop space as the meeting place of rightists similar to 
the perception of their neighbors in relation to the incident.    
 
The most depressed time was the anarchy period. We went everywhere 
together as brothers. They [the leftists] have bombed here eight times; two of 
them were one after another. The reason for that… For example, you come 
here and we chat… Because of people, coming in and going out of the 
shop… “Why did you talk to these people and let them stay at the shop?” 
That was their concern…47
 
 
There is almost no reference to state security forces and their intervening in 
the incidents and fights, as they happened to take place depending on the 
interviews and informal chats with the respondents. In that sense, inhabitants 
narrate certain tactics they had employed to sustain their security vis-à-vis the 
pressures of militant groups in the late 1970s.  There opened a gendarme station in 
the garden of the primary school in 1975 at the center of the market. However, as 
understood from the stories, they seemed to lack behind sustaining security. The 
shop owners who have their shops close to the center or close to the gendarme 
station reported that there was no serious incident that had taken place after the 
gendarme station had come there. However, other shop owners and inhabitants of 
the region mentioned their sufferings and their ways of solving the problems rather 
                                                 
47 Extract from field reserch note no. 16, 8 April 2003. 
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than taking help from security forces.  Related to the bombing, the member of X 
family mentioned the inability of the commander in the neighborhood in the 
following manner:   
 
They bombed here. We had called the police; there was a gendarme station 
here at the time. No one came from this station. Soldiers arrived from Dutluk 
neighborhood. Commander asked me where I was from. “I am from Çankırı”, 
I said. He said: “You are a Muslim person I understand”. He was a Muslim 
person too, I understood from his manner [He refers to the commander’s 
rightist political inclinations when he refers to his Muslim identity]. The 
commander said: “You seem to be thinking going back to Çankırı. [The 
commander seems to refer to the attitudes of the family feeling dread in 
relation to the pressures of leftist militants.] But do not do that… Resist.” He 
shouted at the commander in our neighborhood: “How dare you could stay 
there without hearing the bomb?” Next day, military intervention took place. 
Then we took a deep breath48.  
 
 
As mentioned in the previous pages, the state security forces could not be 
defined as holding politically neutral agency during the period. Particularly among 
police forces, there was an explicit affinity with ultra-nationalist rightist politics49. 
In that sense, the neighborhoods that are mostly constituted by Alevi residents were 
subject to high degree of repression by state security forces. As gathered from the 
interviews in Mamak Municipality, Tuzluçayır neighborhood, a region very close 
to Boğaziçi due to its identification with leftist politics and its inhabitation of Alevi 
migrants mostly witnessed continuous war like struggles between security forces 
                                                 
48 Extract from field research note no. 16, 8 April 2003. 
 
49 Aslan (2004: 132) by referring to his monographic study of a neighborhood that was built as part 
of “gecekondu movement” gave examples to the affinity between some ultra-nationalist civilians and 
police forces. 1 Mayıs neighborhood was constructed as part of leftist class politics by mostly Alevi 
migrants under the belief that poor classes had the right to appropriate public lands for public purpose 
(Aslan, 2004: 79). These neighborhoods were defined as “rescued regions” and subject to continuous 
demolitions and violent incidents (Aslan, 2004: 85). Despite continuous demolitions, they built their 
houses again and again. In that fashion, 1 May neighborhood also witnessed a huge demolition by 
state security forces in which a number of migrants were wounded or killed. During the events, many 
migrants witnessed the presence of civilians who had put on the rosette of Grey Wolves and act on 
behalf of and with the police against neighborhood inhabitants.        
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and leftist militants. In that sense, state interference seemed to be high in such 
neighborhoods. As stated before, Boğaziçi neighborhood exhibits a peculiarity in 
that sense. The neighborhood is heterogeneous in terms of hometown, sectarian 
and ethnic identities. It is also known as a religiously conservative neighborhood 
due to the dense presence of Sünnis from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale. In that respect, 
though the most critical points of public space were under the control of the leftists 
during the late 1970s, the neighborhood was not subject to any total repression and 
interference by state forces. Therefore, the struggles between leftists and rightists 
were taken a more spontaneous form where the tactics people employed on the 
horizontal level considering the power relations between different groups in the 
neighborhood seemed to occupy a more extended place in the lives of the migrants 
when compared to the power relations on the vertical level. In that sense, due to the 
negligible role state forces had played in the neighborhood during that period, even 
the shop owners who played key roles in the production of space in the previous 
decade and who had power and political connections seemed to deal with the 
repression of leftist militants by employing certain tactics of survival. The leftist 
militants were often said to visit the shops with the demand of haraç (protection 
money). While explaining their depressions, Sünni shop owners give clues about 
their sympathy to rightist militants and their distant approach to Alevis and leftist 
ideology:   
 
We had experienced so many troubles from the 1970s to the 1980s. When 
you went out to the street, they interrogated you all the time by asking where 
you were from and your name. Our income had declined enormously because 
we were put in a position to close the shop everyday… They wanted haraç 
(protection money) from us. They broke our glasses and windows.  
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-Who did these things to you? 
-Rightists do not do such things50.  
 
 
The hometown identities had also taken a political connotation during those 
years for the fact that sectarian identities can be searched through hometown 
identities. As an example, if you are from certain provinces like Tunceli or some 
villages like Narlık of Çorum, then it is possible to identify you as Alevi. 
Everybody in the neighborhood had an idea about which villages and provinces are 
Alevi or Sünni. In that respect, the militants on the street whether rightist or leftist 
might put anybody under investigation to learn his hometown identity. That's why 
some individual shop owners from provinces known for their support of ultra 
nationalist politics51 had mentioned about the continuous pressures of leftist groups 
in that period in the following manner:  
 
In those years, being from Yozgat was accepted as a very bad thing. If you 
were from Yozgat, you were automatically considered as rightist, Türkeşci 
[supporter of Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of Nationalist Action Party]. It is 
not true at all. This divisiveness emerged after we had come here. Our village 
was very close to Alevi villages. We loved Alevi villages more than the Sünni 
villages. After we had migrated here, Alevism, Sünnism, being rightist, being 
leftist, all of them have emerged. In the 1970s… It is a matter of people who 
come together from 40, 50 different places and settle and live together. The 
politicians came and deceived our youths in those years. Beneath everything 
lied material reasons52.  
 
                                                 
50 Extract from field research note no. 34, 3 July 2003. 
 
51 As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the provinces of Yozgat and Çankırı were known for 
their support of ultra-nationalist politics.   
 
52 Material reasons here refer to the class dimension of the radical politicization of the neighborhood. 
This is often mentioned by respondents signifying the politicians’ employment of economic 
deprivations of the youths to make them an integrated part of radical politics. In that respect, “the 
politicians deceived our youths” is a common statement made by many respondents referring to the 
late 1970s. Extract from field research note no. 34, 3 July 2003. 
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Another shop owner from Yozgat by using very similar narration explained 
their identification with the rightist ideology. He also described the fragmented 
nature of the public space in the neighborhood as follows:  
 
The most depressed period here for us were the first settlement years. The 
second most difficult phase was between the years 1978 and 1980. I 
witnessed the killing of a young person here in front of me. When someone 
got sick, we could not take them to the hospital out of fear. The space from 
the bridge up here [he refers to the part of the market place close to Samsun 
Highway far from the center of the market] was the forbidden zone. The other 
side of the bridge towards Üreğil was another forbidden zone. There were 
rightists mostly on the other side, but here the majority was leftists. We were 
under the rule of leftists. Being from Yozgat was so bad. They thought that 
people from Yozgat were rightists. But this was not the case. We have also 
many Alevi villages in Yozgat. We do not make a racial segregation.53  
  
 
Despite the fact that these shop owners opposed their identification with 
rightist militants, they kept their distance to Alevis and leftist politics. This was 
made explicit in the course of the informal talks with them. These shop owners had 
developed certain tactics of survival in the insecure and threatening environment of 
the period. Since most of the illegal incidents and bombings in this period took 
place at nights, almost all of them mentioned their preference of closing their shops 
early in the afternoon. According to the sayings of these shop owners who felt 
depressed most in the period, to close shops early in the afternoon, not to stay in 
the shop alone without the companion of family members or to avoid guests and 
social gatherings in the shops can be counted among tactics of avoiding any direct 
attack by the leftist militants.  These tactics, in turn, contributed to serious job loss 
in the market during the late 1970s. These protection tactics seemed to damage the 
natural flow of socio-spatial relations in the market place. The nature of shopping 
                                                 
53 Extract from field research note no. 28, 17 June 2003. 
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and the way shops are employed seem to have a quite peculiar nature in Boğaziçi. 
Shops are in general social places where the relationship between customers and 
shop owners seems to be quite informal and to depend on knowing each other for 
so long. In that sense, I never encountered a case where the shop owner stays in the 
shop entirely alone during the day. The guests and informal gathering seem to be 
an essential part of daily life in the market place. The natural flow of life and 
consumption in the market place, in that sense, had been blocked during that 
period. The survival tactics employed both by the inhabitants and the shop owners 
had overshadowed the lively nature of the market. The restricted mobility of the 
neighborhood residents, in that sense, can also be counted among the reasons for 
the job loss of the shop owners. Depending on the narratives of neighborhood 
residents, they had chosen to stay at home unless they were obliged to go outside 
during that period. The respondents reported the closure of many shops due to the 
financial and security problems during the period. The ones spatially close to the 
shop of X family felt this financial loss deeply. The son of such a shop owner 
narrates how miserable his father felt at the time as follows:  
 
My father had been on equal distance to everybody; he had not been 
interested in politics. Anyway, he told us how demoralized he had got in 
those years. He told us about a letter that he wrote a carpet trader in Kütahya. 
The letter is something like that: “… here everything becomes so disordered. 
I cannot afford to pay you my debt. I cannot earn anything because I cannot 
sell anything. I will send you the goods I bought from you and I will close the 
shop”. My father told us that at one time, rightists came for haraç at other 
times, came leftists. 54
 
 
The shop owners had suffered from serious economic impoverishment during 
those years. These shop owners were mostly the ones having rightist tendencies or 
                                                 
54 Extract from field research note no. 14, 3 March 2003.  
 241
the ones from the hometowns identified with ultra-nationalist ideologies as 
mentioned above. However, since the market place was the focal point of 
interaction in socio-spatial terms, most of the shop owners had suffered from the 
continuous interrogations and pressures of young militants in those years whether 
leftist or rightist. Sometimes, one’s identity as a Sünni in a neighborhood 
dominated by rightists could not be sufficient to feel secure. The shops as social 
spaces were narrated under continuous surveillance of militant groups and 
informants, therefore one’s friends from the opposite sects or hometowns might be 
taken as a proof to the social proximity with the “other” group. During an interview 
with a shop owner from Kırşehir in Boğaziçi market, I encountered such an 
interesting story of a forced departure from Üreğil neighborhood to Boğaziçi. This 
shop owner55 narrates how rightists accepted him as an informer for leftist groups. 
Since he had friends from both leftist and rightist groups, he was forced to leave 
Üreğil neighborhood, the fortress of extreme right, where he had his house and 
shop and move to Boğaziçi neighborhood.  
 
To sum up, the market place had become the focal point of interaction in the 
late 1960s and 1970s. Due to a number of socio-spatial reasons mentioned above, 
the place witnessed the struggles between leftists and rightists. The heterogeneity 
of the neighborhood in terms of sectarian identities when combined with the 
exclusionary attitude of the powerful founders in the previous decade towards Alevi 
residents, led to the reaction of leftists towards these actors and their controlling 
the region by repressing Sünni majority in the market. However, as will be 
mentioned in the following pages, the control of the public space by the leftists did 
                                                 
55 Extract form field research note no. 24, 14 May 2003.   
 242
not provide comfort in everyday life for the ordinary Alevi residents of the region 
who were not politically active.  The settlements of Alevi residents in a loose 
manner due to their latecomer status had put them into a disadvantageous position 
when compared to condensed Sünni communities who had formed strict control to 
and resistance against the opposing militant groups’ intervening in their 
community regions.  
 
 
 
5.5. Tactics of the Ordinary Inhabitants: Insiders’ Space, 
Protection within the Community  
 
 
Depending on the course of spatialization in the region, migrants from 
Kırşehir seemed to lose their power to a large extent in shaping the public space of 
the neighborhood in the 1970s when compared to initial settlement years due to a 
number of reasons. First of all, the migratory flows from different hometowns in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s had made the social composition of the 
neighborhood more heterogeneous. In that sense, migrants from Yozgat, Çorum, 
Tunceli and Sivas had emerged as densely populated communities besides 
migrants from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale.  
 
Secondly, due to their wrong estimates related to settlement decisions, 
Kırşehirlis could not act as the founders of the critical spaces in the neighborhood 
despite their early comer status. In that sense they could not own the lands that 
played a critical role in the development of the region.  
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Thirdly, since they had some community formation from the beginning of the 
settlement period, they had more inward looking and apolitical approach unlike the 
migrants from the less represented regions. In that sense, the shop owners who 
behaved as the leading ones in forming the neighborhood’s linkage to local politics 
are the ones from provinces other than Kırşehir. Despite their relative loss of 
capacity to take near-strategic decisions in the 1970s, due to the reasons mentioned 
above, Kırşehirlis greatly profited from the advantages of living together as a huge 
community. In that sense their near-strategic acts in the initial settlement years at 
least provided a safe habitat for migrants from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale in the 
insecure environment of the time. Thus early settlers who have found chances to 
live with their hemşehris spatially close felt themselves powerful vis-à-vis leftist 
groups and the struggles going on between parties in the public space and streets. 
Many people mention their untouchable position with reference to their identities 
as being from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale and their settlement in communities. 
Therefore, among the communities of Kırıkkale and Kırşehir there was almost no 
mentioning of serious incidents or injuries among the community or near their 
residential areas in the highly political and violent space of the neighborhood. A 
woman from Kırşehir described the atmosphere in the neighborhood during the late 
1970s in the following manner:  
 
Everybody knows these people [leftist militants]. Both leftists and rightists 
know them. They killed each other at the train station out of right-left issue. 
These were the people we know very well. They were leftists our people are 
rightists. It doesn’t matter now. For example, I had friends from Sivas, they 
were killed in the events.  
-How was your relationship with the Alevis residing here? Your neighbors?  
-Majority were people from Kırşehir around here… Therefore they could not 
do anything to us… [“Bize diş geçiremezler” in migrant’s words.] Most of 
Fahrikorutürk and Boğaziçi residents were from Kırşehir. Therefore, they 
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could not go so far. But our neighboring relationship is very good. We have 
grown together, played together…56  
 
 
I encountered the hesitancy in the narratives of Sünni migrants related to their 
approach to Alevis in almost all of the conversations similar to the anecdote above. 
On the one hand, for the fact that they had been living together for years, they had 
Alevi friends and neighbors whom they liked. On the other hand, particularly from 
the early 1970s with the politicization of the neighborhood, the distance between 
the politically loaded definitions of “us” and “them” though sectarian identities had 
been widened.  
 
Kırşehir community provided a safe social space for migrants even from 
other provinces. One of the Sünni neighbors from Yozgat living close to Kırşehir 
hemşehri community mentioned the secure environment of the region due the 
dense presence of Kırşehirlis in the region. As a tactic for their survival, families 
who have no obvious political standpoint prefer to live in isolation at home. In that 
sense, particularly during that period majority of the inhabitants narrate incidents 
refer to their loosening ties with public space. The male head of the family from 
Yozgat narrated their social isolation as follows:   
 
We did not experience any difficulty during that period. I have six siblings; 
we all stayed at home and mentioned zikir57. While I was going to or coming 
from somewhere, nobody told anything to me. I went to work, to Çiftlik 
(Atatürk Orman Çiftliği) everyday. I arrived there at the time of morning call 
to prayers everyday [about 6 am in the morning]. However, one day, my son 
wanted to get off the train in Üreğil, but they did not let him. He was so 
                                                 
56 Extract from field research note no. 39, 15 Aug. 2003.   
 
57 Zikir means repeating silently or aloud, the word Allah, the ninety-nine names of God, or prayers, 
which praise God.  
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scared. They asked him where he was from [his hometown]. He answered 
that he was from right58. They were rightists too. They were Türkeşçi. 
“Nobody could do anything to you” they said to my son. But here, we saw 
nothing [he means their close environment]. Here people were all from 
Kırşehir, they [referring to the leftist militants] were scared of entering 
there59.  
 
 
This protection within large communities seemed to bring some kind of 
safety perception to the narratives of community members. Despite the fact that 
Boğaziçi neighborhood and places close to it are narrated as the fortresses of left, 
Alevi residents of Boğaziçi neighborhood mention their sufferings at the time being 
more and obviously when compared to Sünni residents. Particularly, the Alevis of 
Yozgat and Çorum living nearby or in the middle of the Sünni hemşehri 
communities mention their sufferings and insecurity more in relation to their close 
residential area. As gathered from the narratives, this insecurity perception seems 
to be mainly related to their hesitant and in-between position between Alevis of 
other hometowns and their Sünni hemşehris. Alevi respondents make references to 
the exclusionary and violent attitude of Sünnis more often while mentioning the 
period. On the contrary, as will be mentioned in the following section, when the 
relations between Sünni and Alevi neighbors will be discussed, Alevi neighbors are 
described by Sünni respondents as being protective during the fights between leftist 
and rightists towards their Sünni neighbors whether they are their hemşehris or not. 
As mentioned above, some Alevis of central Anatolian provinces had settled in the 
neighborhood by mainly taking the hemşehri relations into consideration rather 
                                                 
58 It is interesting to note here that hometown identities seemed to be often used as a means to get 
one’s political standing in the incidents of the late 1970s as tackled from the narratives of the 
residents.      
 
59 Extract from field research note no. 31, 26 June 2003.  
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than taking the sectarian identity as the main determining factor. Since Alevis were 
the latecomers, they had settled, in most cases, as a small community from the 
same village near a large community of a Sünni village of the same province. As an 
example, the migrants from an Alevi and Sünni village of Çorum settle nearby each 
other. In that sense, it is not possible to talk about a dense Alevi community 
settlement except the Alevis of Tunceli and Sivas60.   
 
Alevis of Tunceli and Sivas can be accepted as an exception to that since the 
number of Alevis from these settlements was exceptionally high and by settling in 
topographically the most unsuitable places to reside they were able to form 
themselves a relatively autonomous community space. As gathered from the 
language they used, they could form a protected space. Outside of these protected 
boundaries, though, they might be treated brutally by rightists, since particularly 
the Alevis of Tunceli were perceived as the most radical and distant community 
depending on the narrations of Sünni inhabitants. A migrant from Tunceli narrated 
the injury of his brother as follows:  
 
Yes, I remember those years… I was young then. We played outside in the 
evening. It was a winter day. I went to my uncle. We heard some gunshots. 
They shot my older brother while he was on his way to pick me. The bullet 
went into his chest and went out from his back. Here these upper parts were 
all under the control of leftists’ at the time. Enlightened people… In these 
lower parts, there are rightists [he shows the residential areas close to the 
market place]. In Üreğil there were extreme rightists.  
-Was he shot closer to Üreğil?  
-No, in these lower parts [he shows the residential areas of people from 
Kırıkkale]. There were some rightists groups here but here was constituted by 
leftists mostly61.  
                                                 
60 As stated in the introductory chapter of the thesis, some Central Anatolian provinces like Çorum, 
Yozgat and Sivas were known for their inhabiting Alevi villages in great number besides Sünni 
villages. Sivas is a Central Anatolian province known for the dominance of Alevi residents. In that 
sense the migrants from Sivas in gecekondu settlements are mainly Alevi 
        
61 Extract from the field research note no. 40, 19 Aug. 2003. 
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 The Sünnis of Çorum and Yozgat put their Alevi hemşehris into a different 
category vis-à-vis the Alevis of Sivas and Tunceli. As will be mentioned in the 
following chapter, Sünnis of Yozgat and Çorum gave references to their hemşehris’ 
practicing some musts of Sünni Islam in order to explain their difference from 
more radical Alevis of Sivas and Tunceli. Generally, the peculiar way of Alevi 
practice of Islam is either neglected or ignored in Sünni residents’ narrations62. 
Alevi respondents point out one of their most important sufferings as the informing 
activity among their Sünni inhabitants. Sünni neighbors had behaved as informants, 
most of the time and made their Alevi neighbors’ identity explicit to the rightist 
militant groups. The narratives of a number of Alevi respondents reflect this 
informing activity among Sünni residents:   
 
-Have you experienced any difficulty in the 1970s?  
-We were not able to say that we were Alevis. There were some men here, our 
neighbors [referring to his Sünni neighbors]. Their village was so close to 
ours, Uyurcak village… There were no means of transportation other than 
train then. At the train station they told others that we were Alevis. Ten, 
fifteen men with guns walked towards me intending to beat me. I said, “Are 
you not ashamed of yourselves? I am a state officer. I am a member of CHP; 
I have nothing to do with other stuff.  I am also from the village of Uyurcak”. 
Then one of them said, “I am from the same village”. They barely left me 
free. I lied about where I was from63.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 
62 In the discourses of Sünni migrants about Alevism and their neighbor’s practicing of Alevism, it is 
inevitable to understand the tendency to identify Alevism as a version of Sünni Islam rather then a 
peculiar practice. Therefore, the presence of mosques in Alevi villages, the Alevi fellows going to 
mosques for prayer or the Alevis who fasted during Ramadan are often given as examples to show the 
imposed sameness between Alevism and Sünnism. However, the construction of mosques in Alevi 
villages was mostly part of state policy favoring Sünni Islam over Alevi interpretation of Islam in the 
early 1980s. Alevis’ accepting or practice of some Sünni Islamic obligations seems to be due to the 
social pressures of their Sünni hemşehris living close by.    
 
63 Extract from field research note no. 45, 1 May 2005.  
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 As mentioned in the above anecdote, to hide one’s hometown identity could 
function as a tactic of survival for ordinary residents of the neighborhood against 
both leftist and rightist militants. Migrants were subject to continuous 
interrogations about their hometowns at the train station. Moreover, to live in a 
gecekondu neighborhood also made hiding identities difficult due to close 
encounters between communities. The train station had been the most critical space 
where direct encounter between leftist and rightist militants had taken place. 
Almost all of the stories related to the atmosphere of the 1970s in the neighborhood 
include one important anecdote related to the train station. Migrants had no 
alternative but to travel by train due to many reasons mentioned in the previous 
parts. The informal nature of the research setting had made the train as the only 
alternative means of transportation for a certain period of time. In that sense, 
particularly for men who were more mobile when compared to women in urban 
space, traveling by train was narrated as a quite frightening experience due to close 
encounters with the militants. The train station was unavoidably the meeting point 
of both Boğaziçi and Üreğil residents since it was the main and most critical point 
of social space where all the residents needed to use. Consequently, there had 
emerged furious struggles between the leftists and rightists on this critical aspect of 
the space in order to gain the control of the train station during the late 1970s as 
narrated by the respondents who had witnessed these fights. The wife of a former 
leftist militant defined the extreme importance of train in this manner:  
 
Most of the incidents had taken place in the train. If the train at 7 am 
belonged to rightists, the other train after that belonged to the leftists. If 
someone had taken the wrong train by mistake, then, some bad events would 
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definitely have taken place. Even slaughter could occur. Boğaziçi was mostly 
a political place64 [she means space of leftists]65. 
 
 
Despite the fact that the harsh struggles had taken place mainly at the train 
station, the struggles between leftists and rightists took place also within the 
neighborhood mainly at nights as mentioned above. Rightist militants due to dense 
settlement of Sünni residents in the neighborhood collected haraç from the 
ordinary Sünni residents. The most interesting anecdote related to militants’ way of 
persuading Sünni residents for haraç was narrated by a Sünni, highly conservative 
shop owner. According to his saying, the rightist militants committed an attack to 
one of their Sünni neighbors’ house at night and misinformed the Sünni residents in 
the neighborhood that the “communists” did that. He narrated the incident as 
follows:  
   
There were more Türkeşci living close to our house. They shot the houses of 
their people at nights then they told that communists came and shot the 
houses. They collected money in return for protection against communists 
depending on that lie. One day Hacı [a friend of him] kept watch at night to 
see who were shooting the houses. He saw that Türkeşcis came and shot their 
own people’s houses. We got back some part of the money they had 
collected. They had spent some part of it. We gave this money to the mosque 
association.66
 
 
                                                 
64 It is interesting to note that both Alevi and Sünni respondents use the concept “political” to refer to 
leftist politics. Political place, political people mainly signify the leftist politics in the discourses of 
the migrants. “Political” as a concept seems to have a connotation referring to the system opponent 
nature of leftist ideology.     
 
65 Extract from field research note no. 46, 5 May 2005.  
 
66 Extract from field research note no. 30, 25, June 2003. 
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As Bruinessen (1996) mentions not only for the sake of collecting haraç but 
also for recruiting Sünni Muslims of the mixed regions, religious extreme right 
fanned Sünnis’ fear and hatred of the Alevis. In order to do that they spread 
“rumors” that Alevis had bombed a mosque or poisoned a water supply unfailingly 
drew Sünnis into the extreme right camp” (Bruinessen, 1996: 8). Taking into 
consideration the highly chaotic nature of social relationships in the neighborhood, 
the tactics employed by groups with regard to each other had determined the course 
of (social) spatialization in the neighborhood. The spontaneity of Boğaziçi and 
other gecekondu spaces had emerged mainly from this fact during the period. The 
neighboring relations in mixed gecekondu settlements like Boğaziçi, within a 
context mentioned above necessitates a close attention to understand the peculiarity 
of these settlements, which will constitute the subject matter of next section.          
 
 
5.6. Living Spatially Close to Each Other: “Sacredness” of Being 
Neighbors? 
 
In general, being neighbors is considered a “sacred” part of everyday life in 
gecekondu. To be good to neighbors, to respect the boundaries of each other are the 
predominant values of gecekondu life. Depending on research data and depending 
on my personal observations in different gecekondu neighborhoods, the over 
valorization of being a respected neighbor seems to be almost a norm in gecekondu 
life. It is important to note that the sensitiveness about the issue of “being good 
neighbor” seems to be closely related to the competition over the ownership of 
land. Most of the times, the competitions over space and use and exchange value of 
the real estate constitute the primary concern in everyday lives of the migrants. As 
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mentioned in the previous chapter, in the first settlement period, being close to 
one’s villagers was very important for the migrants. To form a community is the 
precondition for them to defend their lands and houses against state forces. Not 
only they should protect their house and land against state forces, but also they 
should respect each other’s belongings. In that sense, the spontaneous and peculiar 
nature of land ownership and gecekondu construction patterns necessitate a trust 
relation between migrants.  In a condition where the ownership to land cannot be 
proven by legal documents, neighbors should respect each other’s boundaries in 
order to avoid arbitrary invasion. There are few cases where migrants narrated such 
disagreement with their neighbors about land issues. They narrated these incidents 
within the context of the most depressing period for them in the neighborhood. 
They gave frequent references to the importance and necessity of good neighbors 
in gecekondu life in relation to these incidents. The sacredness of being good 
neighbors is also closely related to the fact that the distinction between public and 
private spheres is more difficult to make in gecekondu neighborhoods when 
compared to middle and upper middle class districts of the city. Private lives of the 
families are often open to public interest due to the peculiar aspects of gecekondu 
space and the domination of community life in these neighborhoods. In an 
environment where the boundaries of private and public space are not so clear, the 
migrants often mention the importance of neighbors with good intentions in 
gecekondu life.  
 
The outmost value given to being neighbors in gecekondu life becomes 
noticeable at the moment where the migrants narrate the struggles going on 
between leftists and rightists in their close residential area. In cases where Sünni 
 252
and Alevi migrants are neighbors to each other, unlike the estimates, respondents 
mention their avoidance of open conflicts with each other. Particularly, some of the 
Sünni residents narrate incidents where the neighbors from the opposite sect 
despite their political position have behaved so protective to them for the sake of 
being good neighbors in the highly conflict-ridden atmosphere of the period. There 
is almost no explicit reference to an open conflict between neighbors among 
respondents. Alevis, while referring to these years use a more defensive narration 
incorporating a threat perception and an explicit reference to their sufferings. The 
sayings of Sünni residents, on the other hand incorporate descriptions about 
positive and protective behaviors of their Alevi neighbors as mentioned above. 
Despite their reaction and distance to leftists and Alevi identity in general, Sünni 
migrants most of the time adopt a positive representation of their Alevi neighbors. 
A Sünni migrant from Kırıkkale narrates the struggles taking place near their 
residential area by referring to their Alevi neighbors as follows:  
 
We had closed the doors and windows with pillows during these years. In 
case they [leftist militants] had seen light and if they had guns; they might 
have opened fire at houses. We are rightists you know. They [Alevis] did 
nothing to us since we were neighbors to them. My wife told me, a relative of 
her, while he was about to get on his car one day, was surrounded by a group 
of leftists. My wife narrated me that the leftists [their Alevi neighbors were 
among them] were about to beat him, she got out the house and told them that 
he was her relative. Then they let him go. They did nothing to you if you 
were a neighbor for the sake of not to behave shamefully67.  
 
 
Another Sünni migrant from Kırıkkale narrated how positive the attitudes of 
his Alevi neighbors have been towards him in spite of the fact they have quite 
opposite political inclinations:    
                                                 
67 Extract from field research note no. 25, 15 May 2003. 
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If you behave good to your neighbors, they will be good to you too. For 
example, I have a neighbor from Sivas. I do not want to make discrimination, 
but they are Alevi and they were extremely leftists. They gave serious harms 
to many people [“Tuttuklarını mahvederlerdi”in migrant’s words referring to 
terror years.] They knew that I am a rightist. But, Allah Razı Olsun, they 
haven’t shown any wrong behavior to me for years. Sometimes if they see me 
as sad, they come near and ask if I am all right. 68
 
 
The importance and sacredness of being neighbors as a predominant value in 
gecekondu life owing to peculiar socio-spatial qualities of these regions seemed to 
dominate radically political agenda of social spatialization in the 1970s.  
 
It seems so interesting to me as a researcher that Sünni residents while talking 
about the struggles between their leftist neighbors and rightists often give spatial 
references to these neighbor’s fights with the rightists on the opposite hill rather 
than rightists in their close residential area. This might reflect the real picture in 
those years as the fights between groups might take place in long ranges. Still, the 
inhabitant’s remembering no close incidents of fighting may also give clues about 
their perceptions of the inappropriateness of fights between neighbors. The 
similarity between the anecdotes on the same subject may explicate the common 
approach of Sünni migrants related to their Alevi neighbors in the following 
manner:  
 
Our left was resided by people from Sivas and above us people from Tunceli 
were present. They had worked actively during those years [she means their 
militant activities] but had done nothing to us. I do not know if this was 
related to the fact that we were neighbors. But they often fought with the 
people on the opposite hill. They fired within long ranges, from here to there 
[by pointing the gecekondus on the opposite hill]. But neither the ones here 
nor residing there on the opposite hills did anything to us. They had fired 
weapons from these hills to each other. I had no problem with neighbors, my 
                                                 
68 Extract from field research note no. 25, 15 May 2003. 
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dear. One of them was from Tunceli. But they were so interested in us. This 
was because they felt themselves as few in number. I cannot figure it out. 
They are just behind us, you see… They could have done bad things to us, 
nothing like that had ever happened. They were always good to me.69 
[Emphasis mine]     
                                   
 
A quite conservative woman from Kırşehir who had mentioned her dislike 
about Alevis during the course of an informal conversation used a very similar 
expression with the above anecdote as such:   
 
There was a woman writing on the wall with mud. I talked to the commander 
of the gendarme station. I said to him “we are ashamed of her behavior but 
she does not”. We erased it, and then next day they again wrote it down. On 
all of the houses there were writings. But to be honest the same woman, they 
were from Sivas, had protected us against the attacks and therefore nobody 
had done anything to us. Since this women’s daughter, they were our 
neighbors, was a friend of my daughter. They knew us; therefore, they hadn’t 
annoyed us. We all stayed at home at nights by closing all the lights. We 
heard gunfire from the opposite hill.70 [Emphasis mine] 
                  
 
 
Similar to the anecdotes above, there was almost no mentioning of an open 
conflict between Alevi and Sünni neighbors from the perspective of Sünni migrants. 
At the extreme, the relationship between neighbors of different hometowns had lost 
its intensity or totally broken as a result of the politicization of Alevi and Sünni 
identities. I only encountered two serious cases where there emerged a huge 
conflict between Alevi and Sünni neighbors. As a consequence of the conflicts 
between groups, Sünni and Alevi families had exchanged their houses in order to 
live among the migrants from the same sects. If a few number of Alevi and Sünni 
families reside in an area dominated by an opposite sect they might come under 
                                                 
69 Extract from field research note no. 36, 20 July 2003. 
 
70 Extract from field research note no. 35, 18 July 2003. 
 255
serious oppression of the majority. I talked to an Alevi woman71 from Kars who 
suffered from such a replacement of places with a Sünni family. She narrated how 
threatened they had felt during the period in Kayaş surrounded by a Sünni 
community from Çorum despite his husband’s distance to politics in the following 
manner:  
 
Çorumlus got up in order to eat during Ramadan. They had stored gasoline in 
their backyards [I could not understand the meaning of storing gasoline at 
first. After asking a number of questions, I understood that she was scared 
from the possible attempts of Sünni neighbors to burn their house at night]. 
They fired their guns at nights. Since we did not have guns we felt very bad. 
The ones [Sünni Çorumlus who exchanged their houses with the family] here 
went to Kayaş, to our house and we came here to their house. We had a very 
beautiful house there. I am very upset about that. Here the house was small. 
We paid the debt of the other house then we added rooms to the one here. Not 
only us but also some relatives of my husband were with us in Kayaş and 
they also came here after us. We did exchange of places.  
 
 
They did this exchange even without taking their furniture. Some members of 
Sünni family from Çorum, the other party of the exchange made their feeling of 
discomfort explicit because of having lived among an Alevi community as narrated 
by their Alevi neighbors. An old Alevi woman narrated how they liked one of the 
two brothers in the family but according to the saying of the woman the other 
brother and his wife reflected their feeling of uneasiness openly to their Alevi 
neighbors. She narrated the family’s hesitant approach towards them in the 
following manner:  
 
We often visited them. However, one day, we heard that Osman told Sünni 
neighbors here that we were left among Alevis and they did not give comfort 
to us. In reality nothing bad happened. People from Yozgat and Sivas resided 
here. Ayşe the wife of Osman, behaved so good to us, face-to-face… Then 
she talked after us as Kızılbaşlar and unclean people. In those years it was 
                                                 
71 Extract from field research note no. 56, 6 Oct. 2005.  
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said that they had some hemşehris in Kayaş and they told their hemşehris that 
they were not comfortable here72. 
 
 
In general, during the course of the interview and depending on my 
observations, other than the exchange mentioned above and the case of shop owner 
who moved from Üreğil to here, I encountered no case of such conflict and 
discomfort between neighbors from different sects. In case, a few number of Sünni 
and Alevi families had been left among a community of migrants from the opposite 
sect they might feel themselves threatened and uncomfortable in the highly radical 
political atmosphere of the period. In general, the discourse of Sünni migrants 
related to their Alevi neighbors reflected their distance and prejudices about 
Alevism in general, on the one hand, but on the other, they gave references to the 
incidents exemplifying the goodness of their Alevi neighbors towards them. The 
positive evaluations about the humanity and good attitudes of Alevi neighbors in 
particular would not evolve into a general optimism and tolerance without 
prejudices about Alevi society in the narratives of Sünni respondents. On the other 
hand, Alevi people mentioned their sufferings more often and their expressions 
about Sünni migrants in their close environment was more defensive when 
compared to Sünnis. Alevis’ good treatment of Sünni neighbors may not be 
necessarily linked to their good intentions only. Alevis were put into a position to 
develop certain tactics vis-à-vis their neighbors due to often mentioned informing 
activities on part of Sünni neighbors related to leftist activities of Alevis. Sünni 
respondents may, in some cases, mention their informing of the “unlawful” 
behaviors of their Alevi neighbors explicitly. The examples to that, I encountered 
mostly among the narratives of women since women are the important actors and 
                                                 
72 Extract from field research note no.45, 1 May 2005.   
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the real carriers of the relationship with neighbors. Their perception of the period is 
quite different than men’s. While men seem to have knowledge about the incidents 
in the public space of the neighborhood transcending their close environment, 
women give references to their male children and their sufferings in the public 
space and their neighboring relations during the period. They usually do not have a 
general knowledge about the incidents between groups in the wider public space of 
the neighborhood. But they give information about the incidents, which happened 
to take place around them. As an example, they may have a clear track on the 
uneasiness between neighbors but they most of the time do not have an idea about 
what had been going on in the market place. The betrayal of Sünni neighbors seems 
to constitute one of the important themes in Alevi women’s narratives. As 
mentioned above, Alevi and Sünni migrants who had migrated from different 
villages of the same province seemed to live as neighbor communities. An old 
Alevi woman narrated how his son was betrayed to rightists for the fact that he 
pasted Atatürk’s73 picture on his notebook.74 The one who had informed him was 
the son of a Sünni neighbor from a village very close to theirs. For that reason the 
child was surrounded by a group of MHP sympathizers who wanted to see his 
notebook as told by the women and beaten up seriously for being Atatürkçü, 
therefore communist. When they had found him he was unconscious.   
 
The informing activity was quite common despite the fact that the neighbors 
were specifically careful about their attitudes towards each other along everyday 
                                                 
73 “The reason behind most Alevis’ positioning themselves in support of Republican ideology is 
related to the “laicist” reforms of Republican regime targeted Sünni communities that had been 
traditionally and historically the “other” of Alevis” (Okan, 2004: 93). Therefore, Alevi people 
identified themselves with Atatürk as a hero and Republican Regime’s secular policies.    
 
74 Extract from field research note no. 45, 1 May 2005.  
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interaction. However, the narratives of women with reference to the period point 
out a general estrangement in the social relations between Alevi and Sünni 
neighbors with the politicization of these identities. A quite expressive Alevi 
woman made the feeling of insecurity among Alevis vis-à-vis their Sünni neighbors 
explicit in the following manner:  
 
-Have you experienced any uneasiness with your neighbors during the 
period?  
-Yes of course, there appeared a distance between us. The girls were used to 
play outside in the garden together.  We often went to visit our neighbors in 
the past, but during that period we haven’t seen each other that much. It was 
told that people from MHP put some machine guns in the garden of a 
neighbor from Yozgat [a MHP sympathizer]. But then, the youths of Sivas 
have found and taken them. It was said that their plan was to rake the entire 
neighborhood. You know here is an Alevi neighborhood. There was another 
story… People from Yozgat, because of the fact that there were so many 
Alevis in Boğaziçi had planned to fire all Alevi households. They took off 
from Yozgat in buses but before the buses had arrived here, the intervention 
took place. They were left on the road.75  
 
 
The loss of trust on part of neighbors would be triggered in the coming 
decade where the state’s policies of repression had been practiced in the 
neighborhood through intense informing network by the 1980 military 
intervention. This will constitute the subject matter of the next chapter.  
 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
The public space of Boğaziçi in the 1970s had witnessed struggles between leftist 
and rightist militants in close connection with the general political and economic 
context of the country. The spontaneity of gecekondu spaces in general and 
                                                 
75 Extract from field research note no. 52, 10 Aug. 2005.  
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Boğaziçi in particular, emerged from the way these struggles had taken place in 
socially mixed composition of the region and from peculiar social spatialization in 
the region. Due to state’s inability and reluctance to intervene in the radically 
political space of Boğaziçi, the spatialization in the neighborhood had taken a 
highly spontaneous and autonomous form during the period when compared to 
other moments in neighborhood history. The explicit struggles between militant 
groups or the implicit ones between ordinary residents through informing activity 
or giving secret support to militants exhibit a form of display of tactics on the 
horizontal level. Once powerful groups, who were able to take near-strategic 
decisions in shaping public space, in the previous decade had come under serious 
repression by leftist militants. The exclusionary acts of these groups in the 1960s 
had led to unintended spatial consequences that made the public space of the 
neighborhood dominated by leftists. The train station had constituted the main 
point in public space where furious struggles had taken place. In highly radical 
political atmosphere of the neighborhood, the hometown identities had been 
radically politicized due to these identities’ reflecting sectarian affiliations. In spite 
of the fact that living together as neighbors, spatially close to each other for years 
had brought about a learning process between sectarian groups. Even though they 
appreciated their neighbors’ good attitudes as peculiar cases, Alevi and Sünni 
identities, in general, had become a predominant reference point in defining the 
“other” for both groups. However, it is not possible to neglect the heterogeneity 
among Alevi community depending on hometown differences. The neighboring 
relations had not taken a conflict-ridden form explicitly; however, the relations had 
taken great damage in the period, which will affect the course of social 
spatialization in the coming decade.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
AFTER 1980: NEOLIBERAL STRATEGY, IDENTITY 
POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF SPACE 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Military intervened in politics in 1980 with the claim to restore necessary 
conditions of democracy in the country. The strategy of military regime was to 
restrain the radically political nature of public space and mainly urban terror. In 
conjunction with macro strategies of the military regime, the 1980s seem to be the 
years denoting the repressive interventions of security forces with the aim of 
avoiding active politics in public space of the locality. This strategic act of military 
regime to control and manage public space has led to a general degradation of 
active politics and aloofness in social relations. Not to speak about politics is 
defined as the only way to avoid possible troubles in migrants’ expressions in such 
an atmosphere, which will be dealt with in the following sections. 
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My research findings indicate that the strategic decision of the military 
regime to “depoliticize” the radically political space of the neighborhood had been 
realized in three interrelated processes. First of all, at the local level, state security 
officials seem to utilize a secret information network by encouraging some 
migrants to inform about other inhabitants in the neighborhood. The public space 
of the neighborhood at the time can be best defined as a paranoid space where 
communication out of close hemşehri or relative cycle and political talks in public 
had been avoided.  
 
Secondly, at the macro level, the effect of neoliberal policies have been felt in 
the shaping up of neighborhood space and claims to it due to a number of reasons 
beginning by the 1980s. As mentioned in the second chapter, the legalization of 
gecekondu lands with the neoliberal policies of ANAP (Motherland Party-MP), the 
first civilian government after the intervention, had increased the value of 
gecekondu land and led to the further commercialization of the real estate market in 
newly legalized “gecekondu” neighborhoods. This was also the case for Boğaziçi. 
The reforms of decentralization in local government76 system coupled with the 
neoliberal policies that have triggered urban entrepreneurialism, the low-income 
settlements were open to dynamics of urban land market. This brought unintended 
developments where the value of real estate in some low-income settlements 
declined totally, while some others gained value as a consequence of the contingent 
interplay of different dynamics like the resistance of local groups to market 
                                                 
76 As stated in chapter two in detail, in three urban centers in Turkey- İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir- a 
two-tiered municipal system was established in 1983. District municipalities under metropolitan 
municipality began to serve as being responsible from the preparation and application of construction 
plans in their districts. By this law, most of peripheral gecekondu districts that had been built until 
that time were taken in the legal borders of district municipalities and connected to Metropolitan 
Municipality in administrative terms. (Heper, 1987: 1)  
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mechanisms, the spatial location of the neighborhood and the strategic decisions of 
local government. The establishment of district municipalities under metropolitan 
municipalities in big cities inevitably had made local political competition between 
political parties as more responsive to the demands of “gecekodulu”. In parallel to 
these developments, the public space of the research setting had gained 
predominantly an economic meaning for its inhabitants, which in turn led to a 
general increase in the demands of the inhabitants for necessary services and the 
application of plans in accordance to their advantage. This in turn, had further 
increased the value of “gecekondu” houses and lands. 
  
Thirdly, as part of the strategic act of suppressing active politics and 
dominating the ideological claims of particularly leftists, military regime initiated 
and the succeeding civilian governments carried out the policy of privileging Sünni 
interpretation of Islam as an antidote to ideologies of Marxism and Kurdish 
separatism (Göner, 2005: 116; Okan, 2004: 93). Sünni version of Islam had been 
presented implicitly as the formal understanding of religion by state and Sünni 
religious courses had become compulsory during the period as a consequence of 
this policy. The state’s repressive politics towards mainly to Alevi leftists in the 
aftermath of the intervention and their making religious courses compulsory in 
high schools had alienated Alevis from supporting ANAP in the late 1980s despite 
the fact that they had given support to the party in its initial coming to power 
(Schüler, 2002:168). As a result of these developments, crystallization of Alevi and 
Sünni identities with reference to their religious content seems to determine the 
course of everyday life beginning by the mid-1980s. The claims to space in 
economic and religious terms had determined the form of political relations 
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between the realm of strategy and tactic on the vertical level. The power relations 
on the vertical level seem to become more reciprocal and the strategical realm had 
become more responsive to the tactical realm during that period when compared to 
other periods in the neighborhood history. In this chapter these three strategic 
spheres of suppressing radically political atmosphere of the late 1970s and the 
consequences of the strategic acts on the tactical level will be discussed.  
    
 
 
6.2 Paranoid Space: The Isolation of Social Relations in the  
 
Neighborhood  
 
Depending on the narratives of the respondents, the first strategy of state 
forces in suppressing the radically political space in the neighborhood seems to 
depend on getting information about the “previously illegal” activities of the 
people or any kind of political talk in public through migrants from the opposite 
sect or opposite political stand. The intimate relations between neighbors and 
hemşehri groups that had taken great damage in the late 1970s had further receded 
due to the lack of confidence in social relations. Migrants’ portrayal of the 1980s 
mainly embodies feelings of suspicion, anxiety and insecurity on part of 
individuals that define social relations. Speaking about politics was severely 
restricted by the possibility of being reported by neighbors and friends to the 
police. The typical definition of the period can be exemplified by the sayings of a 
migrant from Kırıkkale in the following manner:  
 
After the revolution [he means the military intervention in 1980] there had 
emerged a lot of trouble. Everyday they [the state security forces] took a trip 
here and collected people. Nobody could talk to each other. Informing 
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activities had often taken place; therefore people hesitated to talk to each 
other. These were bad times.77  
 
 
The village-like qualities of social relations had severely eroded during this 
period. Many people interviewed told incidents of being taken by the police for 
questioning. The highly repressive atmosphere of the early 1980s in terms of state 
power to define the course of social relations in a strict way inevitably had 
necessitated a distance with politics in individual’s perceptions about the period.  
 
The state suppression was used mainly against leftists in the aftermath of the 
military intervention. The active leftist militants of the 1970 had suffered most 
from the pressures of the security forces with the denunciation of their neighbors. 
The story of an active leftist militant, who is a Sünni himself, which is an 
exceptional case, reflects such a suffering. He stayed in prison for about ten years 
as a result of the denunciation of his Sünni community. This was narrated, by one 
of his closest Alevi friend who owns a shop in the market.78 At some point of the 
conversation, his friend implied the unfaithfulness of his neighbors. In his words, 
“Even the ones whom he took the school to Üreğil79 do not recognize and respect 
him now. He was also offended by his own people [referring to his Sünni 
neighbors].” I developed a friendly relationship with this militant during the course 
of the research. He shared details of his life story with me except the incidents of 
                                                 
77 Extract from the field research note no. 25, 15 May 2003.  
 
78 Extract from field research note no. 19, 26 Apr. 2003. 
 
79 Due to the fact that Üreğil neighborhood was occupied by mainly rightist militants, it was very 
difficult for people from Boğaziçi to pass there. However, children should go to the school on the 
other side of the bridge in Üreğil. This militant had taken children and accompanied them to the 
school.  
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the late 1970s. However, in his presence, his friends told anecdotes about how 
intimidating and powerful figure he was for the rightist militants at the time being. 
I also have a chance to observe the uneasy relationship he had with his Sünni 
neighbors. He continued his friendship with a number of trusted Alevi friends and 
neighbors though.  
 
The Sünni and Alevi population, who have no direct relation with the political 
issues of the time, had emphasized the apolitical nature of the public space in the 
1980s. The question: “How have the tension laden relations in the 1970s been 
calmed down in time?” is mainly responded by people with reference to the 
declining importance of politics in time and the increasing intensity of economic 
concerns of individuals to earn their daily bread. This perception of individuals 
about the period seems to have close connection with the neoliberal policies of the 
late 1980s. At the macro level, the changing structure of the job market and the 
increasing unemployment rates have resulted in the fragmentation of community 
based claims and solidarity during the period. This has made families and 
individuals more constrained with economic concerns, which contributed to the 
detachment of their communal bonds to a further extent. The common discourse in 
individual narratives portraying two decades following the military intervention as 
a period where the political concerns have been replaced by the struggle to make a 
living seems to signify this process of individualization. A Sünni migrant defines 
this transformation in everyday lives of the individuals as follows:     
 
After the intervention you could not even talk to your best friends 
unreservedly. Now everything is good. People understand that there is no 
good coming from politics. Everybody is after earning their daily bread. Life 
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was hard for everybody at the time being. These issues had lost their 
importance; there are no left or right anymore.80  
 
 
The ones who had actively participated in the political struggles in the late 
1970s and their families emphasized the very same premise that both leftists and 
rightists are the victims of the period. A member of the previously militant leftist 
family from Tunceli narrated the nature of the social relations in the 1980s as 
follows:  
 
There was no longer a tension like that; even the leftists and rightists had 
become friends to each other. Another reason for that is to live together for so 
long. Everybody knows each other here. Now the leftists and rightists sit 
together, talk and discuss about politics. In addition, the events and relations 
have taken a more economic turn. To earn bread money has become 
important; people do not care about left and right, any longer… They believe 
in who has given them more money.81  
 
 
As mentioned above and will be discussed in detail in the following sections, 
this change of approach among migrants towards political issues and their 
emphasis on economic concerns have close relation with the preeminence of 
economic determinants in the social spatialization of the locality by means of 
neoliberal policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 Extract from field research note no. 23, 5 May 2003. 
 
81 Extract from field research note no. 40, 19 Aug. 2003. 
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6.3 The Effect of Neoliberal Policies on Neighborhood Space  
 
 
The uneasiness in social relations due to a lack of trust following the period of 
open struggles between leftists and rightists and the repression of active politics in 
public space should not lead one to a quick conclusion that the public space had 
become to a large extent depoliticized in the 1980s. On the contrary, the 
legalization of gecekondu neighborhoods with neoliberal policies of the 1980s has 
made politics more embedded in the production of public space when compared to 
previous periods. This has one strong relation with the fact that the relations in the 
production of space have come to be determined by economic motives and 
concerns more by the legalization of most gecekondu neighborhoods beginning 
from the 1984 onwards. With the gecekondu law established in 1984, most of the 
gecekondu settlements that had been built until that time were legalized. By means 
of legalization in these neighborhoods, the estate prices and rents in gecekondu 
districts had increased and these spaces had become open to the influence and 
dynamics of urban entrepreneurialism more. Particularly, the early settlers had 
benefited from this condition. Boğaziçi has also been taken within the framework 
of legalization activity by the introduction of the first extensive construction plan 
of the region. It began to be prepared in 1985 during ANAP district mayor ship. 
The law no. 3194 gave the right to authorize construction plans to the municipal 
governments in 1985. Mamak Municipality was established as a district 
municipality, an extension of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality and it was given 
the authority to make and apply construction plans. The gecekondu settlements in 
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the periphery of Ankara had been joined with the city as their legal parts under 
municipal governing during that period.  
 
Until 1989, approximately 10% of Mamak region had been taken in the 
framework of the construction plan and legalized according to municipal officers. 
The operation of legalization in only a limited area in Mamak until the late 1980s is 
said to reflect the inability of the first district mayor of the region from ANAP, 
Mehmet Akgün, to prepare a well-defined construction plan and operate it 
efficiently. As supported by the sayings of some inhabitants and municipal officers, 
the mayor had given priority in legalization process to some neighborhoods from 
which the party had gotten the main support. In that sense, the parts in migrants’ 
narratives about the political acts of Mehmet Akgün, the first district mayor, reflect 
a certain stress of the beginnings of a feeling of favoritism and injustice in the local 
politics. The major legalization activity in the region had taken place between the 
years 1989 and 1995. Social democrat mayors had been in power during that 
period and most of Mamak gecekondu settlement was legalized. The remaining 
part was not legalized due to the geological inconvenience of the region for 
construction. Many respondents defined Selahattin Öcal as the most effective 
social democrat mayor who came to duty in 1989 by both Sünni and Alevi 
residents. However, some Sünni respondents also signify the decisions that had 
taken during his term favoring mainly Alevi migrants. In that respect, the aftermath 
of the highly political atmosphere of the late 1970s as a period seems to take place 
in the memories of the migrants with reference to struggle given to get legal right 
to their lands and houses with best possible conditions vis-à-vis one’s neighbors, 
and “other” groups and in relation to that, by carrying an awareness of possibility 
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about partial treatment on part of district municipality according to sectarian 
identities. The increasing knowledge of migrants about local politics, their 
awareness about nepotistic policies and their willingness to utilize favoritism for 
their interests related to real estate had increased the power of particularly early 
comer migrants. This implies that they are no longer transitory migrants but active 
participants having a say in local politics.  
 
The most remarkable aspect of local politics seems to be constituted around 
the competition over legalizing and planning the neighborhood space between 
mainly Alevi and Sünni communities. This reflected a significant transition from an 
explicit and harsh political struggle in the public space, namely a space of politics 
to a struggle going implicitly through space that is a politics of space. The 
reciprocity and responsiveness of the relations between strategical and tactical 
realm, on the vertical level, intensifies with the increasing power of migrants to 
define the fate of local politics. That is the reason why the respondents narrate the 
activities of social democrat mayors between 1989 and 1999, Selahattin Öcal and 
İsmail Değerli respectively, within the sphere of favoritism. Particularly, Sünni 
migrants define the period as advantageous for Alevi population. One of the 
municipal officers who were actively engaged in the legalization process at the 
time and who is an Alevi himself admitted the incidents of favoritist practices then 
as follows: 
 
The private construction offices under oath determined the condition of lands 
at the time. 30% of people’s land was considered as the right of municipality 
and people were obliged to pay this amount to the municipality in order to be 
included within the context of construction plan. However, the holder of the 
right decided the value of the land. The municipality was the injured party 
because of that. For example, if they fixed the value of their land as 10, the 
 270
municipality could not say it was 5. We constructed committees and 
determined the jointly owned lands. The offices under oath did the ground 
measurements. We distributed the technicians to six different regions. We, in 
all rounds, sent officers to different regions in order to avoid favoritism. But 
things like that had happened, we could not prevent them. 82
 
 
Apart from nepotistic policies of the municipality, the legalization process 
itself has some loopholes that were open to exploitation. As mentioned in the 
second chapter, the responsibility that had given to the private construction offices 
under oath and the informal relation between the inhabitants and officials had 
caused migrants’ abuse of these relations to their advantage. The narratives of 
Boğaziçi inhabitants revealed the fact that the legalization of the houses during the 
period had not led to an automatic increase in the prosperity of all. The informal 
moments in the actualization of legalization had brought injustices to different 
groups in society depending on their political and sectarian standing. The ones 
having legal title deeds to the land were put in a more disadvantaged position with 
legalization vis-à-vis the owners of the gecekondu houses on state owned lands. In 
other words, the ones who legally bought the vineyards of Üreğil villagers could 
not take the advantage of legalization as much as the ones who had built their 
houses on state owned lands. Because, the migrants who had their houses on state 
lands got their formal title deeds according to the declaration they gave about the 
size of their lands to private construction offices under oath. The inhabitants often 
give examples about the exploitation of the relationship between the inhabitants 
and officers under oath. As a tactic, the ones who had no title deeds gained right to 
the state owned lands on which they had built gecekondu houses depending on 
                                                 
82 Extract from field research note no. 42, 21 Dec. 2003.  
 271
their verbal declaration about size of the land. They used the opportunity to declare 
their land sizes larger than its normal size of their gardens and extend their rights to 
the land by including the state lands around within their declaration. The poorest 
ones who have settled on the steepest parts of the neighborhood suffered from the 
legalization process most. These places were taken within the construction plan as 
the green areas, which have transformed into public recreational areas in time.  
 
In addition to legalization, the integration of neoliberal consuming spaces 
[the opening up of different shops selling international brands] increased the value 
of real estate prices in the market place. Particularly the established shop owners 
restored their power in economic and political terms beginning by the late 1980s. 
In general, they had benefited from the application of construction plan in the 
region and the transformation of public space. This process has turned them into 
powerful agents again who could take near-strategic decisions. This restoring of 
power on part of shop owners had contributed to the spontaneity of neighborhood 
space in terms of posing an alternative spatial development to the mainstream 
tendency of apartmentalization in gecekondu areas.  
 
Apartmentalization of gecekondu districts is conventionally considered as the 
integration of these districts with city space and the solution of the problems at 
least in appearance by public perception. However, apartmentalization of 
gecekondu districts, in some cases, poses no real solution to the problems of low-
income settlements, on the contrary, even triggered the problems with their 
unplanned nature and their potential of altering the social rhythm of everyday life 
in these districts. Moreover, the legalization of the neighborhoods will not 
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inevitably bring apartmentalization, in reality as expected by the modernization 
approach.  As mentioned by Brenner and Theodore (2004: 8), the neoliberal 
capitalist territorial organization is always unpredictable and deeply contested 
because free from the market value of a certain land, social attachments to place 
persist as people struggle to defend the everyday practices and institutional 
compromises from which capital has sought to extricate itself. Local actors may 
resist the neoliberal act of “creative destruction”83 not only to defend everyday 
practices or as a result of their emotional attachment to gecekondu space but also 
for the fact that durability of the built environment as it is can be more beneficial 
for its holders. This potential spontaneity in the neoliberal strategic spatial 
practices operates similarly as a factor behind the late apartmentalization in 
Boğaziçi. This subject will be dealt with in detail in the following sections.  
 
It is worth to mention that, with the operation of neoliberal policies, economy 
had come to constitute the main axis of everyday life. The public space was used 
and produced by the social relations that were predominantly determined by 
economic relations and assets of individuals. The proliferation of consumption 
choices has led to the diffusion of new shops selling national and international 
brands in the market place or the modern means of consumption into the economic 
transaction process. The presence of the typical traditional gecekondu shop besides 
chain supermarkets that are preferred to a large extent by the migrants for food 
                                                 
83 This concept is developed by Brenner and Theodore (2002, 15). According to the authors, the 
actually existing neoliberalism should be analyzed with reference to two dialectically intertwined but 
analytically distinct moments: “the (partial) destruction of extant institutional arrangements and 
political compromises through market-oriented reform initiatives; and the (tendential) creation of a 
new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, commodification, and the rule of capital. 
Two important caveats must be immediately added to clarify this conceptualization of actually 
existing neoliberalism as a process of institutional creative destruction.” (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002: 15) 
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shopping reflected such a hybrid structure. The contradictory view of a collapsing 
old gecekondu bakkal with recent advertisements of newly emerged goods and a 
computer print of the statement “visa card is available” hanged on its window is a 
commonly encountered scene in the recent outlook of the market. The social 
spatialization in the neighborhood and particularly in the market place has been 
determined more by economic relations in the 1990s. The value increases in 
gecekondu land with neoliberal policies mentioned above and changing structure of 
local government system had increased the effect of favoritism and clientalism in 
local politics; which will constitute the subject matter of the following section.  
 
 
6.4 Favoritism as the Side Effect of Neoliberal Strategy: The 
Increasing Importance of Alevism and Sünnism as Part of Politics 
of Space      
 
The increasing effect of favoritism regarding ethnic and sectarian identities in local 
politics seems to be a fact of the 1980s. Schüler (2002: 117) relates this fact to two 
main reasons as the decreasing charisma of political leaders in conjunction with the 
loss of the ideological cores in party programs and the increasing domination of 
identity politics with the declining validity of class based politics after the collapse 
of the socialist bloc. The repression strategy of military regime mainly towards 
leftist ideology and its prioritizing Sünni Islam as the official religion of state both 
led to the inability of social democrat parties to use ideological means for political 
support in the aftermath of the intervention and an attempt on part of Alevis to 
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revitalize Alevism mainly as a belief system. In parallel to these developments, the 
social democrat tradition in local politics have followed a more clientalistic way of 
sustaining support from urban poor rather than employing ideological discourses to 
do that (Schüler, 2002: 119).  
 
As was the case also in Boğaziçi, the domination of social democrat mayors 
in local politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s in mostly low-income 
neighborhoods has put particularly Alevi communities in an advantageous position 
for a short time to use their political connections in the appropriation of space vis-
à-vis other groups. The Alevis’ support for SHP (Social Democratic People’s 
Party) in majority seems to be a consequence of the party’s favoring individualistic 
understanding of religion. SHP explicitly put its position in the debates about 
Quran courses in 1986 and 1987 and mentioned the impossibility of giving 
concession from traditional Kemalist and laicist understanding (Schüler, 2002: 
171). The intimacy between SHP and Alevi society can be well exemplified by 
SHP’s nomination of Alevi candidates in 1987 national elections particularly in 
cities where the social polarization between Alevis and Sünnis were rife and 
support of Alevis for SHP was high (Schüler, 2002: 184). As mentioned in the 
previous sections, local government system in big cities was reformed with the 
introduction of district municipalities besides metropolitan municipalities. The 
social democrat mayors had been in duty in the late 1980s in both Ankara 
Metropolitan Municipality and Mamak district Municipality. This had strengthened 
the ability of social democrat officials to employ clientalistic means to receive the 
support of Alevis in the region. From the perspective of Alevis the 1980s in local 
politics seem to be beneficial for their claims to space in economic and political 
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terms. If their disadvantageous position as the latecomers to the city is taken into 
account, their need to use the clientalistic means more when compared to Sünni 
migrants seems to be understandable. As also shown by the findings of a 
gecekondu research by Gökçe et. al (1993: 311), Alevis mainly answer the 
question: “How do you resolve your problems in state institutions?” as by means of 
finding acquaintances in state departments rather than by themselves individually. 
Clientalism for Alevis seems to function as a tactical means to overcome the 
obstacles put forward by strategical realm.  
 
In that respect, the reality of last two decades in the neighborhood has been 
an implicit competition that is dependent on the use and production of public space 
between different groups but mainly between the old rivals that is Alevis and 
Sünnis in the aftermath of the highly radical and fierce battles of the late 1970s. 
Therefore, as mentioned in the previous section, favoritism that has come to be 
embedded in local politics beginning from the 1980s has come to replace the 
explicit competition between Alevis and Sünnis in the context of leftist-rightist 
struggle. In that sense, the municipal treatment of the subjects and the production 
of public space in Boğaziçi have acquired a highly political content depending on 
the political and sectarian affiliation of the mayor. The interviewees narrated the 
municipal service provision and the financial penalties given particularly to shop 
owners with direct references to Alevi and Sünni identities or distinction. Muhtars 
as the local headmen are the most important actors who articulate the local needs, 
demands and knowledge with the municipal level politics. As pointed out by the 
findings of Erder’s (1996: 272) research in one of the biggest low-income 
settlements of İstanbul, migrants counted muhtarlık as the most visited local 
 276
institution that comes before mosque, municipality, coffeehouse, kaymakamlık (the 
office of kaimakam) and political parties. Therefore muhtars seem to be the 
preeminent witness and actors of the politics of space in the region by the 1980s as 
mentioned above. One of the previous muhtars of the neighborhood give an 
example to the favoritist policies of a social democrat mayor of Mamak in this 
way:   
 
Mamak Municipality was social democrat at the time. There weren’t any 
people from right in the municipality then. When Selahattin Öcal came to 
duty, all department heads were Alevi. The services were given to places 
where Alevis were residing densely. To give an example, we had a place left 
for public bazaar with legal expropriation on the upper side in our 
neighborhood when İsmail Değerli [the mayor succeeding Selahattin Öcal] 
came to duty. However, he made the bazaar constructed in another place [he 
refers to the place on the boundary between Boğaziçi and Akşemsettin 
neighborhoods where Alevi people are residing densely]. I mean he did not let 
the bazaar built on the suitable place left for that purpose; he expropriated 
another place and made the bazaar assembled there, close to his own 
people.84  
 
 
The same person told a story where naming a school had become a problem 
between him and muhtar of adjacent neighborhood. He explained how he had 
applied to the Ministry of Education for the need of a primary school in the 
neighborhood. According to his saying, the construction plan including the plan of 
the school was accepted in 1989. However, female muhtar of Akşemsettin who is 
an Alevi had insisted on naming the school as “Devrim” [meaning revolution in 
Turkish that was the motto of left in the late 1970s]. According to the muhtar, this 
was a totally illegitimate claim on part of Alevi muhtar since he initiated the 
                                                 
84 Extract from field research note no. 29, 20 June 2003. 
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construction of the school in his neighborhood. He explained the effort he showed 
in naming the school as “Şehit85 Murat Eroğlu İlkokulu” in the following manner:  
 
She had used her connections a lot and tried to give the name “Devrim” to the 
school. I went to the kaymakam and Ministry of Education and suggested the 
name of a soldier who had lived in our neighborhood and died while serving 
in the army. The ones living in Akşemsettin were using their votes in that 
school. Alevis were in majority in Construction Council. Muhtar had printed 
voter cards under the name of Devrim İlkokulu. For that election, the school 
was admitted as Devrim İlkokulu. Then we gave it its formal name.86  
 
 
Similar to the complaints of the Sünni muhtar, Sünni shop owners define the 
period in the late 1980s and early 1990s by giving references to the biased attitudes 
of zabıtas (municipal police officers) working under social democrat mayors and 
who are defined by shop owners as mostly Alevi. They point out the main reason 
behind the close surveillance of social democrat zabıtas during the period as the 
identification of the market space with Kırşehirlis, therefore it is being considered 
as the space of Sünni and religiously conservative people. The social democrat 
municipal attitude in the late 1980s and early 1990s about this particular space is 
narrated as always more uncomforting vis-à-vis the attitude of recent religiously 
oriented conservative municipal cadre. Almost all of the shop owners mention their 
sufferings during the governing of social democrat mayors. The most often 
narrated complaint was the frequent visits of zabıtas to control and supervise the 
acts of shop owners in compliance with rules and regulations. Financial penalties 
for the proper and healthy functioning of the market are explained as the main 
                                                 
 
85 “Şehit” refers to a person who dies while serving Turkish state or Islam. The rightists name places 
after şehits so as to signify their nationalist sensitivity.  
 
86 Extract from field research note no. 29, 20 June 2003. 
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instruments of politics according to the traders. Both Sünni and Alevi shop owners 
mentioned the feeling of pressure during that period as a result of the continuous 
control of the municipal officers. Alevi shop owners narrate their sufferings like 
the Sünni shop owners for the recognition of market as a conservative space by the 
1980s on. One of these Alevi shop owners compared this stressful period with the 
actions of religiously oriented municipality of nowadays as follows:  
 
When the leftist mayors were on duty, inspectors [zabıtas] were coming from 
the municipality every two weeks. Now these ones [recent municipal police 
officers from AKP] come once a year and they, most of the time, return back 
without fining anybody. These people do not touch the poor and the needy 
ones. If I do not know their real face, their services are far better than the 
leftist municipalities.87  
 
 
Sünni shop owners mention the relative depression they had felt during the 
period when social democrats were in charge of Ankara Metropolitan and Mamak 
district as opposed to quite peaceful and profitable period coming just aftermath of 
the military intervention in 1980. They described the period of social democrat 
mayors as one of the most stressful periods despite the fact that they also narrated 
stories related to their power and political connections against the acts of municipal 
officers. Also on that issue, respondents signify family X as the leader of local 
resistance against the “unjust treatment” of municipal officers. The family by using 
their political connections and local social power they had seemed to lead the 
resistance on part of the shop owners. According to the narratives of the shop 
owners, during İsmail Değerli’s period, a social democrat mayor, zabıtas 
                                                 
87 Extract from field research note no. 7, 5 Nov. 2002. In spite of the fact that AKP party was not in 
power in that period, some migrants, in their recent expressions used AKP in order to refer religiously 
oriented parties with reference to past politics also.   
 279
prohibited the exhibition of goods in front of the shops on the street. Shop owners 
were obliged to put their goods inside their shops. X family had a grocery and 
particularly for them, the exhibition of vegetables and fruits in front of the shop 
was a necessity. The member of the family narrates how they had found an 
acquaintance who held a critical position in the municipality and had resisted 
against the controls of the zabıtas. He particularly emphasized the fact that this had 
constituted a model for other shop owners and the supervisions had become rare as 
a result of this act. Some other shop owners’ narratives as exemplifying the leading 
and powerful shop owners in the region as follows support this narrative:  
 
-Who would play the leading role in transmitting the complaints of shop 
owners to local politicians?   
-The big shop owners, the leading ones... For example, in the past there was a 
municipal police officer... At the time of leftist municipality... Karayalçın 
period... This person who groused the shop owner was Alevi but the grocery 
owner was from MHP... They were from opposite fractions. In order to make 
him to take back two boxes [from the pedestrian way], he had often fined 
him. He said: “Take the boxes in, do not put them outside.”  We could not 
even leave a chair outside at the time. They [the leading shop owners] come 
together among themselves like 15 shop owners. They did a sudden visit to 
the municipality and also arranged people from important places. They made 
the mayor warned the principal [of municipal police officers]. The principal 
was persuaded then the issue was concluded.88  
 
 
The power of shop owners had been further restored with the declining power 
of social democrat dominance in local politics. Political Islam has gained 
momentum starting with the noticeable victory of the pro-Islamist Welfare Party 
(Refah Partisi-RP) in the 1994 local elections, which was the case also in Mamak 
and therefore Boğaziçi neighborhood.  
 
                                                 
88 Extract from the field research note no. 14, 3Apr. 2003. 
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The 1994 local elections signified the beginning of a new period in the 
history of low-income settlements. Gecekondu residents, who had been left as the 
“other” in Turkish politics until the 1994 local elections, accomplished a kind of 
democratic revolution against the central elite powers and this was the first time 
where people defined as the other for years had direct power in determining urban 
policies (Yalçıntan and Erbaş, 2004: 40). Some relate the success of RP to its 
appeal to the economic needs of low-income settlers rather than its religious 
orientation (Özler, 2000: 53). Besides economic factors, the local political success 
of the party depends mainly on migrants’ disappointments with the inefficiency of 
the local services previously provided by the social democrat parties, the 
suppression of leftist politics in the peripheral settlements by state security forces 
since the late 1970s, and the success of the RP in grassroots organization and 
campaigning. The disappointment felt by the residents of peripheral settlements for 
years towards the social democratic tradition that had once a strong basis in the 
peripheral settlements were well revealed in the 1994 and 1999 local elections. RP 
tried to mobilize the urban poor, who had suffered from the liberalization policies 
of the 1980s that had had such a negative impact on peripheral social and economic 
groups (Dağı, 2005: 25). It attracted 19% of the votes nationally and gained 329 
mayor ships including Istanbul and Ankara. The victory of Adalet and Kalkınma 
Partisi- AKP (The Justice and Development Party) that came to power alone in 
2002 national elections, having a strong Islamic basis was announced by a widely 
read newspaper Sabah just after the Election Day as an “Anatolian Invasion” 
(Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 97). These developments triggered the divide between 
secularist and Islamist groups and urban elite perspective evaluates considers the 
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return to all kinds of community formation in low-income neighborhoods as 
dangerous for national unity as mentioned in chapter two.  
 
The dominance of the religiously oriented parties in local politics with the 
popularization of conservative Islamic practices among Sünni population 
particularly living in low-income settlements has opened a new phase in urban 
politics. In parallel to these developments, shop owners mention about the relative 
comfort they have experienced as Melih Gökçek came to duty. As stated by Sünni 
shop owners mainly, the control and supervision of police officers had become 
looser due to this transformation in local politics. In other words, shop owners 
relate the relaxation of municipal control beginning by the mid-1990’s to the 
identification of market place with Sünni conservatism. Many shop owners 
emphasize this connection similar to the anecdote below:  
 
We open our shops on Sundays. The head of the municipal police here in 
Mamak is from AKP. In my opinion, they think that all shop owners here are 
AKP supporters. Therefore he does not pay any visits to the region. We open 
the shops on Sundays and we do whatever we want. 89
 
 
As mentioned above, the shop owners, particularly the ones who could adapt 
their shops to the changing consumption patterns or open new shops in congruence 
with the newly emerging demands had gained a certain economic and political 
power as a result of neoliberal policies after the 1980s. These shop owners were the 
ones who had settled the market earlier and commonly they had more than one 
                                                 
89 Extract from field research note no. 5, 10 Oct. 2002.  
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shop in the region. Despite their complaints about the period of social democrat 
mayors, particularly the leading ones have the power and connections to resist the 
acts of municipal officers at the time. In the late 1990s, regardless of the effect of 
economic crisis, primarily the established shop owners seemed to gain increasing 
power depending on my observations. These are the ones who seem to have power 
to take near-strategical decisions that might unintentionally shape the 
neighborhood space. This will constitute the subject matter of the following 
section.    
 
 
6.5 The Near-Strategical Decisions of Shop Owners vis-à-vis the 
Paradoxes of Strategic Realm 
 
Unlike the estimates of the neoliberal strategy, the legalization of gecekondu 
houses and lands by means of private construction offices and under the 
supervision of two-tiered municipal system had not brought necessarily the 
attraction of large construction firms that are willing to invest on the peripheral 
lands on which low-income settlements had already been established. On the 
contrary, as Erder (1996: 158) mentioned, the preparation of construction plans and 
their application bring settledness of all social layers and power structure in 
gecekondu neighborhoods as they are. Since the planning attempts and applications 
tend to protect the existing structure as it is and this conserves the legal small 
parcels as they are which, in turn, avoids the entrance of the big construction firms 
with capital to such low-income neighborhoods. The real estate system in these 
neighborhoods seems to depend on the small property ownership and individual 
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legal title deeds to land and houses. Therefore as pointed out by Erder (1996: 158) 
elegantly, the new physical and social relations emerged after legalization in such 
neighborhoods hinder two groups on the extreme poles, the poor and big capital 
from entering the real estate market in these regions.  
 
The neoliberal shaping of urban space brings unintended and contingent 
happenings90. As Weber (2004: 183) discusses in her article on neoliberalism and 
urban redevelopment, the distant and big capitalists will only invest on an urban 
property if the property is recognizable beyond its unique character embedded in 
space and if it is believed to sustain short-term returns. If these conditions are not 
met, disinvestments may occur in certain regions that may constitute the reason 
behind the uneven urban spatial development within the context of redevelopment 
of urban land under neoliberal strategy according to the author.  This argument 
may shed light on the reluctance of big investors to invest on some gecekondu 
neighborhoods. The complicated nature of property ownership patterns in 
gecekondu neighborhoods might constitute a reason to understand why the big 
investors behave reluctant to invest in gecekondu settlements despite the 
                                                 
90 Even there emerges a recent theoretical distinction/classification between “ideal-type” versus 
“contingent” neoliberalism. Ideal type of neoliberalism depends predominantly on Hayek’s and 
Friedman’s selective reading of classical liberal project in opposition to egalitarian turn within 
liberalism that began with John Stuart Mill and continued through the work and influence of Keynes 
(Hacksworth &Moriah, 2006: 511). The core principles of ideal type liberalism can be listed as 
follows: 1) The individual is the normative center of a society; 2) The market is the most effective 
means through which individuals can maximize their own utility functions; 3) State actions that 
interfere with either individual autonomy or market relations lead to an autocratic society regardless 
of their intentions (İbid., 511). “Contingent neoliberalism” conceptualization emerges, on the other 
hand, from a three groups of criticism to the contested nature of ideal-type definition of neoliberalism 
as defined by Hacksworth and Moriah (2006: 512). First group has challenged the ideal-type 
neoliberalism on geographical grounds. “They argue that localities filter and define neoliberalism at 
least as much they (localities) are filtered and defined by such ideas.” A second group in close 
relation with the first group has challenged the internal consistency of neoliberalism itself. They 
suggested that neoliberalism entails a form of state intervention that contradicts one of its basic 
premises- that of minimalist state. A third group of thought challenges the emphasis on neoliberalism 
within cities given the presence of other parallel processes and ideologies, like neocorporatism, 
neocommunitarianism and neostatism.         
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legalization of the neighborhood. If the majority of the neighborhood residents 
under the leadership of influential actors act in total compliance with muhtars and 
local politicians to attract such investment, the neighborhoods, may turn into 
middle and upper middle class suburban districts. Even in such cases, there is a 
great possibility to come up with serious problems due to under representation of 
certain groups.  
 
The legalization of the neighborhood and the value increases of land do not 
bring consequential apartmentalization in also Boğaziçi due to the reasons 
mentioned above but mostly because of the increasing power of influential shop 
owners in taking near-strategical decisions. The dependency of apartment 
construction on the choices of the shop owners in the region had one important 
spatial reason. Spontaneous apartmentalization in previously gecekondu 
neighborhoods should be initiated beginning from the two edges of the main roads 
for practical reasons. Only then, apartments in other parts of the neighborhood can 
be built accordingly. The constructors are also more willing to build apartment 
houses principally on the edge of the main roads. This common pattern of 
apartmentalization is also valid for Boğaziçi. As mentioned above, shop owners 
owned the lands on the edges of the main road in the neighborhood passing 
through the market. Depending on the narratives of the respondents, some shop 
owners in compliance with their interests have acted near-strategically and resisted 
the requirements of the construction plan that had changed for a number of times. 
Shop owners in their narratives; give frequent references to their or other shop 
owner’s acts of altering the course of spatial development mainly in two spheres.  
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First of all, some of them are recited as having slowed down the application 
of construction plan by using their connections with municipal officers. The 
construction plan is supposed to give the main road its final form. The construction 
of the road according to the plan is not possible without the partial demolition of 
some shops or houses on the edges of the main road, which would work to the 
disadvantage of some shop owners.  
 
Secondly, as stated by the respondents, some shop owners as the owners of 
land may not prefer to give their lands to the constructor and want apartments to be 
built in place of their shops and houses due to the unprofitable nature of this 
transaction for them. If they have sufficient financial assets, they mention their 
preference to build apartments by themselves without using constructors. Five 
apartment houses in the region had been built likewise. Since if they choose to give 
their lands to the constructor, what they get in return would be one or two flats 
from the constructed apartments. In this respect, unlike the expectation of 
modernization approach that the value increase in land and planning would 
eventually bring apartmentalization, there are few apartment houses in the 
neighborhood despite the quite old age of the neighborhood. The unwillingness of 
most shop owners in giving their lands to the constructors for apartment 
construction can easily be tackled from their narratives. The shop owner who owns 
one of the five apartment houses in the region narrated the late apartmentalization 
process in the region as follows:  
 
The apartment construction remains very slow here. The most important 
reason here is that shop owners are residing on the edges of the main road. 
Look at the apartment on the other side. They, themselves, built their 
apartment just like us. If they gave their land to the constructor, they got only 
one fifth or one sixth of the apartment. Since everybody is a trader here, we 
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all know about financial issues a little bit. We are not satisfied with what the 
constructor offers.91  
 
 
The unprofitability of having two or three apartment flats in return for their 
lands is related to the rent earnings they are already taking from their real estates in 
the market. When apartments are constructed, the basement is designed to be shop 
spaces and the upper flats are used as family residents in general. Traders who own 
three or more small gecekondu shops on their lands may prefer the condition to 
remain the same since the rent revenues from them would be greater than the 
returns they would get from the apartment construction. Traditional gecekondu 
shops are so small that there can be three or four shops on the same plot owned by 
a shop owner, which make the rent earnings of the shop owners quite satisfactory 
from these shops. This finding of the research is supported by the cases in many 
Third world cities as put forward by Davis (2006: 83) that the legalized squatting 
in Third World cities triggers slumlordism as a fact where the rent revenues from 
slum areas may be profitable when compared to invest in some other places in the 
city.  
 
In such an old gecekondu neighborhood that is close to important highways 
and where there is such a big market place, the apartmentalization should have 
already been taken place. However, the presence of shop owners as the main 
property holders of critical locations for construction, they have a potential to show 
a resistance to strategy’s project of “spontaneously modernizing” these regions by 
means of apartmentalization.  
                                                 
91 Extract from field research note no. 10, 2 March 2003. 
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 Shop owners define another obstacle behind apartmentalization that operates 
against their interests. The apartment construction necessitates a change of place on 
part of shop owners at least for a certain period during the construction process. 
The shop owners, in general, mention their unwillingness to move out even for a 
while with the concern of losing their customers. Besides that, if a plot of land is 
owned by more than one person, which is the case for some shop owners in the 
market, no one shareholder should oppose the apartment construction in order a 
construction permit would be given to that plot. Depending on the narratives of the 
migrants, in some cases, this constitutes a barrier to apartmentalization. In general, 
the reasons behind the late apartmentalization reflect the increasing power of shop 
owners in determining the socio-spatial development in the region in relation to the 
legalization of the research setting in the late 1980s.  
 
Some shop owners and other residents of Boğaziçi relate the belated 
application of the construction plan of the main road in the market place to the 
power of some shop owners in employing the favoritism in local politics to their 
advantage. The construction plan of the main road has been changed for several 
times and it could not have been applied properly until the late 1990s. In my last 
visit to the region, the application of the plan has still not been completed due to 
the resistance of some shop owners as signified by other shop owners. When you 
enter the market from Samsun Highway, the shops on the left side have mostly 
been damaged and affected by the planning acts of Municipality. The gecekondu 
shops and houses were built in a haphazard version in the market and they do not 
follow a straight line. When the application of the plan is completed, excess parts 
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of the shops and houses outside the context of the route of the road in the plan will 
be demolished. Some parts of the shops or the houses of traders were already 
severely disturbed in accordance with the conditions of the plan. Shop owners 
evaluate the leaning of the road more on left edge rather than right in different 
ways depending on their shop’s location on the left or right or their political 
affiliation.  
 
There are two types of explanations about that incident. First type of 
explanations defines the the application of the plan in its latest form leaning more 
on left as a result of technical necessity rather than as an act with political 
connotations. Second category of explanations, on the other hand, defines the 
decision and application of the municipality mainly as a political act resulting from 
the imposition of shop owners who have used their connections in the municipality. 
In most cases, the respondents signify the political connections that are against 
their own political affiliations.  
 
First type of explanations relate the construction of the main road leaning 
more on left rather than right edge with a technical necessity mainly for two 
reasons. The presence of public buildings like primary school and mosque on the 
right side is signified as the most important technical reason behind the latest 
construction plan of the road. Secondly, some technical explanations give 
references to the fact that the right side of the road is topographically suitable for 
construction when compared to the left side. Despite the fact that some shop 
owners suffered from the extension of the road themselves, they may define the 
process in a purely technical manner. These are the influential shop owners who 
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define their relations with municipal planners and officials more active when 
compared to others. The owner of one of the disturbed houses, a member of X 
family explains the partial demolition of the house in accordance of the plan as a 
technical necessity and relates this to the topographically suitable nature of their 
side. The internal cross sections of their house become visible and the house seems 
to become totally useless as such. The part of the house annihilated can be easily 
perceived. The door that was once opened to the hole from the salon becomes 
visible now on the front side of the house. In spite of this fact, the owner of the 
house mentioned his satisfaction about the proper application of the plan and the 
payment of their deserving in return for their loss during the metropolitan 
mayorship of Melih Gökçek. The physical conditions restrict the possibilities for 
extension to the right according to the man and if the political connections have 
played such an important role as people assume he told, they would have the power 
to use this most but this was not case.  
 
In addition to dealing with the form of the latest construction plan many shop 
owners complain about the belated construction of the road due to the favoritist 
policies of the previous municipalities. Many of the conservative Sünni shop 
owners who had no sympathy for favoritism operating to the advantage of social 
democrats or/and Alevis in the region blame social democrat municipalities as 
responsible for the delay. Some shop owners also point out that the construction 
plan had taken its last form during the social democratic metropolitan mayor of 
Murat Karayalçın. Therefore these respondents attributed the responsibility of their 
sufferings to social democrat municipality rather than the recent municipality who 
has been applying the plan.  
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 These different interpretations may reflect factual cases sometimes, but most 
of the time the stories are filled with rumors contradicting with other stories 
showing the traces of respondents’ biases. A conservative Sünni shop owner 
explained his sufferings due to the application of the construction plan that has 
been changed during social democrat municipality. The recently constructed road 
passes through the land where there was a shop and house of them. Therefore 
municipal officers demolished their shop and house. He seemed angry at the 
incident, which happened in 1996. In some part of our conversation, he lowered his 
voice and said that the road was not put as passing their land in the actual plan. 
However, in his opinion, later Alevis put pressure during Karayalçın’s period and 
the plan was changed. According to him, in the second version of the plan, the road 
with a slight arc was put as passing in front of their shop. He accused the owners of 
the bakery close to Samsun highway for that. The bakery was located just on the 
entry of the neighborhood from Samsun Highway. If the actual plan has been 
applied the bakery should be demolished. They have delayed the application of the 
plan by using their political relations as stated by him92. This is a common 
accusation about the owner of this bakery shared by many shop owners. A Sünni 
shop owner from Yozgat explains the same incident as follows:  
 
We had a famous bakery here once just on the entrance of the market [He 
mentioned the fact that the bakery was located just on the place where the 
extension of the main road that once was river would be initiated]. They were 
the ones who had showed the main resistance to the development [with 
certain anger]. They were the reasons why no progress had taken place here 
for years. 93   
 
                                                 
92 Extract from field research note no. 2, 25 Sep. 2002. 
 
93 Extract from field research note no. 34, 3 July 2003. 
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The owner of the bakery is from Karadeniz, though not Alevi in origin; he is 
said to have acquaintances in municipality when social democrats were in power. 
Therefore, Sünni explanations of the issue reflect the Alevi political connections 
with the municipality and the favoritism as an ingredient part of social democratic 
municipal tradition. An Alevi shop owner, on the other hand, interprets the same 
event by rejecting the arguments about social democrat nepotistic policies by 
linking the belated application of the plan to the legal and financial barrier in front 
of the municipal officers in dealing with the owner of the bakery as follows:    
 
At the entrance of the market [from Samsun Highway] there was a bakery 
just on the corner. This road could not be built properly because of this 
bakery until now. The bakery shop should be demolished according to the 
plan. The owners acted in a clever manner and insured their shops very much 
above the real value of it. Therefore the municipality could not afford to pay 
the insurance money in order to demolish the shop for years. 94  
 
 
This same shop owner, however, shares a similar criticism in relation to the 
improper attitude of the owner of bakery causing the delay of plan’s application. 
The construction of the main road constitutes a cure also to the serious problem of 
flooding. As a result of the delay of the road extension, the recent and last flooding 
incident in the region had given so much harm to the market according to the shop 
owner. In this recent flooding, as a result of heavy rain, people with their cars and 
in the buses were dragged from the market to Samsun Highway for like 200 
meters. Shop owners hardly saved their lives according to the stories.  
                                                 
94 Extract from the field research note no. 19, 26 Apr. 2003.  
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 There are cases where shop owners who are densely presented in the 
neighborhood like the ones from Kırşehir are accused for delaying the progress in 
the neighborhood. Since they are in majority and have powerful position as a 
group, they were said to take part in nepotistic politics as to be affected least from 
the drawbacks of the plan. A shop owner from Yozgat gives references to this issue 
in a general mood of uneasiness “outsider” shop owners have felt for Kırşehirlis 
for years as such:     
 
Our place was two meters a head but we took it back [because of the 
construction plan]. The shop became smaller, very much smaller than past. 
We are not pleased with the Municipality. They did nothing, like to draw a 
proper construction plan [referring to the spontaneity of the plans]. The 
municipality is not helping us; they don’t even have a concern like that. I 
have been here since 1967 and the progress should be more than that. We 
cannot construct our apartments, for example, we were eight people but my 
uncle died and we are 16 [share holders] now. There are so many problems 
related to infrastructure. Look for example; they could not even complete the 
construction of this road since 1983. There will be elections in ten months. 
As an example, the ones on the opposite side have acquaintances in the 
municipal council. They had already got all their deserving but they did not 
take their shops back. They are all from Kırşehir. Therefore there is no reason 
to expect any development here.95  
 
 
 
The increasing power of shop owners is expected to define the implicit 
competition going on between Alevis and Sünnis after the 1980s through the 
production and use of space. It is interesting to see that, one of the most possible 
areas of competition between them, namely consumption sphere is dominated by 
the economic concerns rather than concerns related to sectarian or hemşehri 
identities. This will constitute the subject matter of next section.  
                                                 
95 Extract from field research note no. 34, 3 July 2003.  
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 6.6 Consumption Determinants: Prices or Alevi/Sünni identities?  
 
The increasing effect of neoliberal policies on the neighborhood space coupled 
with repression of active politics by state policies brought about the predominance 
of economic relations in employing and producing the space. The radically 
political space of the neighborhood in the late 1970s had turned into a space of 
economy. The shops and commodities in the market had been qualitatively and 
quantitatively proliferated in the 1990s. In such a context, once highly political 
categories of being Alevi and Sünni or ethnic differences seem to have very little 
effect or seem to work as criteria for a limited group in defining the consumption 
choices. At least, both on traders’ and customers’ side, the tensions implicit are not 
made explicit in the expressions of the inhabitants and their portrayal of consuming 
habits. There are few incidents I witnessed during my stay at different shops 
making the tension explicit. The following anecdote by a MHP sympathizer 
member of the family X explicates such an implicit tension between trader and 
customer as a result of ethnic distinction:  
 
[After the formal interview] 
You should treat every kind of people good as a trader. For example, that 
man, a second ago stand just beside me. You do not say to his face that he is a 
Kurd, Tuncelili, or any other thing but you are giving him service. He has 
seen that we have been talking here, planted himself just beside me and sung 
a folk song [He tells these things with certain anger and strong 
degradation.]96  
 
 
                                                 
96 Extract from field research note 16, 8 Apr. 2003.  
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Interestingly, there are a number of examples as narrated by the shop owners 
and some inhabitants that material transaction between the people from the same 
sect or hometown may lead to an unfavorable positions for both sides. An Alevi 
shop owner defines his uneasiness with his Alevi customers in the following 
manner:  
 
-Are your customers mostly Sünni or Alevi?  
-To tell you the truth, the opposing group [he means that his customers are 
mostly Sünnis] comes more often. There is envy among our people. Our 
condition [he refers to his prosperity vis-à-vis other Alevis] is so to say good. 
They become jealous of our conditions. However, if something bad happens 
to them, who would run to help them? If something political happens, again 
we mobilize all our opportunities. The others [Sünnis] also know who we are 
but they like our honesty and kindness. And they also had enough of their 
own people’s hypocrisies therefore the majority of my customers are Sünni. 
More than that, our own people use the condition of being Alevi. They ask for 
money, you give; they do not pay you back. These things often happen.97  
  
 
 
As well, from the perspective of the customers, the social proximity in terms 
of being hemşehri or having common sectarian identity with the trader may not be 
a favorable condition where there emerges a difficulty in bartering. An old couple 
narrates the difficulty in the following manner:  
 
We do not prefer to buy anything from an acquaintance. Then they cheat you 
as a friend. It is far worse than shopping from a stranger. Other than that you 
cannot barter with a friend. Shopping from a stranger is better. You can put 
the price as you like.98  
 
 
                                                 
97 Extract from field research note no. 19, 26 Apr. 2003. 
 
98 Extract from field research note no. 36, 20 July 2003. 
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From the traders’ perspective sectarian identities seem to hardly constitute a 
serious concern. Being trustworthy and reliable customers is the most important 
criterion for shop owners in selling goods on credit. In that sense, hometown 
commonalities play a minor role in shop owners’ decision of selling goods on 
credit to certain customers.  
 
From the customer’s perspective, on the other hand, the economic concerns, 
spatial proximity of the shop and the possibility of shopping on credit that is 
dependent on knowing each other for long seem to have a strong effect on 
consumption choices. Particularly in relation to food shopping, almost all of the 
respondents mention their preference of big supermarkets that had been opened 
beginning by the early 2000s in the market. The supermarkets are defined as more 
suitable for the respondents mainly because they can use credit cards in them. The 
markets in competition with each other sell some goods particularly food below 
real prices by taking the risk of loss. Therefore mainly for food shopping they are 
seen as the only alternative recently by the migrants. Therefore the bakkals and old 
groceries have suffered most from the opening up of these markets. They defined 
their incompatibility with the markets in the following manner:  
 
They started business here two, three years ago. They, of course, put an 
impediment before our job. I went to wholesale food market to buy goods for 
the shop. We chatted with the directors of Nazar and Gima [The 
supermarkets that have branches in different locations of Ankara city]. They 
said that they have bought one kilogram of tomato from 600,000 Turkish 
Liras and sold it in the market from 500,000 Turkish Liras. They said: “We 
sell tomato and cucumber by losing money and reflect this loss to other goods 
in the market”. We cannot compete with them. Is it possible? I am asking to 
you.99
 
                                                 
99 Extract from field research note no. 16, 8 Apr. 2003. 
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 For their other needs like clothing and house appliances, they go to the shops 
with which they have developed some kind of trust and intimacy for years. They 
mainly buy things on credit from these shops. Traders mention their function as an 
economic buffer mechanism in the region through delaying the debts of customers 
for a number of months. Therefore shopping and selling on credit is still a norm in 
the paradoxically modernized space of the market as a tactic on part of shop 
owners to compete with the big supermarkets and the shops in other parts of the 
city. Poor people in general have difficulties in paying their debts to shop owners. 
Particularly when shopping for health is the case, the condition of poor people 
become more obvious. Owner of the most visited pharmacy gives the most 
remarkable examples about the issue:      
 
-Do you sell medicine on credit?  
-[The pharmacist showed me a box in which there were different jewelries 
and identity cards that had been left as guarantee in return for their debts by 
the customers.] Here there is an identity card and a driving license left a year 
ago. He left the driving license in place of 3.5 million Turkish Liras debt. If 
they want to take new driving license they have to pay much more. They, in 
some cases, have left their earrings. I took them to the jewelry shop next 
door. They said that they are copper.100 [She laughs.]   
 
 
Moreover, the inhabitants, for the sake of not cutting their close relations with 
bakkals they have known for so long may prefer to shop from them time to time in 
order not to upset them. The respondents, in some cases, tell about their emotional 
discomfort vis-à-vis these bakkals for their choice of supermarkets for food 
shopping. They do not want to offend bakkals not only for the sake of their close 
                                                 
100 Extract from field research note no. 18, 25 Apr. 2003. 
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personal relations with them but also for the financial comfort they provide in 
times of financial difficulty. The continuity of the old and trustworthy relations 
with bakkals constitutes a guarantee for the inhabitants in various ways. This trust 
relation between the customers and bakkals can be well exemplified by the sayings 
of a bakkal below:  
 
People generally go to supermarkets for their collective shopping needs. The 
ones who do not have money and have minor needs come to us. The ones 
who shop from me are all acquaintances. Yesterday a woman who had 
shopped from Özsoy [a supermarket in Boğaziçi] came to me with her 
packets in hand. She said: “Haydar I did something stupid. I shopped from 
the market. Please calculate what I have bought so that I can see if I was 
cheated”. I said that I could not do something like that. 101  
 
 
In spite the fact that the market place has been “modernized” with the 
integration of neoliberal economic space in the neighborhood, the traditional way 
of economic transactions play a vital role for the inhabitants particularly for the 
needy ones. Even though these newly opened shops seem to affect the business of 
traditional shops in a negative way, since old shops perform an important function 
as a buffer mechanism that avoids crisis, they still continue their existence in the 
market.  
 
 
                                                 
101 Extract from the field research note no. 7, 16 Oct. 2002. 
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 6.7 Revitalization of Alevi and Sünni identities: The Politics of 
Religious Spaces  
 
As mentioned above, the military regime’s efforts to propose Sünni interpretation 
of Islam as a remedy for leftist ideology and Marxism has not only strengthened 
the popular basis of Islam in low-income settlements in big cities and in provinces 
where Alevis reside densely with Sünni population but also led to the revitalization 
of ethnic and sectarian identities that have always been in minority position. Islam 
became one of the main components of the ruling ideology as a bulwark against the 
leftist movements of the 1970s. The approach of state towards Alevis in particular 
has always reflected a hesitant position. From the establishment of the Republic 
onwards, on the one hand, the secular basis of state has always been pointed, which 
has constituted the reason behind most Alevis’ loyalty to Atatürk and his party 
CHP, but on the other hand, from that time on, Sünni Islam has been put in a 
privileged position vis-à-vis other interpretations of Islam. As pointed out by 
Göner (2005: 119) the dominant public perception in Turkey paradoxically 
excludes Islamist tenets and and at the same time groups who define themselves 
outside of Sünni Islam. The Presidency of Religious Affairs, a state institution, 
considers only Sünni Islamic religious needs and practices legitimate while 
neglects all other interpretations of Islam including Alevism despite their duty in 
principle to provide religious services to all Muslim citizens without discrimination 
(Göner, 2005: 114). The official approach to Alevism is well revealed with the 
book named as “Alevilik Bektaşilik Debates” prepared by Presidency of Religious 
Affairs. Depending on this source, some premises summarizing state’s official 
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ideology about Alevism can be counted as follows: Alevism cannot be thought as an 
independent religion or extension of other systems or ethnicities; Alevism cannot be 
thought as an Anatolian interpretation of Islam which attributes general values of 
Islam like tolerance, peace, humanism to Alevism only and excludes Sünni 
interpretation of Islam; and Alevism cannot be identified with communism [quoted 
from Yılmaz (2005: 177)].  
 
As a consequence of the hesitant approach of state towards Alevism, the 
serious conflicts and fights between Alevis and Sünnis around leftist and rightist 
ideology in the late 1970s and rise of postmodern discourses of multiculturalism 
and identity politics after the 1980s, there has appeared a “re-politicization of 
Alevilik in the 1990s” (Erman and Göker, 2000: 100). As argued by the authors, 
this re-politicization is qualitatively different from the pre-1980 politicization of 
Alevis as part of Socialist movement. Recently, Alevi communities emphasize their 
identities more with references to religious and cultural qualities. In that sense, the 
previously radically political identity claims that had gone with class issues and 
economic deprivation of Alevi groups as mentioned in the previous chapter had 
been replaced with religious claims and understanding of Alevism as an egalitarian 
world view and way of life. “In an interview at the Karacaahmet Foundation, 
Vahap Güngör argued that “when the axis of politics was left-right we (Alevis) 
chose to be on the left; but now the axis of politics is Shari’a versus Laicism and 
we choose to be Alevis.” (Göner, 2005: 125) This fact also has an important 
connection with the rising Sünni Islamic fundamentalism and long lasting and 
assimilating discourses of Sünni Islam.  
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In parallel to these developments and hesitant strategy of state regarding 
identity politics, Alevi and Sünni identities have lost their explicit political 
connotations in the narratives of the respondents, to a large extent, when they refer 
to the late 1980s. They only regard sectarian identities as political in the context of 
favoritism out of the context of left and right. In general, the religious content of 
Alevism and Sünnism has dominated the respondent’s narratives in relation to 
recent incidents of social spatialization. 
 
The way the public space is used and produced by these two groups had also 
transformed to a large extent. As mentioned in the previous sections, the 
boundaries of and the competition between Alevis and Sünnis in public space that 
was once radically political, have become more embedded in the production and 
employment of space. Being Alevi and Sünni seem to dominate the narratives of 
both sides explicitly while talking about the spaces and life stytles of the “other”. 
Alevi and Sünni identities, in terms of their recent connotations for the migrants, 
define “other’s” religion rather than political identities of left and right. In that 
sense, despite the suppressive policies of state, inhabitants do not neglect the 
awareness of their group identity and preserve a certain degree of tension and 
uneasiness towards the “other” group. Akyüz (1994, 157) who had conducted a 
research in Boğaziçi neighborhood on religious life and modernization argues that 
there exists a sharp distinction and awareness among migrants about Alevi and 
Sünni identities. The percentage of the people who define religion as the main 
factor behind the choice of friends and social interaction is 53.6%, which is quite 
high as defined by Akyüz (1994, 158).  
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Depending on the context of the relationship between the Alevi and Sünni 
migrants, the definitions of the “other” may show variations. In cases where Alevi 
and Sünni families have had a long history of neighborhood relations with each 
other, the uneasiness in the narratives of the respondents may be replaced by the 
praises of the good attitudes of their neighbors despite fact that they are Alevis or 
Sünnis. Particularly for Sünnis who carry relatively more prejudices and superficial 
codes about Alevi people, appreciation of Alevis, in most cases, depends on 
knowing each other for so long as neighbors as is the case in the anecdote below:  
 
Neighbors give no harm to each other. This is a rule. In this region people are 
living densely, close to each other [he means the heterogeneity in terms of 
sectarian identity]. These people [he means Alevis] are open-minded persons 
when compared to our people. My relatives living there [he means among 
Alevis] had better neighboring relations. There is not jealousy among them. 
They do not have so many children. They are certainly more tolerant.102  
 
 
However, even in these cases, the recognition and prejudices of the 
distinction between the Alevi and Sünni lifestyles and the undeserved qualities of 
each lifestyle has dominated the expressions of respondents. In cases where the 
trust between Alevi and Sünni neighbors has taken a great damage in the late 1970 
or through informing activity in the early 1980s the relationship between neighbors 
can be totally broken. In the narratives of both Sünnis and Alevis, one can sense the 
act of othering implicit in the sentences while talking about the people from the 
opposite sect and their undeserved or lesser qualities. Particularly Sünni 
respondents reflect their prejudices combined with a neglect and ignorant attitude 
about Alevism. The superficial codes about Alevi faith in the expressions of Sünni 
migrants are highly present and obvious. During the research, the general approach 
                                                 
102 Extract from field research note no. 29, 20 June 2003. 
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of Sünni migrants about Alevism was often voiced with a completely superficial 
overtone and knowledge about Alevi belief system and with certain ignorance. This 
fact has been supported by the findings of many studies (see Göner, 2005; Çakır, 
1996: 64; Akyüz, 1994). As Göner points out by referring to the sayings of an Alevi 
interviewee, Sünni neighbors refuse friendly offers from her family on the grounds 
that “the meat Alevis offer is not edible” (Göner, 2005: 114). These prejudices in 
everyday life at societal level, according to Göner, operate as crucial informal 
mechanisms by which the access of Alevis to political and economic resources is 
blocked. Some Sünnis identify non-practicing of namaz and oruç (to fast) during 
Ramadan among Alevis with atheism in Boğaziçi neighborhood as pointed out by 
the findings of Akyüz (1994: 149). It is necessary to note that these prejudices are 
most of the time present but not made explicit all the time in the narratives of the 
respondents.  
 
These negative value judgments exist in hybrid form with the pleasant 
personal experiences with Alevi friends in the narratives of the respondents 
reflecting this inconsistent state of mind, under all conditions, contain an awareness 
of difference between Alevi and Sünni life styles. The Alevis who accept and apply 
some religious obligations of Sünni belief system like hac (pilgrimage) and namaz 
are appreciated in such often-encountered expressions. The sayings of a Sünni 
woman from Kırşehir well explicate this bewildered state of mind. She wants to 
emphasize her neutral position vis-à-vis Alevis but gives clues about her prejudices 
and real approach hidden among sentences in the following manner:  
 
Around here, there are not so many Alevis. Kırşehirlis are living here… 
People from Sivas are generally Alevi in origin. The drummers no longer go 
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there [the region where people from Sivas are residing densely] during the 
Ramadan.103 They started beating the drummers there. They do not fast, you 
know. You are not Alevi, are you? [She asked the question with a certain 
concern to behave shamefully. I said “no”.] Neighboring relations have been 
very good though. I like gecekondu life because of neighborliness. Nobody 
knows each other in apartment life. Alevis of Yozgat and Sivas reside here. 
Among them, there are people who went to hac and a number of them also go 
to mosque and pray. The number of these may increase but their people give 
so much reaction. I have relationship with a number of them. Actually we are 
close to all of them. We do not make discrimination. In my opinion, these 
men who visit the mosque become Muslims.104  
 
 
This anecdote is a typical of Sünni and conservative approach that I 
encountered a number of times during the research. The story of Alevis’ beating the 
drummers in Ramadan and their non-practice of Sünni Islamic obligations was 
narrated by Sünni woman as a proof to their non-believer position in an attitude of 
total neglect of Alevi rituals. The commonsense idea about Alevis as being non-
Muslim is quite in compliance with the hegemonic discourse of state that heightens 
Sünni Islam as if it is the only legitimate interpretation of Islam. That is the reason 
why in the 1990s within the context of the re-politicization of Alevism, Cem 
foundation, a broadly based Alevi organization, has aimed at introducing Alevi 
culture and beliefs. They want state to perform the same kinds of activities in the 
month Muharrem- regarded as the holy month by Alevis- that it does in Ramazan 
(Göner, 2005: 130).  
 
                                                 
103 Ramadan is the holy month in Sünni Islamic belief system. Muslims fast along daytime during 
Ramadan. In order to feel satiated, they had to wake up at night and eat something before daylight 
according to the rules of the religion. Drummers, traditionally walk along the streets at nights to wake 
people up during Ramadan. This tradition is still being practiced in cities in Turkey. Alevis also fast, 
but in a different time and form than Sünnis.       
104 Extract from field research note no. 39, 15 Aug. 2003. 
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Alevis also accuse Sünnis for malpracticing Sünni Islam and for behaving 
hypocritical, in practicing their rituals. Akyüz (1994: 149) mentions that Alevis 
mainly criticize the formalistic nature of Sünni prayers and signifies the 
inefficiency of praying five times a day, wearing a headscarf or fasting if your 
heart and mind is full of immoral and inhumanely ideas and emotions.  An Alevi 
shop owner while talking about the Cemevi in the region and Cem meetings gives 
references to the hypocritical attitude of Sünnis in the following manner:   
 
In the past, the rules of cem were harsher, now they are not like that. For 
example, they [Sünnis] fast; but at night they sleep with their wives. Our fast 
is not like that you cannot even drink water. During the fast, rather than 
sleeping with your wife you cannot even share the same bed.  For example, 
this Halitli village association they are from MHP. They fast during the 
Ramadan. Then they gather at nights in the association and gamble until four 
in the morning. I don’t understand their way of fasting. Another thing, 
everybody can take part in Cem meetings according to our rituals. A third 
person [It means that a person who is not Alevi] or women and men 
together… Can you discriminate people in front of Allah? But they 
discriminate people as man and woman.105  
 
 
Depending on my observations in Boğaziçi, the production and use of 
religious space constitutes the most important ground, where Alevis and Sünnis 
continue and signify their differences from each other within the context of 
revitalization of identities vis-à-vis each other. In other words, the production of 
religious spaces for both sides becomes the main means of preserving their 
identities. The production of religious spaces is considered mainly the 
responsibility of community rather than state, in that sense, the informal 
mechanisms through which these spaces are produced mainly depends on the 
political and social networks that these groups have vis-à-vis each other. As 
                                                 
105 Extract from field research note no. 19, 26 Apr. 2003. 
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pointed out by Erder (1997: 123) in her study on a low-income settlement, it is 
considered by migrants, in general, that some services are the responsibility of state 
while others can be a product of cooperative work or totally should be solved by 
the community depending on the accounts of muhtars. In muhtars’ understanding, 
the laws of Turkish Republic give the responsibility of building schools to the 
state, while the mosques to the community. In that respect, according to Erder, 
many issues from the construction of mosques to sustain housing are considered as 
community responsibilities while service provisions related to transportation, 
sewage system, electricity and school are considered as the responsibilities of state 
(Erder, 1997: 123). This is the case also in Boğaziçi where the mosques and 
Cemevi in the region had been built as a result of community effort.  
 
State policies encourage Sünnis to build mosques, while construction of 
Cemevi as a space of prayer has still been considered as illegal despite the 
pressures of EU in relation to Alevis’ rights of practicing their rituals in a free way. 
Military regime had followed policy of suppression and assimilation of Alevis by 
means of opening mosques in Alevi villages and calling upon all Alevi to attend 
worship in the mosque in the 1980s. Sünni Islamists’ reduction of Islam to a single 
interpretation explains the support of them to military regime’s such assimilationist 
policies (Çakır, 1996: 64). From the mid-1990’s onwards, the domination of 
religiously oriented parties in local politics had further eased the conditions of 
religious practices and rituals for Sünni residents in low-income settlements. This 
dramatic change in the political preferences of the gecekondu settlers has also 
affected the approach towards these settlements by the “urbanite” sections of 
society, who have appropriated to a large extent modernist, republicanist and, 
 306
therefore, strongly secularist tenets as mentioned in chapter two. From this tension, 
there has emerged a divide of laicism versus Islamism groups altering the leftist 
and rightist divide of the 1970s. This secular anxiety of urbanites has led to a 
hardening of the exclusionary discourse. Meanwhile these developments have 
instigated the spread of political Islam on everyday life in gecekondu settlements. 
Local religious communities and gatherings have increased in number, particularly 
in the 1990s. The illegal tariqat106 (tarikat) organizations and closed religious 
community formations have attracted considerable attention from the public and 
this has also contributed to the urbanite’s anxiety (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 97).  
 
As concluded by Akyüz (1994: 150) in his findings on Boğaziçi 
neighborhood, the percentage of migrants who mention membership to a tariqat as 
useful for proper practicing of Islam explicitly is 37.1%. This is a quite high 
percentage if one takes into consideration that tariqat membership is forbidden by 
law. The intense surveillance of security forces on illegal zikr107 gatherings during 
the period of social democrat dominance in local politics had been loosened in the 
late 1990s as learned from the informal conversations with the respondents. Other 
than that it is important to note that, I personally encounter many religious 
gatherings108 among women and hear the voice of zikirs rising from the houses so 
                                                 
106 Tarikat is a word of Arabic origin, which is defined as ‘a method of moral psychology for the 
guidance of individuals directing their lives toward a knowledge of God’ in The Encyclopedia of 
Religion, 1987.   
 
107 The common essence of all tariqat organizations is zikr. Tariqats teach Muslims mostly how to 
practice zikr in order to be close to Allah by mentioning his names in a right way. (Akyüz, 1994: 
147)   
 
108 They mainly prefer their neighbors from their hometowns in order to make these gatherings close 
to outside. The participatory observations made in two religious gatherings show that these 
gatherings perform two important functions for the women. First of all, they talk about religious 
issues and try to find answers to their questions about daily issues via the religious teachings. They 
also feel themselves as released from their everyday problems with the comfort of worship. 
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often during my strolls in the neighborhood. Sünni women mentioned about their 
sufferings related to both home meetings and meetings at masjid during the 
governing of social democrat mayors. In recent years, the religious meetings, 
particularly at certain houses that were raid before have been watched over by the 
gendarme forces. The intense supervision of such gatherings by state security 
forces led to a perception of illegality among the inhabitants about some of these 
gatherings. Some Sünni women do not prefer to go to gatherings at certain houses 
rather they themselves organize religious meetings in their houses with smaller 
groups. When compared to Alevis though, it is possible to argue that Sünnis express 
their demands and beliefs more easily and comfortably. In that respect, as observed 
in the research setting, Sünnis seem to feel themselves quite comfortable vis-à-vis 
Alevis and local political actors in making their religious claims to public space 
explicit. As also proved by the findings of Erder’s (1997: 130) study, Sünni 
communities meet no difficulty in sustaining local aid for the construction of 
mosques and Quran courses in the neighborhood unlike the Alevis.  
 
Despite the fact that there is no reference to an open competition over space 
in religious terms, there is a certain dislike showing itself in the narratives as an 
intimidating awareness or neglect about each other’s religious spaces. The 
ignorance and neglect on part of Sünnis about Alevi society and belief system 
                                                                                                                                         
Secondly, these religious gatherings take the place of gün, which is the traditional way of regularly 
coming together for women in Turkey. During the whole ceremony, all the windows were closed 
despite the fact that the weather was so hot. In some part of the conversations, they have mentioned 
their concerns about unexpected attacks. They said that similar meetings in the neighborhood were 
done everyday. The continuous supervision of women gatherings by state security forces has led to a 
reservation on part of women. They give extreme importance to the privacy of these meetings and it 
is very difficult to integrate in these gatherings as a researcher.  
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agitate Alevis most as understood from the narratives of the respondents.109 This 
neglect on part of Sünnis has gone together with the continuous dominance of 
Sünni Islam and its obligations on Alevi population. While Sünni respondents seem 
to be indifferent about Alevi belief system and Cemevi as the space of Alevism, they 
expect Alevis to play roles in the production and recognition of Sünni Islamic 
space. The construction of mosques in the region well reflects these expectations of 
Sünnis from the Alevi residents of the region. As mentioned above, mosques and 
Cemevis are built with the donations of the community in gecekondu 
neighborhoods. Mevlana mosque on the upper parts of Boğaziçi neighborhood just 
on the boundary between Boğaziçi and Akşemsettin has a construction history that 
can constitute a good example for this process. Alevi population resides densely in 
this region. Despite the fact that Sünni inhabitants are aware that Alevis do not pray 
in the mosques, both Sünni and Alevi respondents gave references to the strong 
claim of construction committee on Alevis to take active part in and donate the 
construction activity. Listening to the construction of the mosque from the head of 
the construction committee and from Alevi residents living close by reflects two 
sides of a coin.  
 
Mevlana mosque has no minaret and this is evaluated as a serious problem 
both by Sünni and Alevi people residing close to the mosque for different reasons. 
The head of the mosque construction committee relates the unfinished view of the 
                                                 
109 “From time to time the former Welfare Party (WP) made sympathetic calls to Alevi communities 
and invited their “religious brothers” to the party ranks… However, especially after the Sivas event 
and its aftermath which witnessed the pro-event reactions of Sünni Islamist media and Sünni 
politicians, as well as the anti-Alevi and/or assimilationist declarations of the high-ranking WP 
members, a great majority of Alevis today, regardless of their political dispositions have become 
highly suspicious of the pro-Sünni politics.” (Erman&Göker, 200:109) In 1993, Sünni Islamist 
residents of Sivas committed a massacre to participants in an Alevi cultural festival by setting their 
hotel on fire.   
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mosque without minaret to the dense settlement of Alevi population in the 
neighborhood. He mentions about the difficulties of collecting donations. The 
collection of donations had mainly taken place in the coffeehouses as the most 
important public places. Owners of the coffeehouses are people from Yozgat and 
mostly Yozgat hemşehri community seems to use these two coffeehouses. In that 
respect, the head of the construction committee states coffeehouses as the most 
suitable places to collect donations for the mosque. People give their alms during 
Ramadan that is a necessity in Sünni Islamic practice as in the form of donation to 
mosque construction. However, despite the donations of community, according to 
the saying of the head of construction committee, there is a need to travel to big 
mosques in the city to collect further donations. Still these attempts weren’t 
sufficient according to him because of the dense presence of Alevi people in the 
neighborhood. He relates the difficulty of collecting donations in the neighborhood 
mainly to this fact in the following manner: 
 
We have furnished the mosque with green carpet lately. We bought catalytic 
stove. It gets cold from time to time. We are going to construct a natural gas 
heating system. For the time being we put a cauldron and heat the mosque 
with oil. In the past, we had gone everywhere with our receipts in our hand. 
We went to Ulus, to the big mosques there. It is very difficult to collect 
donations here; there are so many Alevis in this neighborhood. The reason for 
the mosque to look like [without minaret] is mainly because of that.110  
 
 
Sünni respondents in the region relate the matter to the Alevis’ unwillingness 
to donate and their lack of Islamic faith. On the other hand, the scene of the 
mosque without minaret was made explicit by a number of Alevi inhabitants as 
linked to the possibilities of abuse of the donations or the clumsiness on part of the 
                                                 
110 Extract from field research note no. 53, 3 Sep. 2005. 
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mosque construction committee. They mentioned the fact that they have donated 
the mosque financially on a continuous basis but still the mosque has an unfinished 
view, which was a shame. The following anecdote seems to illustrate the ideas of 
Alevis well:   
 
-Have you ever donated to the mosque construction committee?  
-Of course, the ones in the committee and the hocas (hodjas) collect money. 
We had given money for several times. But look at the mosque. It has no 
minaret. Have you ever seen a mosque without minaret? Is it possible? To 
give an example, if I describe my address to someone as the house near the 
mosque, nobody can find the house, because there is no minaret. Since 1973 
there has been no minaret. They collect money all the time. Can’t one 
construct a minaret in 32 years?111  
 
 
Besides that, Alevis mention their awareness about the fact that Sünni people 
perceive the main reason behind the lack of minaret as their dense presence in the 
region, which make them quite outraged related to the issue. They narrate their 
feelings of being treated unjustly by the committee members despite the fact that 
they had donated the mosque for several times. Sünni respondents, on the other 
hand, give answers to my questions related to Cemevi in a mood of total ignorance, 
neglect or discomfort. Regardless of the fact that I was quite sure about the answer 
that I was going to take, I asked some Sünni inhabitants if they had helped by any 
means to the construction of Cemevi in the region in order to get their reactions. 
They behaved as being quite shocked with the question despite the fact that they 
perceived Alevi donations to the mosque as totally normal and expected.  
 
                                                 
111 Extract from field research note no. 55, 4 Oct. 2005. 
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Similar to the findings in Boğaziçi, in Erder’s (1997: 136) study, the 
respondents who define themselves as Sünni accept Alevis mainly as a hemşehri 
community; however, they were quite reactional and opposed to the explicit 
practicing of Alevi rituals in public. In that sense, the opening of Cemevi in their 
neighborhood seems to constitute a big concern for them. Alevi groups, therefore, if 
organized around their community are met with cultural, political and 
administrative obstacles in most cases according to Erder. This finding also holds 
true in the case of Mevlana mosque.     
 
The construction of Cemevi, in that sense, is narrated to be a product only of 
Alevi efforts rather than a community attempt in the neighborhood like mosque 
construction. The construction of only Cemevi in the region was initiated in 1995. 
Despite the dense presence of Alevi population in the region, there was one cemevi 
in a quite large area. The cem meetings are made by turn according to the 
hometowns of migrants. People from Yozgat, Tunceli, Sivas and Çorum all 
commit individual ceremonies in winter. All of them have different dede.112 People 
from Çorum and Yozgat were said to come together more often, because their dede 
are living in the neighborhood unlike the other dedes in the village. Other than the 
cem meetings in winter, Cemevi seems to be an empty space. As understood from 
the narratives of Alevi respondents, Cem meetings are committed rarely and Alevi 
religious practices seem to be more fragmented when compared to Sünni collective 
action in production and employment of their religious space. The fragmented 
nature of Alevi society’s demands and interests constitute the most important 
obstacle behind the difficulty of community action in neighborhoods like Boğaziçi.  
                                                 
112 Dede (Holy men) is religious leader who belongs to a hereditary priestly caste and who directs 
cem ceremonies. Every village has its own dede. 
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 The fragmented natue of Alevi society depends to some extent, on the 
inherent qualities of Alevi rituals and belief system. The rituals of Alevism 
necessitate, in some cases, the inclusion of close community as a result of its need 
to preserve the privacy of the group. As pointed out by Okan (2004: 74) the 
reasons behind Alevis’ not permitting even the Alevis from other villages or Sünnis 
to participate in their Cem meetings emerge from the belief of them that the 
problems of the community should be kept as private. Besides that, Alevis 
depending on where they live may hold different positions in interpreting Islam. 
The Alevis of the villages in Çubuk and Beypazarı or the towns of Ankara, perform 
the namaz, therefore accept a more Sünni version of Islam, while the Kurdish and 
Turkish Alevis of Sivas do not approve this and look at these issues with a 
considerable distance. This fragmentation can also be followed from the 
associational divide and claims of Alevi organizations in public space in the 1990s. 
The perception of two broadly based Alevi associations has greatly divergent 
positions with regard to the interpretation of Islam. Cem foundation adopts a 
definition of Alevism as “Turkish Muslimness” while Pir Sultan Abdal Foundation 
accepts Alevism as a secular and democratic way of life rather than mainly as a 
religious identity. The European Alevi Union Federation and Hacı Bektaşi Veli 
Foundations seem to find themselves an intermediary position between these two 
understandings of Alevism (Okan, 2004: 125). Alevi respondents, during the 
conversations make their understanding of Alevi belief system explicit and they 
may show such variations. Particularly, once radically leftist Alevi militants accept 
an understanding of Alevism similar to the standpoint of Pir Sultan Abdal or Hacı 
Bektaşi Veli Foundations. Among the more conservative Alevi groups, Alevis of 
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Çorum and Yozgat, the consideration of Alevism as a Turkish Muslimness seems to 
be widespread. The fragmented nature of the search of Alevi identity after the 
1980s has also to do with the deterioration of traditional Alevi culture and rituals 
like dedelik with the urbanization of Alevism. The dedes lost their important role in 
the city environment particularly as a result the increasing communication 
facilities. Besides, the spread of Marxist leftist ideology among Alevis and as a 
result of the class understanding of leftist ideology, dedelik began to be considered 
within the sphere of exploiter-exploited relation (Yılmaz, 2005: 149). The 
fragmented nature of Alevi society is well revealed with the fact that they cannot 
unite under the roof of one political party. The former leader of Turkish Union 
Party (Türkiye Birlik Partisi-TBP) that was established in 1966 with the claim of 
representing Alevi society, Mustafa Timisi connect the lack overall Alevi support to 
the distance of Alevis to the idea of Alevi political party that unite all interests in 
Alevi society (Schüler, 2002: 163).  
 
The fragmented nature of Alevi society when encountered with the 
hegemonic domination of Sünni Islam and society, it becomes understandable why 
Alevi community in Boğaziçi cannot build and use Cemevi as easy as Sünnis’ 
producing and employing their religious spaces. As mentioned above, there is also 
a legal barrier to the construction of Cemevi and this fact has been hardly criticized 
by Alevi organizations in recent years. Even, in cases where Cemevi projects have 
been presented as social and cultural foundations rather than places for prayer, the 
possibility of recent religiously municipal cadres’ resistance to give construction 
permission by putting forward pretexts seems to be high. This is the case also in 
Boğaziçi. For this reason, Cemevi has an unfinished outlook and depending on the 
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sayings of the head of the construction committee, also close relative of dede of 
Çorum, municipal officers put important legal impediments in front of them. They 
still fight with the officers in order to prevent the building from demolition. He 
narrates the legal impediments in the following manner:  
 
We experienced great difficulties in taking construction authorization. We 
showed a coal cellar as our address. We cannot do a legal opening. They 
[municipal officers] said that it was built on the land of ASKİ (Ankara Water 
and Sewer System Department). We would like to go to the municipality in 
order to put our claims but they always postpone our meeting. ASKİ is near 
the police station and besides them is the big water depot. This area is seen as 
the green area in the construction plan. During the municipal period when 
CHP was in power in Mamak, these areas were all legalized and opened to 
construction. But they want to put impediments before us [as in the form of 
setting forth the land of Cemevi as in the status of ASKİ’s land].113  
 
 
In spite of the fact that the presence of Cemevi and its construction has a 
highly symbolic meaning and importance for Alevi people, the space seems to be 
an empty one in everyday life except some meetings conducted for a certain period 
in a year. This has something to do with the illegal quality of space at the moment. 
However, more than that, these places gained attention and extreme importance in 
times where the manifestations of identities are needed. In that sense though, 
cemevi, masjid or village associations may not be considered as lively and “full 
spaces” they are standing as the spatio-symbolic indications of Alevi and Sünni or 
hemşehri identities. Even for the ones who are not so committed to the gatherings 
done in Cemevi, the difficulties of building a Cemevi and the possibility of its 
demolition constitute an important concern. Therefore, it is possible to understand 
through a spatial perspective that Alevi and Sünni identities as mainly religious 
identities seem to protect their implicit importance after the 1980s. The increasing 
                                                 
113 Extract from field research note no. 50, 5 Aug. 2005. 
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domination and imposition of Sünni Islam over everyday life have led to the 
revival of Alevi and Sünni identities. The religious recognition on both sides has 
affected the neighboring relations and particularly the way women have gathered 
and formed relations with women form the other sect. As being neighbors and due 
to spatial proximity, Alevi and Sünni women may see each other; however, they do 
not visit each other specifically. Most of the time, women gatherings include the 
women from the same hometown or from the same religious sect. This has one 
important reason more than a mere coincidence. Most of the time women 
gatherings among Sünni women happen to be for the purpose of religious sharing 
as mentioned above.        
 
 
6.8 Conclusion  
 
The course of social spatialization in the neighborhood beginning in 1980, in 
general, has been affected by the “depoliticization policies” of the military regime 
and the succeeding civilian governments. The suppression of active politics by 
means of close surveillance of security forces in the locality, the general imposition 
of neoliberal political agenda and the strengthening of Sünni interpretation of Islam 
over Alevi can be considered as the most important components of this 
depoliticization strategy. The suppression of active politics by means of security 
forces’ close surveillance and the emergence of an informing network among 
migrants have further alienated Alevi and Sünni migrant communities from each 
other.   
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The neoliberal economic policies, on the other hand, had broken down the 
community claims to a large extent and replaced them with the economic concerns 
of individuals. The policies have also started an immense legalization movement in 
gecekondu settlements. This legalization process has been operationalized via a 
reform of decentralization in local government system and the mediation of private 
construction offices under oath. Neoliberal policies seek the “spontaneous 
apartmentalization” in these settlements by making gecekondu lands subject to 
market mechanisms and to the interests of big construction firms as attractable 
peripheral lands.  
 
However, the loopholes of the neoliberal legalization strategy that was open 
to abuse both by migrants and officials in duty; the increasing local agency of 
migrants with the growing favoritism in local governing; the complicated nature of 
land ownership patterns and the increasing reciprocity and responsiveness between 
tactical and strategical realm, in general, led to the emergence of unintended 
consequences in spatial terms. Late apartmentalization in the designated research 
setting can be given as an example to these unintended consequences. In 
congruence with the growing reciprocity and responsiveness between strategical 
and tactical realms, there has emerged a transition in the locality from “space of 
politics” to a “politics of space”. In other words, the radically political nature of the 
public space in the late 1970s has been replaced by an implicit competition 
between hemşehri and sectarian groups that has been embedded in and defined by 
diverse claims over the social spatialization of the research setting by the 1980s.  
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The third component of depoliticization strategy that is the domination of 
Sünni Islam over Alevi has led to a general revitalization of Alevi and Sünni 
identities mainly in religious and cultural terms. This revitalization of identities has 
had a serious effect on the nature of social spatialization in the locality. The 
widespread practice of Sünni Islam in research setting particularly after the mid-
1990s has brought about a threat perception on part of Alevis. In that respect, 
besides economic claims, religious claims to space have determined the course of 
social spatialization beginning by the mid-1990s.  
 
Unlike the nature of spontaneity that was mainly a consequence of the 
minimum or non-intervention of strategical realm in the 1970s, the spontaneity of 
social spatialization in the last two decades has been a consequence of the growing 
local agency that is able to take near-strategical acts and the increasing reciprocity 
between the strategical and tactical realms on the vertical level. This reciprocity, 
however, has functioned mainly to the advantage of these powerful groups having 
the capacity to take near-strategical acts rather than the migrants that ought to 
behave tactically within the context of strategical realm on the vertical level and 
near-strategical realm on the horizontal level.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The main theme of this thesis is social spatialization in the locality.  Individual 
stories of migrants are the constitutive ingredients of this story. They illuminate 
certain critical moments of social spatialization that are considered crucial for this 
research. In this section I will explain the main points of my research findings. 
After these general empirical conclusionary remarks, possible theoretical 
contributions of the thesis will be emphasized.  
 
The story of social spatialization began in the 1940s, the times where the first 
encounters of forerunner migrants with the locality had taken place. Aside from the 
macro political, social and economic reasons behind the rural-to-urban migration, 
the emergence of a gecekondu neighborhood in this particular locality had been 
closely related to the early planning strategies of Ankara city with unintended 
consequences. The main reason behind these unintended consequences depends on 
the irreconcilabilities between the “conceived” and “lived” spaces in the initial 
stages of the planning activity in relation to Ankara city. The lands in the periphery 
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of the city were considered as the green belt and recreational areas for the urbanites 
of the city in the context of strategical planning. In fact, these lands had hosted 
large agricultural activity as the main supplier of food for state institutions and 
tobacco for Tekel in the 1940s and 1950s. The first encounters of the rural-to urban 
migrants took place within the boundaries of the city in a context where “urban 
agriculture” had brought paradoxical consequences for the modern urban plan in 
Ankara.  
 
The reason behind the arrival of first migrant group from Kırşehir was to 
work as agricultural laborers in Üreğil villagers’ farms and vineyards. This seems 
to constitute an important challenge to the conventional acceptance of 
modernization approach that delineates agriculture and urbanization as conflicting 
issues. Interestingly, the relation between the rural-to-urban migrants and the 
native villagers in the periphery of the modernist city had supplied the first context 
of the formation of the locality. The initial nature of the social and trust relations 
between native villagers of Üreğil and some migrant groups had even defined 
power relations in the locality between different hemşehri communities in the 
coming decades. In the research setting, the main reason behind Kırşehir hemşehri 
community’s appropriating certain critical spaces in the locality is their building 
close relationships with the villagers to their advantage. They could take near 
strategical decisions mainly in terms of which lands to buy or appropriate with the 
calculation of natural risks of the time. They had bought the vineyards and farms of 
Üreğil villagers in good locations from the best possible price by calculating all 
natural risks.  
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As gathered from the narratives of the migrants, the development of locality 
as a gecekondu region had two important spatial reasons. These are the presence of 
railway connecting these peripheral lands with city center and the presence of 
Samsun Highway connecting the central Anatolian cities and towns with Ankara. 
In fact, the railway and highway had been constructed as the outcomes of the 
modernist interventions of RPP and DP in the city space respectively. However, 
these strategical interventions had led to the unintended growth of gecekondu 
settlements in Mamak. These two incidents of strategical intervention had 
contributed to serious increases in land prices. Thereby, agricultural lands were put 
on the market to be sold as gecekondu lands to the arriving migrants. The first 
amnesty law in 1948 had triggered the gecekondu construction in the locality and 
Mamak in general. As was identified in individual narratives, by the 1950s, there 
had emerged a dense migratory trend to the locality. 
 
The construction of gecekondu houses as an illegal process witnessed the 
initial display of certain tactics of the migrants vis-à-vis the realm of strategy. The 
narratives about the construction of houses reflect a game like relation with 
unwritten rules between the migrants and state officials who had the duty to apply 
demolition decisions. In the narratives, giving bribe to the officials in charge is the 
most often encountered tactic to protect the houses from demolition. To form close 
personal relations with the officials or to sustain the conditions of unspoken rules 
of the game like relation provide ways to protect the house from total demolition. 
As gathered from the narratives of demolition, sometimes, in order to give the 
impression that rules had been applied properly; officers damaged a part of the 
house that may not cause the demolition of the entire house.  
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 There were certain tactics employed by the migrants in the course of the 
construction of gecekondu houses. To build gecekondus rapidly, in one night, can 
be counted as the most important one among these tactics. Officials gave 
demolition priority to the houses under construction or that had been recently built. 
Another tactic was to construct the house as something else in appearance, at first, 
by attributing different functions to it. As an example, most of the gecekondu 
houses under the “strict” and “selective” supervision of the time had been 
presented as “coal cellars” to the officials as a masking tactic. Within the context of 
this game-like relation, the officials overlooked this masking tactic.  
 
The rapid pace of construction necessitated close community solidarity. Early 
migrants who have established close hemşehri community in the region mentioned 
their advantageous position with regard to the community help both in material [as 
sustaining restricted resources of the time for their hemşehris, for example, 
permitting them to use their wells, providing construction material and food] and 
non-material [mostly labor]. In the narratives of migrants it is also possible to 
understand how they had defined hemşehri in this early settlement period. Unlike 
the conventional considerations in the literature, hemşehri refers to a very intimate 
group like relatives or at most people of the same village rather than the migrants 
of the same province. 
  
Settlement decisions also included some tactical moments especially for the 
early settler migrants who have had a chance to make choices in the empty space of 
the locality at the time being. The natural factors, the river being the most 
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important one, had represented an important concern in the decisions of the 
migrants about the most proper place to settle down in these initial years of 
settlement. The initial settlers had taken their decisions about where to settle with 
mainly natural spatial indicators. For instance, they have taken into account the 
possible dangers (river-flooding had often taken place in the 1950s after heavy 
rains) and resources that the river poses for construction (water and sand). Other 
than the lands near the river, the upper sides of the hills seem to be considered as 
improper to settle by the migrants in topographical terms.  
 
The second important tactic for the migrants to survive in the “insecure” and 
“unknown” space of the locality was to settle close to their hemşehri community. 
Wealthy migrants among Kırşehir community due to their relative experiences in 
the locality and their close social relations with Üreğil villagers bought large plots 
of lands from the villagers to sell to their hemşehris later.  
 
Thirdly, migrants with certain future estimations appropriated large plots of 
lands that included state owned lands in combination with the lands they bought 
from the Üreğil villagers. By “colonizing the lands” of mixed ownership on which 
they had built their gecekondus on, they gained the right to state owned lands in 
time with amnesty laws and legalization decisions of the strategical realm. 
Particularly beginning by the 1950s with the emergence of multiparty politics until 
now, the practices of political agents in the strategical realm via amnesty laws and 
legalization decision as part of populist policies hesitantly have gone together with 
the degraded representation of these settlements and expressions of the urgent need 
to modernize them.    
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 The near-strategical settlement decisions of the wealthy migrants in places 
distant to river considering the risk of flooding led to unintended consequences and 
unprofitable results for the migrants in the 1960s and 1970s though. This was due 
to remarkable value increases in the lands just on two sides of the river due to the 
construction of market place there. Since the river provided the natural resources 
like sand and water that were desperately needed for construction of gecekondus at 
the time, the first small workshops and a number of sand factories were built near 
the river in the 1950s.  
 
This triggered the construction of the market place there. The wealthiest shop 
owners in the region who own few apartment houses present in the market now had 
been the poorest ones and the ones lacking hemşehri bonds in the initial settlement 
years and who had no choice but to settle near the river due to low prices of these 
lands. X family who had been identified as the most influential family in the 
locality and who had determined the course of social spatialization in the market to 
a large extent was one of these poor migrant families. Kırşehirli migrants, on the 
other hand, often mention their regrets regarding their choices of not settling close 
to the river and some of them blamed the forerunner hemşehris for this “false” 
decision. 
 
The following decade is specified as the most remarkable second moment in 
the history of the locality.  In the 1970s, the social spatialization in the 
neighborhood had taken a radically political turn in congruence with the macro 
political and economic conditions of the country. Struggles between the rightist 
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and leftist militant groups had mainly defined the course of social spatialization on 
the horizontal level. The narratives of the respondents about this period include 
emotional depictions of the fights between militant groups, strong feeling of 
insecurity and sufferings of mainly youths and male members of the family. These 
sufferings are narrated as a consequence of the continuous interrogations of 
militant groups. The Sünni and Alevi respondents alike mention their disapprovals 
about the struggles between militant groups that had taken place during this period. 
Yet, this period signifies the moment where they located themselves and their 
hemşehri community within the polarized identities of Alevism and Sünnism 
associated mostly with leftist and rightist ideology respectively. In the narratives, 
the sectarian identities of Alevism and Sünnism emerged as politically overloaded 
identities of this period.  
 
The near strategical acts of powerful Sünni shop owners had excluded mainly 
latecomer Alevi migrants of Çorum, Sivas and later Tunceli from taking lands and 
shops in the most critical component of public space in previous decades. This had 
affected the course of social spatialization in the late 1960 and 1970s. 
Unintentionally, the near-strategic attempts of the founders to control the social 
spatialization in the market place and general discomfort of Sünni shop owners 
with respect to Alevis could not prevent the place to turn into the fortress of leftist 
militants in the late 1970s. This unintended consequence seems to have one 
important socio-spatial reason. Exclusion of Alevi groups from the central and 
valuable lands of the market place to lands close to Samsun Highway and the 
settlement of Alevi migrants of Tunceli on the upper parts of the hills nearby 
Samsun Highway instigated the close encounters between these groups and 
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residents of Üreğil neighborhood on the other side of the highway who had been 
mostly Sünni and supporter of ultra nationalist militant groups. Therefore the train 
station as adjacent to highway, which is located just in between these two 
neighborhoods is narrated as the most crucial point in public space where open 
fights and even incidents of killings had taken place between leftists and rightists 
with reference to this period. 
 
The spontaneity embedded in the social spatialization had been felt by the 
migrants to the fullest extent during that period due to the limited capacity and the 
intention of state security forces to intervene in the tactical realm. The relation 
between strategical and tactical realm on the vertical level seems to have been the 
weakest of all periods during those years. There is almost no reference to security 
forces and their intervening in the incidents and fights, as they happened to take 
place in relation to this period. Since Boğaziçi was mainly known for its inhabiting 
Sünni migrants from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale, the locality was not subject to any 
total repression and interference by state security as had been the case in some 
neighborhoods resided totally by Alevi migrants. Due to the limited interventions 
of state forces, the shop owners who had the power to take effective near-
strategical decisions in defining the course of social spatialization in the previous 
decades point out their sufferings and repression of leftist militants more when 
compared to other shop owners. They used such tactics as closing the shops early 
in the afternoon, not to stay in the shop without the companion of family members 
and to avoid social gatherings that might be evaluated by militant groups as 
political gatherings. The pressure of militant groups either by attacking the shops 
or by collecting protection money had contributed to serious job loss during the 
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late 1970s, which is the most often pronounced complaint of shop owners related 
to the period besides insecurity. Shop owners’ tactics for survival seem to be the 
main reason behind the job loss since this had damaged the natural flow of socio-
spatial relations in the market place. The restricted mobility of the residents for 
security reasons had constituted another reason behind job loss. They define these 
years as their most difficult period in the region. 
 
Since the interaction between the strategical and tactical realm had been the 
weakest of all periods during the late 1970s in the locality and the interaction 
between groups via the social spatialization of the neighborhood involve a serious 
dose of spontaneity due to that, residents seemed to find protection mainly within 
their hemşehri communities. In that respect, the prior settlement decisions in 
communities had proved to be a successful security mechanism particularly for the 
more homogenously and densely settled communities like migrants from Kırşehir 
and Kırıkkale. On the other hand, the Alevi and Sünni communities of 
heterogeneously represented provinces in sectarian terms like Yozgat, Çorum and 
Sivas mention their sufferings more related to the political incidents due to their 
dispersed location and tense relations with neighbors of the opposite sect.  
 
Mostly male migrants mention their sufferings as a result of continuous 
interrogations of both leftist and rightist militants in their way to work. Almost all 
of the male respondents identify one incident from which they had suffered or that 
they had witnessed. Most of these incidents are narrated as to take place at the train 
station. During these interrogations, one’s hometown identity and in relation to that 
political affiliation seem to constitute the core of the investigation. This is related 
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to the fact that one’s village of origin is often identified as one’s sectarian 
affiliation. Within this context, some residents as a tactic of survival lied about 
their hometown identities depending on who was doing the interrogation.  
 
The narratives related to the 1970s, despite the highly chaotic nature of social 
spatialization emphasize the importance of being neighbors. Being a good neighbor 
as an important value embedded in gecekondu life due to certain socio-spatial 
factors seems to have transcended the highly political nature of social spatialization 
at the time. Particularly some of Sünni residents narrate incidents where their Alevi 
neighbors despite their political position had behaved protective of them. The good 
attitudes of neighbors from different sects to each other seem to be related to both 
parties’ unwillingness “to behave shamefully” to each other in their own words. 
The respondents who are neighbors to a family of opposite sect almost give no 
reference to an open struggle between each other during those years. Rather they 
may mention about the fights of rightists and leftists as happened to take place 
outside the social and spatial context of these neighboring relations albeit one of 
the neighbors might have militant involvements. At the extreme, in some few 
cases, the relation between Alevi and Sünni neighbors might have lost its intensity 
or totally broken down due to the operation of stereotypes and prejudices mainly 
on part of Sünni neighbors. In cases where one or two families reside in a region 
that is dominated totally by the residents of the opposing sect there emerged certain 
problems. I encountered a case during the research where an extended Alevi family 
had felt the need to exchange their houses with a Sünni family residing in an Alevi 
dominated region due to the pressures of Sünni community.  
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Sünni respondents mainly portray their Alevi neighbors as treating them good 
and protective during the period. This seems to be related not only with the good 
intentions of Alevi neighbors but it has some material reasons as well. Alevis had 
been put in a position to develop certain tactics of survival vis-à-vis the informing 
activities of their Sünni neighbors. Alevi respondents do not give reference to any 
open conflicts between neighbors, however, after developing a certain trust 
relation; a number of them narrate the incidents in which their Sünni neighbors 
reported them to the police in the late 1970s. Some Sünni women openly 
mentioned that they had informed some of their Alevi neighbors to security forces 
for their illegal activities like writing certain leftist slogans on the walls. Mostly 
women give references to the nature of relations with neighbors in those years 
since they have been the main carriers of the relationship with neighbors now and 
then.   
 
The third period as specified by the narratives of the migrants seems to have 
peculiar qualities differentiating it from the previous periods. This period in the 
1980s is the one that explicates best the development of reciprocity between the 
strategical and tactical realms.  
 
Immediately after the military intervention, the main course of social 
spatialization had been governed mainly with the repressive strategies of military 
regime to suppress active politics in the locality. Three main strategies can be 
identified in these “depolitization” strategies. First one was to control the active 
politics in the locality by utilizing a secret information network by encouraging 
some migrants to report about other inhabitants in the neighborhood. Secondly, on 
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the macro level, the neoliberal economic policies have brought certain 
consequences that designated economic concerns of the migrants as the major 
determinant of social spatialization rather than the political fights between the 
militant groups. Legalization of gecekondu lands and houses within the framework 
of neoliberal policies of post military regime when connected with the reforms of 
decentralization in local government system have not only brought a general 
increase in real estate values in the locality but also led to a more reciprocal 
relationship between migrants and local politicians. New municipal system made 
local politics more responsive to the demands of gecekondulu. The increasing 
power of migrants in influencing the strategical acts of developing plans or 
providing certain services to the locality seems to be the defining quality of this 
period.  
 
Thirdly, as part of the strategic act of suppressing active politics in general, 
military regime initiated and civilian governments succeeding carried out the 
privileging of Sünni interpretation of Islam as an antidote to ideologies of Marxism 
and Kurdish separatism. In congruence with this strategy, the practice and effect of 
Sünni Islam had become widespread in everyday life especially in low-income 
settlements. Particularly after the mid 1990s, low-income settlements had become 
the main supporters of religiously oriented conservative political tradition. In 
parallel to these developments the re-politicization of Alevism had mainly taken 
place with reference to cultural and religious content of the identity with regard to 
the strategical policies of making Sünni interpretation as the hegemonic 
interpretation of Islam.  
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All these strategies have led to a transformation in the course of social 
spatialization in the locality from the “space of politics” to a “politics of space”. 
The legalization of gecekondu neighborhoods with neoliberal policies of the 1980s, 
the increasing responsiveness of local politics to the demands of gecekondulu, the 
favoritist policies depending on the sectarian affiliation of the mayors in charge 
and the increasing religious claims of Alevis and Sünnis over the social space of the 
locality have made politics more embedded in the social spatialization when 
compared to other periods.  
 
The narration of local politics in conjunction with the macro policies of the 
time includes a certain stress of the beginnings of a feeling of favoritism in the 
narratives of the migrants. The aftermath of the highly political atmosphere of the 
late 1970s as a period seems to take place in the memories of the migrants with 
reference to struggle given to get legal right to their lands and houses with best 
possible conditions vis-à-vis one’s neighbors, and “other” groups. In relation to 
that they carry an awareness of possibility about partial treatment on part of the 
local strategical agents. The incidents of favoritism dominate the narratives of 
respondents in relation to the period that begins by the mid 1980s and lasts until 
recent years. Favoritism in politics seem to emerge out of the fact that the 
reciprocity and responsiveness of the relations between strategical and tactical 
realm on the vertical has intensified with the increasing power of migrants to 
define the fate of local politics. Therefore, the open struggles between leftists and 
rightists in the social space of the late 1970s have transformed into a more implicit 
competition between Alevis and Sünnis or different hemşehri groups embedded 
more in the production of public space.  
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 The social democrat municipal tradition in the 1980s that had been followed 
by the Islamist conservative municipal tradition by the mid 1990s are narrated as 
favoring Alevi and Sünni groups in the locality respectively. Particularly, Sünni 
shop owners give important references to their perceptions of favoritism during 
social democrat mayorship. The municipal police officer’s intense and frequent 
supervision of the conditions of trading in the market place is the most often 
emphasized example of the biased attitude of social democrat mayors to the shop 
owners in Sünni dominated market place. Powerful shop owners, by means of 
using their connections to critical posts in the strategical realm, also showed strong 
resistance against these policies.        
 
The strategical realm as dominated by the neoliberal political agenda 
mentioned above leaves many loopholes and uncontrollable spaces where tactical 
acts may be employed. The legalization process through the agency of private 
construction offices under oath has brought about such uncontrollable processes. 
As an example, the ones who have no title deeds gained right to state owned lands 
on which they had built gecekondu houses. The decision depended on their verbal 
declaration about the size of the land they had appropriated previously.  
 
Legalization as a general strategy has brought unintended consequences, 
which in turn challenged its main objective that is the modernization of gecekondu 
districts. The legalization process and the integration of neoliberal consuming 
spaces in the market had restored shop owner’s power in economic and political 
terms because these developments contributed to increases in the value of real 
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estate prices in the market place. Interestingly, this restoring of power on part of 
shop owners had contributed to the spontaneity of neighborhood space in terms of 
posing an alternative spatial development to the mainstream tendency of 
apartmentalization in low-income settlements. Due to the spatial necessity of 
initiating apartment construction from the edges of the main street in the market 
place, the shop owners gained certain agency in determining the course of 
apartmentalization process in the locality. However, shop owners had benefited 
greatly from the legalization process because the legalization process protected the 
traditional structure of small gecekondu shops as it is. Thus, shop owners have not 
behaved so willingly to change the spatial structure of the market by 
apartmentalization because the rent revenues from these traditional gecekondu 
shops had increased, with the rise in the value of real estates. Therefore 
“slumlordism” for many shop owners is more beneficial than the gains they are 
supposed to get from the constructors in return for the apartments constructed 
replacing their shops.  
 
The consumption patterns had also changed with the opening of big 
supermarkets in the market place. The migrants often mention their preference of 
shopping for food from these supermarkets for the attractive prices there and the 
possibility of using credit cards. However, they also state that they do not want to 
offend their bakkals or other shop owners whom they had known for years for the 
fact that these shop owners had still provided traditional and informal shopping 
opportunity of veresiye (shopping on credit) under conditions of economic need. It 
is also necessary to note that Alevi and Sünni identities or hemşehri relations have 
played relatively a minor role in determining shopping choices for the migrants and 
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trust relations for the shop owners providing the opportunity of veresiye. Economic 
concerns, knowing each other for so long, and spatial proximity had mainly 
defined the parameters of shopping concerns.  
     
The third strategy of state’s imposing of Sünni interpretation of Islam as an 
antidote to leftist politics contributed to the redefinition of Alevi and Sünni 
identities mainly with reference to their religious content. The narratives in relation 
to this period cover such religiously overloaded definitions of Alevism and Sünnism 
rather than referring to the political connotations of these sectarian identities. 
Parallel with macro policies favoring Sünni Islam over Alevism, Sünni residents 
exhibited an attitude of ignorance containing certain prejudices and superficial 
codes about Alevi belief system. These negative value judgments about Alevi belief 
system seemed to exist in hybrid forms with an appreciation or mentioning of the 
good character or intention of Alevi friends or neighbors who have been known 
closely. In general, the recognition and prejudices embedded in the distinction 
made between Alevi and Sünni lifestyles have dominated the expressions of 
respondents with reference to recent social relations between different sectarian 
groups. In cases where the trust between Alevi and Sünni neighbors had taken a 
great damage in the late 1970s or through informing activity in the early 1980s the 
relationship between neighbors could be totally broken.  
 
In general, it is possible to observe the increasing effect of religious concerns 
besides economic concerns in defining the course of social spatialization in the 
neighborhood. In that respect, the production of religious spaces has constituted an 
important part of social spatialization. There is no reference to an open competition 
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between sectarian groups over public space in religious terms in the narratives of 
the migrants. However, there is a certain dislike showing itself in the narratives as 
an intimidating awareness or neglect about each other’s religious spaces. While 
Sünni respondents seem to be indifferent about Alevi belief system and Cemevi as 
the space of Alevism, they expect Alevis to play active roles in the production and 
recognition of Sünni Islamic space. Informal religious gatherings among Sünni 
women had become widespread despite the pressures of security forces mainly 
during the years of social democrat dominance in local politics but have loosened 
recently. These gatherings have replaced the traditional gatherings of women called 
as “gün”. Therefore, the possibility of Alevi and Sünni women coming together as 
neighbors had become nearly impossible and women of two sects had further 
isolated their relations with the repolitizication of sectarian identities with 
reference to their religious contents mainly in this period.   
 
Unlike the nature of spontaneity that was mainly a consequence of the 
minimum or non-intervention of strategical realm in the 1970s, the spontaneity of 
social spatialization in the last two decades has been a consequence of the growing 
local agency that is able to take near-strategical acts and the increasing reciprocity 
between the strategical and tactical realms on the vertical level. This reciprocity, 
however, has functioned mainly to the advantage of these powerful groups having 
the capacity to take near-strategical acts rather than the migrants that ought to 
behave tactically within the context of strategical realm on the vertical level and 
near-strategical realm on the horizontal level.   
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First of the main empirical conclusions that can be drawn from the research 
data is that the ethnic identities through sectarian and hometown affiliations have 
constituted the main means by which the migrants have developed certain tactics in 
dealing with the strategical acts on the vertical level and other tactical acts on the 
horizontal level. In that respect, Alevism, Sünnism and hemşehrilik have played 
vital roles in migrant’s developing tactics in conjunction with the political and 
economic context of the strategical realm, which have attributed these ethnic 
identities changing values and definitions overtime. Secondly, the growth of the 
locality as a gecekondu region can not only be considered as an unintended 
consequence of urban development but also must be considered as a by product of 
the sum of modernist strategical acts that have captured diverse and paradoxical 
acts and decisions within themselves. Thirdly, empirical data give important 
examples from the reciprocal and interdependent relation between the tactical and 
strategical realm. In other words, the tactical decisions and practices employ the 
structural means or loopholes of the strategical realm rather than having an 
autonomous existence. From the other way around, the strategical realm as to 
define and redefine its modernist project always needs its “other”. However, 
different agents of the strategical realm represent and define this “other” differently 
depending on the macro political and economic context of the country and socio-
spatial transformations in peripheral settlements. Depending on the political and 
economic context, the agents who may have different agendas in the strategical 
realm may represent and deal with the tactical realm by using different means. 
Fourthly, the research data support the criticisms that were posed to the 
homogeneous and static definition of strategical and tactical realm in chapter one. 
The actors in the tactical realm, depending on their relations with the agents in the 
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strategical realm may attain active and determining agency in the social 
spatialization of the locality. This agency on the tactical level transcends the limits 
of tactical acts as defined by De Certeau. Therefore they are defined as near-
strategical acts throughout the empirical chapters, since they have certain capacity 
to take decisions with a certain sight of future and producing and employing their 
space. This capacity not only affects the course of social spatialization in the 
locality but also leads to certain spatial and temporal moments of resistance on part 
of the powerful migrants against strategical realm. As exemplified by the empirical 
findings, these resistances emerged against the interventions of the strategical 
realm in the locality in terms of the application of the legalization decisions, 
construction plans, provision of certain services or the legal supervision of the 
political, commercial and real estate activity. On the macro level, these near-
strategical acts even have some transforming and determining capacity on the 
agency of strategical realm as can be best exemplified by the “post-planning” 
practices and policies. Fifthly, just like the operation of strategy-tactic on the 
vertical level, the interdependent relation between the near-strategical acts of the 
more powerful groups or actors and tactical acts of the less powerful groups on the 
horizontal level may bring unintended consequences via spatial contingencies. 
These unintended consequences might alter power relations in the locality in time 
depending on the general social, political and economic context.  
 
The empirical findings also support the premise that the main competition 
between the groups has taken place mainly with reference to the appropriation of 
and competition over space. This seems to be related with the general spontaneity 
embedded in the formation of gecekondu settlements. The identity definitions of 
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hemşehri and sectarian groups have a dynamic nature that have been altered and 
contested depending on their positionality vis-à-vis each other in the course of 
social spatialization. 
 
After making these general empirical and theoretical conclusions, I would 
like to mention the possible areas to which studies similar to this thesis may 
contribute. The belief in the need to increase the number of such studies constitutes 
the main inspiration behind the thesis. First of all, in today’s cities, it is not 
possible to develop inclusive, participatory, democratic and successful planning 
and urban policies without local knowledge of social spatialization particularly in 
relation to low-income settlements including a serious dose of spontaneity. It 
seems highly important to understand the processes and patterns through which 
these localities had been produced by means of a dialectical interplay of strategical 
and tactical realm. This understanding may hopefully develop a new approach of 
urban governance that transcends the limits and impediments of conventional 
urban planning and policy understandings. It becomes even more crucial to 
develop a more inclusive and democratic understanding of local governance with 
the operation of neoliberal political strategies that trigger the spontaneous nature of 
social spatialization in low-income settlements, which in turn increase the social 
and economic inequalities dramatically between more powerful migrant groups and 
late comer, “ethnically other” less powerful groups.   
 
Secondly, space-sensitive methodological and conceptual approach used in 
the thesis may hopefully constitute an inspiration for other studies on low-income 
settlements. Spatial approach or in Lefebvrian sense “spatiology” provides rich 
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conceptual tools to understand everyday life or history in low-income settlements. 
On the theoretical level, social and spatial cannot be thought apart regarding the 
theoretical and empirical discussions in the thesis. On the empirical level, “to have 
a space of one’s own” constitutes the basis of everyday life due to the spontaneous 
nature of these spaces and close encounters between different identity groups in 
gecekondu settlements. Therefore, spatial analysis is vital to understand the social 
dynamics in the neighborhood.  
 
It is also important to note that the close encounters between different 
hemşehri, ethnic and sectarian groups have not always resulted in conflict-ridden 
relations as have been represented and exaggerated by public discourse for the last 
three decades. As the cases of neighbors from the opposite sects show, despite a 
continuous explicit or implicit competition over space that has changed its intensity 
and nature depending on the context, living close to each other for years and to 
take part in social spatialization in the region together have brought migrants an 
understanding and learning process about each other’s life worlds. Findings of the 
research also give clues about the uses of spatial dialogue and the dangers of 
spatial fragmentation of different identity groups if one considers the socio-
spatially created nature of social identity.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
Questions Guiding the Organization of Semi-Structured Interviews, Informal 
Conversations and Observations with Regard to Neighborhood Inhabitants  
 
Basic Demographic Concerns: 
1) Name, Surname 
2) Age 
3) Education history  
4) What is your occupation? 
5) What are the jobs that you have done from the first years of your presence in the 
city until now?  
6) What is the year of migration from the village/town to the city? 
7) Where did you migrate from as a family?  
8) What were the reasons behind your migration? 
9) Where did you settle first in Ankara?  
10) What were the different places that had been resided in Ankara in years?  
11) When did you first arrive to this neighborhood?  
12) Have you ever changed place/house in the neighborhood? For what reasons?  
13) What were the factors behind your decision to settle in this particular 
neighborhood?  
14) Do you own the house that they are living in?  
 
In case they own the house:   
15) How did you construct the house? 
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16) Did you get any help from anybody during the construction? If yes, what kind of 
help did you get?  
17) Did you hire workers during the construction?  
18) Did you get any financial help in the course of the construction? If you did, from 
whom did you get financial help? 
19) What kind of difficulties did you encounter in the course of construction of your 
gecekondu?  
20) What kind of reactions did you get from your neighbors or other migrants living 
in the close environment during your settlement?  
21) From whom did you buy the land on which you constructed your gecekondu?  
22) If you built your house on state owned land, who did play the mediating role in 
the appropriation of the land? 
23) Do you have legal title deeds to the land?  
24) Do you have construction permit for the house?  
 
In case they own the house, but they are not the first owners of the house: 
25) From whom did you buy the house?  
26) Under what conditions did you make the payment? 
27) Did you get any financial help from somebody? 
28) Who was the first owner of the house? What was their reason of selling the 
house?  
 
In case they do not own the house:  
29) Do you reside in the house as tenants?  
30) If not, under what conditions are you residing in the house?  
31) Who is the original owner of the house?  
 
General Questions Regarding the Early Settlement Period: 
32) What kind of difficulties did you experience related to living in gecekondu in 
the initial settlement period?  
33) Did you take any help from your neighbors for your immediate needs like water, 
electricity, tools and labor power in the initial settlement period?  
34) Has your house ever been demolished during or after the construction?  
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35) If yes, what was your attitude in dealing with demolition?  
36) When did the infrastructural services like water, sewer system and electricity 
become available in the region and for your house?  
37) What did you do in order to demand or get these services? 
38) Have you ever done any changes in the house? If yes, what kind of changes and 
additions did you make in the house?  
39) Do you own a house in other parts of Mamak or Ankara?  If yes, how did you 
buy the house? 
 
Questions Regarding Public Space: 
40) How did you choose the place for settling down when you first came to the 
district? 
41) In that period, with whom were you in relation in your near environment? 
42) How was your relation with these people? 
43) Where were they from? 
44) How was the physical appearance of the district in that period? 
45) Did you experience a disaster in the district in this period or later (like flood, 
landslide)?  
46) If you did, how were you affected by this event or how other people were 
affected? 
47) Was there any shop/store for buying food, clothes etc. when you first come to 
the district in the close environment? 
48) If there were, which ones did you prefer? 
49) What were your reasons for preferring these shops? 
50) What kinds of shops were there in the district in the early settlement period? 
51) If there were not such shops, where did you do shopping?   
52) In case you were shopping from the shops in your near environment, were you 
paying cash or on credit? 
53) If you were paying on credit, did you have any affinity with the owners of these 
shops? (in terms of  hemşehrilik, neighborhood or being Alevi/Sünni) 
54) How frequently and for what reasons you were going to the city center in the 
early settlement years?  
55) What kind of transportation means were you using?  
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56) What is your opinion about the transportation system of the time? (What are 
their perceptions about the advancement of transportation over time?) 
57) Which was the most difficult period for you in financial terms? 
58) In these financially hard times, did you receive financial aid from anybody?  
59) In the neighborhood, which was the hardest period regarding your social 
relationships?   
60)  With whom and what types of problems did you experience?  
61)  What kind of hardships has been faced in the neighborhood between 1975 and 
1980?   
62)  Were you influenced by the political struggles of the late 1970s? How? 
63)  What is your opinion about the municipal services?  
64)  What can you demand from the municipality for your neighborhood? 
65)  What do you do in your spare times?  
66)  Where do you do your clothing shopping?  
67)  If you do your shopping from the neighborhood, which shops do you prefer? 
For what reasons?  
68)  Where do you do your food shopping? 
69)  If you do your shopping from the neighborhood, which shops do they prefer? 
For what reasons? 
70)  Where do you go to buy your other needs?  
71)  Do you go to mosque/cemevi? How frequently? 
72) Which mosque/cemevi do you prefer? What are the reasons behind your 
preferences?  
73)    Where are the families living in your close environment from?  
74)    How are you relations with your neighbors? (the history of neighboring 
relations)  
75) Do you have your village association in the neighborhood?  
76) If yes, how was your village association established?  
77) If yes, what kinds of activities are taken place in these associations? 
78)    If no, where is your village association in Ankara?  
79)    Do you participate in the activities of village association? 
80)    How frequently do you go to the city center and for what reasons? 
81)    Which hospital do you prefer to go when you are ill? For what reasons? 
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82)    Which schools did you attend for your primary and secondary education?  
83)    Is there any school in the neighborhood back then?  
84)    How were the schools constructed in the neighborhood?  
85)    How were the mosques constructed in the neighborhood? 
86)    How was the cemevi constructed in the neighborhood?  
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
Questions Guiding the Organization of Semi-Structured Interviews, Informal 
Conversations and Observations with regard to Shop Owners  
 
1) Name, Surname 
2) Age 
3) Education history  
4) What are the jobs that have been done by the shop owner from the first years of 
his/her presence in the city until now?  
5) What is the year of migration from the village/town to the city? 
6) Where do they migrate from as a family?  
7) What are the reasons behind their migration? 
8) Where did the family settle first in Ankara? What were the different places that 
had been resided in Ankara in years?  
9) When did you first arrive to this neighborhood?  
10) Have you ever changed place/house in the neighborhood? For what reasons?  
11) What were the factors behind your decision to open shop in this particular 
neighborhood?  
12) When did you first open this shop?  
13) Have you had another shop in the market place previous to this shop?  
14) Did you construct the gecekondu shop by yourself?  
15) If yes, how did you acquire the land on which the gecekondu shop was 
constructed?  
16) How did you construct the shop?  
 357
17) During the construction, from whom did you get help in material or non-
material terms?  
18) If you did not construct the shop by yourself, how did you buy the shop?  
19) How did you make the payments of the shop?  
20) What kind of reactions did you get from other shop owners during the 
construction of the shop?  
21) From whom did you buy the land on which you constructed your shop? If you 
built your shop on state owned land, who did play the mediator role in the 
appropriation of the land? 
22) Do you have legal title deeds to the land?  
23) Do you have construction permit for the shop?  
24) Which was the most difficult period for you in financial terms? 
25) In these financially hard times, did you receive financial aid from anybody?  
26) In the neighborhood, which was the hardest period regarding your social 
relationships?   
27) With whom and what types of problems did you experience?  
28) What kind of hardships has been faced in the neighborhood between 1975 and 
1980?   
29) Were you influenced by the political struggles of the late 1970s? How? 
30) What is your opinion about the recently opened supermarkets in the market 
place?  
31) How is your relationship with the municipal officers and zabıtas?  
32) What do you think about the policies of local government?  
 
 
The incidents that are taken into consideration during the participatory 
observations in the shop and informal talks with the shop owner:  
33) What are the things sold in the shop?  
34) How is the shop space used in daily life? 
35) What are the conditions of shopping?  
36) Does the shop owner sell the goods on credit?   
37) If yes, how does the shop owner select the customers who are creditable?  
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38) Is the shop space used for functions other than trading like, social gatherings, 
association meetings etc.? 
39) Is it possible to group the customers of the shop under one homogenous 
category with regard to the sectarian, hometown, ethnic identity of them?  
40) Does the shop owner have customers from other neighborhoods?  
41) If yes, how does the shop owner define the reason behind customers’ preference 
of this shop in particular?  
42) Is there any person or institution from which the shop owner gets material help 
or credit?   
43) Is there any person or institution to which the shop owner gives credit or 
donations regularly? 
44) What are the political inclinations of the shop owner?  
45) Does the shop owner have a membership to any political party or organization?  
46) Do the political inclinations of the shop owner have any impact on his selection 
of trusted customer to give goods on credit?  
47) Has the shop owner ever given reference to the religious issues?  
48) Has the shop owner ever given reference to the identities of Alevism and 
Sünnism by any means?  
49) How does the shop owner define the nature of his/her relations with the 
neighboring shop owners? 
50) Does the shop owner define any group or individual with whom s/he has an 
uneasy relationship?  
51) Which aspects of the history of market place is emphasized more by the shop 
owner?  
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